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## **The dynamics of domination and displacement in global politics**

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### **Introduction**

This paper explores the part played by displacement (ie, being pushed down, out or aside) in the global politics of nations, states and peoples. It represents a particular 'take' on the topic of domination and resistance to domination in world politics.<sup>1</sup>

The paper is one of a series building on the 'platform' I constructed in my recent book on globalization, modernity and humiliation. In this instance I propose an approach to domination and resistance that is part of a broader perspective, one that weaves a phenomenology of humiliation into an analysis of globalization and modernity.

As part of the argument, I suggest that some of Barrington Moore's insights explaining class conflicts and class alliances within particular polities may be adapted to explore some aspects of international relations.<sup>2</sup> However, I want to begin by making some empirical generalisations about empires.<sup>3</sup>

### **The end of the empires**

The most prominent examples of domination and hierarchy in world politics during the past two hundred years have been the European empires, both land-based and sea-borne. The big story of the twentieth century was the step-by-step collapse of European imperialism, overlapping with the four decades of the Cold War, presided over by two new global imperial systems based in Moscow (which inherited much of the territory of the land-based empires, eg those based in Vienna, Berlin and Constantinople/Istanbul) and Washington (which became the legatee of the sea-borne empires whose headquarters were in London, Paris, Amsterdam/the Hague, Madrid and Lisbon).

All these empires collapsed because of a central contradiction that was exacerbated by the strains of their conflicts with each other combined with their own internal revolts. This contradiction arose from the fact that after the late eighteenth century the European empires had gradually become what might be called nation-state-empires.

The problem was the following. On the one hand, empire is an absolutist notion. It is predicated on three ideas:

- an absolute difference between superiors and subordinates,
- an unbridgeable gap between the superior and the inferior, and
- the complete domination of the former over the latter.

By contrast, the idea of the nation-state incorporates the notion of citizenship. Citizenship is an idea based upon the principles of universality and equality. All members of a nation-state have not only duties (such as the obligation to pay taxes

and obey the law) but also rights (civil, political and social) that the state must recognise and fulfil.

A subject within an empire is someone whose task is to serve, demonstrating absolute subservience and giving complete obedience. Edward Said was not the only one to notice this. The difficulty is that a proper citizen could not also be a proper subject. Which claim should take priority? This matter had been a central issue during the American and French revolutions. Similar struggles continued throughout the European empires.

I would argue that over the past couple of hundred years there have been four kinds of empire, although the categories have overlapped and intermingled in particular instances. The oldest form is the *dynastic empire*, which served the interests not just of the ruling family but also a network of rival upper-class families or clans linked by marriage, property interests, and, sometimes, ethnicity and religion. Imperial Rome is one example.

Then we have a fascinating category, the *settler society*, which had all three characteristics of empire just listed. Examples include the Boers in South Africa, the planters from mainland Britain who moved to Ulster, the Jewish settlers in Palestine who founded the state of Israel, and the English settlers who went to North America and whose successors founded the United States. They all abused and victimised the indigenous population, and in the last case did the same to slaves imported for that purpose.

There was a special kind of imperialism, fuelled by a historical memory of humiliation back in Europe, and a determination not to be humiliated again. This gave their political cultures four abiding characteristics:

- a feeling of *resentment* against the corrupt world 'outside' that had wounded them deeply in the past,
- a strong inclination to disentangle themselves and *escape* from this evil world surrounding them,
- a ruthless determination to achieve *absolute dominance* in the territories they controlled and the surrounding perimeter from which threats might emerge, and
- a self-cleansing sense of their own *virtuousness* bordering on righteousness, as a way of justifying the cruelties they found themselves inflicting on others in the cause of self-protection.

If you visit the Voortrekker Monument near Pretoria in South Africa you can find all those elements portrayed in stone, including a depiction of the protective wagon-train circle on the site's boundary wall.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, there are two versions of the nation-state-empire. One is the European nation-state-empire, which tried to reconcile the interests of the landed, trading and working classes in the home country while seeking to limit the spread of 'subversive' nationalism in the colonies.

The other version, already mentioned, is the global nation-state-empire which had two variants, based in Moscow and Washington. In this case, two highly militarised

regimes, both 'big winners' at the end of World War II, constructed imperialisms using as their building blocks polities that were in most cases officially recognised as nation-states. Over time, two things happened. The prestige and authority of the ruling state was undermined by highly publicised humiliating defeats: in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively. At the same time, it became increasingly difficult for the ruling power to either satisfy or contain the aspirations of its most powerful subordinate nations such as Poland and Hungary on the one side, and the European Union on the other.

The end of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 brought a phase of American 'global monarchy' during which two factors dominated global politics: the prestige and, to some degree, the effectiveness of the American military machine, and the increasingly obvious influence of large multinational companies, of which some, but by no means all, were American.

One reason why the multinationals built up their bureaucratic and professional 'muscles' (so to speak) and became, in some respects, mini-states, was that they were operating in a world that, in terms of governance, became 'de-globalised' after 1989. In other words, law and order at the global level became a much more uncertain business. This was due to the disappearance of the structure of global governance, albeit rickety, that had been provided by two successive arrangements: first, the British Empire and its European counterparts based in Paris, Vienna, Berlin (and, on the fringes of Europe, in Moscow and Constantinople), and later the standoff between the two Cold War megaliths. The institutions of global governance developed after 1945, notably the United Nations, remain relatively weak.

#### **Does imperialist domination persist?**

Is the European Union yet another form of imperialist domination? The answer has to be a mixed one. To some extent, the EU has played the role of resisting attempted domination from both East and West. One reason that the 'Common Market' came into existence during the 1950s was as a bulwark against increasing Soviet international influence. More recently, especially since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has often found itself resisting the power exercised by the United States, especially on trade matters but more recently on the matter of the Iraq War.

On the other side of the question, it is true that the EU contains many of the old 'headquarter states' of the old European empires, such as France and Britain. The recent interventions of London and Paris in Africa (in places such as Zaire and Sierra Leone) have certainly had the taint of imperialism. However, at the same time, the EU has raised up old 'subject' or 'underdog' nations within Europe itself. Ireland and Poland, for example, have both experienced a distinct improvement in their levels of prestige, recognition and influence within Europe, and indeed globally as the EU has itself become more powerful within the world as a whole.

As for the United States, there was certainly a lot of talk about 'the American empire' in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The US military command system quarters the globe. The Bush doctrine extended a version of the Monroe Doctrine to the rest of the globe insofar as the US reserves to itself the right to take pre-emptive military action against any regime it considers to be a threat.

US hegemony meant that for the first time in history global power was achieved by a country where traders and their professional associates, unburdened by the inherited tradition and influence of a monarchy and aristocracy, achieved global power. Immediately after World War II, the United States used its military might and economic dominance to impose new socio-political orders very friendly to business on both Japan and Japan. Marshall Aid was a powerful lever used to push Western Europe in a similar direction and also towards increased cross-border economic cooperation.

Once this initial push was given in Europe and Asia, the exercise of American domination was less heavy-handed and overt. To some extent, it consisted of the rapid spread of American advertising and mass media whose central message, covert or overt, was that America's technology and socio-legal system could deliver what most men and women have always wanted: relief from hopeless poverty and endless physical labour.

This message is not just the 'American Dream,' a term less than a century old.<sup>5</sup> It is also something much more ancient. It is the 'peasant's dream' everywhere, expressed in tales like the story of the genie in the lamp who makes Aladdin's visions of luxury and happiness come true. It's all there in such stories. Consumption and convenience without debilitating effort: rub a lamp, turn on a switch. In the early seventeenth century Sancho Panza hoped for his own island where he would be boss; modern consumers, more modestly and realistically, but in the same spirit, hope for their own fully-fitted kitchen.<sup>6</sup> This widely broadcast American promise had tremendous appeal throughout the world.

In effect, the United States has shown the world that is possible to put together, off the peg so to speak, a politics based on a pragmatic mix of individualism, materialism and the hope of social justice, all to be achieved through a combination of corporate investment and state action, sometimes military in nature. Versions of this motley outfit can be adapted to most of the world's polities. It can even be worn as a disguise, as Nicolas Jabko has recently shown. Since 1985 the European Union has managed to make its so-called 'market revolution' into a bureaucratic instrument for controlling member governments and exercising new public powers.<sup>7</sup>

If this is an American 'empire' it is an empire of a very peculiar kind. Its modus operandi is not domination through detailed regulation. Nor is the United States after 1989 interested in 'nation-building' abroad. Instead, the 'American empire' is built upon three things: bilateral deals with allies of convenience on every continent; the maintenance of a global panopticon, including spy satellites and missile shields; and the economic and military capacity to disrupt or even destroy regimes or organisations that pose a threat.

Bilateral alliances are mainly focused on the wish to preserve global resource supply lines into the US and deny such resources to rivals. US aid to Georgia is a case in point. The underlying justifying logic, the one that wins elections, is that America must be protected because of its righteous mission. That mission is to be an example to the world, a city on the hill. American commerce and culture, its soft power, carries that message to all.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, military strength, hard power, is available to destroy any 'bad guys' lurking outside the perimeter fence.

The core metaphor of the United States remains the wagon-train circle, even though this protective circle can sometimes be expanded to include certain 'non-threatening' neighbours in Eurasia, Latin America, Africa and Australasia. Does this seem to be 'stretching it a bit', pushing the metaphor too far? If you are reluctant to accept this suggestion, glance at Thomas Barnett's version of 'the Pentagon's new map,' published in 2004. He draws in detail the boundary between what he calls the 'functioning core' (North America, most of Europe, Russia, India, China, Japan, Australasia, South Africa and half of Latin America) and the threatening 'non-integrating gap' (including Mexico, Central America, Columbia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, most of Africa, the Middle East, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines). The 'non-integrating gap' countries all lie outside the wagon-train circle.

Does this add up to a strategy of pursuing global domination? What, indeed, is 'domination'?

### **Domination and Displacement**

Domination is the continuing exercise of overwhelming power or control. Parents of very young children and the carers of very old parents quickly learn that this domination is normally resisted. The fact that domination is resisted does not necessarily mean it is malign – that issue is a matter for argument, case by case. However, when people resist domination this fact suggests they have a perception that it diminishes or disadvantages them.

'Resistance' is one way of actively rejecting the unwanted effects of domination. Rejection is often a mixture of thrust and parry. It may involve direct action against the dominating party or condition, for example through an armed uprising, sabotage or subversive propaganda. This may be intended as an act of revenge against the oppressor for the demeaning subjugation or disablement he has imposed upon you. Revenge may be 'sweet.' It may satisfy honour. But it may also be irrational, costly and self-defeating, especially if it brings the oppressor's destructive wrath upon your head in full force.

An alternative to revenge may be a more rational form of resistance that strengthens the threatened person or group, perhaps by direct action to weaken the oppressor, perhaps by strategies of self-education, training, re-equipping, or alliance-making. Adopting a strategy of resistance means facing up to the 'resistance paradox' which is that in order to protect a threatened person, group or way of life, it may be necessary to change that person, group or way of life so as to make them stronger and more capable of surviving and resisting the threat.<sup>9</sup>

Resistance is already beginning to look like a complicated phenomenon. In fact, matters are even more complex than has been stated. That is because *domination followed by resistance to domination* is just one variation within a much broader, more encompassing phenomenon: *displacement followed by the response to displacement*.

When domination is resisted this is typically because it involves rejection by those at the receiving end of what they see as an unacceptable but unavoidable forced

displacement. Displacement is 'unacceptable' when it removes or excludes the 'victims' from the position that is 'theirs', the position they feel they have a right to occupy. The displacement imposed by domination is 'outrageous' if it forces them to forgo the prospect of enjoying that social location with its specific mix of freedom, agency, security and recognition. This displacement may take the form of imposing

- subordination (creating a new hierarchy),
- relegation (pushing the victims downwards within a hierarchy), or
- exclusion (placing the victims outside the group, network or socio-political order to which they feel they should belong).

People will usually try to reject domination when it subordinates, relegates, excludes or (more generally) insultingly misrecognises them; or to put it more briefly, when it displaces them in a humiliating way.<sup>10</sup>

I would add that apart from *rejection*, which includes both revenge and more rational resistance, there are two other ways of responding to humiliation, ie forced and unacceptable displacement. One way is *escape*, which often stimulates abiding fearfulness on the part of the escapee. Another is *acceptance*, which tries to turn the humiliation into a form of shame that can hopefully be redeemed, for example by changing the way you think and act.

Rejection, escape and acceptance have one thing in common. They all involve action by the 'victim', either upon themselves or upon the relationship in which they fear they are likely to be diminished or degraded. The likely victims may include individuals, states or social classes, especially classes facing decline, which is a convenient point in the argument to bring in Barrington Moore's work.

### **Adapting Barrington Moore**

In *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Moore 1969), Moore focuses initially on the situation of landed aristocracies whose position was declining for two reasons. One was the increasing bureaucratic and military power of the central ruler. The other was the advance of commercialisation, reaching out from the towns, disturbing settled agricultural social relations, and attracting peasants to the excitements of city life. If they did nothing, the great rural landlords in their grand houses faced humiliation. They would not be able to keep up their position in society.

So much for the aristocracy. Meanwhile, what of the peasantry, and their brethren who trod a path to the city? Typically, those who left the countryside escaped one form of domination only to find another in the city with its curfews and watchful masters. That domination was sometimes oppressive. Under what conditions did this oppression generate open outrage and active resistance?

Moore can also help us here. In his book *Injustice. The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (Moore 1978), Moore argues that ordinary people have tests that they can apply to those who have power, even dominant power, over them. For example, are the priests interceding effectively with the divine being? Is the military regime winning its wars and keeping the peace at home without imposing avoidable suffering? Are the politicians keeping their promise to bring welfare and prosperity to the people? Is the aristocratic master resolving disputes between peasant families on his estates in a just and consistent manner?

The tests differ in different cases but there is always, says Moore, an implicit social contract: loyalty and obedience in return for the exercise of rational authority by those exercising domination. As Moore puts it, 'Rational authority is a way of advancing individual or collective purposes by granting certain persons the right and in some cases even the obligation to execute specific tasks and give orders to other people in the course of doing so. For such authority to be rational the individual and collective aims must themselves be rational. I will define as rational any form of activity for which in a given state of knowledge there are good reasons to suppose that it will diminish human suffering or contribute to human happiness, without making other human beings miserable' (Moore 1978, 440).

When the implicit social contract was broken, and when those who suffered as a result realised this was happening, the result would be outrage. The outrage expressed the victims' anger at being mistreated, at being dealt with in ways that undermined their position and diminished them. Again, we have the essential element of humiliation, a forced and outrageous debasement, although Moore does not use this terminology.

How did the peasants and ex-peasants respond to humiliation? One response was, of course, escape, especially from the countryside to the city. Another was resistance through revolt. Moore thought that resistance was more likely to occur if levels of suffering increased sharply in a short time, if rulers were divided, if skilled agitators were at work, if social enclaves appeared in which new moral resources could develop, giving leaders and followers more courage, and if people began to overcome the sense that their suffering was inevitable.<sup>11</sup>

Let us briefly return to the great landowning aristocracies? How did they try and avoid humiliation as the town-based market economy became more intrusive? In order to avoid being pushed aside they had either to ally themselves with the urban traders and financiers, or try to subordinate them. In *Social Origins* he traces the political consequences of these responses in different societies, eventually leading towards democracy, communism or fascism.

At the centre of Moore's analysis is the insight that humiliating displacement can occur on both sides of the relationship between dominating and dominated parties, such as lords and peasants. We notice that in both cases effective action in response depends upon a change of perception, which normally demands the presence of effective political educators. The peasantry have to be persuaded that their existing condition is not only humiliating and unacceptable but also capable of being changed. For their part, the aristocracy have to arrive at the realisation that they are likely to face humiliation in the near future unless they take effective measures. Moore points out the contribution of aristocratic 'outsiders' like Cavour and Bismarck to analysing the predicament of their own class and exercising political leadership to help save it, or at least delay its downfall.<sup>12</sup>

### **Barrington Moore and the emerging global (dis)order**

I want to explore how Moore's analysis can be adapted to the new conditions produced by the greatly increased power and freedom of multinational corporations in the late twentieth and early twentieth centuries. The first point to make is that the distinction between aristocracy and bourgeoisie in early modern polities was a

distinction between an interest which combined a military tradition with control over a specific territory, the rural landed estate, and one that depended on the capacity for mobility between cities, countries and continents.

There are grounds for arguing that the inheritor of the aristocracy's mantle as both warrior and territorial sovereign is the modern state apparatus, the national government. Now the territory is national, not local. Meanwhile, the leading traders and financiers have become global to a much greater extent than four centuries ago. They still derive wealth and power from their capacity to move themselves or their commodities rapidly from place to place in search of profit. However, now they conduct most of their operations off shore, out of reach of the territorial lord, the state, which would like to tax and control them more if it could.

Perhaps we can go further and suggest that the modern equivalent of the central relationship between lord and peasant is the bond between state and citizen. In the early modern period the relationship between lord and peasant was challenged and disrupted by the intrusion of the urban bourgeoisie. Now, the relationship between state and citizenship is likewise challenged by the intrusion of global business. Unemployment levels, interest rates, the worth of the currency, and the cultural experiences of ordinary people that shape their aspirations are just some of the crucial determinants of the state/citizen relationship that are deeply affected by the influence of global business. The state has less capacity to deliver what its citizens ask, and in response they look elsewhere for their guidance and rewards, especially to the private sector and consumer culture.

Citizens have been demonstrating their disenchantment with the state's failure to keep its promises by voting for parties that promise to reduce taxes, or by not voting at all. Political authority of all kinds has grown weaker in the past half century. One of the state's responses has been to emphasise the citizens' need for a strong protector against the threat of violence from subversive outsiders. This is a modern version of the feudal aristocracy's traditional claim to be the defenders of Christianity against infidels. The 'war on terror' allows the state to increase its surveillance powers and impose new restrictions upon freedom. It forces citizens back into a relationship with the national state that many had found increasingly meaningless and pointless, at least while they were in employment and in good health.

Ironically, then, one way in which the national state restores its own self-importance is by humiliating citizens through oppressive security measures, a fact known to all who travel through airports these days. Meanwhile, like its aristocratic predecessors, the state has the choice of either allying with traders and financiers, by now global, or trying to impose its will upon these commercial interests. We can discern three patterns, although these are not a continuation of the three routes to the modern world traced in *Social Origins*.

China is the obvious case of a leading state that has kept the whip hand in its dealings with business. For example, in 2006 the Chinese government made it clear that the state would have 'absolute control' in 'strategically important sectors.' These include armaments, power generation and distribution, oil and petrochemicals, coal, aviation telecommunications, and shipping, all 'vital arteries of the national economy and essential to national security' (*China Daily* 19<sup>th</sup> December 2006).<sup>13</sup> On 1<sup>st</sup> August

2008, the Chinese government introduced an Anti-Monopoly Law that could be used, among other things, to prevent foreign multinationals from asserting their intellectual property rights in China. State monopolies are, of course, immune from action under this law.<sup>14</sup>

China is not alone in this approach, which also extends to active involvement by wholly state-owned companies in the international investment market. That includes the oil giant PetroChina, now one of the largest companies of any kind in the world, and Russia's Gazprom, one of the world's largest gas companies. Abu Dhabi's government-owned investment company, also one of the world's largest in its field, is now the leading shareholder in Citigroup.<sup>15</sup>

The political scientist Azar Gat has argued that evidence such as this indicates that China is leading a distinctive international trend, which he calls 'the return of authoritarian capitalists.'<sup>16</sup> The authoritarianism is, of course, asserted not only with regard to foreign nationals doing business in such countries but also in dealing with their own citizens whose freedom of speech, especially in the public sphere, is greatly restricted. In *Globalization. The Hidden Agenda* I use the term 'domineering state' to describe the political organization of such societies. The spirit of this approach may be summarised as: 'The state is going to use its strength to look after those it favours at whatever cost to others. Steer clear. We can hurt you' (Smith 2006, 201).

The second pattern is represented by the European Union, which may, indeed, be the only major example. It is a political order in which there is a much more even balance than in the first case between government bureaucracy and business interests.<sup>17</sup> The EU is currently facing a profound crisis of democratic legitimacy. This is significant for two reasons: first, the European Commission takes this very seriously since if national voters stop respecting its efforts, funding will eventually dry up for national governments; and, second, the Commission is responding to popular pressure to show that it is useful to voters.

In effect, the EU civil service is in a competition with business interests to win the favour of ordinary people. The EU certainly favours an efficient, highly digitalised, and unified market but it wants a market that genuinely maximises benefits to consumers rather than simply shareholders. It has used opinion polls to draw up its list of targets. These include: credit card charges, mobile phone fees, bank charges, and the profits of energy companies.<sup>18</sup> In May 2008, the hands of the Commission were strengthened further when the European Parliament passed legislation enforcing the compulsory registration of the 15,000 lobbyists working in Brussels, making them declare the special interests that sponsor them.<sup>19</sup>

Against this background, and bearing in mind the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty with its strong commitment to the social rights of citizenship, we would be justified in describing the EU as continuing to move in the direction of 'decent democracy;' in other words a political order based on the proposition that 'The implementation of the human rights code by states and citizens means that everyone gets a decent life insofar as that is humanly possible' (Smith 2006, p 201).<sup>20</sup>

The third pattern occurs when business interests have an overriding influence over the state apparatus and this is most clearly illustrated by the case of the United States,

especially since 1989. Here we encounter a mixture of categories. On the one hand, citizenship in the United States in the early twenty-first century is mainly operated as a set of rules that favour those who are well-equipped materially and culturally to do well in the marketplace. It expresses the logic of the market, which pays most attention to protecting people's right to buy and invest freely if they have money and credit. Much less attention is given to the government's duty of care towards its citizens, in other words, the need to give the poor and weak support and protection. In all these respects, the United States exemplifies the approach of 'liberated capitalism.' In other words, 'Life is a humiliating struggle but let us keep the struggle open, non-violent and free for all to enter. That is the best you can expect. That is as democratic as life gets' (Smith 2006, 200). This philosophy is set out in Thomas Friedman's widely-read book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Friedman

However, there is another side of the American way. In its relations with other nations, especially those that are much weaker, the US state has been prepared to use its clout - economic, diplomatic and, on occasion, military - on foreign states and traders in order to open up foreign markets to American business. The ideal is supposedly a world of 'market states' in which nationalism (especially non-American nationalism) does not get in the way of commerce. This approach has been expressed most fully in recent years by Philip Bobbitt (Bobbitt 2002), and most bluntly by Thomas Barnett (Barnett 2004). The approach has many of the characteristics of the domineering state.

### **Conclusion**

In this paper I have attempted three things. First, I explored some of the dynamics of the making and breaking of empires, distinguishing between four types of empires, looking at an emerging contradiction within nation-state empires, and asking if the EU and the United States are examples of imperialist domination. I suggested that the EU had some residual imperialist elements but was at least as much, if not more, about resistance to domination from Russia and the US, and the promotion of increased status equality between countries within the EU.

With respect to the United States, I proposed that the core self-image of the United States is the wagon train circle. Despite the magnificent confidence of the 1940s and the ebullience of the 1990s, during the early twenty-first century projections of American power capacity beyond the wagon train's perimeter have been mainly concerned with undermining global opponents, not providing global governance or even much leadership.

I have also argued that 'domination' and 'resistance' were specific variations within a larger framework, that of displacement and response. I suggested that resistance to domination was most likely to occur when the subordinate party experienced a humiliating displacement. I gave a summary of some aspects of my approach to the dynamics of humiliation.

Finally, I adapted the arguments made by Barrington Moore in *Injustice* and *Social Origins* to suggest that both states and citizens fear humiliation in the early twenty-first century. I have treated states located in the current global order/disorder as being in some ways the equivalent of landed aristocrats in early modern society confronting the disruptive force of the commercialised city. I argue that the responses of modern

states to the threat of humiliation has been two-fold: to transmit that experience 'downwards' onto their own citizenries through the imposition of intrusive surveillance; and to draw upon the resources offered by global finance and commerce in one of three ways.

These three ways are:

- by establishing an alliance of approximate equals between the agencies of public governance and the global commercial sector, as in the EU, leading towards 'decent democracy';
- by subordinating business to the interests of the state, as in China, leading towards the 'domineering state', authoritarian in all matters; and/or
- by making the state subordinate to the demands and interests of big business rather than to, for example, the citizenry's demand for social rights, leading towards 'liberated capitalism.' In practice, this is often combined with a 'domineering state' strategy in dealing with foreign countries.

The irony of this analysis is that while all three of these strategies are intended to avert humiliation of the state, two of them impose renewed humiliation upon the citizen. The system of liberated capitalism neglects the duty of care and produces the degrading conditions in which the inhabitants of New Orleans were left after Hurricane Katrina. The domineering state is likely to impose heavy obligations upon the citizen, including taxation and military service, while denying citizens the human rights that complement such duties in decent democracies.

In *Social Origins*, Barrington Moore saw the fundamental choice facing modernizing societies as being between democracy and dictatorship in one of two forms, either fascism or communism. When we consider the case of globalizing societies, the fundamental choice seems likely to be between decent democracy and humiliation in one of two forms, either the domineering state or liberated capitalism.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper, previously unpublished, is a revised version of one I gave to the *British International Studies Association Workshop on the historical sociology of domination and resistance* at the Centre for International Politics, Manchester University on 18<sup>th</sup> September 2008.

<sup>2</sup> See Smith 2006, Smith 2008a, Smith 2008b, Moore 1969, Moore 1978, Moore 1983.

<sup>3</sup> The following section draws in part upon the argument made in *Globalization. The Hidden Agenda* (Smith 2006).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, <http://www.voortrekkermon.org.za/index2.html> (13th September 2008)

<sup>5</sup> The origin of this phrase is often attributed to James Truslow Adams, who used it in his book *The Epic of America* in 1931.

<sup>6</sup> Sancho Panza dreamt of 'some earthly paradise where drudgery was unknown and the stomach was always full' (Moore 1958). See also Corteguera 2005.

<sup>7</sup> See Jabko 2006.

<sup>8</sup> See Nye Nye 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Smith 2006, 165-7. There is also a 'revenge paradox' which is that in time those involved in long-lasting revenge cycles grow to depend psychologically and perhaps materially on the continued existence of the 'other' that they are supposedly trying to damage and destroy. Smith 2006, 164-5.

<sup>10</sup> More generally, while some instances of domination are humiliating, not all are. At the same time, humiliation is sometimes the result of domination, but not always. In fact, humiliation might be the result of someone using spoiling tactics against you, trying to disrupt you rather than dominate you.

<sup>11</sup> See references and discussion in Smith 1983, 138-41.

<sup>12</sup> Moore 1969, 440.

<sup>13</sup> [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/19/content\\_762056.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/19/content_762056.htm) (14th September 2008).

<sup>14</sup> 'Foreign business. The dreaded Anti-Monopoly Law,' Intelligence Research Ltd, originally published in the *China Watch Weekly Briefing* of 25 July 2008 (<http://www.asiaint.com/cwsb>), also in *China Business Success Stories Newsletter*, 31<sup>st</sup> July 2008 (14<sup>th</sup> September 2008)

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<sup>15</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick , 'State Inc,' Boston Globe, March 16<sup>th</sup>, 2008 (14<sup>th</sup> September 2008)

<sup>16</sup> Azar Gat, 'The return of Authoritarian Capitalists,' *International Herald Tribune*, June 14<sup>th</sup>, 2007 (14<sup>th</sup> September 2008)

<sup>17</sup> India may possibly be another such case, or may become one in time, give both its strong bureaucratic tradition and its more recent commitment to hi-tech IT industries.

<sup>18</sup> Paul Taylor, 'Is the EU friend or foe to industry?,' *International Herald Tribune*, March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2008 (14<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

<sup>19</sup> 'European parliament moves to curb power of lobbyists,' *Deutsche Welle*, 9<sup>th</sup> May 2008 (14<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

<sup>20</sup> This is not very different from the definition of rational authority given earlier.

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