

CHAPTER ONE: KEY THEMES

What is at stake

If globalization does not change direction, there will be a high cost in terms of freedom and human rights.

The crucial struggle is not between the West and ‘terrorism’ but *within* the West, between supporters of decent democracy and proponents of liberated capitalism enforced by the domineering state. The outcome of this struggle will shape the world for the rest of this century.

How far will the European Union go to defend its historic commitment to combining the pursuit of prosperity with a strong version of human rights that takes seriously the duty of care to the poor and disadvantaged? How long will it tolerate the United States’ determined promotion of a ruthless ‘logic of the market’ throughout the world without regard to the wishes of others, including its old allies?

How long before Europe builds up its military strength to match its massive economic clout? How long before the EU and the United States are intervening on opposite sides in armed conflicts? Unthinkable? So was a Europe without war or preparation for war between France and Germany. So was a world without the Soviet Union. So was a capitalist China.

As the West divides, with or without a transatlantic war, what lessons will it give to the restless, exploding populations of the world’s cities, the real arbiters of our shared

future? If decent democracy loses out in the West, this will give the world the message: don't be a victim, victimize others. That was Hitler's creed.

If urban citizens throughout the world are denied decent democracy and humiliated by the logic of the global market, will they be tempted to follow 'new Hitlers' promising them the rewards of revenge? It has happened before. If it happens again, we will be on our way to a third world war between the American state, terrified of humiliating decline, and its increasingly powerful global neighbours in Europe and Asia.

Understanding what the future might hold for us unless we prevent it means looking behind globalization's public agenda to investigate the processes and mechanisms shaping its hidden agenda.

Sensitive issues

Globalization's public agenda is well known. It is focused on market opportunities, business interests and access to key material resources. The benefits of foreign direct investment are frequently mentioned. So are the 'healthy' disciplines imposed by multilateral agencies such as the International Monetary Fund. We hear a great deal about competition for energy resources such as oil and gas, including stratagems to deprive geo-political rivals of such access. 'Orange' political revolutions usually get a round of applause in the Western press. Since 9/11 another item has been added to this public agenda: the 'war on terrorism.'

Behind this public agenda lies globalization's hidden agenda. These are items that touch on too many vested interests to be discussed too openly too often. Five items on the hidden agenda for the next three decades are:

1. How will the United States and other leading powers cope with the forthcoming relative decline in America's global influence?
2. How will global governance be managed as American power wanes?
3. Now that capitalism has finally triumphed, what *kind* of capitalist political order will become dominant? Whose interests will it serve, and how?
4. What are the future global prospects for the version of human rights supported by the European Union with its emphasis upon strong social rights?
5. As the world's population becomes increasingly urbanised with practically half its people in cities already, and half the developing world's population due to be city-dwellers by 2030, how will this newly urbanised population be incorporated within national and global socio-political orders and whose political lead will they follow?

Over the next few decades globalization's hidden agenda will become much less hidden. By the time its key questions are obvious to everyone, they may have been answered in ways we do not want. To stand some chance of getting our interests taken into account we must think through those interests in a constructively self-critical spirit. We must also acknowledge the existence of globalization's hidden agenda, and get a better understanding of what globalization is and how it 'works.'


This book identifies a ‘triple helix’ of social mechanisms driving the historical processes shaping globalization’s hidden agenda. If they continue in their current direction, we may expect violent and destructive outcomes.

The tsunami of globalization

Globalization was ‘discovered’ in the 1980s. It took a while for the news to get out. For most of the 1980s, references to globalization were infrequent, but during the 1990s they became a stream and then a flood.

Figure 1
References to Globalization in Social Science Journals 1981-2004

Figure 3: References to Globalisation in Social Science Journals 1981-2004



Journalists, businesspeople, politicians and scholars seized upon the term and made it part of their core vocabulary. Discourse about ‘globalization’ rapidly increased. Look at the bar chart in figure 1.¹ We see a steeply rising curve, like a massive ocean wave. That picture mirrors the way globalization was experienced, especially by Westerners.

During the 1990s globalization felt like a tsunami racing up the beach, transforming our landscape whether we liked it or not. The globalizing world seemed to be ‘risk-ridden,’ ‘liquid’ and ‘runaway.’ⁱⁱ The evidence was everywhere:

- international money moving rapidly into and out of different national currencies, causing economic devastation in its wake,
- multinational corporations searching restlessly for new energy sources, scarce raw materials and cheap, flexible labour wherever these things could be found, and rapidly departing if it became more convenient to try somewhere else,
- information technology destroying jobs, penetrating protective shells of all kinds, and laying waste to the old to make space for the new,
- citizens losing confidence in bureaucrats and technocrats, and being forced to come to terms with risks they had not realised existed,
- the determined migration of people from poor countries to the West, hoping to get their feet on a higher rung of the economic ladder, and
- the cosmopolitan jostling of different cultures, nationalities and ethnicities, bringing fear, disruption and conflict.

Read, for example, Anthony Giddens on the runaway world, Zygmunt Bauman on liquid modernity, Manuel Castells on the informational society, Ulrich Beck on risk society, Samuel Huntington on the clash of civilizations, and Thomas Friedman on globalization’s rampaging ‘electronic herd’ of global investors.ⁱⁱⁱ

Those themes helped make sense of how we *experienced* globalization during the 1990s and early 2000s, especially in the West. These authors did two things. Firstly,

they distilled how we felt: disoriented, anxious, vulnerable, angry and in need of reassurance. Secondly, they gave us organising concepts linking these feelings to various master trends: decreasing control, growing speed, increasing liquidity, the advancing importance of information technology, heightened awareness of risk, the decline of the West, the resurgence of the market, and so on.

These works gave us a vocabulary to describe our condition, identified various factors we could blame, and produced very insightful descriptions of the new countryside we are passing through. But now we need much more.

We need a map, a compass, and a way of choosing between alternative routes through this countryside. We also need to look beyond the present, not just forward but also backward.

Looking backwards and forwards tells us that globalization is a long and complex historical process, weaving continents together. It is cultural, political, and technological, as well as economic. It has been underway for centuries. It stretches back to the Vikings and much earlier.^{iv}

It also tells us that for most of those centuries, business or trade was globalization's passenger, hitching a ride. It was rarely the driver, though sometimes the navigator.^v Furthermore, seen in this historical context, the United States has been globalization's 'star player' for only a very short time, and the 'American' phase of globalization is likely to come to an end in the next few decades.

Why history?

A historical approach is vital, not a scholarly luxury. We use this approach in our daily lives when important assessments and decisions have to be made. Do you buy a road vehicle without looking at its service record? Would you appoint an employee without asking about their previous career? Or set up house with someone if you did not know something about their past life?

We *are* our history. We are the result of the way processes of personal development have worked out. Furthermore, we become particular kinds of adults, citizens, consumers, and cultural beings because of the influence of several groups and institutions (family, ethnic group, nation, faith group, and so on) that are themselves undergoing processes of development.

When someone says something like ‘Oh, he’s just growing up’ or ‘they are still learning how to handle democracy’, the speaker is describing and explaining others by locating them within a process of development, one that may take years, decades or centuries to reveal its shape in full.

There are dangers: retrospective myth-making about the past, false impressions of the present, and wishful thinking about the future. To avoid this we need self-knowledge, healthy scepticism, high standards of proof, a willingness to look at as many kinds of evidence as possible, openness to the ideas of others, and a readiness to change our minds if rationality and evidence demand it.

So it is when analysing globalization. Applying this approach, we discover through empirical analysis that it is a complex socio-historical process closely interwoven with other processes, each driven by distinctive mechanisms whose workings reveal themselves through long stretches of historical time. Discovering these things about globalization gives us a better chance of working out where we are in the process and what future options are open to us.

What is globalization?

Globalization means the gradual forging of links between groups and societies until they finally reach around the globe in several directions. These links have become increasingly dense, extensive, complex, and dynamic over several centuries. How has this long historical process been structured? What kind of networks and hierarchies has it produced?

The globalizing ventures of explorers, opportunists, and deal-makers create large, loose networks of social relations. Such networks are liable to fracture and break up as they get more extensive and complex. Networks survive rapid expansion by developing sites of surveillance and hierarchical control. Imperial capital cities play this role. So do institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trades Organization (WTO).

The term 'globalization' conveys two things.

1. the way economic, technological, military, political and cultural forces and mechanisms 'become global,' ie become anchored in institutions at the global level, over historical time.

2. the way interests and institutions at the global level exert *downward pressure* upon those below, especially national governments and their citizens, reducing the latter's freedom of action and telling them what to do in some respects.

'Going global' is one way of 'becoming less local.' Over the centuries, village inhabitants have learned to look upward to the big city, whose denizens, in turn, have increasingly felt the pull of the national metropolis, whose citizens, in turn, have increasingly found that capital, credit and the market are operating in global circuits.^{vi} Meanwhile, castle-based regional dynasties have bowed down to national states, which have found themselves part of transcontinental empires.^{vii}

Societal forces and mechanisms have been getting 'less local' since human societies began, although not without a struggle. There has been continual tension between,

- localising pressures to settle, cultivate and defend a specific 'homeland' and,
- opposing pressures to expand outwards and upwards beyond the local, capture more land and resources, and construct a higher tier of control from which to survey and control the captured realm.

These latter pressures have tended to prevail after repeated reverses. Becoming less local and more global has happened in a 'two steps forward, one step backward' manner, rather like the way waves advance up the beach as the tide comes in.

That tide turned into a tsunami during the 1990s. Why? Because the structure of hierarchical control directing and restraining global flows suffered a catastrophic breach. A major levée holding back the flood collapsed. In other words, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc broke up. This event signalled the final demise of the ancient imperial dream, the end of empires as a viable modern form of government.

The end of empires

By empire I mean a politico-military hierarchy intended to express the superiority of the individual, dynasty, group or nation sitting enthroned at its summit, and the inferiority of all others below.

Empires were part of globalization almost from the beginning. They provided regulation, political cover, and legitimacy for globalizing ventures by warriors, diplomats, traders, missionaries, fixers and opportunists of many kinds. They were killed by the rise of democracy, citizenship and human rights, backed up with the power of the United States.

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1989 finished the work of humbling Europe's arrogant imperial capitals that began when Americans guns destroyed the Spanish fleet in 1898. In fact, it took almost a century to teach Madrid, Berlin, Vienna, Istanbul, London, Paris and Moscow they could not make imperialist absolutism stable and permanent in a democratic age.

This was a hard lesson to learn. The imperial impulse does not want to wither and die. It still rages in Washington, which is now paying the price of letting it get the upper hand, especially in Iraq.

One of the biggest questions confronted in the twentieth century was this: what global system would replace the European empires? One response was the creation of the United Nations in the late 1940s. However, the world found it hard to break with its old ways.

The European empires were replaced during the Cold War order by two massive global empires, based in Moscow and Washington respectively. These Cold War politico-military structures took over the space occupied by the old European empires. They inherited their fundamental weakness: trying to combine absolutism or top-down assertiveness with the claim to be egalitarian, libertarian and democratic.

The Cold War empires were much bigger than the old inefficient European empires, and tried to be more rationalised and systematic. They were always trying to prove themselves in the eyes of the world by displaying exemplary performance. Ironically, this made them much more vulnerable than the old empires to the political effects of structural contradictions, whose effects tended to be highly visible, especially in the form of liberation movements and acts of repression (as in Vietnam and Afghanistan).

Now the Russian global empire is gone and the American one is limping on, the lone survivor of an ancient breed.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union were major and decisive breaches in the rickety structure of empire, leaving the American ‘strut’ standing alone amid the wreckage. A large political vacuum was suddenly created in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. These factors, acting in combination, released powerful forces, sending capital, commodities, crowds and cultures racing round the world, crashing through borders on every continent.

This was a shift *within* the globalization process. Previously, economic forces and demographic flows had been forced to work their way through and around the overriding global strategic concerns of government and the military. During the 1990s international movements of capital and labour, were ‘liberated’ and given a new lease of life. They made the most of that fact, especially in the ex-Soviet Union and the countries of the old Soviet Bloc.

Beyond the market

But to understand globalization we must look beyond the marketplace, taking account of three things:

1. Historically, globalization has been driven at least as much, and often more, by the motive of glorifying gods and magnifying rulers as by the pursuit of business opportunities.
2. Globalization causes people to be displaced or excluded in ways that make them feel outraged and resentful. This is only partly due to the way *the logic of the market* is implemented. It also stems from the unleashing of *the imperial impulse* to dominate and destroy, sometimes out of fear. A further source of humiliation is the

displacement caused by processes of socio-political transformation that leave people stranded between the old and the new in a distressing *cosmopolitan condition*.

3. The model of profit-seeking human beings making rational choices about their material interests is inadequate as a tool for understanding the way people participate in globalization. They are also moved by how other people's actions affect their sense of who they are and where they fit into society, and how they feel about this.

Empowered with a historical perspective, and this broadened view of how human beings 'work,' we can now turn to the socio-historical processes that are shaping globalization's hidden agenda.

The triple helix

At the centre of these processes are three intertwining sets of social mechanisms. I will shortly introduce them in turn. They operate within

- the frames of globalization,
- the codes of modernity, and
- the modes of humiliation

These social mechanisms interact with each other in a complex and continuous way, so that for the purpose of this present analysis they may be treated as a kind of triple helix

Uncovering the working of this triple helix is the main task of this book. This task demands that we reach back into the past to get a clearer perspective on the present and a stronger purchase on the future. Understanding the triple helix will help us to clarify some possible answers to the questions on globalization's hidden agenda.

Frames of globalization

The major dynamics of globalization are the pursuit of power, prestige, and profit as well as the wish to ensure survival. As winners beat losers and incorporate their assets, as networks become more extensive and complex, and as surveillance and rule enforcement climb up the agenda, so hierarchies develop whose fields of operation eventually become global in extent.

Globalization makes victims as well as victors. People get wounded. There are victims of *the* imperial impulse: people who lose their assets and their sense of independence, who are forced to bow down before alien masters, who see their homes destroyed and their futures ruined. Then there are the victims of the *logic of the market*, turned into losers by the rules of a game they usually did not ask to join. Finally, there are the estranged victims of the cosmopolitan condition, uprooted by structural change.

The period since 1600 may be divided into three historical phases.

1. *European imperialism*. This phase came to an end during the decades immediately after the end of the Second World War, when it overlapped with the second phase.

2. *Global imperialism*. The Cold War confrontation pitted the Russian-led 'Communist Bloc' and the American-led 'Free World' against each other. By the 1990s only the American empire remained standing although it was beset by deep

internal conflict, especially between Europe and the United States. It overlapped with the third phase.

3. *Global multi-polarity*. The uni-polar world dominated by the United States is coming to an end. In the early twenty-first century, the third phase is beginning to take shape with the increasing independence of the European Union, the rise of China, the revival of Japan, the resurgence of oil- and gas-rich Russia, the emergence of India and the clear signs of American weariness with, and distaste for, its present role as ‘global monarch.’

Codes of modernity

Globalization needs to be understood and assessed in terms of whether it is going to improve or damage the chances for the majority of the global population to enjoy decent and fulfilled lives in the foreseeable future. That means exploring how the process of globalization intersects with the interplay between two codes of modernity: the *honour code* and the *human rights code*.

Alexis de Tocqueville drew attention to this issue at the centre of his argument in *Democracy in America* (Tocqueville 1968)^{viii}, written in the 1830s. He saw a future in which aristocrats such as himself, imbued with the strongly hierarchical honour code, would have to take a back seat, if they survived at all, in democracies which emphasised equality and aspired to universal citizenship. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche reacted strongly against what he called ‘slave morality’ and called for a return to aristocratic values, by which he meant accepting

the strength, pride and creativity of outstanding individuals prepared to seize what they want and become the people they choose to be.

Both codes of modernity are focused on three things: social competition, provision of care and protection, and control of access to life-enhancing socio-cultural benefits. In handling these, the honour code values strength: the capacity to maximise your stake in the world, and destroy your enemies. It is particularistic: 'I look after mine; we look after ours'. By contrast, the human rights code respects needs and makes the demand that all human beings should be given access to the means of enjoying a decent life. It is universalistic: 'my needs will be recognised; we look after all'.

Both codes are 'modern.' This is a factual, not an evaluative statement. Neither is innately 'programmed' to disappear. The two codes are strongly present, and closely intertwined in most societies in the early twenty-first century. This situation has historical roots:

1. The human rights code made a decisive advance with the spread of modern nation-states modelled on the constitutional examples set by the American Republic (after 1776) and France (after 1789). Sovereign democratic states were powerful defenders of this code.

2. However, globalization since the 1980s has seriously undermined the strength and sovereignty of these national states. This threatens the advance of the human rights code by weakening its main protector.

3. Meanwhile, the honour code remains strong at both the national and global levels.

In practice, most societies operate with a pragmatic mix of the two codes. The important questions are: what kind of mix will prevail and which code will be dominant? The crucial scene of action is the city. Global society is urbanizing very rapidly. What do their inhabitants want? What are they likely to get? How will they act?^{ix}

Modes of humiliation

An important spring of action is the experience of being humiliated. Not that globalization always humiliates. Nor, of course, is all humiliation, or even most of it, directly related to globalization.^x However, the logic of the market, the imperial impulse and the cosmopolitan condition are powerful generators of humiliation, outrage and resentment amongst many of those at the receiving end.

Being humiliated means being forced to undergo an experience of displacement or exclusion from where you think you should be. It means being denied the recognition, security, freedom and power to act on your own behalf that you are used to having or think you should rightfully have.

There are three main types of humiliation. There is *conquest humiliation*, which removes your previous freedom and forces you into subordination. There is *relegation humiliation*, which forces you downwards within a hierarchy. There is also *exclusion humiliation*, which denies you membership of the group, hierarchy or network to which you feel you rightfully belong.

The initial reaction to humiliation is normally resentful and half-hearted acquiescence in something one cannot prevent. However, following the initial shock three other responses are possible: *escape*, *acceptance* and *rejection*. Each of these responses may, in certain circumstances, trigger further episodes of humiliation. As I argue, escape frequently leads to *fear cycles*, acceptance to *victimization cycles* and rejection to *revenge cycles*.

A major effect of globalization is that the escape response is much less available than it was to, say, the Pilgrim Fathers in the early seventeenth century. Unlike them, we can no longer say to the ('old') world: 'I want to get off.'

Three drivers

To summarise, relationships amongst three powerful drivers are shaping the future of global society in the twenty-first century. These drivers are located within

- *the frames of globalization* – ie the imperial impulse, the logic of the market, and the cosmopolitan condition,
- *the modes of humiliation* – ie conquest, relegation, and exclusion → escape, acceptance, and rejection → cycles of fear, victimization and revenge, and
- *the codes of modernity* - ie the honour code and the human rights code.

The dynamic relationships *within* each of these drivers have identifiable parameters that persist through long periods of historical time. Within these parameters one can see certain processes occurring, certain 'stories' unfolding.

For example, in the interplay amongst the *frames of globalization*, the relative significance of the logic of the market has increased during the past half century, especially since 1989. The advance of the human rights code has seriously undermined the imperial impulse. However, it is fighting a rearguard action. It does not want to die.

Meanwhile, the unsettling cosmopolitan condition has been gathering strength since the sixteenth century. It was initially fostered by the anxieties of urban existence. It is now reinforced by the decreasing capacity of the nation-state to contain and structure our lives as influence shifts upwards towards the global level.

In the interplay amongst the *modes of humiliation*, there have been two long-term shifts. The spread of human rights thinking with its universalistic and egalitarian tendencies ('we are fundamentally all the same') means there has been an increase in sensitivity to exclusion. Victims of acts of conquest and relegation are more likely than before to make complaints to third parties (eg the United Nations, law courts or employment tribunals) about being wrongfully 'excluded' from the enjoyment of rights that should be respected.

The second long-term shift is that the escape response to humiliation has become decreasingly available. This is an old story, now being repeated at a higher societal level. In Europe and elsewhere, peasants who ran away from servitude on the land to 'freedom' in the city in early modern times often found themselves subject to new forms of regulation, frequently oppressive, by urban authorities. More recently, the

descendants of migrants and settlers who left their old homes and went abroad to build new lives in various 'promised lands' have found that the 'old world' their ancestors left behind has not only transformed itself but also 'followed' them, pulling them back into its entangling grip. Globalization does not like those who try to 'opt out.'

With escape increasingly ruled out, the fundamental choice confronting those for whom globalization means humiliation is as follows: to accept or reject their oppressors and/or the structures that oppress them. Most people do not want to make this choice. Many people find themselves falling into bemused and resentful acquiescence: a 'holding' pattern which is neither active acceptance nor active rejection. This in-between response is widespread.

Turning to the *codes of modernity*, the past two hundred years have seen a steady advance of the influence of the human rights code, which has undermined the plausibility and coherence of aristocracies and empires. 1989 saw the final collapse of the European imperial order. The Chinese empire only survived by transforming itself into a nation dominated by the Han, a unique achievement.

The guardians of the human rights code have been national states whose governments have had the authority and organizational capacity to implement it through their legal systems. The European Union has inherited this role although it largely depends on the constituent national governments acting as 'enforcers.'

However, the influence of the human code is now under threat. The reason is that national governments' sovereignty and practical influence has been undermined by globalization during the past half century. If national states are not available to enforce human rights as strongly as before, who will?

Nations and groups who feel belittled or left out by others are liable to 'take the law into their own hands.' In other words, they may use force to advance their interests at the expense of others. This represents a shift back towards the honour code. If global-regional or global governance does not become strong enough to protect and enforce the human rights code, it is likely that the honour code will gain further ground.

In any case, it is unlikely that Tocqueville's vision in *Democracy in America* (Tocqueville 1968) of the human rights code completely displacing the honour code will come to pass. The question is: what kind of amalgam between the two codes would be most likely to help bring about a world order in which most people could live decent lives in decent societies?

Generalization and uniqueness


These three narratives about historical tendencies with respect to frames of globalization, modes of humiliation and codes of modernity relate to long-term socio-historical processes that intertwine. They wind around each other, touching at various points (see table 2). As already mentioned, the model of a triple helix comes to mind, drawing inspiration from the 'double helix' model of DNA but without pushing the parallel too far.


Each of the three strands or processes has distinctive forms and mechanisms, in other words, specific frames, modes or codes. Within each strand or process, the interplay between its distinctive forms (eg between the honour code and the human rights code) produces a specific sequence through time. We have identified some aspects of these historical sequences, such as:

- the increased influence of the logic of the market, the growing pervasiveness of the cosmopolitan condition and the incongruous, uncomfortable survival of the imperial impulse;
- the increased awareness of exclusion and decreased availability of escape; and
- the rise of the human rights code followed by renewed strengthening of the honour code.

It is possible to make empirical generalizations about these three socio-historical processes, shaped in part by historical analysis and in part by thinking through the properties of structures, how they ‘work.’ Such generalizations are difficult to achieve, complicated to express simply, and always subject to modification through further thought and empirical investigation.

Figure Two
The Triple Helix





Difficult though all this is, it is still more difficult to make generalizations about *the way these three processes intersect* within national societies or in the life courses of groups or individuals or about the way particular conjunctures work themselves out

over time. There are very many different possibilities and each historical case has important features that are particular to it.

In this book, many case studies are woven into the argument. Their purpose is to show some of the ways in which the mechanisms and processes shaping global society, and the nations, groups and individuals within it, actually work themselves out.

However, this does not allow us to arrive at handy theorems that tell us how to produce the perfect 'well-adjusted' society, group or individual. Each case is complex, a unique combination of elements. In fact, it is tempting to recall that in the case of DNA, a very small number of basic elements with distinctive and well-known properties could combine in so many different ways that DNA testing could be used to identify individual human beings with a very high degree of confidence.

Trends and circles

There are two kinds of analysis in this book. One is concerned with long-term social processes. Apart from the historical tendencies just summarised, there are two other major shifts that will have momentous implications.

We are moving towards a world in which overall control is no longer vested in a particular global region (the West) or a specific country (the United States) but is divided between three continents and at least as many political forces, including China and the European Union. How will a multi-polar world manage its business?

We are also moving towards a world in which most people live in cities, places to which many will have migrated as an act of choice because they want a better life for themselves. How will the world's urbanites get what they want? How will they react if they cannot?

The complementary analytical thrust is inward, investigating the mechanisms at work within the triple helix and each of its component strands.. This involves a process reminiscent in some respects of the hermeneutic circle.^{xi} Basically, this means shifting back and forth between the parts and the whole of a complex object in order to clarify its meaning or find out 'how it works.'

The organisation of the book

Following this introduction, in part two the three strands of the triple helix are examined in successive chapters, moving from the codes of modernity, ie the honour code and the human rights code (in chapter 2) to the modes of humiliation (chapter 3) and then on to the frames of globalization (chapter 4), intermittently stepping back to remind ourselves of the larger context, the whole of which they are parts. This will give us a good working understanding of the societal processes in which globalization is embedded and what is at stake for states and citizens.

The rest of the book renews the exploration of the triple helix, this time in greater depth and reversing the order.

In part three, attention is paid to the three global generators of humiliation already mentioned: the imperial impulse (chapter 5), the logic of the market (chapter 6) and

the cosmopolitan condition (chapter 7). In part four, three ways of responding to humiliation are considered, in turn: escape (chapter 8), acceptance (chapter 9) and rejection (chapter 10).

In other words, in parts three and four we look at key socio-historical mechanisms *within* globalization, and *within* processes of humiliation, now and then stepping back to see how these mechanisms contribute to the bigger picture. In part five (the concluding chapter), we look *within* the dynamic interaction between honour and human rights, the two codes of modernity. This chapter draws the argument together and considers the implications of the book's analysis for globalization's hidden agenda.

ⁱ Figure 1 contains the results of a survey of social science journals recorded in Social Sciences Citation Index carried out by the present writer in May 2005 which found that 'globalization' (or 'globalisation') appeared as a term in 7355 articles written between January 1981 and December 2004. 89 per cent of them were published since the beginning of 1997. Over the same period the number of references in the Arts and Humanities Citation Index rises from zero to 219. There is some overlap between this index and the Social Sciences Citation Index and this would make it slightly misleading to aggregate the two series.

ⁱⁱ See Beck 1992; Bauman 2000; Giddens 2000.

ⁱⁱⁱ See previous note and also Castells 1997-2000; Huntington 1997; Friedman 2000.

^{iv} For background see, for example, Maddison 2003; Ponting 2001.

^v The business interests of Venice financed the fourth crusade (1202-4) in return for a share of the anticipated profits. The Doge of Venice offered the crusaders easier terms on their debts to the city if they would begin their military campaign by helping Venice to conquer Zara, a Roman Catholic town on the Adriatic that had revolted against Venetian domination. This was hardly a 'natural' target for a Christian Crusade. However, the deed was done, even though the Pope, quite naturally, objected.

^{vi} In practice, the local village-based structures and the globalized economy took shape before national economies and national states. See, for example Braudel 1981-4.

^{vii} As in the previous note, it has to be emphasised that the shaping of the global often preceded the crystallisation of the national. In other words, transcontinental empires were common a long time before national citizenship became widespread.

^{viii} See also Smith 1990.

^{ix} My intellectual interest in humiliation originally stemmed from becoming familiar with research being done by Evelin Lindner.

^x On these points: America's rise to global power in the 1940s had a profoundly liberating impact, although this liberation was delivered by humiliating existing political regimes, not just the rulers of Japan and Germany but also the British and French governments who were prevented from rebuilding their colonial empires. To take another case, Irish society has a much greater air of prosperity since that country joined the European Union and attracted a great deal of foreign direct investment. (For a critical perspective on Ireland as a 'Celtic tiger,' see O'Hearn 1998). It is possible to manage transformations in a person or group's social location in a way that helps them to accept and even welcome their new location. That is one objective of special courses preparing people for retirement. Special counsellors may be employed to help workers facing the run-down of their industry (eg mining or fishing) prepare for new types of employment.

^{xi} Although I am not focusing on texts. For discussions of the hermeneutic circle, see, for example, Gadamer 1975; Habermas 1977.