Social fluidity and social displacement

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Abstract

The recent prominence of analyses emphasising social fluidity within the social sciences has obscured the continuing relevance of the dynamics of social displacement. This paper contrasts the two approaches, traces their different trajectories as they have permeated sociology and adjacent disciplines, and, finally, proposes a research agenda investigating social displacement processes in the context of globalization.

Fluidity and displacement[1]

The social displacement perspective is concerned with events and conjunctures, past, present and in prospect, that force people, individually or collectively, to confront and cope with dislocating jolts and upsetting disruptions in their circumstances. These shocks dislodge them from social locations in which they are established and, as a result, disorient them, initially at least, and make them feel worse off than they were before or believe they should be. This approach also explores how people's reactions to these circumstances feed into the shaping and reshaping of societies through history.

By contrast, the social fluidity approach focuses upon the ways that human relationships are enacted through time and across space in sequences of interactions within networks. It is also concerned with the modalities whereby information, capital, credit, ideas, means of production and destruction, currents of emotion and people themselves are able to travel rapidly in many directions across oceans and continents. Finally, it examines the means by which people, groups and institutions respond to the pervasive systemic requirement that they adapt constantly to each other, to the situations they confront, and, more generally, to continual reconfigurations of the networks to which they belong.

Two sources of social dynamism

The social displacement perspective assumes that a powerful source of social energy, including the energy of political resistance, comes from responses

made by people to the threat or fact of forced displacement, in other words, removal or exclusion from what they see as their proper place in the socio-political order.

By contrast, within the social fluidity approach social behaviour is driven by the desire of individuals and groups to maximise or optimise the potential benefits of the social situation in which they are located and the resources to which they have access. This motivation may be variously labelled as 'ambition', 'doing the best for oneself' or, negatively, 'greed'. In sum, various forms of advantage-seeking provide the motor that drives social interaction in the social fluidity approach.

As has been seen, in the social displacement approach the emphasis shifts away from the logic of advantage-seeking with its dual pathways supposedly leading from desire towards either satisfaction if successful or dissatisfaction if not. Instead, we are focusing on the logic of harm-avoidance leading from fear (or anxiety) towards either relief if successful or anger (or resentment) if not. We are now concerned with people who have been pushed down, shoved aside, and told to 'get back.' Such people are denied entry to places where they feel they rightfully belong and/or used to be. As they see it, they have been wrongfully excluded and pushed into an inferior position. Those who find themselves in 'unacceptable' situations of this kind are likely to be angry. The gap between where they 'should' be and where they are 'wrongly' confined is painful for them to experience or contemplate.

This situation is likely to stimulate action to diminish the pain: for example, by trying to undermine or reconstruct groups, institutions or attitudes that stand in the way of their return to their proper social location; or by somehow escaping from their place of involuntary confinement in order to avoid the attendant humiliation and, perhaps, find the equivalent of their actual or metaphorical 'lost homeland' or something even better; or by reconstructing themselves emotionally, psychologically or culturally so they can learn to fit into their 'inferior' social location, now redefined as 'acceptable.' There are evidently further variations but this is hopefully sufficient to illustrate the energy-producing potential of social displacement, the urge to act that it engenders.

Social integration and system integration

The social fluidity and social displacement approaches overlap somewhat and can be combined in ways that make them compatible with each other as they were, for example, in Marx's work.[2] Each approach has its own priorities. An implicit assumption of the social fluidity perspective is that the demands of 'system integration' are overriding.[3] For example, people do not normally 'buck the market' but instead buckle down, willingly or not, to the tasks that must be done to ensure that 'capitalism' (or whatever the system shall be

called) keeps working, or they find a niche where they can survive and 'do their own thing' without troubling the system too much or being overly oppressed by it.

A related assumption is that individuals or organisations identify, limit and pursue their goals by exploiting the means and opportunities available within the arena defined by those systemic constraints. In the social fluidity approach, the human agent is often highly individualised: sometimes visualised as a sovereign maker of rational choices, sometimes as an insecure and confused person seeking guidance from advertisers, counsellors, salespeople or political activists, sometimes as an urbane opportunist who enjoys or endures whatever circumstances deliver. However, there is also scope within this approach for collective or organizational agency, as when, for example, national states develop tax and spend strategies, and companies open new branch offices in specific cities.

By contrast, the social displacement approach is grounded in the dynamics of social integration, including both social and inter-societal mal-integration and dis-integration. A social integration approach emphasises the structuring impact on the wider socio-economic and socio-economic order of sequences of negotiation, cooperation and conflict between individuals and groups who are trying to advance or protect their 'interests', as they see them. In the course of historical time, such sequences can lead to a restructuring of the wider socio-economic and socio-economic order.

An illustration: The 1940s debate about capitalism's future

The tension between the two approaches can be discerned in the debate under way towards the end of World War II about whether and how the capitalist market would continue to exist in the post-war world. This concern was largely a response to the challenges posed to the old liberal free market by the collapse of the old European empires that had provided the market with political protection in spite of all their inefficiencies, the violent expansion of Nazi Germany with its gross irrationalities, and the growth of Soviet communism, which was explicitly hostile to capitalism. This issue was taken up by Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992) and Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950).

Hayek and Schumpeter were both intellectual offspring of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had been shattered by the First World War. Both passed through the University of Vienna and the London School of Economics before settling in the United States. Neither was enthusiastic about the Soviet experiment. Both recognised the potential for the generation of great wealth and productive capacity through the market. Both embedded their technical insights about economic mechanisms such as the price system (in Hayek's case) and business cycles (Schumpeter) within more general interpretations of political economy and history, especially in Hayek's *The Road To Serfdom*

(Hayek, 1976), which first appeared in 1944, and in Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy* (Schumpeter, 1981), originally published in 1942.[4]

Despite these similarities, their interpretations of the dynamics and prospects of the liberal capitalist order were very different. For his part, Hayek emphasised the key role played by untrammelled market forces as the key to 'freedom' and, more generally, the importance of continuing social fluidity. By contrast, Schumpeter stressed creative destruction as the key to 'development' and, more generally, the inevitability of recurrent social displacement.

Friedrich Hayek and the social fluidity model

Hayek thought central planners lacked the universal knowledge and coherent value system needed to coordinate society's economic activities effectively. It was more efficient and rational to rely on the competitive price system. Prices told people what they needed to know to deploy their resources in pursuit of their goals, and to keep those goals realistic. The price system provided stimuli for workers, consumers and investors, identifying the best opportunities and encouraging frugality in times of scarcity. Prices made all relevant information available economically, effectively, and over the whole of the society. This knowledge could be obtained by 'watching the movement of a comparatively few prices, as an engineer watches the hands of a few dials' (Hayek, 1976: 36).

This outcome was not centrally planned. In fact, the more human beings tried to interfere with its operation, the less effective the price system became as a source of information. It enabled each individual to be his or her own planner, making their own decisions and organising their own lives.

Hayek thought no group of individuals was fit to plan the lives of others. As he saw it, people were mainly concerned with constantly adapting to their environment in order to survive. Rational calculation was mixed in with unconscious and intuitive reactions to changing circumstances. Society was a sort of laboratory in which a multitude of individuals made a multitude of decisions. People should take individual responsibility for their own mistakes without believing that a perfect society, providing ready-made solutions for their own problems, could be handed down to them by a government bureaucracy. Government should provide a simple and clear framework of law without trying to redistribute wealth, promote equality or restrict either the opportunities or responsibilities of free individuals. He thought that any alternative arrangement was likely to lead, ultimately, down the path towards fascist or communist dictatorship.

Joseph Schumpeter and social displacement

Like Hayek Joseph Schumpeter drew upon his experience of two world wars and the Great Depression in his own analysis which focused upon past and

future displacements of individuals, classes, institutions, technologies and modes of production. At their heart were business cycles, bringing booms and slumps, driven by innovations that came in clusters, making economic change 'lopsided, discontinuous, disharmonious . . . studded with violent burst and catastrophes . . . like a series of explosions' (Schumpeter, 1939: 102).

Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy (Schumpeter, 1981) was written soon after the great depression of the 1930s when capitalism's radical critics predicted that system's imminent failure. Schumpeter had the nerve to suggest not only that capitalism was a continuing success story but also that its very success would be its downfall. This would be the ultimate outcome of repeated processes of 'creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1981: 83) sweeping away established institutions and practices at the centre of economic life, making way for new types of commodity, material, process and organisation.

In Schumpeter's view, the unfolding sequence of displacements was sweeping away the lynchpin of the capitalist bourgeoisie: the independent innovating entrepreneurs who owned and managed their own businesses. Initially, innovation was the product of individual personalities imbued with creative energy. Later, as companies grew in size during the early twentieth century, innovation became routinised and rationalised, carried out by specialised departments and teams. The status and morale of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie withered away.

Meanwhile, the new spirit of systematic rationalisation raised the status and influence of intellectuals throughout society. Their radical political critiques weakened the aristocracy, especially after the First World War. This was significant, in Schumpeter's view, because capitalists had neither time nor energy to take leading political roles and left the tasks of government to the aristocracy. By the 1920s, many industrialists and financiers were turning towards socialist or social democratic governments for political help and protection, a trend strengthened after World War II, for example in Britain under a Labour government. Meanwhile, radical intellectuals were turning on capitalism itself. Schumpeter calculated that as public opinion shifted in the West during the 1940s and beyond, the state would expand the public sphere at the expense of the private. Government officials would displace private bankers at the commanding heights of the economy. As a result, capitalism would be increasingly displaced by socialism in the form of state control over the major levers of economic life.

Rebalancing the dialogue

The issue here is not whether Hayek, Schumpeter or neither was right but that the social sciences benefit from having articulate and well-researched contributions from both the social fluidity and the social displacement perspectives in continual dialogue and, sometimes, vigorous contention. In the period since the 1940s, both approaches have found adherents across the social sciences but

the pendulum has swung quite sharply first in one direction, then the other. Take British sociology as a case in point.

As sociology expanded in British universities during the 1960s and 1970s, particular attention was given to how people experienced social inequality. W G Runciman's *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Runciman, 1966)[5] expressed the concerns of many sociologists in its title. A few years later, Paul Willis explored how working-class lads experienced being channelled into jobs that offered little opportunity or intrinsic satisfaction (Willis, 1977). Not least, feminist sociology was drawing attention to the disadvantaged situation of women and challenging complacent and blinkered assumptions about gender relations in all spheres. Related work was being carried out on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb showed that offspring of blue-collar families who made managerial careers for themselves in Boston experienced a sense of displacement, albeit in an 'upward' direction as opposed to being pushed 'down and out' (Sennett and Cobb, 1972). Meanwhile, Bourdieu's work on symbolic violence appeared in *La reproduction* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970) and Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977) became available in English translation. This list is far from comprehensive. However, the works just mentioned from the 1960s and 1970s all focus on social displacement: how it occurs, how it is perceived, and how the potential for discontent among the displaced and denied is mobilised or quelled.

What has happened since then? There are many possible narratives of the development of sociology in the subsequent decades, including the 'turns toward' social theory, language, culture, feminism, and the body, and the growth of specialist offshoots in areas such as health, science and technology, media, criminology and education. However, part of the story is that by the 1990s and 2000s the pendulum had swung decisively towards the social fluidity approach, especially in the rapidly expanding sphere of globalization studies where Giddens, Beck, Castells, Bauman and Urry were key contributors. Each of the writers just mentioned have theoretical and empirical interests that also encompass social displacement, and, more generally, issues relating to both system integration and social integration.[6] But the 'cutting edge' theme during the past two decades has been the fluidity of the world: its riskiness, its 'runaway' nature, its networked complexity, its shifting and increasingly permeable boundaries.[7]

It is true that feminist scholarship, work on 'race' and ethnicity, and subaltern studies (for example) have all provided a continuing stress on aspects of social displacement. Also that 'social exclusion' became a policy focus during the recent Labour government. These are important successes. However, since the 1980s it has become more difficult to get a hearing in the popular media for the argument that specific structures and processes, which can be altered, make capitalism unfair and oppressive for many, and that political and economic structures and processes systematically degrade and diminish the poor and weak. Instead, the challenge of 'social exclusion' has typically been pre-

sented by politicians and the media as being about how to get excluded individuals back into a flexible and fluid labour market. A condition created by displacement has been defined in terms of the need for adaptation to fluidity. Within academe, the displacement approach has survived within lively enclaves (e.g. gender studies, 'race'/ethnicity) but the fluidity approach has taken centre stage.

It is time to rebalance the dialogue, to increase our empirical awareness and theoretical understanding of the dynamics of social displacement, especially in relation to globalization.[8] The rest of this paper approaches the challenge of rebalancing the dialogue by drawing attention to a body of recent literature on social displacement whose coherence and convergence have not been sufficiently recognised. Attention is paid, first to the dissemination of the social fluidity approach since the 1940s, and then to manifestations of the social displacement approach during a similar period. Neither account will be comprehensive but it will be suggested that the two permeation processes occurred in different ways. Let us begin by considering social fluidity, starting with Milton Friedman.

The Americanisation of Hayek

Hayek's political economy was 'Americanised' by Milton Friedman during the 1960s. Hayek's view had been that men and women were liable to be seduced by the deceptive solutions offered by planners without realising these would lead them down the 'road to serfdom.' He wanted to turn people back towards the harder road of freedom. Looking at the people, Hayek saw a bamboozled herd. By contrast, Milton Friedman saw Prometheus in chains. He stressed the energetic selfishness of the free individual. He wanted to release this creative energy from political captivity into a happier and more productive state.

Milton Friedman's political mission was to convince his readers that this individualistic spirit should be let loose throughout society. The case was set out in *Capital and Freedom* (Friedman, 1962), then again in *Free to Choose* (Friedman and Friedman, 1980), written with his wife Rose. His message was that market freedom should be the default arrangement, ensuring resources were deployed with greater care, efficiency and effectiveness. As Friedman put it, a person (say a government official) spending someone else's money (ie the tax payers') for someone else's supposed benefit (e.g welfare recipients) would be far less careful and attentive than if they (as citizens) were spending their own money on themselves.

By the time the fortieth anniversary edition of *Capital and Freedom* appeared in 2002, another Friedman, Thomas, had Americanised and popularised the fluidity model even more. In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Friedman, 2000) Thomas Friedman 'normalised' the painful disruptions caused by market movements and technological change, arguing that these kept the

world open and transparent, knocking down walls and barriers. New technology, information and finance were all being democratised, opening them up to new players throughout the world. Openness and transparency were being forced on businesses and government. The key feature of this fluid global political economy was speed and ease of movement over its entire surface.[9]

The other side of social fluidity

The social fluidity approach became influential across the political spectrum, acquiring greater depth and complexity. Manuel Castells saw that fluidity brought not only extensive interconnectedness but also considerable disorientation. In *The Information Age* (Castells, 1997; Castells, 1998; Castells, 2000), Castells argued that informational capitalism was producing crises of identity within national states, families and communities. Restructured organisations had flexible labour, decentralised structures of control, and open and dynamic networks able to handle information of great complexity at great speed. However, this network of networks was potentially volatile and unstable. As cities became 'spaces of flows' (Castells, 2000: 407) they ceased to be culturally meaningful places. These changes undermined the bonds between managers and labour forces, and between government and citizens.

Thomas Friedman and Castells both identified casualties of advancing social fluidity. Friedman advised potential 'losers' that they must adapt or go under, without considering further alternatives. Castells saw other possibilities, such as developing resistance or project identities. This move in the direction of the social displacement approach is paralleled by Zygmunt Bauman's extended analysis of (post) modern estrangement, the 'other side' of social fluidity.

Bauman has explored the restless dissatisfaction liable to plague early twenty-first century people whose lives, he argues, are uncertain, individualised, and fragmented. In books with titles such as *Liquid Modernity* (Bauman, 2000a), *The Individualized Society* (Bauman, 2000b), *Society Under Seige* (Bauman, 2002), *Liquid Love. On the frailty of human bonds* (Bauman, 2003), *Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts* (Bauman, 2004), *Liquid Life* (Bauman, 2005), *Liquid Fear* (Bauman, 2006) and *Liquid Times. Living in an age of uncertainty* (Bauman, 2007) Bauman examines the vulnerability of our contemporaries to recurrent experiences of disintegration, disaggregation, and disengagement, the difficulties of constructing and maintaining an identity without any authoritative guide, the way communal solidarities have dissolved leaving the locus and the institutional lineaments of power and sovereignty quite unclear, and the complexities of a world where bonds are not durable, giving us the ever-present task of defining and asserting the self. We have moved a long way from the confident Prometheanism of Milton Friedman.[10]

Bauman provides a map of our discomforts but no route to more solid ground where we can feel more comfortable. Others have been more

willing to identify key coordinates and nodes in the world of networks and flows.

Defining and mapping fluidity

In *Sociology Beyond Societies*, (Urry, 2000), John Urry presents a sociological manifesto for a world of networks, nodes and flow.[11] He explores the diverse mobilities of human and non-human entities, showing that interwoven with networks and nodes are global fluids, in other words 'remarkably uneven and fragmented flows of people, information, objects, money, images and risks across regions in strikingly faster and unpredictable shapes.' These fluid mobilities are 'heterogenous, uneven and unpredictable' (Urry, 2000: 38). Urry also explains that diverse mobilities entail diverse modes of sensing (not just seeing), various ways of framing and experiencing times, including 'instantaneous time' (129), different ways of 'dwelling' within a range of collective situations, and the challenge of coping with the risks, rights and duties of cosmopolitan or global citizenship.

In such a world it is very difficult for states to exercise detailed control over their highly mobile citizens (à la Foucault). Instead of being 'gardeners,' to cite Bauman (Bauman, 1987: 51–67), governments become 'gamekeepers', who try to 'regulate the herds moving in and across their land' (Urry, 2000: 189). Urry is describing the world in which Thomas Friedman's global investors feel at home, the key to their sense of belonging to the modern world being their proximity to hub airports with flight schedules that 'cover most of the globe' (63).

In *World City Network* (Taylor, 2004), political geographer Peter Taylor maps in empirical detail some of the global pathways linking the activities of highly inter-connected professionals, especially in service sectors such as accountancy, advertising and law. This helps him identify key parts of the global urban network. These include the dominant centres of New York and London, the regional clusters in Pacific Asia (via Jakarta and Taipei), Latin America (from Buenos Aires outwards), the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean (through Istanbul), including many emerging markets, and several US cities such as Baltimore that, surprisingly, 'tend to be less globally connected than their European counterparts' (Taylor, 2004: 204). Like Jane Jacobs, one of his intellectual inspirations, Taylor sees a tension between the interests and behaviour of cities, attuned to networks and flows, and of national governments that defend territorial boundaries.

Contrasting permeation processes

To summarise, in the post war period the development of the social fluidity approach began with an emphasis upon untrammeled markets driven by a transparent price system (Hayek), to which were added two further ingredi-

ents: confidence in the efficacy of human selfishness (Milton Friedman), and an optimistic vision of technology (eg Thomas Friedman). Subsequently, Castells and Bauman presented downbeat global visions derived from the pervasiveness of the fluid hi-tech market, with disorientation and estrangement as troubling by-products. More recently, Urry and Taylor, avoiding undue optimism or pessimism, have brought the needle back to the centre of the dial, so to speak. They have provided detached theoretical analysis and detailed empirical research. By the late 1990s, analyses of globalization provided the social fluidity approach with a congenial home turf where it became highly visible and deeply familiar.

It is easy to forget how much the permeation process just described resembled a tsunami. The political success of neo-liberalism during the Thatcherite-Reaganite eighties made waves that swept through many institutions, including higher education and the major research grant providers. For many academics it made sense to accommodate to the new agenda, to surf the new wave. Sociology and other social sciences did not lose their licence to criticise capitalism and the market but the big money gravitated towards institutions that could show their critiques were embedded in empirical inquiry that generated policy-relevant evidence for evidence-based policy. Grant applications, project reports and publications began to deploy terms like fluidity, flows, and flexibility with which the major financial sponsors were familiar and comfortable.

If the social fluidity approach was developed in part by skilful 'surfers' catching the wave of neo-liberal success and engaging in lively debate initially stimulated, although not bounded, by the neo-liberal agenda, the social displacement perspective has to an extent been developed by other scholars engaged in lone 'deep sea' explorations driven by their own agendas: not 'surfers' but 'divers.'[12] The clustering of studies in the years around 1970 (eg Runciman, 1966; Willis, 1970; Sennett and Cobb, 1972; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970 and Foucault, 1977) mentioned earlier, attracted notice partly because they occurred at a time when the Keynesian welfare state's implementation of its ideology of social rights was coming under political attack from both left and right. This political context threw these writers into prominence. However, there are other social scientists, widely dispersed across several disciplines, whose work has converged without any apparent intent or public awareness and in ways that, in retrospect, help us to trace the contours of a possible model of social displacement.

These explorers have broken surface with their intellectual findings at different times and in different places across the spectrum of the social sciences. Only now, when the pattern of their intellectual contributions over several decades can be discerned, is it possible to trace the crystallization of the social displacement approach in the post-war decades. As we begin to 'join the dots' in the following examples, the coherence and pervasiveness of this approach become clearer. For example, we see that social bonds within hierarchies, communities and work organizations, and their breakdown, are recurrent themes.

Displacement as the creation of new hierarchies

We can begin just before World War II. During the late 1930s Norbert Elias traced the development of court societies as part of his argument in *The Civilizing Process* (Elias, 1968; Elias, 1994). He argued that in the early Middle Ages, feudal life was dominated by continuing violent struggles in many localities.

Eventually, through decisive military victories, consistently enforced top-down authority came into existence, gradually reinforced by bureaucracies and by resources drawn from the taxation of trade. These developments, which took decades and even centuries, were encouraged by the pacification imposed by successful overlords. Warriors were forced to become obedient and control their emotions. The tightening of external controls was matched by the strengthening of internal, self-imposed, controls. Personal practices initially imposed from outside and above became a pattern of thought, feeling and behavior that was unconsciously adhered to. Here lay one of the origins of the 'civilized' habitus: controlled, calculating, detached and potentially devious.[13]

In 1942, only three years after Elias's book appeared, Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Democracy and Socialism* was published. As has been seen, it described the taming of independent entrepreneurs and the institutionalization of their functions as risk-taking innovators within the research and development departments of large business organizations. There is a remarkable similarity between this and a central theme of *The Civilizing Process*, *viz* the pacification of feudal lords and the institutionalization of their functions as risk-taking warriors within the war machines of early modern monarchies. The entrepreneur ended up in the company boardroom, the feudal warrior in the royal court, both of them more civilized but also, to a degree, humiliated.

In each case, the author argues, a way of life and a social class were effectively abolished, and with them a whole socio-political order: in one case, early feudalism and a seigneurial regime that alternated between rural estate and military adventures; in the other case, capitalism and an urban bourgeois life-style that hovered between café and counting house. The free-booting warrior and the independent entrepreneur gave way, respectively, to the aristocratic courtier and the graduate employee. Both were required to conform to the demands of an organizational hierarchy, unlike their predecessors.

Displacement as relegation within socio-political order

Another form of forced downward displacement occurs when an organisation, social class or group faces the prospect of being relegated within a socio-political order or market arena: for example, an aristocracy being undermined

by an increasingly powerful monarchy, peasant communities facing increasing exploitation and diminution of customary rights, a previously flourishing business confronting bankruptcy, or a political party losing an election after a period in government.

Barrington Moore was concerned with declining and oppressed social classes both in *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Moore, 1969) and *Injustice* (1978). Moore shows that members of rural classes losing out as the world around them urbanised, industrialised and bureaucratised, were often ready to take extreme measures to defend themselves or damage those who threatened them. People facing potential humiliation were ready to impose it on others. The same applied to urban workers. The result was sometimes civil war or revolution. The agents of radical social change were at least as likely to be declining social classes as rising ones.[14] Albert Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Hirschman, 1970) appeared shortly after Moore's classic work on dictatorship and democracy. Like Moore, Hirschman deals with how people respond when an entity to which they belong is 'failing', eg not delivering the outcomes and/or receiving the support it needs to maintain its position.

As Hirschman sees it, a choice is made between 'exit', the option of withdrawal from the business organisation, party or country, and 'voice', which is the option of trying to change the leadership's behaviour and mitigate or reverse failure. Moore's peasants have a similar choice when confronting increased hardship: between escape from the countryside to the town, and exercising 'voice' by demanding that their rural masters fulfill their implicit obligation to use their control and authority for the benefit of the whole community. For Hirschman the key variable is the strength of loyalty, the feeling of membership and commitment to the failing body. For Moore it is the degree of outrage felt by underlings at their masters' culpable neglect to fulfil their social contract with the communities they rule. In both cases, the strength of social bonds and judgments about legitimacy are decisive.

Displacement as resistance from below

The tensions that arise when established hierarchies break down and the old overlords face the prospect of being overwhelmed by one-time underlings is central to the analyses of both Samuel Huntington and Amy Chua. In *Who Are We? America's great debate* (Huntington, 2004). Huntington expressed concern that the Anglo-Protestant tradition vital, as he saw it, to American strength would be fatally undermined if Latino politicians, professionals and businesspeople displaced the existing incumbents. In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Huntington, 1997), he faced up to the relative decline of the West and the rise of 'the Rest,' and recommended that different civilizations should keep themselves to themselves, avoiding the temptation to interfere in their neighbours' business.

Amy Chua analysed socio-political situations where such avoidance was impossible. She argues that introducing the combination of electoral democracy and 'raw laissez-faire capitalism' (Chua, 2003: 14) over a short period of time in societies that had little experience of either typically produced two results. One was the rapid economic rise of successful ethnic minorities such as the Chinese in the Philippines or the Indians in East Africa. Their new wealth led to immense resentment. The other result was the structuring of democratic politics around campaigns aimed at taking revenge against the hated newly-rich groups. Brutal revenge cycles occurred such as those in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. To summarise, both Huntington and Chua analyse situations in which established hierarchies are challenged from below as power balances shift. Ethno-cultural entities (groups, civilizations) are set against each other in a desperate or malign spirit of 'displace or be displaced'.

Displacement as disorientation from above

Finally, we turn to displacement as deliberate strategy. In *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello showed that business managers confronting trade unions were adopting a 'regime of displacement' to run alongside the more established 'regime of categorization.' By the latter term they mean the system of formal agreements and institutions set up in conjunction with employees' representatives and providing the normative and procedural context for bargaining. These orderly arrangements were deliberately disrupted by a diverse and intentionally unsystematic accumulation of special instances, conditions and distinctions created by management, subverting the formal system and undermining its authority and dependability. This was the regime of displacement. Its arbitrary shifts in rules, practices and settings had the intended effect of undermining predictability and putting workers and their representatives at a continual disadvantage.

Naomi Klein has given another name to the same strategy of subverting expectations, especially when carried out on the macro scale, affecting whole cities, regions or countries. She calls it 'disaster capitalism' and argues that it puts into effect the 'shock doctrine' (Klein, 2007). Populations that are suddenly disoriented on a large scale will be unable to resist radical innovations that serve the interests of those who want to expand the part played by the market and the privately-owned corporations that benefit most from manipulating it. One example she uses is the flooding of New Orleans in 2005. Milton Friedman wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* that Hurricane Katrina had, in effect, abolished the city's public school system and this provided an opportunity to introduce a system of privately-run (though state subsidised) charter schools in their place.[15]

The central point is that displacement, whether intended or unintended, can serve the interests of capitalism as long as its supporters are prepared to seize

opportunities as they arise. In *The Shock Doctrine*, Klein sums up her analysis as follows: 'the original disaster . . . puts the entire population into a state of shock.' Its effect is 'to soften up whole societies . . . (and) shocked societies often give up things they would otherwise fiercely protect' (17). A flow of disasters can be relied on since the pursuit of growth at all costs means environmental regulation is being neglected and wars to control scarce resources including oil are liable to recur: 'Disaster generation can be left to the market's invisible hand. This is the one area in which it actually delivers' (427).[16]

A research agenda on social displacement and globalization

Some key concerns of the social displacement approach may now be summarised. They are:

i) the origin and character of processes of forced social dislocation, intended or unintended;

ii) the ways in which those process lead to the ejection or exclusion of specific individuals or groups against their will from particular social locations and contexts within which they have been embedded;

iii) the fact that those who are ejected or excluded feel they rightfully belong to the places or categories from which they have been rejected; and

iv) the responses by those who undergo forced displacement to their own feelings of fear/anxiety and/or anger/resentment, which include both

   a) responses directed at themselves (eg the reshaping of their own capacities, intentions or identities) and

   b) responses directed at the broader social context, identified in terms of structures, relationships, groups or individuals (eg various forms of revenge, resistance, reform, rebellion, and/or retreat including passivity, exit or escape).

It is also possible to compare the social fluidity and social displacement perspectives as two approaches to the study of globalization, as summarised in table one. As can be seen, the two approaches are compatible although neither necessarily implies the other. The advantages of combining the two approaches in this context include the following: neither is confined within the 'nation-state' paradigm[17]; the integration, mal-integration and disintegration of systems and structures, in all their complexity, from local to global, command equal attention; the springs of human agency are seen to encompass both advantage-seeking and harm-avoidance; and globalization is recognized to be conducive not only to possibilities for increased happiness, freedom and empowerment but also to the risk of pain, restriction and humiliation.

    In conclusion, it will be useful to set out some assumptions and propositions that could be put to the test as part of a research agenda focused on globalization and concerned with the analysis of social displacement processes. The

Table 1 Two complementary ways of analyzing globalization

Approach:	Social Fluidity	Social Displacement
Primary focus of research and analysis:	Patterns of flows and mobilities through networks of, eg information, capital, credit, ideas, people with reference to both their systemic origins and consequences, and people's experience of and adaptations to them.	Processes of forced social displacement, eg in relation to socio-political hierarchies, communities and work organizations, including both their structural/processual origins and consequences and people's experience of and responses to them
Key human drives:	Advantage-seeking (desire) leading towards either contentment or discontent	Harm-avoidance (fear/anxiety) leading towards either relief or anger/resentment
Negative assumption:	Nation-states do *not* structure and control most social processes globally	Globalization is *not* necessarily experienced as a process of liberation and self-realisation

following statements are applicable, in different ways, to individuals, groups (of various sizes), and organizations (including national governments).

1. Forced social displacement may be experienced in at least three ways: as conquest, relegation and exclusion. The experience is painful and liable to be described as 'humiliating.'
2. Historically, globalization has subjected individuals and populations to forced social displacement in at least three ways: through colonialism and its aftermath, through the imposition of politico-economic structures and practices from outside (eg the 'Washington consensus') that disrupt established local social hierarchies in the name of a particular 'logic of the market,' and through the disorienting effects of an increasingly unavoidable 'cosmopolitan condition' that leaves people stranded between the old and the new, in an anomic arena where many different cultures, religions and ethnicities share the same social space with no settled hierarchy or clear boundaries between them.[18]
3. Depending on contingent constraints and opportunities, people may cope with displacement's attendant anxiety and resentment by attempting one or more of the following: escape, acceptance and/or rejection. The rejection may take the form of resistance (mainly concerned with defending the group's or one's own resources and capacities) or revenge (mainly concerned with damaging a target that represents the 'cause' of one's humiliation), or both.

4. The coping strategies listed have a tendency to generate continuing 'humili- ation cycles', either by repeatedly imposing painful displacements on others (eg as objects of revenge or as potential obstacles to successful escape) or on the self (eg by becoming vulnerable to continuing victimisation follow- ing acceptance of the displacement).

5. Breaking these cycles is difficult but the chances of doing this are increased if two conditions exist: the willingness of powerful and respected third parties to help reduce the level of hostility and encourage cooperation; and the availability of sufficient surplus resources to help restore those con- cerned to a more 'acceptable' condition in which they feel less humiliated and more willing to cooperate constructively with others.

6. Globally, it may become increasingly difficult to meet the conditions just outlined as the world becomes increasingly multi-polar (rather than subject to US dominance) and the competition for material resources (including energy resources) becomes more intense, both inhibiting cooperation and decreasing the availability of surplus resources to help fund conciliation processes.

7. The danger then becomes that at many levels from the international arenas to local city government, the 'politics of hope' stressing opportunities for advancement and self-realisation will be restricted by lack of material resources in many locales, leading to an increase in 'the politics of humili- ation', in other words, a politics that cultivates feelings of resentment among those who experience forced displacement, and recommends aggression against those who can be held responsible.[19]

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Notes

2 For example, both approaches are intertwined in *The Communist Manifesto* where, Marx and Engels proclaim that 'All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air . . .' Meanwhile, 'The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.' This is a fluid or 'liquifying' world but at the same time a world full of displacements: 'The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; . . . . The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry; the place of the industrial middle class by industrial millionaires, the leaders of the whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois. . . . The bour- geoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, ... has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors" . . . (and) . . . The lower strata of the middle class – the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants – all these sink gradually into the proletariat . . . The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superin-

cumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air' (Marx and Engels, 1969: 51–2; 60). Likewise, Keynes represents a mid-point between displacement and fluidity. He saw that global disruptions had undermined the confidence that stimulated the flow of cash and credit into spending and investment. For a while capitalism was beached, disrupted, and under threat of displacement. Keynes developed a strategy for floating the capitalist boat once more (see Skidelsky, 1992). A third case, different yet again, is Foucault who evinces a strong sense of personal 'displacement' due to the stifling ubiquity of alienating power/knowledge structures – and visualizes release through the dissolution of the self in fluid chaos (see Smith, 2001a: 93–7).

3 Lockwood, 1964.
4 For a more extended comparison between Hayek and Schumpeter, see Smith, 1990: 131–50.
5 Runciman's important book cannot be discussed in detail in this paper but on Runciman see Smith, 1991: 130–9; 186–8.
6 See, for example, Bauman, 1987; Beck, 2000; Castells, 1977; Giddens, 1973; Lash and Urry, 1987.
7 See for example, Bauman, 1998; Beck, 1998; Castells, 1997; Castells, 1998; Castells, 2000; Giddens, 1999; Urry, 2007.
8 An important move in this direction was the recent publication of Sylvia Walby's *Globalization and Inequalities* (Sage, 2009) which uses complexity theory to suggest a way of re-thinking our approach to systems, structures and social change. See also Wikinson and Pickett, 2009.
9 On Thomas Friedman see also Smith, 2006: 88–90; 154–7.
10 On Bauman see also Smith, 1999.
11 *Sociology Beyond Societies* (Urry, 2000) both drew upon and presaged a substantial body of theoretical and empirical work by this author. See, for example, Dennis and Urry, 2009; Lash and Urry, 1987; Lash and Urry, 1994; Urry, 2007 and Urry, 2011 (forthcoming).
12 It is, of course, possible to be both a surfer and a diver, though perhaps not at the same time.
13 On Elias, see also Smith, 1991: 46–53; Smith, 2001a; and Smith, 2001b.
14 On Moore see also Smith, 1983.
15 The US federal response to Hurricane Katrina was seen locally as a massive failure to exercise the duty of care. See Smith, 2006, 81–5.
16 Also relevant to the development of the social displacement perspective are the important discussions on 'recognition' stimulated by the work of Axel Honneth. See, for example, Honneth, 1996. Fuller discussion would require a separate paper but see also, for example, Margalit, 1996; Sennett, 2004; Lindner, 2006; Moisi, 2009; Phillips, 1998; Smith, 2006: 35–6; and Taylor, 1994.
17 cf Elias, 1978, 241 cited in Urry, 2000: 7–8.
18 For a sharply-drawn characterisation of this cosmopolitan condition, focused on cities rather than globalization, see Wirth, 1938. On Wirth, see Smith, 1988: 153–66.
19 Some of these themes are explored in *Globalization. The Hidden Agenda* (Smith, 2006).

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