CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COSMOPOLITAN CONDITION

Introduction

The imperial impulse and the logic of the market both evoke sharp-edged images of 'perpetrators' (wicked sheriffs, heartless traders) and 'victims' (defenceless subjects and workers). The third global generator of humiliation is less easy to characterise. Why do some people experiencing the cosmopolitan condition identify themselves as 'victims' while others do not? How do they decide who is to 'blame' for their feelings of displacement and belittlement?

Cosmopolitan conspirators

The conspirators who flew the two hijacked planes into the twin towers were not poor. Nor were they scarred by a childhood and adolescence lived in the prison-like conditions of the Gaza Strip. They were thoroughly middle class. It would be difficult to make the case that they were humiliated by a denial of freedom, opportunity or the means to live a comfortable modern life as that is generally understood.

To understand them we should turn not to Robin Hood, nor to the Pied Piper but to Guy Fawkes, the infamous gunpowder plotter who tried to blow up the English Houses of Parliament in 1605.

The leading 9/11 hijackers were urbane religious zealots: well-educated, well-heeled, well-travelled and well-connected. They were global citizens or, more accurately, global denizens.[i] Consider some of their backgrounds:

- Mohamed Atta, who lived in Germany, was an urban planner, the son of an Egyptian attorney;
- Ziad al-Jarrah, born in Lebanon, also came from an affluent family and, like Atta, was pursuing higher education in Germany.
- Marwan al-Shehhi, Atta's cousin, was remembered as being 'convivial and "a regular guy," wearing Western clothes and occasionally renting cars for trips to Berlin, France and the Netherlands' [ii]

If we want to make sense of what they did, to know why they carried out such a desperate and deadly act, we should go back four centuries, not to the Middle East but to Europe in the early modern period, the period of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, the time in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when men and women killed each other in very large numbers in the name of religion.[iii]

Let us compare the conspirators who carried out the 9/11 attacks in the United States with the gunpowder plotters of 1605, Guy Fawkes and the rest, all devoted Roman Catholics, all determined to detonate a huge explosion beneath the English ruling class at the opening of parliament.

The gunpowder plotters who attacked the Houses of Parliament were also urbane religious zealots: well-educated, well-heeled, well-travelled and well-connected. They were men about town:

- Robert Catesby was prosperous, from a very good family, known in court circles, and much travelled on the continent of Europe.[iv]
- Everard Digby was also a courtier, well regarded.

- Robert Wintour, rich from the salt trade, married the daughter of an aristocrat.
- Christopher Wright, old school friend of Guy Fawkes, owned property at Lambeth in London and spent much of his time there.
- Thomas Percy was related to the Earl of Northumberland. [v]

Why, in 1605 or 2001, were a number of relatively affluent, educated men, apparently with so much to live for, willing to get involved in extreme actions that carried the certainty or, at least, the very high risk of death?

That question is worth asking, and the parallel worth drawing because Europe in the sixteenth and early seventeenth had many striking similarities to the world as a whole during the twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries. History can teach us something about what is happening now.

The half-built upper-storey

A metaphor will help. Suppose you and your neighbours live in a line of houses. Sometimes you fight with each other and sometimes you cooperate but your main concern is to keep other people away from your property and perhaps get your hands on some of theirs. All this happens within a framework of rough and ready rules you all more or less accept. These rules have developed over quite a long time and continue in existence because they more or less suit everyone.

Then you begin to notice that builders' scaffolding is being assembled around all the houses and a new platform is being created at roof height over all the houses. You protest and even attack the scaffolding and builders but the work goes on. You cannot

prevent it. More and more material gets shifted up onto the overhead platform. Machinery springs into life, loudspeakers blare, and you can see walls being built up there and doors and windows being installed.

Some of your children and hired help start to clamber up the scaffolding to have a look. Many of them stay there and don't come back down. The next indignity occurs when pile drivers burst through your roof and force steel girders down through your living space to ground level. Life gets very difficult and you cannot rely on anything any more.

By now you are busy consulting with your neighbours, sending delegations upstairs to the new upper storey that is being constructed over all your heads, and thinking of moving up there yourself, not because you particularly want to, but because it seems the only way to survive.

That is a picture of early modern Europe at the time of Guy Fawkes (see figure 1). It is also a picture of the late modern world four centuries later (see figure 2).

Figure One

Building a new upper story: before and after in early Modern Europe

BEFORE		represent feudal landed estates, local dynastic lords, and petty princedoms in *medieval* Europe until about 1500.
AFTER	New 'upper storey'	represent feudal landed estates, local dynastic lords and petty princedoms in *early modern* Europe, ie approx 1500-1650.  Represents the new 'upper storey' appearing above as stronger dynastic (national) monarchies develop, exploiting resources from rural society and the cities (after approx 1500).

Early modern Europe

By the sixteenth century European feudalism was falling apart. It was eventually replaced by national states operating at a higher societal level. Feudal lords fought against this without success. Some went down fighting but the others had to adapt to a new socio-political regime, eventually dominated by glorious monarchs buttressed by glamorous royal courts, imposing judicial systems, well-equipped armies and loyal bureaucrats. By the late seventeenth century, the regime of Louis XIV of France was the supreme example of this new order.

A new breed of monarchs emerged, building their power base outside the old feudal bonds of loyalty between lords and vassals. For a long time these monarchs were as insecure as they were glorious. However, their campaigns to impose conquest humiliation on the old, highly localised, feudal order of lords and peasants was helped by another process that was simultaneously undermining this order: the drift of people from the countryside to the cities. This diminished the authority and resource base of the seigniorial lord on his local landed estate (see figure 2).

Figure Two
The drift of power and influence
away from feudal landed estates
in early modern Europe (approx 1500-1650)



↗ → = shift of power and influence

The towns, especially ports and capital cities, had grown in size during the two hundred years since the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century.[vi] The invention of printing helped to make more people aware of the excitements of city life and strengthened their magnetic pull. The towns offered an exciting alternative to the boredom and oppression of life in the village.

Town life was risky and dangerous. You might, for example, catch a nasty disease, get mugged, lose all your savings, get injured trying new kinds of work, be lynched by an angry crowd or suffer abuse from an employer who felt no sense of responsibility towards you. Despite these dangers, the towns were pulling many energetic, ambitious and skilled workers away from the countryside and out of the lord's influence. This fluid, expanding, social arena in the cities was vigorously and effectively challenging the control that feudal powers in the countryside had over the European population.

In town, the role of the market was much more evident and highly mobile, non-fixed assets were the main power resource. In these new market-driven arenas people could make their own way in the world, become 'masterless'[vii] men and women, lapse into anonymity, and even change identity. All these things threatened the old feudal order.

During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, monarchs such as Elizabeth I put on a grand show of propaganda and employed quite effective torturers and spy systems.[viii] But seen from below, from the perspective of those fellow dynasts these royal families had left behind when they seized the crown, it was evident that the national rulers did not have the sort of day-to-day control over, the urban population that the rural aristocrats and their fathers and grandfathers had enjoyed over the locals in the countryside.

The growing cities were dangerous and violent places, harbouring fanatics and visionaries. They were the seedbeds for the Protestant Reformation and the answering Counter-Reformation. These movements brought fundamentalist

enthusiasm, crowd violence, rebellion and war to Europe for much of the sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth century.

In large part, the story of globalisation in our present cosmopolitan era is a larger, louder, version of the urbanization story. To take just one aspect, the challenge of finding modes of communication and coexistence between different cultures was being confronted in microcosm in Europe over three centuries ago.[ix] When emigrants from the little local worlds of early modern Europe met in the big city in early modern Europe, the resulting clash of cultures was considerable. It was not easy for most people to travel long distances by land, especially when they had fields to till. Printing and the circulation of printed materials only began to get under way in the late fifteenth century. In spite of the best efforts of the Church to impose uniformity, people in adjacent valleys often had very different cultures and quite distinctive dialects.

The late modern world

Now, four centuries later, the story is being repeated at a higher societal level. But in addition to urbanisation, which continues in strength throughout the world, the part played by globalization has become more prominent.[x] This process is enabling many more people to live much of their lives shifting from one society to the next, occupying the social spaces above and between them. This provides both a challenge to, and an escape from, the pressures of life in specific national societies.

The global arena is a fluid, amorphous zone of ramifying networks and rapidly shifting people and capital. In this arena global finance, global business, global crime,

global migration, global NGOs, and global diplomats operate and exercise influence in several ways: through the internet, along airline routes joining major cities, within networks linking expatriate communities across national borders, and in shopping and entertainment spaces in almost every locality. The global arena with its crowds of economic migrants and global investors, and its complex intertwining networks, is a different world from the old national state with its sturdy hierarchical structure integrating groups that 'know their place.'[xi]

Figure Three
Building a new upper story: before and after in the late modern world

BEFORE		represent sovereign national states in the *early and mid- 20th century*
AFTER	New 'upper storey' 	represent sovereign national states in *late 20th and early 21st centuries*.  Represents the new 'upper storey' appearing above as multinational corporations, multilateral organisations (eg EU, WTO. IMF) and a new 'global monarchy' (US) assert their influence.

In our late modern world, in a similar way to sixteenth century Europe but at a higher societal level, there is a shift in power balances away from the old territorial powers . This shift is happening in two directions (see figure 4):

- B→A, ie towards the winners in the contest for domination among national states, although these winner (ie the United States) has not securely or fully institutionalised and legitimised its rule, and
- B→C, ie towards a new, fluid, expanding, social arena where the market is much more important, one where highly mobile, non-fixed assets, as distinct from the fixed asset of land or territory, are the main power resources. In other words, towards the increasingly urbanised arena of globalisation.[xii]

Figure Four
The drift of power and influence
away from 'sovereign' nation-states
in the late modern world



↗ → = shift of power and influence

Like the feudal landed estates in Europe centuries before, national states throughout the world are finding that power resources and authority are drifting away from them. In the old days, when they looked upwards, the old feudal lords saw the royal insignia of an upstart Bourbon, Stuart or Hohenzollern ('who do they think they are?') at whose court they were commanded to attend.[xiii]

These days, a similar experience is being imposed on many national leaders. When they look upwards they see the Stars and Stripes. For the moment at least,

the new global monarch and royal palace ('who do they think they are?') are in Washington. These days, the equivalent of being presented at the royal court is being admitted to the World Trade Organisation.

It is easy to understand that these changes produce widespread feelings of being displaced, undervalued or left out. These experiences are deeply unsettling for everybody. They are unsettling for the new and insecure global monarchy, the United States, which, like the new monarchies in Europe centuries ago, is making up its new role as it goes along and is highly sensitive to criticism. They are unsettling for the 'old feudal barons,' in other words, the leaders of the other nations, now forced to bow down before a state their predecessors had treated as culturally inferior. They are unsettling for ordinary people, who enjoy the trappings of American life when they can get them but do not want to be ruled by a foreign government they cannot think of as 'their own.'

Displacement and revenge

In early modern Europe, some people hated the new upper storey being built above their heads, especially if they lived in a country where the ideological cement of the new national monarchy was a religion they could not accept.

Men like Fawkes, Catesby and the others, belonged to a long-established religion that had lost its political protection. The old rules no longer applied and the roof beneath which they had sheltered was being destroyed. In the 'good old days' Henry VIII had been pleased to receive the title 'Defender of the Faith' from the pope. But his

eventual successor, James I, showed every sign of becoming a persecutor of the Roman Catholic religion when he assumed power in 1603.

Over eighty years before, the split in Christendom following Martin Luther's Protestant revolt in 1517 had weakened the influence of the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire throughout Europe.[xiv] Extremists like Fawkes and Catesby could neither forget nor forgive.

The similarity to Bin Laden and his followers is striking. Eighty years after the fall of the Ottoman empire following World War I Bin Laden was still lamenting this disaster whose effects on Muslims in the Middle East was similar in some respects to the impact of the Reformation on English Catholics. Specifically, it took away their old sense of political and psychological security and left them more exposed to the intrusion of 'enemies.'

The main motivation for the gunpowder plotters was the fear that Catholicism was about to be criminalized.[xv] England had been a Catholic country until a few decades before but those who clung to Rome became, in effect, enemies of the state. The new king, James I, imported from Scotland to succeed Elizabeth I, wanted legislation that would deprive Catholics of their civil rights, making them virtual outlaws.

The gunpowder plotters' drive to action was four-fold. Firstly, there was a sense of displacement, of belonging to a group that had been kicked out of its rightful social location and denied what it was owed. Secondly, there was a feeling of being crushed and conquered. The forces of repression were directed against them whenever they

displayed their faith openly. Thirdly, they were aggressively determined to strike back and take revenge, hurting their tormenters as much as possible. Fourthly, they wanted to impose their own way upon others, giving them at best the choice of acquiescence or death.

The 9/11 hijackers had a similar four-fold drive: a sense of displacement, a feeling of being crushed and diminished, a desire to take revenge and a determination to fight for the triumph of the faith. Consider the description of Mohamed Atta given by a German urban planner who had been friendly with him[xvi]

Feeling displaced: Atta's German friend commented that '(Mohamed) didn't take part in many affairs of the western world' although he was 'in contact with Arabian friends.' Atta found himself in 'a strange world' with 'a strange language' and a '[s]trange daily life for a religious orientated person. Most of Germans are not used to pray daily…' It was evident that Atta did not have 'many relationships to the German or to the western world' although he 'studied the western world and he studied the policy, the democratic practices' while living ' in a much more strict way than [a] person from the western world.'

Feeling crushed and diminished: Atta's ambition was 'to work for an international organisation.' One advantage of this plan was that 'he wouldn't have been in danger of being imprisoned, he wanted to work in Egypt, he wanted to work in Arabia as a planner, as an urbanist, but he wanted to be saved [from]… being criminalised.' Atta's 'dream [was] to work in Egypt' but he feared he would not 'be allowed to say what he meant and for [a] well educated person, it's some kind of torture not to be

allowed to tell what your confessions are.' He experienced an 'inner exodus,' like others who live in countries 'with …very restrictive political systems…they don't tell what they think.' Atta wanted to live happily in Egypt but …'not being allowed telling or showing the inner opinions, not having the opportunity to show the professional knowledge he had would be some kind of torture….'

Taking revenge: When Atta's friend was asked 'for any explanations of what happened in New York, ' he immediately thought of 'the visit of Ariel Sharon visiting the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.' The point was that Sharon 'threatened a holy place of the Islamic world and threatening or damaging a holy place is a sacrilege and it may have been answered by threatening and damaging the holy place of the western world and from the view of an Arab, from the view of a Muslim, the World Trade Centre in New York is a holy place for the western world and this may…show an interrelationship and this visit of Ariel Sharon giving fire to the oil or burning the oil may have been the last drop, the water overflowing.'

Determination to fight: When Atta's German ftiend first met him in 1993, he did not wear a beard, but 'in about 1995, end of 1994, suddenly he had a beard and . …he told me all people wearing a beard in Egypt are thought to be fundamentalists and due to this in solidarity with all people criminalised in Egypt now. He wanted to wear a beard also.' The point was that Atta 'didn't want to hide his personal opinions, religious people have a beard in Egypt and if you do not want to be criminalised or if you don't want to have problems, you can't [wear] your beard but Mohamed told me … he wanted to show his opinions freely, openly and he didn't want to hide his opinions'.

Humiliated liberation

The conspiratorial networks of the gunpowder plotters and the 9/11 hijackers were embedded within much larger networks of cosmopolitan men and women who became vulnerable to a paradoxical condition: feeling liberated and humiliated at the same time. The reason is that urban immigrants in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries discovered, as new global denizens are now discovering, that the arenas of social existence to which they now belonged, or half belonged, were full of new conflicts and anxieties.

Men and women living urban lives, cosmopolitan people, find they have more freedom to think and feel for themselves. In fact, they are obliged to think and feel for themselves. There is no alternative. Unquestionable sources of authority are very difficult to find. For example, in this new world, those who wield most power resources worry constantly about their legitimacy. Their right to rule is frequently contested, sometimes violently.

In early modern Europe, as now, there were many areas of social, political, economic and moral life with very little institutional support for any clear set of rules. Town dwellers were caught between feudal lords busily protecting their own dynastic interests, monarchs who were as insecure as they were glorious, and a Church that had lost much of its credibility. Surrounded as they were by evidence of society's instability and life's uncertainty, how could townspeople chart a passage through their mortal existence towards the hereafter?

Now, as then, cosmopolitans are caught in between. The primordial socio-political orders, the village or city 'back home' from which they have half escaped and to which they still half belong, are being profoundly transformed by the pressure of competition from the dynamic new world taking shape outside and above. The town imposes its influence upon rural society, just as, later, globalisation penetrates the boundaries of national states and transforms the life within.

The new urban or global arenas in which they find themselves and to which they also only half belong do not provide strong, clear, coherent and morally satisfying rules and structures. There are many new opportunities for advancement or failure, and a high degree of freedom from moral surveillance. This is liberating. However, urbanisation and globalisation also impose humiliation. In the new socio-political arena, the level of social support for the cosmopolitan's distinctive primordial identity, the one inherited from the old society, is greatly reduced. Meanwhile, the old society seems as if it is being washed away by tides of commerce and bureaucracy driven by outside interests in league with local collaborators.

Cosmopolitan wanderers are caught between the Devil and the deep blue sea. They lose their old position within the local communities they have left behind. The longer they are away, the more likely it is that when they return 'home' they are half-strangers. It is a strain trying not to embarrass relatives with the knowledge you have of the wider world, nor let slip your amusement at their old-fashioned ways. Meanwhile, you see the old place changing, becoming more 'modern,' less authentic. After a while, it hurts to be there too long. You get bored and angry.

Back in the big wide world, where has the cosmopolitan 'arrived'? Life is a disorderly jungle of people getting by, getting high, getting on - and going where? There are too many confusing answers on offer and too many people satisfied with no answer at all. What does one do, surrounded by slick salesmen and turned-off cynics? Cosmopolis – the big city, the global arena – does not provide a simple, straightforward, supportive and reassuring source of authority that tells you who you are, how you should live and what you should be satisfied with.[xvii]

This analysis of the cosmopolitan condition accounts for two of the elements already identified in the make-up of the potential religious zealot: a sense of displacement, and a feeling of being crushed or diminished. These are both aspects of humiliation. However, most cosmopolitans do not become religious zealots, even if they may be openly or secretly sympathetic to some of their actions, and even if they sometimes take part in crowd actions led by such zealots.

Two other elements were identified in the zealot's make-up: a desire to take revenge and a determination to resist by fighting to the death for the triumph of their own point of view. These are two ways of responding to humiliation. Why some people choose these specific responses is a matter requiring more detailed investigation of particular communities, particular cultures, particular social networks and particular personalities.[xviii] It is enough, for the moment, to realise that *some* people will make those deadly choices.[xix]

Technology, politics and religion

Drawing back a little, it is becoming clear that the part played by the cosmopolitan condition as a global generator of humiliation is a complex one in which long-term historical trends in the spheres of technology and politics are important, as well as religion. Let us look at these factors, briefly, in turn.

Information and identity

Some aspects of our contemporary cosmopolitan condition have been well described by Manuel Castells in *The Information Age* (Castells 1997; Castells 1998, Castells 2000). The central argument of his three volumes may be summarised in a single sentence: new technology makes possible informational capitalism, which is producing crises of identity within national states, families and communities.

Castells argues that during the 1970s, cost pressures from wage increases and the rise in the price of oil drove the leaders of advanced capitalist economies to use new information technology as a tool in restructuring their organisations. This meant more flexible labour, decentralisation of control, and a shift away from rigid hierarchies to open and dynamic networks that could handle great complexity and a constant traffic of information. Informational capitalism was able to integrate dynamic economic sectors worldwide into a network of networks, especially in the arena of finance.

There were two results. Financial volatility was quickly transmitted around the world, damaging vulnerable national economies. A gulf opened up between global

managerial elites, living in gated communities, and their labour forces: poor, localised, individualised, atomised and trapped in their ghettoes. Cities became 'spaces of flows' (Castells 200, 407), nodes within global networks, not valued places full of meaning for their inhabitants.

Three kinds of identity crisis have developed:

1.National states become players at the global level at the cost of losing touch with their national citizens whom they can neither serve nor control to the same extent as previously.

2.Throughout the world the patriarchal family is undermined as women are drawn into the labour force and acquire increased control over their fecundity.

3. Media screens bring new cultural forces into local communities, undermining their old sense of reality.

These identity crises may, hopes Castells, lead to proactive social movements based on 'project identities' (Castells 1997, 8) seeking to make the world more just. However, the initial response consists of challenges expressing 'resistance' identities (8), for example, fundamentalism, ethnic conflict, and riots in poor neighbourhoods. These forces may be found at work in Russia, Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and Europe. Castells' optimistic conclusion is that 'There is nothing that cannot be changed by conscious, purposeful social action, provided with information, and supported by legitimacy' (Castells 1998, 360).

Broken bonds

Castells is a little too optimistic. A social movement seriously seeking greater justice, one with a 'project' identity (in his terminology), would need either to win control of important levers of political and economic influence or cooperate with allies who already have such control.

However, both strategies are made more difficult by the weakening of the bond between governments and citizens in recent decades. The proportion of men and women abstaining from voting increased during the 1990s throughout the world.[xx] People are steering clear of formal party politics, not getting involved if they can avoid it. This represents an active refusal to participate in a political system that many ordinary people think is now failing them. It is a revolt against being 'taken for a ride.'

In response, government has become a 'stalker,' watching its estranged citizens, silently and uninvited. The state's message 'we are watching you' is a forceful reassertion of a relationship that many citizens (replying 'Get lost. We don't want to know') are trying to weaken, rather as an ex-wife might want to escape from a husband for whom she has lost respect.[xxi]

Since 9/11, the 'war on terror' has provided an opportunity for states to become more active and forceful. The need to defend the nation against terrorism has provided a rationale for increasing the state's powers to arrest and imprison people. Some of these powers may infringe previously untouchable civil liberties and even go some way beyond what defence against terrorism strictly demands.

The current climate is very unfavourable to political initiatives arising outside the charmed circle that includes national government circles, the top level of 'official' politics and the media, mainly controlled by large business interests. When major economic and political interests are involved, it is difficult to behave like an active democratic citizen without feeling like a 'trouble-maker.' Those who are resentfully wrestling with the indignities of the cosmopolitan condition will not find much satisfaction there.

The bonds of fundamentalism[xxii]

The situation is made more difficult still by the fact that throughout the American, Eurasian and African continents a kind of reformation is occurring. Like the Reformation in early modern Europe it has two elements.

On the one hand, it is a protest against 'false' intermediaries between the people and higher authority. Nowadays these intermediaries include not only party politicians but also the mass media, a modern 'priesthood' claiming to interpret the words of the great god Demos. Many people are saying to these intermediaries: do not speak and act for us; do not tell us how to feel; we will do these things for ourselves. Disillusionment with the failed promises of those holding political authority has led many to withdraw, to privatise their ambitions and hopes, to turn themselves into workers and consumers first and foremost, looking after themselves and their families.[xxiii]

On the other hand, the new late modern global reformation is, like the early modern European one, a search for identity and meaning. The most ambitious and dedicated worker-consumers, those who want to 'get on' not just 'get by,' have to impose and accept a high degree of self-discipline. They learn to control and shape their bodies, minds and emotions.[xxiv] Such a determined regime of self-preparation is likely to lead towards two questions: what kind of person do I want to be? And are the identities on offer satisfying? A kind of filtering process may occur as depicted in figure 5.

Figure Five
The cosmopolitan filter



Cosmopolitan America

We can summarise our current situation as follows. The old system of national states cannot easily contain, control and institutionalise the flows of people, capital, goods, weapons and ideas around the globe. The world has undergone

political de-regulation as a result of the break up of the European empires, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. There is no global political force that is sufficiently capable and motivated to perform the task of regulation.

The United States, or the American empire, is the nearest thing we have to such a force. The US government has an unrivalled capacity to get its own way on specific matters. However, its current and, indeed, 'normal' stance is 'America first.' The US government is trying to protect its basic supply lines, guarantee its own strategic security, and advance the business plans of influential American corporations. The rest of the world is perceived as a relatively disorderly and potentially dangerous 'environment' in which the United States, the 'real' world so to speak, is located.

At the centre of the American empire is, figuratively speaking, the tightly closed circle made by a wagon-train and within this circle the Western pioneers are hunkered down, enjoying their protected camp fires but always remaining alert, on guard, prepared for attack at any moment. The hinterland outside the wagon train circle has to be monitored regularly for useful resources,[xxv] and checked out for lurking threats. Life outside the wagon train circle can be exhilarating for short spells, especially if you have the military means to go wherever you like whenever you like. It is pleasant to feel liberated and, to a high degree, free of practical, legal and even moral restraints. It is exciting to exercise the imperial impulse.

However, it is important to be able to retreat back inside the protecting wagon train circle and warm yourself at the homely campfire. This option is a vital psychological and political safeguard. But this option is disappearing, as we might expect in the light of experiences undergone by exiled cosmopolitans everywhere. The old American haunts change. The United States stops feeling like 'home.' Recently, commentators such as Pat Buchanan, Samuel Huntington, Thomas Frank and Michael Moore have all begun to worry that America just isn't America any more. They talk about 'the decline of the West,' ask 'who are we?', inquire 'what is the matter with America?' and cry 'Dude, where's my country?'[xxvi]

In a cosmopolitan world, Americans are experiencing the cosmopolitan condition at double strength. They, above all people, are caught in between. They do not feel as content as they used to in their own homeland, the old 'new world' they thought they knew. It is changing in ways they cannot control and do not like. Nor can they agree upon their proper place in the new 'new world' that is the global arena.

Summary

In this chapter we have: compared the 9/11 hijackers with the gunpowder plotters in London in 1605; seen similarities between urbanization and the growth of national monarchies in sixteenth and early seventeenth century Europe, and half a millennium later, globalization and the development of the American 'global monarchy' in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; analysed the cosmopolitan condition these circumstances generate

leading to humiliated liberation; looked at the parts played by technology, politics and religion in mediating the cosmopolitan condition; and considered how these pressures impinge upon American society and politics

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[i] The term 'denizen' implies residents who do not have strong or deep roots there, who have a tinge of alienation about them, and whose rights are a little insecure. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, a denizen is 'One who lives habitually in a country but is not a native-born citizen.'

[ii] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 2004, 162.

[iii] See, for example, Arthur 1999; Bouwama 1988; MacCulloch 2004.

[iv] His father had made plans, with the approval of Elizabeth I, to set up a catholic colony in North America. The Spanish disapproved and it was not done. See http://www.gunpowder-plot.org/people/rcatesby.htm (22 May 2005).

[v] It seems likely the government knew about the gunpowder plot and allowed it to proceed so that when it was 'discovered' there would be wide public support for persecution of Catholics in England. All the conspirators, save for one, Francis Tresham, were executed. Tresham died while a prisoner in the Tower of London. It is possible that this was arranged to conceal his possible role in uncovering the plot. It is widely suspected that he told his brother-in-law, Lord Monteagle, about the plot and that they tried to inform the authorities in a way that would prevent the explosion from taking place but still allow the plotters to escape; see http://www.gunpowder-plot.org/people/g_fawkes.htm (22 May 2005).

[vi] The extent of urban growth throughout Europe as a whole should not be exaggerated. However, the proportion of the population in the North and West of Europe in cities of over 10,000 people increased from about 6 percent in 1500 to about 13 percent in 1700. See Hohenberg and Lees 1985, 110; De Vries 1981, 88.

[vii] See Walzer 1965.

[viii] For an examination of baroque culture in this context, see Maravall 1986.

[ix] As it was in many large US cities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See, for example, the discussion of the work of Robert Park and Louis Wirth in Smith 1988.

[x] On some aspects of the complex interweaving of urbanization and globalisation, see, for example, Bairoch 1988; Castells 1989; Chase-Dunn 1989; Sassen 1991; Sassen 1998; Taylor 1999.

[xi] Cosmopolitanism has become a focus of debate in the social sciences. Recent contributions include Archibuigi and Held 1995; Breckenridge 2002; Cohen and Vertovec 2002; Delanty 2000; Fine 2003; Hardt and Negro 2005; Held 1995; Hoffman 1981; Toulmin 1990. This list is very far from comprehensive and fails to include several important contributions. For a recent dialogue and commentary in *Current Sociology* on globalization, cosmopolitanism and transnationality involving Bruce Mazlish, Victor Roudometof and Dennis Smith, see Mazlish 2005a; Mazlish 2005b; Roudometof 2005a; Roudometof 2005b; Smith 2005.

[xii] It is true that warriors and weapons of war are also highly mobile non-fixed assets, which are important power resources. Territorial rulers attempt to maintain a monopoly over control of the most effective and efficient warriors and weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction.

[xiii] For an insightful comparative perspective on these processes see the work of Barrington Moore. See Moore 1969; Moore 1978; Smith 1983;

[xiv] It is an interesting coincidence that 1517, the year in which the split in Christianity began, was also the year when the Ottoman Sultan assumed the title of Caliph, thus becoming Islam's spiritual head and temporal ruler. The caliphate was abolished in 1924.

[xv] It was a little easier to survive with dignity in the preceding Elizabethan period. .See Holmes 1982.

[xvi] See http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/atta/interviews/hauth.htm (October 7th 2004).

[xvii] Zygmunt Bauman has explored these dilemmas in recent decades. See, for example, Bauman1992; Bauman 1997; Bauman 2000; Bauman 2005. See also Beilharz, P 2000; Smith 1999. See also Toulmin 1990.

[xviii] For contrasting apoproaches to Islam in recent times, see Lewis 2004; Ahmed 2003.

[xix] If you want a vivid seventeenth-century portrait of one who does make such choice, look at John Milton's *Paradise Lost* (Milton 2004; originally published in 1667). Milton's Satan is the archetypical cosmopolitan.

[xx] The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance reports that although 'Overall participation in competitive elections across the globe rose steadily between 1945 and 1990…with the influx of a host of competitive elections in newly democratising states, the average for elections held since 1990 has dipped back.' The drop is relatively small, from the high 60s to the low 60s in percentage terms, but definite. They add that while the participation rate of all eligible voters has dropped only marginally, the drop in the participation rate of those actually registered to vote has been

more pronounced. The average global trend contains some wide disparities. In India, for example, participation rates in parliamentary elections have fluctuated within a range of 54-67 percent since the late 1940s. However, the fall is very clear in the cases of parliamentary elections is, for example, the United Kingdom (81.4 percent in 1951, 57.6 percent in 2001), France (74.3 per cent in 1956, 59.9 per cent in 1997) and Japan (77.4 per cent in 1952, 44.9 per cent in 1995, rising back to 59 per cent in 2000). In the United States, the proportion of the eligible population voting in presidential elections fell from 63.1 per cent in 1960 to 49.3 per cent in 2000. These data and the quotation are from the IDEA website. See http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout1.cfm (19th May 2005).

[xxi] As is well known, during the past three decades, the increasing power and sophistication of information and communication technologies have greatly increased the state's ability to keep an eye (and an ear) on its national population. Electronic banking and credit, mobile phone records, image recognition technology and the use of television cameras along national highways and in city streets and shopping centres have all made it easier for government to engage in systematic surveillance, or at least monitor video tapes and other records for evidence after incidents have occurred. See Gibb 2005.

[xxii] On current religious trends, see, for example, Armstrong 2004; Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001; Freston2004; Milton-Edwards 2005; Parratt 2004; Eashid 2003; Ruthven 2005; Sarkar 2003; and Vasquez and Marquardt 2003.

[xxiii] See also Hirschman 1982.

[xxiv] The classic reference has become Hochschild 1983.

[xxv] See Klare 2002.

[xxvi] See *The Decline of the West* (Buchanan 2002), *Who Are We?* (Huntington 2004), *What Is the Matter with America?* (Frank 2004), and *Dude, where's my country?* (Moore 2004).