

CHAPTER ELEVEN: DECENT DEMOCRACY OR DOMINEERING STATE?

Introduction

Now we have explored the triple helix of socio-historical processes whose inner mechanisms are shaping globalization's hidden agenda. It is time to address that agenda more directly:

1. How will the United States and other leading powers cope with the forthcoming relative decline in America's global influence?
2. How will global governance be managed as American power wanes?
3. Now that capitalism has finally triumphed, what *kind* of capitalist political order will become dominant? Whose interests will it serve, and how?
4. What are the future global prospects for the version of human rights supported by the European Union with its emphasis upon strong social rights?
5. As the world's population becomes increasingly urbanised with practically half its people in cities already, and half the developing world's population due to be urbanised by 2030, how will this newly urbanised population be incorporated within national and global socio-political orders and whose political lead will they follow?

This final chapter deals with these issues, making a journey in two stages: from optimism to pessimism, and from pessimism to realism. We begin in Europe in 1914.

Europe's 'clash of civilizations'

World War I was 'a clash of civilizations.' German officers leading their men in the trenches 'knew' they were fighting for German *Kultur*. Their enemy was French/Anglo-Saxon/Jewish 'civilization,' which, in their view, was shallow, materialistic and liable to corrode more profound values.ⁱ Meanwhile, in November 1914 the religious authorities in Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire, issued a *fatwa* declaring a *jihad* against all Christians.ⁱⁱ

Over ninety years later, there is good and bad news to tell. The bad news is that between 1914 and the present time, multi-polar rivalries in Europe and around the globe led to two world wars. The first war cost over nine million lives. The second killed over fifty million people. A much larger number of people were wounded. Ironically, most of the major participants got outcomes they certainly did not bargain for. In 1914 the leaders in Vienna, Russia, Istanbul and Berlin did not aim to see their empires broken up. Neither the Nazis in 1939 nor the Japanese in 1941 were aiming to create an American 'global monarchy.'

The good news is that Germany and France are no longer enemies but are bound together peacefully at the centre of the European Union. Meanwhile, the Turkish government has made an application to become a member of the EU and this application is being seriously considered. Here the optimism begins. Let us see how far it takes us.

Emancipation cycles

Relations between the European powers are far more cooperative than they used to be before 1945. Is this an instance of the emancipatory reworking of

humiliating relationships? Does the development the EU represent a fourth response to humiliation, nor escape, acceptance or rejection but *transformation*?

By transformation, I mean a process during which those involved in imposing and suffering humiliation redefine their relationship in such a way that humiliation is progressively removed from it. Transformation is a kind of collective renewal. One way transformation might be achieved is through an *emancipation cycle*, which involves

- truce,
- dialogue,
- a new language of peace-seeking as a shared enterprise; and
- the gradual creation of a new set of joint interests.

An emancipation cycle requires a combination of truce and dialogue. This may make possible a 'decommissioning' of negative stereotypes, which are a kind of reinforcement humiliation, a way of making others feel inferior and excluded. This may make it possible to develop a new language of peace-seeking as a shared enterprise; and the gradual creation of a new set of joint interests which does not necessarily imply a merging or submerging of existing interests. The process may involve building attachments to new collective symbols that encompass existing loyalties.

Truce and dialogue may establish a pattern of repetition. A covert truce among key participants may get this pattern established by permitting a process of dialogue within which the work of building trust may begin, shaping attitudes

sufficiently to permit an overt truce from hostilities. If successfully implemented, such a truce may provide space for dialogue to deepen and broaden and for trust to increase further.ⁱⁱⁱ If the transformation envisaged within the dialogue runs ahead of the participants' willingness or capacity to accept it, there may be a truce from dialogue itself, a breathing space for persuasion and adjustment to occur within each side before dialogue is resumed once more.^{iv}

Such a process is greatly helped if certain background conditions are present.

For example,

- if the parties concerned are weary and disenchanted with the existing situation, perhaps suffering the costs of a prolonged revenge cycle;
- if the leaders of each party are able to enter into truce and dialogue on behalf of their followers and deliver on agreements reached;
- if there is a powerful authority respected by both the parties concerned that is willing to take part in an attempted transformation process; and
- if resources are available to help make possible the construction of new interpersonal, inter-group and/or socio-political arrangements within which conflicts may be conducted in a more peaceful manner.

Table Two
Emancipation cycle

<p>(i) exhaustion leads to truce from either conflict or dialogue, and this permits reflection and the renewal of energy;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">↓</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">←</p> <p>(iv) gradual transformation of attitudes, behaviour and structures, reducing levels of humiliation;</p>
<p>(ii) dialogue moves beyond stereotypical →</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">↑</p> <p>(iii) jointly-created meanings</p>

thinking;	and intentions increase trust between dialogue partners;
-----------	--

One of the intentions of intermediaries in such negotiations might be gradually to build up enthusiasm for, commitment to, and pride in, the new arrangements being developed. If this is done effectively, such pride might help to modify the feelings of fear and anger the parties initially bring to the discussions.

Distrust cycles

On the other hand, exhausted opponents may grasp the chance of a truce so they can rebuild their capacity to fight. They might not want to cast aside the emotional

Table Three
Distrust cycle

(i) exhaustion leads to truce from either conflict or dialogue, permitting reflection and the renewal of energy ↓	(iv) as the agenda moves beyond points of mutual pragmatic convenience, further bargaining arouses distrust, fear of deception, increased mutual antagonism and a renewal of hostilities. ←
(ii) dialogue fails to move beyond stereotypical thinking →	(iii) dialogue restricted to contingent areas of pragmatic mutual concern, for example, establishing the boundaries of aggression.

reassurance provided by stereotypical thinking with its protection against the need to expend mental energy on thinking things out afresh.^v In those circumstances, the dialogue enabled by the truce is liable to be highly restricted, giving as little as possible away, getting as much as possible for your own side; in fact, bargaining for short-term advantage as distinct from engaging in a mutual sharing of ideas and problems.

The result will be a distrust cycle (see table 3). In some contexts, such as Northern Ireland or Israeli-Palestinian relations, both the emancipation cycle and the distrust cycle seem to be operating simultaneously.

The European story

So, what does the European Union tell us about the dynamics of the emancipation cycle? The first thing to notice is that this new polity is as strange and challenging to its global neighbours as the United States was in the nineteenth century. The political experiment on the other side of the Atlantic contradicted the old ways since it was not a monarchy and had no aristocracy. Many people in aristocratic, monarchical Europe looked on with quiet satisfaction as the American Republic tore itself apart during the Civil War.

The European Union is also a political experiment, breaking the old rules (since it is not exactly a state. Outsiders find it reassuring that the European Union now seems destined to undergo a period of inner turmoil as, like the United States in

the 1860s, but without the violence, it strains to manage the problems of territorial expansion.

During the American Civil War, the American experiment had sometimes seemed to be in danger of failing. However, three decades after the war's end, the United States was busy forcing its way into Latin America and the Far East, pushing aside the European colonial powers. Where will the EU be thirty years from now? It is worth laying a bet that by 2035 it will have overcome its structural problems and be much more coherent and powerful in the global arena.

Despite its recent difficulties, the EU has articulate admirers. Will Hutton finds the EU a more admirable phenomenon than the United States under the control of neo-conservatives. Hutton likes Europe's clear commitment to three ideas: 'the obligations of the propertied to society, the need for a social contract and the centrality of a public realm and government to a happy community' (Hutton 2002, 21).^{vi} Jeremy Rifkin is entranced by the 'European Dream' (Rifkin 2004), which he discovers is a mixture of civilization, civil society, and 'network governance' (223).^{vii} Tzvetan Todorov (Todorov (2005) hails Europe's defence of rationality, justice, democracy, individual freedom and secularism. He likes the adaptability of this 'tranquil power' (51) and hopes it will expand its influence geographically.

Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman 2004) is more narrow-eyed. He thinks Europeans have been pulled too far along the road from the 'social state' to the 'security state' (91), which cultivates its citizens' fears. However, Bauman hopes Europe

will be outward- looking rather than inward-looking, ready to put aside 'the logic of local entrenchment' in favour of 'the logic of global responsibility (which) ushers us into unknown territory' (137).

In fact, these analyses do not quite get to the heart of the European story. This story is best told in a transatlantic context and with a historical sweep. When the Americans took effective control of Europe in 1945, they put an end to the cycle of 'bloody revenge'^{viii} that had torn the continent apart repeatedly during previous decades. America was, for a while, the unchallenged global monarch. It behaved like a sovereign subduing its unruly nobility. In Europe, for a few years the word of the Americans was law.

Europe in the mid-1940s was devastated. Loss of agricultural stock, disruption of trade, rising prices, capital shortage and debt were just a few of the problems. The American response was Marshall Aid. The Economic Recovery Plan, to use the official title, injected nearly \$12.5 billion into Europe between 1948 and 1952. During the decade after 1945 the total amount of support for Europe added up to nearly twice that amount, directed to Britain, France, West German and Italy, in other words to old friends and old enemies alike.

Part of the deal was that European countries would reform their institutions to achieve financial and monetary stability, reduce trade barriers and integrate their national economies with each other. One of the leading American officials, Paul Hoffman, told the Europeans in 1949 that the United States wanted to see 'the formation of a single large market in which quantitative restrictions on the

movement of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away.^{'ix}

The European movement was given a very decisive shove forward by the United States in the late 1940s, partly because they wanted Western Europe to be a strong barrier against the expansion of the Soviet Union's influence and partly because they wanted a thriving market for their own products, services and investments.^x

Looking back on this period, Michel Jobert^{xi} recalled that Western Europe just after the war was 'Lined up in one camp, under strict US control, taking orders and reporting for duty.'^{xii} Not surprisingly, there was resistance. In 1953 the Americans failed to force through the idea of a European Defence Community. Three years later came the Suez campaign.

Transatlantic power relations became more evenly balanced after the oil shock of the early 1970s, which forced the United States to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold, a great blow to its prestige.^{xiii} The Europeans responded in three ways. They moved towards a single internal market. They made plans for a common currency. They made the European Union (then Community) more like a developmental state, with a regional development fund, direct elections to the European Parliament, and qualified voting in the Council of Ministers.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 created a much larger, reunited Germany, which agreed to abolish its separate currency and support the Maastricht Treaty,

implemented in 1993. This treaty provides for a more coordinated foreign and security policy within the EU, as well as greater inter-governmental cooperation with respect to justice and home affairs. It set up the Committee for the Regions, and the Cohesion Fund, created EU citizenship, and gave the European Parliament greater powers. Economic and monetary union was established in 1999. At the time of writing, the EU is busy absorbing new countries bringing its total membership up to twenty-five.^{xiv}

The EU faces large problems, although no more serious than those faced, and surmounted, by the United States as it developed, historically. Europe's leaders have been buoyed up by the existence of this huge, if still underdeveloped, power base, which has the clear potential to rival the United States. In November 1999 Jacques Chirac declared that 'The European Union itself [must] become a major pole of international equilibrium, endowing itself with the instruments of a true power.'^{xv} In October 2000 Tony Blair argued that 'Europe's citizens need Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power in the world. Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power.'^{xvi}

In some respects, the European Union is a classic case of successful transformation.^{xvii} It has emancipated its members from the violent and humiliating revenge cycle into which they were locked during the decades before 1945. It has also emancipated the 'subordinate' nations of Western Europe (and, later, Eastern Europe) from their previous position of inferiority. The most

obvious beneficiaries are Ireland and Spain. More recently, Poland's leaders enjoyed a similar effect as they achieved EU membership.^{xviii}

By 2004, the EU's population had grown to 450 million, about 175 million more than the United States. In that year its economy was over 40 percent larger than the U.S in terms of GDP although if account is taken of differences in living standards and costs, the United States and the expanded EU of 25 countries are practically equal.^{xix} According to such figures, the European Union is a tremendous success, especially if one considers the wrecked condition of Europe four decades before.

However, things are not as simple as that. Transformation carried a cost. The two processes of emancipation from humiliation just described coincided with the creation of two new humiliation processes.

The first was triggered by an example of exclusion humiliation. The European movement has largely been a matter for political, professional and business elites. It has excluded ordinary people from its key decision-making processes.^{xx} For a few decades, referenda and parliamentary votes were won by appealing to the motives of fear and gratitude: fear of the communist east, gratitude for the absence of war.

Now both fear and gratitude are considerably diminished. There is a tide of resentment surging from below. Citizens are beginning to take revenge upon

their 'betters' through the ballot box. Europe's leaders, in France and elsewhere, will have to find ways to mend the broken bond with their electors.^{xxi}

The second humiliation process was stimulated by the humiliation experienced by Europe's political leadership during the mid and late 1940s. It was degrading for the old masters of the world to be made into indigent beggars at the court in Washington. As the Europeans regained their wealth and strength they hit back. The result was a transatlantic revenge cycle that has lasted over half a century.

1. An early event within this revenge cycle was the Suez debacle of 1956, vigorously opposed and exposed by the American government. This affair resulted in the shaming of the British and French governments before the United Nations.
2. Europe's restless subjection to American dominance in the 1950s and early 1960s was answered during the following decade by European attacks on American motives and character during the Vietnam War.^{xxii}
3. The Americans repaid these attacks by determined self-assertion under Reagan's presidential leadership. They engaged in aggressive neo-liberalism during the 1980s, abetted by Britain. This was followed by a period of self-glorification during the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
4. 'Old Europe' ^{xxiii} minus Britain retaliated by overtly opposing the American plan to invade Iraq in 2003, culminating in the French declaration that it would use its UN Security Council veto against the United States for the first time since the Suez crisis in 1956.

Multi-polarity

Here the pessimism begins. The West is divided. It has not got over the shock of losing its old Soviet enemy, which provided a convenient focus for unity. It is difficult to find a replacement. Many have been considered but each has major disadvantages: the Chinese are too capitalist, the Japanese too Americanised, the Russians too accommodating, and Islam too diverse (although this remains Washington's favoured candidate for the job of 'necessary enemy').

In the event, the two halves of the West, Europe and America, have turned on each other: not directly but discretely, punctuating emollient back scratching with venomous back-biting. This is not simply a matter of nursing historical wounds. The US and EU leadership are divided on three fundamental matters, with the United Kingdom hovering uneasily between the two:

1. The current American administration is inclined to *unilateralism* where possible while the Europeans much prefers *multilateral* approaches.
2. The Americans are broadly happy with a *uni-polar* world but the Europeans are evidently looking forward to a time when *multi-polarity* will more fully restore their capacity to have an independent voice in the world.
3. The Americans are inclined to favour *militaristic* approaches to troublesome issues of foreign policy while the Europeans are more inclined to favour *peaceful diplomacy*.^{xxiv}

These divisions within the West are part of a steady drift towards multi-polarity at the global level. China's national income has been doubling every eight years

during the past two decades. OECD predicts that China's share of total world exports will increase from 6 percent in 2005 to 10 percent by 2010 by which time it is likely to be the world's leading exporter.^{xxv}

With increased economic power comes increased capacity to become militarily powerful. That can be turned into actual fighting power quite quickly if a country puts its mind to it. The United States has shown how to do it: you buy brains, skills, information, and, where necessary, hardware and software, and you persuade your citizens, rich and poor, that building up armaments is a good idea worth paying for.

Table 5 is a guess at how the global order might look in 2035. It seems quite likely that by that time the United States will no longer be the only global super-power and that it will have been joined by China and the European Union. There will be other global-regional players, probably with aspirations to have increasing global influence. Russia, Japan and India all come to mind.

It is possible that by that time fundamentalist terrorism carried out by non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda may have declined, especially if the political uncertainty in Central Asia and the Middle East has diminished. The parts played by Turkey and Iran could be crucial, providing a moderating influence on fellow Muslims that is likely to be more effective than 'infidel' fire power.

Table Four
How the global order might look in 2035

<i>Global Giants</i>	China	United States	European Union
<i>Leading Global-Regional Players</i>	Japan	Russia	India

However, there is no reason to anticipate a smooth transition from uni-polarity to multi-polarity. Consider the possibility that the decline of loosely-coordinated *freelance or franchised terrorism* of the Al-Qaeda kind may well coincide with the spread of *state-sponsored terrorism*, not especially linked to Islamist causes. I am using this term to include possible future equivalents, on any continent, of the Nazi rule in Germany during the 1930s and early 1940s. State brutality against citizens and neighbouring countries is certainly not a specifically Middle-Eastern or Muslim phenomenon. It encompasses all manner of brutal regimes employing violence and fear to get their way, with or without Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, Russophobia, anti-Hinduism, anti-Americanism, hatred of capitalism, loathing of democracy, detestation of whites, horror of blacks, or revulsion against yellows.

State-sponsored terrorism could spring up anywhere:

- where there are rapidly growing cities containing many educated or semi-educated young people without paid employment, and

- especially if such societies harbour enterprising politicians ready to work on the people's resentments as a means to build political movements and seize state power.

According to Immanuel Wallerstein, we have entered a 'transformational TimeSpace' (Wallerstein 1998, 3). In other words, we are arriving at 'a structurally chaotic situation that will be both unpleasant to live through and thoroughly unpredictable in its trajectory' He believes 'a new order will emerge out of this chaos over a period of fifty years, and this new order will be shaped as a function of what everyone does in the interval – those with power in the present system, and those without it' (89-90).^{xxvi}

Put beside this the assessment of Timothy Garton Ash who argues that 'Unless China's economic growth falters dramatically, perhaps due to political turmoil, China in 2025 will be such a major power – with Japan still formidable and India coming up as well – that there will be no point in conceiving a political strategy for Europe and Asia separately from the intentions and dynamics of Asia. So the old Atlantic-centred West, which has been shaping the world since about 1500, probably has no more than twenty years left in which it will be the main world-shaper' (Ash 2004, 192).

Add a further consideration, which is that all the actors involved, whether politicians, business people, electorates, customers or congregations, are likely to be highly influenced by feelings of fear and vengefulness, and all will have a strong desire to avoid being victimized even if this means becoming victimizers.

The challenge of the slums

The situation is intensified by the fact that a high proportion of the global population is on the move. It is undergoing the difficult and major transition from life in the countryside to an urban existence.

It is a well-known fact that one out of every two people in the world lives on \$2 a day or less. It is less well known that the poor are becoming a highly urbanised phenomenon. They are no longer mainly scattered in villages. The recent United Nations report entitled *The Challenge of the Slums* (UN-Habitat 2003) makes it clear that over the next two decades the world's urban population will double from 2.5 billion to 5 billion people.^{xxvii}

By 2007 half the global population will be urban dwellers. At the moment the world's urban population is growing by the equivalent of 33 new cities each with 2 million people every year and this can be expected to continue for the next thirty years.^{xxviii} In 1950 the poor in the developing world were mainly rural. Only 18 per cent of them lived in cities. This is changing rapidly. By 2030 over half their population will be city people.

City life brings people face to face with extremes of inequality. In Armenia, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine, levels of inequality have almost doubled over the last ten years. In Hungary between 1992 and 1996 the proportion of people existing below the minimum subsistence level increased by half. By 1999 more than half the population in the Commonwealth of Independent States were living in poverty.^{xxix}

Will religious leaders and local politicians tell their followers to accept the logic of the market and make the best of it? The answer is: probably not. People in cities are powerful when they are organised or become mobilized as crowds. Whether or not urbanites have the vote, they can ruin property, take lives and break governments. That is what the rich found in nineteenth century Europe.

In the early nineteenth century, the rich, egged on by books such as Thomas Malthus's *Essay on Population* (1798), tried telling the poor they deserved to be poor and could expect no help.^{xxx} By the late nineteenth century, after several revolutionary upheavals, the rich concluded, a little reluctantly, that the best way to 'defuse' the revolutionary threat was to make sure the poor had the means and opportunity to get a decent livelihood in a decent environment.

Support was required on such a scale that the welfare state came into existence, supported by tax revenue taken from those who could afford to pay. This knowledge was won the hard way. It was one half of a double lesson that is still valid. To make the cities safe and reasonably content two things have to be done:

- poverty must be eliminated; and
- humiliation has to diminish radically.

In late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, progress was made on the first front but much less was done on the second. In fact, the advance of human rights in the form of citizenship made people even more acutely resentful of the humiliations to which they were still subjected.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, *The Challenge of the Slums* does not say very much about the economic costs of confronting urban poverty but if its proposed solutions are to be adopted widely this will need massive political commitment and large amounts of money from the pockets of the rich.

The report calls for ‘good urban governance’ within ‘inclusive cities’ which have ‘sustainability, subsidiarity...equality of access to decision-making processes and the basic necessities of urban life...efficiency in the delivery of public services and in promoting local economic development,...transparency and accountability of decision-makers and stakeholders,...civic engagement and citizenship... (and) security of individuals and their living environment.’ (182-3).

If this is what the urban poor need, then a little bit of intellectual ‘reverse engineering’ applied to that list quickly tells us what they have got now. By implication, what they have got now is:

- forbidding and socially excluding cities,
- political leaders who are thoughtless, centralised and distant,^{xxxii}
- inefficiently delivered public services,
- failure to take local economic development seriously,
- secrecy and corruption
- lack of participation by poor citizens, and
- unsafe environments.^{xxxiii}

Put it another way: these people are being humiliated, excluded and relegated, either deliberately or through ignorance and neglect.

The ghost of Hitler

Hitler inherited a political culture ridden with humiliation as a consequence of the snobbish and militaristic ethos of the upper class of the German Empire, an ethos that permeated downward through German society. Hitler found a population used to feeling resentment.^{xxxiii} He cultivated this feeling and used it as a reservoir of political energy for his own purposes.

Adolf Hitler presented himself as the leader of a great people cast down by others' treachery. He asked his followers: 'Who yields voluntarily? No one! So the strength which each people possesses decides the day. Always before God and the world the stronger has the right to carry through what he wills.'

Hitler asserted 'the authority of personality' and proclaimed the need for the German people under his leadership to 'champion their right to live.' This meant having the strength to win and not being afraid to use it. England and France pretended to be superior but were not. Hitler invited his audience to ask themselves 'By what means have the virtuous nations obtained for themselves this quarter of the world' and added: 'They did not apply virtuous methods!' His message was: 'Do not deceive yourselves about the most important precondition in life - namely, the necessity to be strong.'^{xxxiv}

Hitler was able to work upon a demoralised and disoriented German population that was simultaneously experiencing the humiliating effects of

- the imperial impulse (which Hitler identified with England and France),

- the logic of the market (which Hitler personified in the stereotype of the Jew),
and
- the cosmopolitan condition (in other words, a world of weakened national states facing the prospect of being disciplined from ‘outside’ and ‘above’ which Hitler dramatised as the so-called international Jewish conspiracy).

Compare the global situation in the early twenty-first century. As we saw in chapters four to six, the imperial impulse, the logic of the market and the cosmopolitan condition are all in play. They create feelings of humiliation in many societies, even the United States where in 2005 President Bush was busy cultivating fears of ‘a radical Islamic empire that spreads from Spain to Indonesia.’^{xxxv} The danger of a return to fascism remains high on all continents.^{xxxvi}

Fusing the two codes of modernity

It is time to undertake the second stage of our journey, from pessimism to realism. How can we protect the gains won for human rights and advance them further? We need to build strong institutions of governance at the global-regional and global level that can codify and enforce those rights. The point is that it was the strength of central governments in national states that turned human rights, usually in the form of citizenship, into a practical reality during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Something similar has to happen at the global-regional and global levels in the twenty-first century. The EU has made a good start. It offers one model for

progress at the global level, as Peter Singer has pointed out.^{xxxvii} How differently the Iraq invasion of 2003 would have been regarded by the world if it had been a police operation sanctioned by a global body accepted as legitimate by the vast majority of national states.

The most important ingredient needed for building strong global and global-regional institutions is political will. A major step in the creating it must surely be to engage the interest and commitment of the strategically crucial urban populations coming into being throughout Eurasia, America and Africa. What they want, and what they will endure, counts very heavily indeed.

These rapidly expanding urban populations are caught between the tribal, dynastic or communal honour codes of their old villages and the strengthened dose of human rights thinking they receive in the cities where trade-union, political and business activity all speak the language of 'rights' and 'opportunities.' New urbanites bring with them, and find within the city, religious frameworks for interpreting the world. These convey ideas about the worthiness of every soul and the majesty of God, ideas that can be deployed to reinforce both honour-based and human rights perspectives.

Table Five
Fusing the Honour Code with the Human Rights Code

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
Type of fusion between the two codes	Liberated Capitalism	The Domineering State	Decent Democracy
From Human Rights Code	Everyone has the right to aspire to a decent life and should be free (unless they are a nuisance to the rich); violence should be eliminated from human relationships as much as possible (although it is often permissible in defence of property.)	A powerful and successful state can and will keep those it favours comfortable and secure, providing them with social rights	Everyone has the right to become equipped for, enter, and be fairly treated in the social competition, benefit from a duty of care, and receive life-enhancing benefits such as access to culture
From Honour Code	Humiliation is a fact of life and must be borne or overcome; life is a struggle in which the winners are those that know how to look after themselves.	Might is right. Strength is admirable. All that counts is conquest, victory and success by any means.	Strength, loyalty, courage, steadfastness, striving for high achievement, and personal integrity are to be admired if they are displayed within the context of the human rights code, including efforts to implement, benefit from, defend and/or extend it.

People in such situations do not make a complete switch from the honour code to the human rights code. They look for a mixture of them both. The question is: which mixture works best for the world and for them? Which amalgam of the honour and human rights codes will be most favourable to building strong forms of governance at the national, global-regional and global levels, creating institutions that are thoroughly committed to maintaining a decent standard of material existence and fair treatment for all citizens?

At least three options exist (see table 5). One we have already met. It is *liberated capitalism*, driven by the logic of the market, which has one foot firmly planted in each of the two codes. It says 'Life is a humiliating struggle but let us keep the struggle open, non-violent and free for all to enter. That is the best you can expect. That is as democratic as life gets.'

The second option is *the domineering state*. This approach says: 'The state is going to use its strength to look after those it favours at whatever cost to others. Steer clear. We can hurt you.'

The third option is *decent democracy*. It says 'The implementation of the human rights code by states and citizens means that everyone gets a decent life insofar as that is humanly possible. You cannot promote or defend the human rights code by breaking it.' This option responds positively to the values of strength, loyalty, courage, steadfastness, striving for high achievement, and personal integrity, which a very high proportion of the world's population learn within the context of the honour code. However, it says: 'these values must be implemented

to defend and promote the human rights code and the laws that enforce it, and never to undermine those rights. That way we all benefit.'

Ideologies promoting liberated capitalism and the domineering state invite us to accept nasty means such as violence, exploitation, and deception as a way to achieve attractive ends: especially, the care and comfort of 'those that matter in the world,' however defined. But 'those that matter' according to these two approaches represent only a small minority of those that matter according to the human rights code. Furthermore, the arrival of supposedly attractive ends is forever being delayed and most people spend their lives suffering the penalties imposed by the nasty means.

Far better, as Gandhi realised, to promote an approach in which the means, which are with us day by day, are as morally wholesome as the ends which arrive gradually over more than one generation. Decent democracy stands for this ideal and campaigns against political corruption such as the one that led to the wholesale resignation of the European Commission in 1999 show that voters are prepared to take this ideal seriously. Cleaning up politics is a perfectly feasible objective, especially if business lobbyists are kept at a greater distance from parliamentarians than they are under the system of liberated capitalism.

Choices

Let us consider the choices in the table from the point of two actors. One is the United States in the early twenty-first century. The other is the poor or nearly-poor city dweller almost anywhere in the world.

The United States straddles all three options:

1. There is no doubt that current American policy is strongly in favour of liberated capitalism, both at home and abroad. It works on the assumption that the domination of capitalist business interests in a country is a powerful indicator that it this country is 'free' and therefore has the basic ingredient of democracy;

2. When the US government attacks other countries, its spokespeople usually say they are defending or establishing the human rights basic to a decent democracy. It is embarrassing when video footage or photographic evidence gets into the mass media showing prisoners being are tortured or the bodies of enemies burnt.

3. In practice, some Americans and some of their critics regard such atrocities as an inevitable by-product of the fact that the United States is, in fact, doing what it takes to show that might is right; in other words behaving according to the norms of the domineering state.^{xxxviii}

New city dwellers have a different set of perspectives:

1. From their point of view, since they usually have a relatively low level of resources at their command, the rational choice is decent democracy, as long it is capable of being implemented through efficient and effective governance of the kind recommended in *The Challenge of the Slums*. However, this option is often not available.

2. There may be a strong pull towards the domineering state, especially if 'their' ethnic, tribal or religious group is strongly represented in government.

3. The least favoured choice would be liberated capitalism since it provides rewards to a minority only, especially in the short and medium term, and its implementation may, in any case, be undermined if their government is behaving like a domineering state.

Whenever the United States behaves like a domineering state, saying, in effect, that ‘might is right’, it strengthens the hands of those throughout the world who favour that option for themselves, from Israel to Zimbabwe. The American government may argue that applying a strategy of ‘might is right’ is a way of introducing ‘freedom,’ implying human rights. However, most poor or nearly-poor urban dwellers, (and outside the West that means the majority), are unlikely to be convinced by this argument since they realise that ‘freedom’ means liberated capitalism, which does not solve their problems.

The official agenda of globalization tells us that the world is faced by a choice between ‘Islamic terrorism’ and freedom in the form of liberated capitalism. This is untrue. It is not on the real agenda. That real agenda has been hidden from our eyes. It asks us to choose between decent democracy and the domineering state.

The choices that will be available to the world, and especially the world’s city-dwellers, in the next decade or so depend upon the choices being made by the West now. The West, albeit divided, has the capacity at the moment to adopt *any one of the three options* set out in table 5.

The European Union has gone much further than the United States in envisaging and partly implementing decent democracy. It has not been an easy ride. The people have often objected. Why? In part, hostility has arisen because many ordinary people think the EU's practices are too generous to 'outsider' groups such as asylum seekers. Another reason is that people believe that life in Brussels has become something of a gravy train for politicians. Many of those who represent the EU are too obviously failing to live up to the standards of honourable behaviour expected in a decent democracy. Remedying the second problem will give politicians more authority in dealing with the first.

A struggle is going on within the EU between the options of decent democracy and liberated capitalism. Perhaps this struggle will eventually be renewed with the United States also. If liberated capitalism wins outright, if the EU and the US move much closer together politically once again, and if the militaristic approach of the Americans prevails, the world will draw its conclusions. People elsewhere will then see Europe as a major beneficiary of the domineering state option, kept secure and comfortable while American strength keeps the poor people outside the club at bay.^{xxxix}

If in the next few years the West rules out the option of decent democracy as its goal for itself and others, this will mean the EU has failed to assert its independence within the transatlantic arena. In those circumstances, the most likely outcome is that Washington will continue using the strategy of the domineering state as a means of establishing liberated capitalism over an expanding global area as long as it is able to do so.

If the West abandons decent democracy as a genuine option , if it abandons the duty of care, if it says the market will cure all ills, what will happen then? Who then will make the case for embedding decent democracy and human rights in the working practices of strong global-regional and global institutions of governance? Probably no-one.

In that case, our global city dwellers will be left with the choice between liberated capitalism and the domineering state, each offered to them by a different set of local politicians. They are likely to favour the latter. It offers them a chance to avoid being victimised and turn some other group into victims (see table six).

Table Six
Is this what we are choosing for the twenty-first century?

	Washington	The World's Cities
First Preference	Liberated Capitalism	Decent Democracy
Second Preference	Domineering State	Domineering State
Third Preference	Decent Democracy	Liberated Capitalism

If that happens, the world will be denied the opportunity of building decent, prospering, non-humiliated and non-humiliating societies, which is the prospect potentially offered by the option of decent democracy.

What will be left? If people cannot have the decent democracy they really want, with the domineering state they at least have the chance to enjoy the satisfaction of revenge and some of the spoils of possible victory. That was more or less what Hitler offered. The eventual cost was fifty million deaths in the Second World War.

The future of our world will be settled in the big cities of Eurasia, Africa, Latin America – and the United States. Mohammed Atta, who piloted the first plane on 9/11, was an urban planner. If Atta and the others had discovered a more meaningful and satisfying future in the cities they inhabited, they would not have been on those planes.

The choices being made by the West now are shaping how the world will be in thirty years time when the West is no longer so powerful. These choices are being made in the dark, without much consideration about where they lead. It is time the hidden consequences of globalization's agenda were brought into the light.

The story of the twenty-first century will be this: the West shuffled the pack but the world dealt the cards.

At the moment the West means Washington, which strongly favours liberated capitalism enforced, with a show of reluctance, by the domineering state. Washington does not want decent democracy. Business leaders and politicians have taught the American people not to want it. They have told them it puts taxes up too high.

If the European Union bows down to the Washington Consensus (big capital, weak state, obedient populations, US militarism as required), then decent democracy, the card most likely to bring us all relative peace and relative prosperity, will be thrown out of the pack. Everyone will get the second preference they do not really want, the one that says: 'Might is right. Strength is admirable. All that counts is conquest, victory and success by any means.'

As the American empire wanes it will be replaced by domineering states confronted with urban chaos on every continent. That will almost certainly lead to war. How bad will it be? In a disorderly and aggressive multi-polar world, the possibility of a third world war can hardly be ruled out.^{x1}

ⁱ See, for example, Berman 182, 47; Elias 1994, chap 1.

ⁱⁱ Its victims included many of Turkey's Armenian population.

ⁱⁱⁱ The work of Piotr Sztompka is relevant here. See Sztompka 1999.

^{iv} For relevant texts on dealing with conflict, see Galtung 2004; Ury 1999.

^v On stereotyping, see Pickering 2001.

^{vi} See also Hutton 2002, 61-106.

^{vii} See also Kupchan 2002, 119-59.

^{viii} The reference is to Scheff 1994.

^{ix} Quoted in Walker 1994, 87

^x On American involvement in these early phases of European integration see Lundestad 1998; and Smith 1999b.

^{xi} French foreign minister 1973-4

^{xii} *Le Monde* 10 August 1991

^{xiii} According to Hutton, 'This ranks with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 as a pivotal event in postwar history.' (Hutton 2002, 235).

^{xiv} See Smith and Wright 1999a; Smith and Wright 1999b; Smith 1999b.

-
- ^{xv} From a speech at Élysée Palace, 4th November 1999. See www.delegfrance-cd-geneve.org/chapter1/chirac041199.htm (30th May 2005).
- ^{xvi} ‘Prime minister’s speech to the Polish Stock Exchange’, October 6th 2000. See www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=1341&SectionId=32. Quoted in Kupchan 2002, 151.
- ^{xvii} See, for valuable background, Axtmann 1998.
- ^{xviii} On Spain, see Jáuregui 1999. On Poland, see the lecture by the Polish foreign minister at Poland’s embassy in London the day after enlargement. Cimoszewicz 2002 to be found at <http://www.poland-embassy.si/eng/politics/londynang.htm> (22nd October 2005).
- ^{xix} See <http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/EuropeanUnion/basicinfo.htm> [US Dept of Agric - Economic research service)
- ^{xx} See, for example, Connolly 1995; Siedentop 2001, Smith and Wright 1999a.
- ^{xxi} The French rejection of the new European Constitution in May 2005 is consistent with Eric Hobsbawm’s view, expressed five years earlier: ‘Today, in my opinion, the French drive for European integration has abated. They have less interest in the process, now that their centrality has been visibly diminished’ (Hobsbawm 2000, 93).
- ^{xxii} There were, of course, major protests against the war within the United States also. They were seen by other Americans as ‘anti-establishment.’ By contrast, the European protests often seemed to ‘anti-American.’
- ^{xxiii} Meaning France and Germany, castigated as ‘old Europe’ by Donald Rumsfeld during a press conference on 22 January 2003. See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm> (26th May 2005).
- ^{xxiv} See Smith 2003a; Smith 2003b.
- ^{xxv} See OECD Economic Survey of China, 2005, summarised at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_2649_201185_35343687_1_1_1_1,00.html
- ^{xxvi} For the broader context of Wallerstein’s analysis, see Wallerstein 1974; Wallerstein 1980; Wallerstein 1989; Wallerstein 1997.
- ^{xxvii} An urban area according to UN Population Division is a settlement with a population of at least 2,000 people. See <http://www.unhabitat.org/hd/hdv7n2/> (October 22nd 2005).
- ^{xxviii} UN-Habitat 2003, xxxi-xxxii.,
- ^{xxix} UN-Habitat 2003, 39.
- ^{xxx} See Malthus 1999.; originally published in 1798.

^{xxx} See Reiss and Moore 2005

^{xxx} See Aziz 1997; De Soto 2000 for other perspectives.

^{xxx} See, for example, MacAleer 1994; Elias 1996.

^{xxx} These extracts are taken from speeches given on 13th April 1923, 27th January 1932, and April 1st 1939. See <http://www.hitler.org/speeches/>

^{xxx} <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-2.html> - oct 6 05. For the impact of the logic of the market and the cosmopolitan condition in American society see chapters 5 and 6.

^{xxx} See, for some evidence, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly document 8607, 'Threat posed to democracy by extremist parties and movements in Europe', January 2000, located at <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc00/Edoc8607.htm> (30th May 2005). I will not give a long list of citations for other continents. They are easily found, but the term 'fascist', like the term 'humiliation,' has to be handled with caution, especially when used about others. For a more optimistic reading of the situation, see Wright 2001.

^{xxx} Singer 2004, 199.

^{xxx} For moves in this direction, see Hanson 2001; Bobbitt 2002; Kaplan 2003.

^{xxx} See Kagan 2003.

^{xl} See Kearney 1987.