

Dennis Smith v Ljubljani

S prispevki Avgusta Lešnika, Marka Kržana in Polone Fijavž

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Dennis Smith in Ljubljana

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Kazalo/Content

- 5 — *Ksenija Vidmar Horvat*
Evropski intelektuallec na periferiji: ob obisku Dennisa Smitha v Ljubljani
- 7 — *Dennis Smith*
Kako naj si razložimo krizo EU?
- 31 — *Avgust Lešnik*
Historična sociologija v očeh Dennisa Smitha
- 45 — *Marko Kržan*
Kaj nam lahko historična sociologija pove o krizi EU? Pogovor s profesorjem
Dennisom Smithom
- 59 — *Polona Fijavž*
(E)vropska (u)topija? Pogovor s profesorjem Dennisom Smithom
na TV Slovenija
- 69 — *Borut Krajnc*
Smith na Filozofski fakulteti - fotografije
Smith at the Faculty of Arts - photography
- 85 — *Ksenija Vidmar Horvat*
A European Intellectual on the periphery: after Dennis Smith's visit to Ljubljana
- 87 — *Dennis Smith*
Making Sense of the EU Crisis
- 113 — *Avgust Lešnik*
Historical sociology in the eyes of Dennis Smith
- 127 — *Marko Kržan*
What can historical sociology tell us about the crisis of the EU? A conversation
with Prof. Dennis Smith
- 149 — *Polona Fijavž*
(E)uropean (u)topia? A conversation with Professor Dennis Smith
on TV Slovenia
- 147 — Imensko in pojmovno kazalo

Evropskih intelektualcev, ki se v zadnjem času ukvarjajo s prihodnostjo evropskega projekta, je kar nekaj, nemara celo čedalje več. Sociologi, ki so še do nedavna Evropsko unijo obravnavali predvsem v kontekstih širših procesov globalizacije ali zgodovini modernizacije, kot na primer Ulrich Beck ali Zygmunt Bauman, se pospešeno vračajo nazaj v domovanje analize, ki je znova introvertirana: obrnjena nazaj k Evropi, opazovana iz njenega samega središča, usmerjena proti notranjemu jedru zgodovinske turbulence in intelektualne negotovosti. Sociologi, ki so že dlje zaposleni z nastajanjem nadnacionalne in transnacionalne evropske demokratične družbe, kot na primer Jürgen Habermas, se enako pospešeno lotevajo kritike evropskih inženirjev združevanja, od politikov, uradnikov, do intelektualcev, in kličejo k nemudni oživitvi ideje evropske javnosti – neposredno iz njenih centrov, a.k.a. Bruslja. A le redki so evropski sociologi, ki so pripravljeni za reševanje krize evropskega projekta v njenem centru priti na periferijo: opazovati, kako se jedro evropske ideje razkraja na njenih robovih, pa tudi, kako so margine Evropske unije postale najbolj dosledne, ko gre za izražanje temeljnih idealov evropskega združevanja: načel pravičnosti, solidarnosti, socialne države in – aktivnega državljanstva.

Dennis Smith na obrobju EU, in v polperiferni Sloveniji, ni postal po naključju. Nasprotno, o njegovem obisku v Ljubljani smo se prvič pogovarjali, ko je prof. Avgust Lešnik pri založbi Studia humanitatis pripravljal prevod njegovega dela *Vzpon historične sociologije*, pa njegove poti tedaj ni bilo mogoče finančno realizirati. Zgodaj spomladi 2013 se je spet oglasil in napovedal svoj študijsko pot v Grčijo, na Ciper, Hrvaško in, če bi bilo le mogoče, v Slovenijo – tokrat da si bo stroške potovanja lahko kril sam.

Čemu takšna želja obiskati države, ki so pravkar prestajale vrhunec soočenja s finančno krizo? Česa bi se imel naučiti zaslužni profesor s prestižne angleške univerze ob opazovanju streznitve o dometu načel evropske solidarnosti, ko so te sproti, od države do države v krizi, kot plamen upanja v katastrofičnem vetru ugašali jezdeci zloglasne Trojke – česa novega že, česar historični sociolog ni poznal že iz dosedanje kolonialne zgodovine Evrope, britanskega imperija ali nastajanja Združenih držav Amerike?

Odgovor na zgornja vprašanja je jasen takoj, ko ima človek z Dennisom Smithom priložnost izmenjati le nekaj besed. Izjemna intelektualna bistrina, pronicljivost,

hudomušnost in zdrava avto-distanca ne klijeta v kabinetnih proučevanjih zgodovine v nastajanju; pa tudi ne v terenskih opazovanjih drugega, ki se je znašel na robu nekega duhovno-civilizacijskega projekta, imenovanega EU.

Le redki, ali skorajda edini evropski intelektualec med tistimi, ki sploh pripotujejo do sem, je, ob katerem dobiš občutek, da se pogovarjaš kot z domačinom iz svojega kraja – z Evropejcem iz skupne domovine demokratične prihodnosti.

Ob takšnem obisku je povsem jasno, naj ne zveni prenapeto, da se usoda EU tokrat zares odloča na njenih marginah; in da je edini recept za evropskega intelektualca, ki želi pri tem sodelovati, soočenje z evropsko resnico, ki se jo živi na periferijah.

Ta resnica ne ponižuje, kot smo bili vajeni do sedaj vsaj na postsocialističnem Vzhodu, z zgodbo o kulturni nekompatibilnosti; ponižuje, vsepovsod po EU, po njenem robovju in dnu, v centrih in na periferiji, z globalnim diktatom kapitala.

Dennis Smith

Kako naj si razložimo krizo EU?*

* To besedilo je predelana različica predavanja, ki sem ga imel v okviru programa LLL Jean Monnet na Univerzi v Ljubljani v torek, 23. aprila 2013.

Uvod

Ugotovil sem, da je Slovenija poseben kraj. Morda zato, ker prijazno sprejema potujoče akademike (no, vsaj tega je), kadar se ti dobronamerno zanimajo za njene zadeve. Morda zaradi svoje enkratne lege na stičišču velikih evropskih trgovskih poti. Morda zato, ker je kraj, kjer se srečujejo slovanski, germanski, ugrofinski in romanski jeziki. Morda pa tudi zato, ker so bili Slovenci skozi stoletja vključeni v številne večje politične enote, od Rimskega imperija do Evropske unije. Če hočejo narodi s takšno zgodovino preživeti, morajo razviti posebno prefinjenost, čuječnost in odločnost. Takšne lastnosti se obrestujejo tudi na intelektualnem področju. Ni čudno, da je v Ljubljani sedež univerze, ki ni le med največjimi v Evropi, ampak tudi med najboljšimi na svetu.

Zato mi je v veselje, da sta me profesor Avgust Lešnik in profesorica Ksenija Vidmar Horvat povabila, naj pridem sem predavat o krizi Evropske unije, ki se še zdalec ni končala. To je priložnost, da spregovorimo o tej temi, in to ne le z vidika Slovenije, čeprav ni dvoma, da so ljudje v tej deželi v zadnjih nekaj letih doživeli precej begajoče »evropsko popotovanje«.

Slovenija

Vstop Slovenije v EU leta 2004 je njenim državljanom obljubljal zatočišče pred viharji, ki jim je bila izpostavljena širša regija. Tudi vstop v evrsko območje leta 2007 se je zdel pametna poteza, ki je Ljubljani omogočila, da se je priključila ožjemu krogu evropskih držav. Toda le leto dni zatem se je z zlomom banke Lehman Brothers to zatočišče spremenilo v središče ciklona. Slovenija se je pridružila vrsti držav, ki so postale kandidatke za finančno pomoč, to pa, če pogledamo grški primer, ne pomeni nič dobrega. V resnici se primer Slovenije precej razlikuje od grškega. Je dramatična in kompleksna zgodba, v kateri se težave evra prepletajo z množičnimi uličnimi protesti proti korupciji v Ljubljani in Mariboru. Je ena od sedemindvajsetih ali (po juliju 2013)¹ osemindvajsetih zapletenih zgodb, ki govorijo o državah članicah EU-27 (zdaj EU-28). A če se ozirate po evropskih medijskih zaslonih ali pogledate v časopisne trafike, naj vas ne preseneti, če tam ne boste našli panoramskega pregleda, ki bi upošteval kompleksnost evropskega prizorišča.

Stereotipi

Nasprotno. Prevladujoči način govorjenja o sedanji evropski krizi, ki se brez konca ponavlja v množičnih medijih, je le slabo prikrita različica mračnih moralističnih pravljič, prenesenih iz otroških vrtcev. Se spomnite Janka in Metke? To je pravljičica o

1 Hrvaška je vstopila v EU 1. julija 2013.

zlobni čarovnici s hišico iz čokolade, ki preslepi in ukani dva nesrečna otroka. Namesto »čarovnice« beri: bankirji in finančniki. Njihov domnevno otročji plen naj bi bili evropski delodajalci, delavci, potrošniki in mali vlagatelji. V izvirni zgodbi sta Janko in Metka porinila čarovnico v njeno lastno peč in nato pobegnila. V dejanskosti pa so jo bankirji in finančniki praviloma odnesli le z nekaj praskami, ki so se večinoma hitro zacelile.

Druga razlaga govori o leglu nespametnih »prašičkov«, kot so Portugalska, Irska, Grčija in Španija.² Njihova slabo zgrajena bivališča so porušili sestradani volkovi na globalnem trgu. Ti plenilci so »puhali in pihali ter tako odpihnili hiške prašičkov«, čisto tako kot v izvirni *Pravljici o treh prašičkih*. Njihovi strogi »severnjaški« starešine so bili zgroženi. Ti starešine so kot »starka, ki je živela v čevlju«, lik iz angleške pesmice za otroke, ki je očitno prototip splošne percepcije Angele Merkel. V starkinem raztegnjenem čevlju je bilo vse polno neubogljivih otrok. Kako jih je ukrotila? Dala jim je »juhe brez kančka mesa«, jih »dobro zlasala in spat spravila«. Pa imamo opis strogega varčevanja [austerit] v rimanem kupletu.³

Boji

Če nam torej rumeni mediji ne morejo kaj prida pomagati pri razumevanju krize, se ozrimo drugam. Na primer k Jürgenju Habermasu in Ulrichu Becku, ki sta se posvetila tem vprašanjem. Beckovo temeljno sporočilo je, da je Evropa postala nemška: »[P]ogumno izjavljamo, da je to, kar je dobro za nemško gospodarstvo, prav za vse evropsko gospodarstvo in širše!« (Beck, 2013: 57). Toda pokazalo se je, da nam to, kar naj bi bilo »dobro za nas«, v resnici škoduje, pravi Beck: »[T]i programi strogega varčevanja so zgolj zaostri gospodarstvo v Evropi, tako da je bil učinek nasproten od nameravanega« (59). Tam, kjer Beck vidi kugo nemškega »evrskega nacionalizma«, Habermas opaža drugo bolezen: »izvršni federalizem«. Voditelji držav članic v »Evropskem svetu, katerega oblast izvira iz njega samega«, sklepajo dogovore med sabo in nato »organizirajo večino v svojih državnih parlamentih pod grožnjo sankcij« (Habermas, 2012: viii).

Kaj lahko storimo? Habermas je previdno optimističen. Meni, da politična oblast v Evropi postopoma postaja manj brutalna in hierarhična. Ta proces, pravi, napreduje pod pritiskom norm, ki se vgrajujejo v evropsko zakonodajo na naddržavni ravni. V teh normah se nakazujejo obrisi Evrope, ki pozna razširjeno demokratično povezovanje,

2 P kot Portugalska, I kot Irska ali Italija, G kot Grčija in S kot Španija. Akronim se lahko kaj hitro razume slabšalno. [»Pigs« v angleščini pomeni prašiči. Avtorjeva aluzija na pravljico o treh prašičkih izhaja iz te besedne igre. Op. prev.]

3 Pesmica gre takole: »There was an old woman who lived in a shoe. / She had so many children, she didn't know what to do. / She gave them some broth without any bread; / And whipped them all soundly and put them to bed.« [V zasilnem prevodu: V čevlju živela je starka nekdaj, / imela otrok je, da ni ved'la, kaj. / Jim dala je juhe brez kančka mesa, / jih dobro zlasala in spat spravila. Op. prev.]

kolektivno odločanje in državljansko solidarnost po vsej EU. Habermas zato veliko pričakuje od procesa *učenja*, skozi katerega gredo evropske politične elite in v okviru katerega jih njihovi ustavni pravniki učijo, kako razmišljati bolj svetovljansko.

Po Habermasu so akterji zelene spremembe razsvetljeni strokovnjaki, ki izhajajo iz filozofije in ustavnega prava. Po Becku naj bi imeli podobno vlogo razsvetljeni državljani, oboroženi s sociološkim pogledom. Toda, kot bi se oba strinjala, moramo obravnavati tudi dva druga ključna akterja spremembe: vlade, ki razpolagajo z velikansko vojaško, pravno in fiskalno močjo države, ter velika podjetja (vključno z medijskimi) s svojimi neznanskimi finančnimi, tehnološkimi in prepričevalnimi zmogljivostmi.

Moja teza je, da sta za razumevanje razvoja Evropske unije dejansko ključna dva niza odnosov. Eden je triada, ki povezuje državo, velika podjetja in navadne državljane (»ljudstvo«). V Evropi poteka bitka med vladami in gospodarstvom za to, kdo bo imel glavno besedo na najvišji ravni odločanja v kapitalistični politični ekonomiji. Boji potekajo na več prizoriščih, metode pa vključujejo obdavčitev, privatizacijo, lobiranje in korupcijo. Ključno vprašanje je: katere vrste državljanstvo bo imelo prednost v vladnih programih, ali bo šlo za nekakšno »tržno državljanstvo«, ki daje prednost interesom velikih podjetij, ali bo to »socialno državljanstvo«, ki pri izdatkih poudarja potrebe tako imenovanih »99 odstotkov«, potrebnih dela, stanovanja, zdravstvenega varstva in tako naprej?

Drugi ključni odnos pa je odnos med Evropsko unijo in Združenimi državami Amerike. Obeta se dolgoročni boj med EU in ZDA za prvenstvo v prestižu, oblasti in moči tako na Zahodu kot globalno. Ta boj lahko opazujemo v razpravah v Svetovni trgovinski organizaciji, prepirih okrog vojn v Iraku in Afganistanu, tekmovanju za vpliv v Severni Afriki in na Bližnjem vzhodu ter ob občasnih razkritjih prikritih operacij, kot sta bila »gladio« (predvsem v Italiji)⁴ in programi nadziranja evropskih držav ameriške Nacionalne varnostne agencije [NSA] s sedežem v Fort Meadu v zvezni državi Maryland.⁵

Odnos ZDA – EU je zanimiv zlasti zato, ker je po mojem mnenju sedanja kriza za prihodnost Evropske unije enako pomembna, kot je bila za razvoj Združenih držav Amerike državljanska vojna. Če ta dva zgodovinska dogodka primerjamo, bomo obakrat videli, kako si neki okvir vladavine prizadeva združevati dve vrsti politične ekonomije, ki vlečeta v dve radikalno različni smeri. V obeh primerih je šlo, grobo rečeno, za spopad med lastninskimi pravicami in človekovimi pravicami. Poleg tega je bilo na obeh straneh tega nasprotja tudi veliko hinavščine in korupcije, celo nekaj fanatizma.

4 Gl. na primer: Ginsborg, 2001: 171–173.

5 Gl. na primer: »Attacks from America: NSA spied on European Union Offices«, Spiegel Online International, 29. junij 2013 na <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nsa-spied-on-european-union-offices-a-908590.html> (zadnji dostop: 30. 9. 2013).

Moja razprava ima tri dele. V prvem delu bom govoril o »evropski zgodbi« kot nizu dveh zaporedij. Prvo zaporedje je trajalo petdeset let (1939–1989) in je najprej doseglo vrhunec z izgradnjo aparata, nato pa doživelo upočasnitev pogona konec 80. let prejšnjega stoletja. Drugo zaporedje (po letu 1989) je za zdaj krajše, njegov vrhunec pa je bila vrsta pretresov, ki so razmajali aparat, s čimer so razgalili njegove sestavne dele, ki so bili prej tesno priviti skupaj, tako da jih lahko opazujemo kot na tehnični skici.

V drugem delu razprave bom na kratko orisal »tehnično skico« EU v krizi, pri čemer bom izpostavil osi sodelovanja, meje boja in brezna odtujitve v Evropi, ki so nastali ali postali izrazitejši v času krize po letu 2008. Pokazal bom, da se usmeritve glavnih skupinskih igralcev razlikujejo v dveh pogledih: glede upoštevanja pravil in glede na pravila vladanja ter trga. Pri svojem razpravljanju bom vzorec napetosti znotraj EU po letu 2008 na hitro primerjal z odgovarjajočimi, a bistveno drugačnimi vzorci napetosti v Združenih državah Amerike v kriznih letih po bančnem zlomu leta 1857, ki so pripeljali do državljanske vojne in obnove.⁶

V zadnjem delu razprave bom obravnaval perspektive EU po koncu sedanje krize.

I. del

Evropa 1939–1989: katarza, geneza, skleroza

Oktobra 2012 je Evropska unija (ki je pod tem imenom uradno nastala leta 1991) prejela Nobelovo nagrado za mir zaradi »več kot šest desetletij trajajočega prispevka k uveljavljanju miru in sprave, demokracije in človekovih pravic v Evropi«. ⁷ Ob tej priložnosti je bilo veliko odklonilnih komentarjev, najbrž zato ker so se države članice že več mesecev prepirale o tem, kako se spopasti z evrsko krizo. Toda ob rojstvu EU v 50. letih je bila njena privlačnost tako za voditelje kot za volivce v tem, da je ponujala zatočišče pred vojno in političnim zatiranjem.

To močno integrirajočo silo – združevanje hvaležnih preživelcev – moramo vključiti v svoje zgodovinsko razumevanje procesov, ki so pripeljali do sedanje krize. Od leta 1939 smo pravzaprav doživeli šest faz: *katarzo*, *genezo* in *sklerozo* do konca hladne vojne leta 1989, po letu 1989 pa še *hibris*, *nemezo* in nazadnje še *krizo*.

Katarza. Gledano za nazaj sta dve evropski (in svetovni) vojni 20. stoletja odgovorili na dve vprašanji. Prvo vprašanje je bilo, ali lahko imperiji, ki so obvladovali svetovno

6 Gre za obdobje med letoma 1865 in 1877, ki ga je zaznamovala reintegracija južnih držav v ameriško zvezo. Op. prev.

7 Za nadaljnje podrobnosti gl. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html (zadnji dostop: 30. 8. 2013).

politiko 19. stoletja, preživijo v dobi, ki je postajala vse bolj komercializirana, urbanizirana in industrializirana. Odgovor je bil nikalen, številne od teh političnih struktur – vključno z nemškim, avstro-ogrskim, otomanskim in ruskim imperijem – pa so do leta 1918 celo propadle.⁸ Britanski in francoski imperij, povezana v svoji *entente cordiale*, sta še lahko stala na nogah.⁹ Bila sta najbolj »moderna« izmed vseh starih imperijev in sta še naprej izkoriščala vire Afrike, Azije in Bližnjega vzhoda, dokler sta jih lahko.

Druga svetovna vojna je deloma odgovorila na drugo vprašanje, in sicer: kateri interesi in katere ideologije bodo zapolnili svetovno vrzel, ki bo ostala po dokončnem propadu angleško-francoskega imperialnega režima: nemški nacizem, rusko-kitajski komunizem ali ameriška kapitalistična demokracija?

Kot vemo, je v letih od 1939 do 1945 med temi tremi interesi in ideologijami potekal boj na življenje in smrt, v katerem je življenje izgubilo najmanj 60 milijonov ljudi, od tega približno polovica v Evropi. Vojna in njene posledice so bile za Evropejce globoko katarzične.¹⁰ Po koncu 40. let so bili ljudje bistveno manj pripravljeni umirati in ubijati v imenu utopičnih obljub, ki so jih dajali politiki. Bojevniški duh je bil zatrt. Ljudje so bili pripravljeni graditi mir, ne pa se zapletati v nasilne boje.

Geneza. Ne le »vzhodni blok«, dežele na obeh straneh »železne zavese« so bile po letu 1945 disciplinirane od zunaj. Washington je postavil svoje tanke in jedrske konice na zahodnoevropsko ozemlje in iz krvavih evropskih bojevniških poglavarjev napravil uslužne dvorjane. Francija in Nemčija sta bili prisiljeni prekiniti svoj dolgotrajni cikel maščevanja, ki sega na začetek 19. stoletja. Vse skupaj je spominjalo na »proces civiliziranja«, kot ga je opisal Norbert Elias.¹¹ Elias je menil, da se je oblikovanje držav v zgodnji moderni Evropi začelo z nastankom močnih centralizatorskih kraljevih dvorov, na katerih so bili vojaški poglavarji prisiljeni odvreči svoje meče in poklekniti pred prestolom.¹²

Po zmagi zaveznikov so se morali tudi evropski generali sprijazniti z manevri NATA pod ameriškim poveljstvom, moderno različico srednjeveških viteških turnirjev. Marshallova pomoč je bila močno diplomatsko orožje, ki je ameriškim voditeljem omogočalo, da so zlasti Francija in Nemčija, pa tudi Italija in druge prejemnice pomoči začele med sabo gospodarsko sodelovati.

8 Španski imperij je doživel hud udarec že v špansko-ameriški vojni leta 1898. Kitajska cesarska dinastija je bila odstavljena leta 1912.

9 Belgijci in Nizozemci so prav tako ohranili donosne kolonialne posesti.

10 Gl. na primer: Lowe, 2012.

11 Gl.: Elias, 2000.

12 Gl.: Elias, 1983 in pa Smith, 2001.

Iz Evropske skupnosti za premog in jeklo (1951) je nastala Evropska skupnost (1957), ki je sčasoma sprejela Enotni evropski akt (1986). Evropski »dvorjani« iz Nemčije, Francije, Italije in držav Beneluksa so kmalu znova prevzeli precejšen nadzor nad svojim življenjem. Evropska »skupnost« je postala zahodnoevropski klub, ki je svojim članom ponujal področje delovanja, ki ni dovoljevalo grobega gospodarskega protekcionizma ali neprizanesljive morilske medsebojne oboroževalne tekme. Ta klub je postal zavetišče za politične voditelje Zahodne Evrope in njihove poslovne prijatelje, v katerem ne bo mogoče ponižanje. Vzpostavili so stalen dialog in pustili za sabo staro navado, da se o stvareh odloča na način, da lahko močnejši tekme podre na tla svojega nasprotnika in ga izrine z bojnega polja.

Zahodnoevropski birokrati, poslovneži in politiki so bili postopoma pripravljani bolj zaupati drug drugemu, sklepati dogovore in sodelovati v Bruslju. V tem času se je članstvo v klubu podvojilo. Tri »severne« države, VB, Irska in Danska, so se pridružile prvotnim šestim leta 1973. Sledile so jim tri nekdanje diktature: Grčija (1981), Španija (1986) in Portugalska (1986).

Ta zgodba ima pomembno »ozadje«. To ozadje je dolgotrajno rivalstvo med Združenimi državami Amerike in evropskimi vladami, ki sega še pred leto 1776, ko je »novi svet« uradno zavrnil Evropo. Kljub hudim ranam, ki jih je Združenim državam prizadejala državljanska vojna v 60. letih 19. stoletja, je bila Amerika leta 1918 že dovolj močna, da je pomagala dobiti prvo svetovno vojno in nato v glavnem narekovala pogoje sklenitve miru v Evropi. Z zmago pod vodstvom ZDA je leta 1945 prišel vrhunec ameriškega ponosa in evropske podreditve, ki sta se pozneje še okrepila zaradi francoskega in britanskega ponižanja pri Dien Bien Phuju, v Alžiriji in na Suezju med letoma 1954 in 1962.

Vloge so se zamenjale, ko Združenim državam Amerike v zadovoljstvo številnih evropskih intelektualcev in njihovih študentov ni uspelo vsiliti svoje volje Vietnamu in so bile prisiljene priznati poraz. V tem, da je zdaj prišla na vrsto Amerika, se je odražalo dejstvo, da se je »imperij pretirano razširil«. V 70. letih so se pojavili tudi drugi znaki: devalvacija ameriškega dolarja, otoplitev odnosov v hladni vojni, zmanjšanje ameriških obrambnih naprav v Evropi.

Skleroza. Če sklenem z navezavo na Hegla, lahko rečem, da je katarzična izkušnja pošastne totalne vojne v 40. letih vzpostavila izhodiščno »tezo« EU, to je, ustvarila je splošno hrepenenje po miru, stabilnosti in blagostanju. Kmalu zatem je nastopila »antiteza«: povojna geneza prijateljskega kluba, v katerem so stari nasprotniki privolili v udobno dogovarjanje. V 70. letih je dvignila glavo »sinteza« v obliki »evroskleroze«, kot jo je leta 1985 poimenoval Herbert Giersch, vodilni nemški ekonomist.

Skleroza ali otrdevanje institucionalnega tkiva je bila »druga plat« izogibanja konfliktom, te evropske želje po ohranjanju miru za vsako ceno. Drugače rečeno, evropski politiki, poslovneži, skupine strokovnjakov in sindikati so težave raje reševali z različnimi odpustki, kot pa da bi spremenili svoje delovanje. Posledično so izgubili svojo prožnost in sposobnost prilagajanja. V času dolgega gospodarskega razcveta se

to ni zdelo problematično. Toda na začetku 70. let je bilo tega razcveta konec. Takrat je postalo jasno, da mir in stabilnost ne prinašata več nenehne rasti življenjskega standarda številnih ljudi, ki je bila stalnica v prejšnjih desetletjih.

Giersch je leta 1985 ugotavljal, da v evropskih državah naraščajo različni stroški: od surovin, energije, izdatkov socialne države do zahtev privilegiranih skupin. Medtem je naraščala brezposelnost, stopnje rasti pa so padale: od več kot štirih odstotkov v 60. letih na manj kot dva odstotka na začetku 80. let.¹³ Kako bi bilo mogoče premagati te težave? S sprostivijo pobude ljudi v novi »informacijski družbi« ter z zmanjševanjem davkov, plač, rent in trgovinskih ovir.

Evropska komisija je bila zelo naklonjena tej analizi, ki je bila na široko sprejeta v intelektualnih krogih. Enotni evropski akt iz leta 1986 je pomenil velik korak v smeri odpiranja trgovine znotraj EU.¹⁴ Toda to odpiranje takrat ni potekalo sistematično. Bruselj sta namreč presenetila dva dogodka, katerih posledice še vedno čutimo.

Eden je bil seveda nastanek mogočnega rezervoarja zasebne in javne posojilne sposobnosti, ki je podžigal in zalagal ambicije politikov ter potrošnikov. Ključni trenutek je bil »veliki pok« (1986), ki je londonski city odprl ameriškim finančnim hišam, s čimer je bilo na enkrat na voljo ogromno kredita za vso Evropo in še čez. Eksplozivna energija dereguliranega finančnega sektorja je vladam in zasebnim potrošnikom zagotovila obilo kredita: to je bila prava zlata jama.

Ta bogati tok kredita je vladam omogočil, da so ohranjale nižjo obdavčitev, kot bi jo sicer, državljanom pa, da so svoje plače dopolnjevali s tem, kar je Gillian Tett (2009) imenoval »bedakovo zlato«, posojilnimi aranžmaji, ki jih je zagotavljalo bančništvo v senci. V zadnji instanci je šlo za to, da ni bilo nobene zadnje instance. Vselej je bilo mogoče, vsaj tako se je zdelo, s pomočjo finančnega vzvoda priti do dodatnega kredita. To je zmanjšalo pritisk na evropske vlade, podjetja in privilegirane skupine, da se resno spooprimejo s svojo lastno neučinkovitostjo in togostjo.

Drugi dogodek velikanskih razsežnosti je bil nepričakovani razpad Sovjetske zveze, ki je prinesel konec hladne vojne in pa, presenetljivo, ponovno združitev Nemčije, česar v času svojega življenja ni pričakoval skoraj nihče, ki je bil rojen po letu 1945.

Evropa po letu 1989: hibris, nemeza, kriza

S tem pa smo prišli do drugega zaporedja v naši obravnavi življenja Evropske unije. Večina evropske politične dinamike po letu 1989 je izhajala iz akutne potrebe, da se reši vprašanje združitve Nemčije, ki je grozilo, da bo znova obudilo stara politična zaveznitva

13 Giersch, 1985: 1. Gl.: <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48070> (zadnji dostop 10. 9. 2013).

14 Izrecen namen tega akta je bilo povečati stopnjo harmonizacije in konkurenčnosti znotraj EU.

in delitve. Tako Francija kot Britanija sta nasprotovali tej spremembi statusa svoje stare sovražnice. Mar se bosta umaknili iz EU in se povezali veliko tesneje, v novo srčno zvezo? In če bi se to zgodilo, bi Nemčija zaradi take zavrnitve sčasoma poiskala močnega novega partnerja na Vzhodu kot v času rapalskega sporazuma (1922) med Berlinom in Moskvo?¹⁵ Ali bo Evropa spet razdeljena in ji bodo grozili novi konflikti in razdori, morda celo vojna?

Da bi se izognili temu potencialnemu razpletu, je bilo treba Nemčijo pritegniti globoko v evropski projekt in jo s tem napraviti zainteresirano za njegov uspeh. Pomenilo je tudi, da bo moral ta projekt postati bolj ambiciozen, tako da bo vsem ponujal več sredstev in obljubljal večje koristi. Če je EU hotela pogoltniti veliko in ambiciozno Nemčijo, je morala postati še večja in še bolj ambiciozna.

Spoprijemanje s temi izzivi je sprožilo še eno kvazidialektično zaporedje, zaporedje, v katerem so upanja in ambicije, ki so se porodili v začetni fazi hibrisa, prišli v protislovje z razočaranji v fazi nemeze, zaradi česar so pričakovanja trčila ob izkustvo, kar je pripeljalo do zamer, tesnobe in razočaranja v fazi krize, ki je sledila.

Hibris. Pred letom 1989 je EU zasedala ravnotežni položaj med izrazito etatiističnimi režimi ZSSR in Vzhodne Evrope ter izrazito tržnim režimom Združenih držav Amerike. To ravnovesje vpliva na njenih mejah je dopolnjevalo ravnovesje moči znotraj EU. Gospodarstvo in vlada sta bila v nenehnem, sicer prikritem boju, v katerem si noben ni pridobil odločilne prednosti in v katerem si je vsaka stran prizadevala pridobiti koristi od druge, ne da bi morala veliko ponuditi v zameno. Evropska komisija v Bruslju je bila navajena na udarce z obeh strani. Veliko število lobistov iz gospodarstva je bilo ves čas v bližini, da so lahko predlagali različne ukrepe. Toda plače bruseljske birokracije so se financirale iz sredstev, ki so jih zagotavljale nacionalne vlade, te pa so morale svoje izdatke upravičiti pred volivci.

Po letu 1989 so lobisti iz gospodarstva in svetovalci z Zahoda preplavili Srednjo, Vzhodno in Jugovzhodno Evropo, kjer so propagirali različne aranžmaje za izvajanje zdravstvenega varstva, izobraževanja, menedžerskih storitev in drugih dejavnosti, s katerimi naj bi zapolnili ogromno praznino, ki je nastala po popolnem propadu socialističnih upravnih aparatov. Na začetku 90. let je rasla priljubljenost ideologije »globalizacije«, ki je navadno pomenila poslovno motivirano prizadevanje za dvig kapitalistične produktivnosti, visoke profite in maksimalno prehodnost na mednarodnem tržišču.¹⁶ Drugače rečeno, ravnovesje moči med državo in gospodarstvom se je v notranjosti EU močno prevesilo v prid gospodarstvu.

15 Za rapalski sporazum gl.: Salzman, 2012. [Seveda ne gre za sporazum o meji med Kraljevino Italijo in Kraljevino SHS, ki je bil prav tako podpisan v Rapallu, letoviškem mestecu ob ligurski obali. Op. prev.]

16 Gl. na primer: Smith, 2006.

Maastrichtski sporazum je poskusil ohraniti stanje pred letom 1989, ko je vladalo približno ravnovesje med državo in trgov, je pa postavil strožje zahteve za oba člena v tej enačbi. Po eni strani je vzpostavitev denarne unije (evra) zahtevala strožjo nacionalno proračunsko disciplino kot kadar koli prej, kar je vključevalo omejitve javnih izdatkov; upati je bilo, da bo to vseč trgov. Po drugi strani pa se je maastrichtska pogodba v poglavju o socialnih pravicah sklicevala na mogočen ideal socialnega državljanstva, kolikor je predvidela, da morajo imeti vsi državljani enakopraven dostop do dostojnega stanovanja, možnosti izobraževanja, zdravstvenega varstva, ki si ga lahko privoščijo, in zanesljive varnostne mreže, ki naj bi zmanjšala trpljenje zaradi brezposelnosti, bolezni in drugih vrst ranljivosti. Obenem so kölnhavske kriteriji (1993) od novih članic zahtevali vpeljavo demokracije, uveljavitev vladavine prava, varovanje manjšin in vzdrževanje zmogljivih tržnih gospodarstev.¹⁷ Upati je bilo, da bodo ti ukrepi vseč volivcem, tudi tistim v bodočih novih članicah.

EU si je postavila zelo ambiciozen cilj: da bo disciplinirano in dinamično, do podjetij prijazno gospodarstvo, da bo politična skupnost, ki bo prerasla ponižanje, ne le ko gre za vlade, ampak tudi ko gre za državljane, da bo zgradila ustrezne strukture in sisteme, s pomočjo katerih bo dosegla te cilje, in, ne nazadnje, da bo vse to dosegla hkrati z vključitvijo kar se da velikega števila dežel, ki jih je »osvobodilo« zrušenje »socialističnega bloka«. Kratak čas je celo kazalo, da recept deluje. Med letoma 1995 in 2007 je bilo v EU sprejetih petnajst novih članic. Obenem pa sta tegobe in težave evroskleroze ublažila zmanjšanje notranjih trgovinskih ovir in tok dobičkonosnih poslovnih naložb, ki jih je spodbujal poceni kredit.

Če je beseda »hibris« primerna za opis EU v 90. letih, je še primernejša, ko gre za Združene države Amerike v istem obdobju, desetletju prve zalivske vojne, daytonskega sporazuma, washingtonskega konsenza in vse bolj razširjene uporabe izraza »ameriški imperij«.¹⁸ Ameriški ekvivalent Rudyarda Kiplinga, človeka, ki je množicam razložil, kaj je britanski imperializem, je bil Thomas Friedman, avtor knjige *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (2000). Ta prodajna uspešnica, polna prispevov iz živalskega sveta, je bila globalizacijska različica *Knjige o džungli* (Kipling, 1996). Avtor je trdil, da je bilo Ameriki pravzaprav usojeno, da postane Levji kralj. Drugi narodi naj bi si našli mesto v hierarhiji džungle, kakor vejo in znajo.¹⁹

17 Kriteriji za vstop v EU so bili postavljeni na srečanju Evropskega sveta v Københavnu junija 1993. Za podrobnosti gl.: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (zadnji dostop 30. 3. 2013). Poglavje o socialnih pravicah je pokrivalo področja, kot so enakopravnost spolov, zdravje in varnost, pravice priseljencev, obravnava ranljivih skupin, pravice do združevanja in kolektivnih pogajanj. Kot je znano, je bilo treba priznati nekatere izjeme britanski vladi, ki je bila zelo zadržana do sprejema teh obveznosti.

18 Gl. na primer: Bacevich, 2002.

19 O Fridmanu gl.: Smith, 2006: 88–90, 154–157.

Nemeza. Arogantne ambicije je čakalo povračilo. Tako je vsaj sporočal Osama bin Laden, ko je prevzel odgovornost za 11. september.²⁰ Razglasil je, da je bila Amerika, voditeljica Zahoda, kaznovana, zato da bi bilo maščevano ponižanje, ki ga je islam doživljal na Bližnjem vzhodu. To, kar je sledilo, je še predobro poznano. Preskočimo lahko neuspeh ZDA, ko so poskušale dobiti podporo Združenih narodov za svojo vojno proti Iraku, ki sta ji nasprotovali tako Francija kot Nemčija. To, kar je bilo v prvih letih po letu 2001 najpomembnejše, je, da ameriški vladi kljub njenemu visokotehnoškemu orožju ni uspelo pokazati, da lahko uveljavi svojo politično voljo v Iraku, Afganistanu ali Pakistanu. Zato se je ustvaril vtis, da so ZDA šibke in da nimajo jasne usmeritve.

To dojemanje ameriške šibkosti se je prelilo v finančni sektor. Poletje 2008 je minilo v znaku pogajanj z Iračani glede datuma umika ameriških sil, pozneje istega leta pa je ameriška vlada privolila v pogovore s talibani, ki so še vedno imeli polne roke dela z nasilnimi dejanji po vsem Afganistanu.²¹ Banka Lehmann Brothers je propadla 15. septembra 2008, nekaj tednov pred ameriški predsedniškimi volitvami, ki naj bi v Belo hišo izstrelile nepreizkušene, neznanega novinca po imenu Barack Obama. Ta v nasprotju z osmimi predhodnimi predsedniki ni bil nikoli podpredsednik ali guverner kake zvezne države. Ni napak, če rečemo, da sta bila prav klavni razplet teh ameriških vojn in Obamova anonimnost glavna dejavnika iz ozadja, ki sta septembra 2008 prispevala k izgubi finančnega zaupanja, kar je sprožilo naglo sesedanje neznanke gore mednarodnega dolga – in krizo evrskega območja.

Kriza. Obstaja en element EU, ki po letu 2008 ni v kritičnem stanju: vloga evra kot zanesljive mednarodne valute. Ta vloga ni bila prizadeta. V tem se (za zdaj) odraža prepričanje velikih imetnikov te valute, da je glavna prioriteta Evropske centralne banke in Evropskega sveta preprečiti razpad evrskega območja.

Krizo gre torej iskati drugje: v državah članicah, institucijah in družbenih skupinah, ki so prisiljene prenašati postransko škodo, ki nastaja zaradi (za zdaj) uspešne operacije reševanja evra in evrskega območja. Med drugim jo moramo iskati v gospodinjstvih milijonov Evropejcev, ki so bili pahnjeni v brezposelnost, prisiljeni v manj varno zaposlitev ali primorani sprejeti možnost manjših pokojnin, znižanih standardov zdravstvenega varstva in omejenih socialnih pravic.

Vse se je začelo, ko so banke z obeh strani Atlantika nenadoma nehale posojati denar druga drugi, s čimer so iz sistema tako rekoč čez noč izločile ogromno količino

20 Za njegovo izjavo gl.: Smith, 2006: 21–22.

21 Gl. na primer: <http://www.mapreport.com/years/2008/countries/afghanistan.html> and <http://www.cato.org/doc-download/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policy-makers/2009/9/hb111-49.pdf> (zadnji dostop 15. 9. 2013). Pogovori so bili najavljeni oktobra 2008 po posvetovanju z afganistanskimi in pakistanskimi oblastmi. Gl.: *France* 24, 28. 10. 2008, na: <http://www.france24.com/en/20081028-kabul-islamabad-agree-talks-with-taliban-afghanistan> (zadnji dostop 15. 9. 2013).

likvidnosti. Številni kreditorji so zahtevali odplačilo obstoječih posojil ustanovam in posameznikom. Unovčili so številne hipoteke. Ta bančna »stavka« je sprožila verižno reakcijo. Vlade posameznih držav so vsepovsod posegle vmes z dokapitalizacijo bank, s čimer so povečale svoje lastne državne dolgove, zato so kreditorji samih vlad od njih zahtevali reze v javne izdatke, tako da bi bilo mogoče te dolgove čim prej zmanjšati. Bančna stavka je torej sprožila plaz vladnih rezov v javni sektor. Ta proces so v dramski obliki izrazila protestniška ulična gledališča, odraža pa se tudi v inkvizicijskem diskurzu *trojke*, ki v državah, kot so Grčija, Španija in Italija, spremlja pomoč ali grožnjo, da bo pomoč potrebna.

Bančna kriza je ponizala vodstvo EU, ker ga je leta 2010 prisilila, da je za pomoč zaprosilo MDS. Osramočenost EU je prišla na dan leta 2012, ko nekateri svetovni voditelji na srečanju skupine držav G20 v Mehiki niso mogli skriti zadovoljstva, da so lahko odrekli pomoč svojim nekdanjim kolonialnim gospodarjem. Neizprosnost pogojev, pod katerimi sta pomoč dobila Grčija in Ciper, je v določeni meri nedvomno posledica tega, da je skušala Evropska komisija ta udarec »prenesti navzdol«. Zanimivo je, da so Ciprčani za pomoč, ki so jo dobili po nesramno kaznovanih pogojih, zaprosili le teden dni po mehiškem sestanku.²² Po drugi strani pa je pomembno tudi to, da sta očitna jeza in gnev, ki so ju povzročili ekstremni varčevalni ukrepi v Grčiji, EU zagotovili podporo prestrašenih volivcev po vsej Evropi za njen fiskalni pakt, ki nacionalnim vladam v evrskem območju od zgoraj vsiljuje obvezno proračunsko disciplino.²³

Za zdaj je kriza zapustila tri vrste dediščine. Ena je nagla in radikalna centralizacija oblasti in nadzora Evropske komisije in Evropske centralne banke nad proračunskimi politikami držav članic znotraj evrskega območja. To ni malenkost, čeprav je bilo na mizi že dlje časa in čeprav kriza nikakor ni »koristila« temu, da bi taka ureditev postala politično sprejemljivejša kot prej. Zdaj imamo torej močno Evropsko centralno banko, evropski semester, »šestorček« [»six-pack«] in »dvojček« [»two-pack«], postopek makroekonomskih neravnotežij, pakt o fiskalni stabilnosti (vse to je bilo uvedeno v obdobju 2010–2012), dokončne denarne transakcije na sekundarnih trgih držav evrskega območja (OMT) in operacije dolgoročnejšega refinanciranja (LTRO).

Druga vrsta dediščine je nastanek ogromne brezposelnosti, še posebej med mladimi ljudmi. Ti so izkusili, kaj pomeni biti premagan, oslavljen, zavržen in zanemarjen, drugače rečeno, kaj pomeni biti žrtev ponižanja. Občutek degradacije se krepi tudi zaradi spomina na obljube EU, da bo za svoje državljane postala politična skupnost, ki ne bo poznala ponižanja. Ponižanje je zelo dinamičen proces: zahteva dejanja za odpravo

22 Skupina G20 se je sestala 18. in 19. junija 2012. Ciprska prošnja za pomoč je prišla 25. junija 2012.

23 Gl.: www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/3/304649/stootscg26_12.pdf (zadnji dostop 15. 9. 2013).

stanja, ki je po definiciji nesprejemljivo. Pričakujemo lahko, da bodo dinamike ponižanja v prihodnjih nekaj letih odigrale pomembno vlogo.²⁴

Če hočejo politiki razumeti dinamiko ponižanja, ki je lahko destruktivna in subverzivna, ne bi bilo slabo, da odložijo Hayeka in odprejo Haška. »Dobri vojak« Švejk, češki antijunak iz romana Jaroslava Haška, je bil ravnodušen vojak avstro-ogrske vojske med prvo svetovno vojno. Svojo inteligentnost je uporabljal za oviranje in posmehovanje težnjam sklerotične družbe, ki ga je zaničevala in ki jo je v povračilo tudi sam sovražil. Danes, ko vse več ravnodušnih rekrutov silijo v polke prekariata in brezposelnih, se vračajo Haškovi časi. »Švejkovske« tehnike institucionalne in ideološke sabotaže – zasedbe, šotorjenje, razkrivanje prave vsebine oglasov [ad busting], gverilsko komuniciranje [culture jamming] itn. – uporabljajo skupine, kot so Occupy Wall Street, 5 MS, 15 M in druge.

Obstaja pa še tretja vrsta dediščine. Kriza je preoblikovala evropski politični zemljevid, ker je na površje spravila podtalne napetosti v evropskih političnih in poslovnih elitah ter med njimi. Kakšen je ta novi zemljevid?

II. del

Vélíki duhovniki, puritanci, kavalirji in gusarji

Evropa. Izvirna evropska poroka med Francijo in Zahodno Nemčijo – ki jo je simboliziral znameniti poljub de Gaulla in Adenauerja leta 1963 – je temeljila na medsebojnem spoštovanju in tolerantnem odnosu med *dirizizmom* Pariza, osredinjenim na državo, in večjo pripravljenostjo Nemčije, posebej pod Ludwigom Erhardom, da prepusti več pobude gospodarstvu in finančnemu sektorju, ki pa jo morata uporabiti na družbeno odgovoren način.²⁵

Pol stoletja pozneje, ob nastopu krize, je znotraj močno povečane EU nastalo izrazito nasprotje med dvema tipoma politične ekonomije, ki sta oba dobro zastopana. Na eni strani dihotomije so elite in države (kot sta Nemčija in VB), v katerih velja, da je »glas« trga glavni razsodnik političnoekonomskega vedenja. Na drugi strani so elite in države (kot sta Italija in Grčija), v katerih politični voditelji in vladni funkcionarji poudarjajo, da je njihova glavna dolžnost služiti »ljudstvu« in ščititi interese državljanov, ne pa se uklanjati zahtevam financierjev. V grobem lahko ta dva tipa ločimo glede na to, ali dajeta prednost velikim podjetjem (»trgu«) ali veliki državi (»ljudstvu«).

24 Gl.: Smith, v pripravi.

25 Ludwig Erhard je bil kancler Zahodne Nemčije v letih 1963–1966, pred tem pa je bil v letih 1957–1963 podkancler in gospodarski minister v letih 1949–1963.

Oba modela, nemškega in francoskega, obdajata ponos in dostojnost, čeprav sta oba včasih osramočena zaradi dokazov o korupciji. Oba sta tudi del širšega spektra. Visoka merila francoskega *dirizizma* so tradicionalno prežemala birokratsko kulturo Evropske komisije ter bila zgled njenim standardom, pravilom in postopkom. Toda v nekaterih delih EU sta bila oblast in vpliv države, ki naj bi delovala v imenu ljudstva, včasih zlorabljeni v klientelistične namene, kar je nekaterim političnim voditeljem omogočilo, da so ustvarili obsežne sisteme patronatstva in da so davčne prihodke preusmerili v aranžmaje, od katerih so imeli korist njihovi prijatelji na račun drugih skupin.

Tudi vzdušje popolne poštenosti in strogega upoštevanja ustreznih postopkov, ki se povezuje z nemško *Bundesbank*, je v izrazitem nasprotju s kulturo oportunitizma, ki se je razvila v drugih institucijah v Evropi, vključno z nekaterimi segmenti londonskega cityja. V tem primeru je bil v kulturah določenih delovnih mest pogosto poudarjen element pripravljenosti na prevzemanje podjetniških tveganj namesto svetosti pravil, ki naj bi vodila ravnanje na tržišču.

Tako lahko na vsaki strani naše dihotomije med elitami, naravnanimi k velikim podjetjem (ki delujejo »na trgu«), in elitami, naravnanimi k veliki državi (služenju »ljudstvu«), napravimo še en razloček: med tistimi, ki se dosledno držijo pravil, in tistimi, ki pravila oportunistično prikrajajo. Na eni strani so politični voditelji in poslovne elite, ki so ponosni na dosledno vztrajanje pri jasnih načelih in formalnih pravilih. Na drugi strani pa so politiki in ljudje iz poslovnega sveta, ki se odločajo za bolj vpadljiv in oportunističen pristop z večjo toleranco do prikrajavanja pravil, čeprav seveda pri tem početju poskušajo ostati v okvirih zakona. Namerne prevare najdemo tako v sferi velikih podjetij (spomnite se škandala z LIBOR-jem) kot v sferi velike države (spomnite se na domnevno prirejanje grških proračunskih statistik pred vstopom države v evrsko območje).

Dejansko lahko ločimo štiri vrste elit. Prva so *veliki duhovniki*. Pristop k vladavini, ki temelji na rigoroznem upoštevanju pravil, lahko najdemo na primer v Bruslju, kjer si birokracija Evropske komisije zelo prizadeva ohranjati sloves kompetentnosti in poštenosti.²⁶ Potem so tukaj politični *kavalirji*, mojstri avanturizma, kakršni navdušujejo množice. Za to področje moramo pogledati v Italijo, Romunijo ali na Madžarsko, ki velikokrat veljajo za tipične primerke političnega klientelizma.

Tudi na drugi strani dihotomije najdemo dve tendenci. Eni od njih pripadajo rigorozno pedantni *puritanci*, ki jih odlično zastopajo »ordoliberalci« v Frankfurtu in

26 Na nekem blogu smo lahko pred kratkim prebrali, »da so sprejemni izpiti za uradnike EU strožji kot za večino državnih javnih uslužbencev. Znanje jezikov si zasluži tudi dobro plačo. Raven kompleksnosti pri oblikovanju politik, ki so prebavljive za vseh 27 držav članic, je prav tako nekaj posebnega.« Toda zaradi visokih plač in arogance je birokracija ranljiva za kritiko. Dean Carroll, »The EU gravy 'gravy train' in Brussels – fact or fiction?«, <http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/editor-blog/211/the-eu-gravy-train-in-brussels-fact-or-fiction> (zadnji dostop 30. 3. 2013).

Berlinu. In končno, velika podjetja in finančni sektor imajo svoje *gusarje*, ki jih zanima predvsem podjetniški uspeh, ne pa obsesivno upoštevanje pravih tržnih postopkov. Najpomembnejša evropska baza tega pristopa je London. Primeri te tendence naj bi občasno prihajali na dan v občilih velikega medijskega imperija, ki ga v zadnji instanci obvladuje Rupert Murdoch.²⁷

Preglednica 1: Boji in odnosi sodelovanja v EU (po letu 2008)

VÉLIKI DUHOVNIKI (Evropska komisija)	→ sodelovanje ←	PURITANCI (»ordoliberalci«)
↓ rivalstvo ↑	↘ sovražnost in odtujitev ↗	↓ rivalstvo ↑
KAVALIRJI (politični klientelizem)	→ sodelovanje ←	GUSARJI (neoliberalci)

Znotraj EU trenutno potekajo štirje politični boji (gl. prvo preglednico). Eden poteka med puritanci (predvsem »ordoliberalci« v Nemčiji) in kavalirji (zlasti Grki). Enako izraženo pa je tudi nasprotje med gusarji v londonskem cityju in velikimi duhovniki Evropske komisije, ki jim načeluje g. Barroso. Oba boja imata ideološko razsežnost: v igri so svetovni nazori. Obe nasprotji sta precej žolčni: številni nemški »puritanci« so že dolgo trdno prepričani, da so vsi Grki (ali celo vsi »južnjaki«) leni in nezanesljivi, londonske gusarje pa v bes spravlja odločenost Bruslja pri dušenju podjetništva, kot ga sami razumejo. V obeh primerih drugo stran, vsaj tako se zdi, obravnavajo kot nepopravljivo hudobno.

Potekata še dva druga boja. Številni frankfurtski borzniki bi radi prevzeli posel Veliki Britaniji in prisilili londonski city, da sprejme njihova pravila. Na koncu je tu še pogosto

27 Zaradi obtožb, da so časopisi, ki jih obvladuje Murdoch, na neprimeren način vdiral v mobilne telefone, sta bila Rupert Murdoch in njegov sin James julija 2011 poklicana pred preiskovalno komisijo britanskega parlamenta.

spregledana bitka med Brusljem in vodji kavalirjev, kot sta ministrska predsednika Madžarske in Romunije, ki bi rada spremenila ustavi svojih držav v korist lastnih strank in patronatskih omrežij.

Skupni učinek teh prečnih bojev je paradoksen: ustvarjajo neke vrste stabilnost, ki pa zavira razvoj kakršne koli »tesnejše povezave«. Poleg tega ta nasprotja dopolnjujeta še dve ključni partnerstvi, ki prečita mejo med vladami in trgom. Eno od njiju je partnerstvo med birokratskimi velikimi duhovniki iz Bruslja in tržno naravnanimi puritanci v Berlinu, ki so postrojeni za go. Merkel in ki jih povezuje naloga discipliniranja evrskega območja. Druge vrste partnerstvo, ki je enako pragmatično kot prvo, spodbuja vzajemno koristne povezave med kavalirji in gusarji. Te omogočajo, da v Srednji Evropi uspevajo oligarhi in cveti privatizacija.²⁸

Kaj torej to pomeni? Skupni rezultat je Evropska unija, v kateri kompleksno nihanje med žolčnim nasprotovanjem in pragmatičnim sodelovanjem elit povzroča hrupni in zopni zastoj. EU trenutno stopica na mestu. Zaradi tega je praktično nemogoče, da bi se znotraj EU na nekakšni metaforični »frontni črti« vzpostavila nevarna odkrita konfrontacija. Isti vzrok hkrati ovira tudi drobljenje EU in/ali evrskega območja, čeprav niti te možnosti ne moremo popolnoma izključiti.

In kar je najpomembnejše, kljub nedavno uvedenim institucionalnim novostim v EU, ki so okrepile centralizirano nadzorovanje in discipliniranje, še vedno nizka raven zaupanja med državami članicami zavira resnejše premike k notranjim reformam, ki bi bistveno povečale gospodarsko rast, zmanjšale visoko brezposelnost, zvišale raven plač in znova pridobile, kar je bilo izgubljenega na področju socialnih pravic.²⁹

Najbolj učinkovita pot naprej bi se odprla, če bi bila presežena strukturna neskladja med dvema političnima ekonomijama EU, tisto, ki je osredinjena na lastninskih pravicah na tržišču, in ono, ki obljublja, da bo obvarovala človekove pravice v okviru demokratične politične skupnosti, pri čemer trenutno obe poganjata korupcija in hinavščina. V tem trenutku imajo glavno besedo veliki duhovniki in puritanci, toda kavalirji in gusarji so še vedno premočni, da bi jih bilo mogoče zares disciplinirati.

Kako bi se lahko premaknili naprej? Za razmislek o tem bi bilo morda koristno narediti korak nazaj in položaj v Evropi po letu 2008 na hitro primerjati s položajem Američanov po letu 1857.

28 Gl. Eric Best: »Five Families that Rule Czech Republic«, 23. 5. 2013, Akttualne.cz, <http://akttualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=746021> (zadnji dostop 30. 3. 2013); Donald Blinken, »Privatization Helps«, 31. 7. 2011, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-blinken/privatization-helps-the-h_b_914383.html (zadnji dostop 30. 3. 2013).

29 Gl. na primer: Martin Wolf, »Why the Euro Crisis is not Over?«, *Financial Times*, 20. 2. 2013, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/74acaf5c-79f2-11e2-9dad-00144feabd0c.html?ftcamp=crm/email/2013220/nbe/Analysis/product#axzz2LQW3Hiu> (zadnji dostop 15. 2. 2013).

Amerika. Opazovalci so bili presenečeni nad podobnostmi med bančnima panikama v letih 2008 in 1857.³⁰ V obeh primerih so paniko povzročile same banke, ko so poskušale zaščititi svoj kapital ob izteku špekulativnega razcveta, ki se je napajal s poceni krediti. Bančnim stavkam so tako v Združenih državah Amerike (1857) kot v Evropi (2008) sledili splošno razširjeni bankroti in družbeni nemiri. Leta 1857 je Karl Marx, ki je takrat delal kot novinar, celo mislil, da bo kriza, ki je nastopila tistega leta, pomenila začetek katastrofalne svetovne recesije, ki se je je nadejal, tako da je na hitro začel pisati razpravo, ki je pozneje postala njegov *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1973).

Preglednica 2: ZDA in EU

	I: Ustanovitev	II: Širitev
USA	Prvotnih trinajst 1776–1791	1791–1703: +4
		1812–1821: +7
		1821–1837: +2
		1845–1861: +8
		1791–1861: +21
EU	Prvotnih šest 1951–1960	1960–1986: +6
		1995: +3
		2004: +10
		2007: +2
		1960–2007: +21

Tako kot v Evropi sto petdeset let pozneje je nenaden upad likvidnosti tudi v ZDA pripeljal do zaostritve družbenopolitičnih delitev.³¹ In podobno kot pozneje v Evropi se je to zgodilo ob izteku obdobja precejšnjega povečanja velikosti in kompleksnosti politične povezave. Z vsako pridružitvijo je prišlo do krča negotovosti, ker so morali akterji na novo ugotoviti, kako bo širitev vplivala na ravnotežje moči. Združene države Amerike,

30 Na primer: Riddiough, 2012 (<http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:bisbpc:64-03>) (zadnji dostop 30. 9. 2013), Panitch in Gindin, 2011; gl. tudi: Marini, 2005 na: <http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/3366/2/marini-1857.pdf> (zadnji dostop 30. 9. 2013).

31 James L. Houston (1987) je ugotavljal, da so politični odzivi na krizo leta 1857 v Združenih državah Amerike, še posebej v zvezni državi Pensilvaniji, pripomogli k zmagi republikancev na predsedniških volitvah leta 1860, kar je privedlo do odcepitve Juga in do državljanske vojne. Sicer pa je za nas bolj kot podrobnosti te specifične teze pomembno ravnotežje političnih in ekonomskih sil, ki se je vzpostavilo tik pred začetkom državljanske vojne.

ki jih je izvirno sestavljalo trinajst držav,³² so se v 70 letih po letu 1791 povečale za dvaindvajset novih držav, kar pomeni, da se je število glasov v svétiški zbornici povečalo za 2,6-krat.³³ Tudi Evropska unija, ki je imela prvotno šest članic, se je povečala za enaindvajset novih članic v 57 letih po letu 1960, kar je, sorazmerno gledano, celo večja širitev (4,5-krat), izvedena v krajšem času (gl. drugo preglednico).

V tretji preglednici skušam pokazati, kako bi lahko kategorije vélikih duhovnikov, puritancev, kavalirjev in gusarjev aplicirali na élite v predvojni Ameriki in v kakšnih odnosih so bile te élite med sabo. Poenostavljeno povedano so južnjaški plantažniki in njihovi politični voditelji zagovarjali stališče, da posamezne države predstavljajo suvereno oblast – njihovo »veliko državo« – in da ameriška zakonodaja štíti njihovo pravico do zasebne lastnine sužnjev. Svojo čast so zastavili za ohranitev teh načel, nekateri njihovi voditelji, tako imenovani »požiralci ognja«,³⁴ pa so jih bili pripravljeni braniti tudi z nasilnimi in »kavalirskimi« dejanji.³⁵

V nasprotju s tem so bili gonilna sila v življenju Severa ob nastopu 50. let 19. stoletja kapitalistični podjetniki, ki so delovali na področjih trgovine, industrije in velikega gradbeništva. Kraljevala so velika podjetja. Njihov kandidat je bil Abraham Lincoln, republikanski železničarski pravnik iz Čikaga. David Donald, pisec Lincolnove biografije, je gusarskega duha Lincolnovih podpornikov dobro izrazil v »prevodu« njihovega programa iz leta 1860. Pričakovali so, da bo Lincoln, če bo izvoljen, »vedel visoke protekcionistične carine, ki bodo rojevale monopole, da bo sprejel agrarni zakon, ki bo privabil špekulante, da oplenijo javno sfero, in da bo subvencioniral gradnjo transkontinentalne železnice, ki je ponujala neskončne možnosti zaslužkarstva« (Donald, 1961: 106).

Znotraj republikanske stranke so bili »gusarji« v koaliciji s »puritanci«, katerih vlogo so v tem primeru igrali severnjaški abolicionisti, odločeni, da bodo odpravili suženjstvo, kar je zanje pomenilo uveljavitev nečesa, česar niso razumeli zgolj kot

32 Med izvirnih trinajst držav spadajo: Delaware, Pensilvanija, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, Južna Karolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, Severna Karolina in Rhode Island.

33 Te države so bile: Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Misisipi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, Misuri, Arkansas, Michigan, Florida, Teksas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Kalifornija, Minnesota, Oregon in Kansas.

34 »Požiralci ognja« [fire-eaters], večinoma pravniki, nekateri z vojaško kariero, so bili radikalni secesionisti. Gl. na primer: Walther, 1992.

35 Neki požiralec ognja po imenu Laurence M. Keitt je leta 1858 v kongresu začel pretep, v katerega je bilo vključenih okrog petdeset poslancev. Pretep je izbruhnil, ko je omenjeni mož fizično napadel Galusha A. Growa, radikalnega republikanca (gl: <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collid=llcg&fileName=045/llcg045.db&recNum=666>, zadnji dostop 30. 9. 2013). Na samozavest južnjakov, ki so trdili, da so, če se tako izrazim, kot »véliki duhovniki« poklicani razlagati ustavo, je morda vplivalo tudi dejstvo, da je sedem od prvih desetih ameriških predsednikov izviralo z Juga, čeprav je bilo navala južnjakov konec po desetem predsedniku, Zacharyju Taylorju (1848–1850), ki je umrl med opravljanjem funkcije.

človekove pravice, ampak kot Gospodovo božansko postavo.³⁶ Vzorec sodelovanja in nasprotovanj med temi štirimi elitami je orisan (in seveda močno poenostavljen) v tretji preglednici.

Zaradi razporeditve sil, prikazane v tretji preglednici (predvojne ZDA), odkrit spopad sicer ni bil neizogiben, vsekakor pa je bil veliko verjetnejši kot v kompleksnem vzorcu, predstavljenem v prvi preglednici (EU po letu 2008). Kot vemo, je bilo suženjstvo odpravljeno, kar je odprlo vrata novim oblikam izkoriščanja Afroameričanov: diskriminaciji na Severu ter linčanju in zakonom Jima Crowa na Jugu. Kljub kratkemu poskusu obnove je bilo zaporedje izkušenj, ki jih je Jug imel s Severom, zato takšno: bil je premagan, oslavljen, zavrnjen in zanemarjen, zaradi česar je bil neprestano ponižan. Danes smo, ironično, priča enakemu zaporedju, ki ga na svojih plečih občutijo milijoni evropskih brezposelnih v Španiji, Grčiji in drugod.

Preglednica 3: Boji in odnosi sodelovanja v predvojnih ZDA

VÉLIKI DUHOVNIKI (južnjaška elita plantažnikov)	↔	PURITANCI (severnjaški abolicionisti)
↓	sovražnost in odtujitev	↓
sodelovanje		sodelovanje
↑	↔	↑
KAVALIRJI (»požiralci ognja«)		GUSARJI (predstavniki severnjaških velikih podjetij)

Toda med povojnim ameriškim Jugom in evropskim Jugom po letu 2008 je velika razlika. V Ameriki je ljudem, kot so bili osvobojeni sužnji in revni belci, nasproti stal mogočen, trden in odločen severnjaški aparat. Ta aparat je bil enoten, ker je bil zavezan širitvi sistema tržnih podjetij za vsako ceno in ovenčan s slovesom svetosti, ki mu ga

36 John Brown, ki je leta 1859 nameraval začeti vstajo suženjev, je bil skrajni abolicionist, pa tudi goreč protestant. Gl. na primer: Reynolds, 2006.

je prinesla zmaga v puritanski križarski vojni proti zlobnim kavalirjem in heretičnim vélikim duhovnikom. V nasprotju s tem se žrtve sedanje krize EU spoprijemajo z evropskim aparatom, ki je razdeljen in ki je obtičal v notranjem nasprotju. Kaj nam lahko v takšnih okoliščinah prinese prihodnost?

III. del

Sklep

Na obzoru se kažejo tri perspektive. Obravnaval jih bom v zaporedju po privlačnosti, tako da bom za konec prihranil najbolj zaželeno perspektivo, ki pa jo je kajpada tudi najtežje uresničiti. Prva perspektiva je po eni strani neprijetna, po drugi pa zmerno verjetna. Gre za to, da lahko evrsko območje in EU kot taka postaneta areni zamer in maščevanja, to vzdušje pa bi lahko v najslabšem primeru sprožilo proces odcepitev in drobitve. Ne pozabimo, da je EU pri svojih dvainšestdesetih (če za njen začetek vzamemo leto 1951) že precej starejša od nemškega cesarstva (1870–1918), ki je bilo ob svoji smrti staro oseminštirideset let, in skoraj tako stara kot ZSSR (1917–1991), ki je izdihnila po dobrih sedemdesetih letih. Ali je torej EU že v zadnjih izdihljajih?

Recimo, da bi SYRIZA po naslednjih grških parlamentarnih volitvah stopila v vlado. Precej velika manjšina aktivistov SYRIZE je pripravljena tudi na izstop iz evrskega območja. Obenem bi v Veliki Britaniji od tretjina do polovica poslancev konservativne stranke, ki ima trenutno največ sedežev v spodnjem domu, podprla izstop Britanije iz EU. Ali bi tovrstni izstopi lahko navedli nezadovoljne volivce v drugih državah na to, da bi tudi sami zahtevali izstop? Ta možnost ni popolnoma izključena, če bi se sovražnost javnosti do priseljencev tako zaostrila, da bi volivci po vsej Evropi zahtevali ponovno uvedbo strogega nadzora državnih mej.

V praksi se najbolj razširjena oblika odtujitve skriva v odnosih med politiki in običajnimi državljani. Številni volivci so se odločili podpreti zabavljajske antipolitike, kot sta Beppo Grillo in Nigel Farage, voditelj UKIP.³⁷ Zaradi te splošno razširjene apatije se glavnina državljanov večino časa drži stran od parlamentarne politike. Tudi ta dejavnik bi lahko prispeval k temu, da v večini držav članic odcepitev formalno ne bo prišla v poštev.

V zvezi z drugo možnostjo, verjetnejšo perspektivo, ki pa je le malenkost manj skrb vzbujajoča, lahko rečemo, da si bodo po koncu strogega varčevanja lobisti iz gospodarstva v nacionalnih prestolnicah in v Bruslju na vse kriplje prizadevali, da bi

37 United Kingdom Independence Party, skrajno desničarska stranka v VB, ki se, kot pove že ime, zavzema za izstop VB iz EU. Op. prev.

korporativnemu kapitalu odprli možnost povečanega investiranja v storitve, ki jih tradicionalno zagotavlja država v javnem sektorju: na primer v zdravstvo, šolstvo, vzgojo otrok, skrb za starejše in poštno storitve. Obenem bodo verjetno lobirali za znižanje standardov (»manj birokracije«), kar pomeni nižje stroške in višje dobičke, a tudi slabše storitve in razvodenitev socialnih pravic.

Zahodna in Južna Evropa bosta po letu 2008 prav lahko postali podobni Srednji, Vzhodni in Jugovzhodni Evropi po letu 1989: postaneta lahko obsežen prostor, v katerem se bosta povečala negotovost in tveganje osiromašenja, zato ker politiki ne bodo več skrbeli za blaginjo svojih državljanov, območje, na katerem si bodo lahko podjetja našla stranke za svoje privatizirane storitve. Če se bo to zgodilo, se bo ravnotežje vpliva med državo in gospodarstvom tako močno prevesilo v prid drugega, da bo »edina primerjalna prednost EU«, približno enakopraven odnos, ki ga je ohranjala med državo in trgom, prenehala obstajati. Še vedno ni jasno, ali bodo določila predlaganega prostotrgovinskega sporazuma med EU in ZDA pospešila prenos vpliva od države k velikim podjetjem, toda to najbrž ni nemogoče.

Tretja možnost, ki je najbolj privlačna, a tudi najtežje uresničljiva, je, da bodo državljani morda spoznali, da velika podjetja pridobivajo vse več vpliva in nadzora nad njihovimi življenji, hkrati pa se postopoma zmanjšuje njihov lasten vpliv, ki ga imajo skozi delovanje nacionalne parlamentarne demokracije. Državljanje, ki ne volijo oziroma nasprotujejo udeležbi na volitvah, bi bilo treba spomniti, da v parlamentarnih demokracijah vlade v zadnji instanci še vedno vladajo »v imenu ljudstva«. Volivci so tisti, ki z izražanjem svoje volje na volitvah, včasih pa tudi na ulicah proizvajajo politično legitimnost. Kot ustvarjalci te legitimnosti ljudje vsaj za zdaj ohranjajo močan »proizvajalčev interes«, interes, ki ne preneha obstajati niti tedaj, ko propadajo celi sektorji in ko so sindikati v zatonu.

Ob tem bi morali ustavni pravniki, na katere se obrača Habermas, oblikovati zakonodajo, ki bi od gusarjev zahtevala, da državi prepustijo večji del svojih neznanskih dobičkov, hkrati pa bi zagotovila, da bodo kavalirji prevzeli odgovornost za skrb nad interesi vseh državljanov, ne zgolj svojih privržencev. To je težaven izziv, ki pa bi se ga izplačalo uresničiti, ker bi to imelo »civilizirajoči« učinek, ki je po Habermasu pomemben vidik ustvarjanja ustave. Tako bi se zgodil pozitiven premik k zmanjševanju strukturnih protislovij med veliko državo in velikimi podjetji, ki so glavni vzrok za sklerozo evropskega gospodarstva.

Če bi v ta namen mobilizirali državljane in zakonodajalce, bi se lahko nadejali, da bo družbenopolitično ozračje postalo veliko bolj naklonjeno svetovljanski družbeni pogodbi med evropskimi vladami, ki si jo je zamislil Ulrich Beck, kot danes. Potem bi se lahko z več optimizma veselili razvoja živahne transnacionalne demokracije, ki bi ponujala zaščito in podporo vsem državljanom v okviru evropske solidarnosti.

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Avgust Lešnik

Historična sociologija v očeh Dennisa Smitha

*All sociology worthy of the name
is 'historical sociology'.
C. Wright Mills (1959: 146).*

V okviru evropskega projekta Jean Monnet European Module, ki se izvaja na Oddelku za sociologijo Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani (2012–2015), je 23. aprila 2013 gostoval eminentni britanski sociolog prof. Dennis Smith. S predavanjem »Kako pojasniti krizo EU«, nadvse aktualne problematike, ki bremeni tekoči evropski projekt, je pristopil s pozicije historične sociologije. V tem kontekstu naj spomnim, da je prof. D. Smith avtor referenčnega dela *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (1991), ki je leta 2011 izšlo tudi v slovenskem prevodu (*Vzpon historične sociologije*) pri zbirki Studia humanitatis. Posledično se ta zapis ob gostujočem predavanju prvenstveno osredotoča na znanstveni prispevek prof. D. Smitha na področju historične sociologije.

Profesor Dennis Smith (1945) velja za eno najbolj uveljavljenih imen svetovne historične sociologije in utemeljiteljev vede. Po študiju sodobne zgodovine na univerzi v Cambridgeu in nato sociologije na London School of Economics je predaval na Poslovni šoli Aston (Aston Business School) ter na oddelkih za družboslovje Univerze v Leicesteru in Univerze v Loughboroughu. Do nedavna je bil urednik ugledne revije *Current Sociology* (2002–2010) ter podpredsednik evropskega sociološkega združenja (European Sociological Association). Danes, po upokojitvi, je v nazivu zaslužni profesor sociologije Univerze v Loughboroughu znanstveno še vedno nadvse aktiven in še naprej vključen v mnoge mednarodne projekte in terenske raziskave na področjih historične sociologije, družbenih teorij, globalizacije in modernizacije. Še naprej sodeluje z mnogimi univerzami, akademijami in inštituti po vsem svetu.³⁸

I.

O svoji knjigi *The Rise of Historical Sociology*, objavljeni leta 1991 (slov. prevod 2011), je D. Smith povedal, da je »del večjega projekta«. Potem ko je objavil historično primerjavo procesov formiranja družbenih razredov v dveh angleških mestih (Birminghamu in Sheffieldu) z naslovom *Conflict and Compromise* (1982), se je odločil

38 Harvard University; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; Institute of Social-Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; University of KwaZuluNatal (South Africa); Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research (Sweden); Rhodes University (South Africa); University of Silesia (Poland); Gothenburg University (Sweden); University of Zaragoza (Spain); American University of Beirut University; Institute of Sociology at Graz University (Austria), Higher School of Economics, Moscow; idr. Poleg tega je opravljal oziroma opravlja tudi terenske raziskave v Turčiji, Cipru, Mehiki, Singapuru, Indiji, Južni Koreji in drugi delih Evrope. Več na: <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/socialsciences/staff/dennis-smith-html>.

raziskavo nadgraditi s podobno transatlantsko primerjavo, ki bi se osredotočila na Birmingham in Chicago.

Kmalu pa sem ugotovil, da to pomeni, da se je treba soočiti z dejstvom, da se stališča glede (na primer) mesta, države, kapitalizma, demokracije, človeške narave in moči v teh dveh družbah zelo razlikuje. Zato sem moral kar nekaj časa posvetiti temu, da bi razumel različne intelektualne težnje v zahodni liberalni tradiciji, zlasti v njenih ameriških in britanskih različicah.

Tako so nastali študija o Barringtonu Mooru (1983) in raziskava o chikaški šoli sociologije (1988) ter delo, ki je posebno pomembno za pričujočo knjigo, Kapitalistična demokracija na preizkušnji: Transatlantska debata od Tocquevilla do danes (1990). Kakor pričujoče delo tudi ta raziskava skuša identificirati razvojno logiko in ponavljajoče se vzorce zblizevanj in razhajanj v polemiki, ki zavzema osrednje mesto v zahodni liberalni tradiciji, ter umestiti to debato v njen historični in politični kontekst (Smith, 2011: 6).

Po objavi dela *The Rise of Historical Sociology* je D. Smith napisal naslednje knjige: *Zygmunt Bauman: Prophet of Postmodernity* (1999); *Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory* (2001); *Globalization: The Hidden Agenda* (2006) ter vrsto odmevnih študij, objavljenih v socioloških revijah (*Current Sociology*, *Sociological Review* idr.). Njegova dela so brez dvoma nepogrešljiva referenca vsem znanstvenikom in raziskovalcem zgodovinskega razvoja družbenih struktur ter zgodovinski družbenih fenomenov.

II.

Vprašanje – kaj je historična sociologija? – se zdi na prvi pogled resda »šolsko«, a glede na to, da se v slovenskem prostoru ne moremo pohvaliti z besedili, ki bi obravnavala historično sociologijo kot znanstveno disciplino,³⁹ je prav gotovo na mestu. D. Smith nanj odgovarja: [Historično sociologijo] predstavljam kot vedo, ki skuša razumeti preteklost (in sedanost), tako da raziskuje, kako delujejo in se spreminjajo družbe (Smith, 2011: 5).

V svoji najboljši različici je historična sociologija razumska, kritična in domiselna. Išče mehanizme, s pomočjo katerih se družbe spreminjajo ali

39 Svetle izjeme so razprave: F. Zwitter, *Sociologija in zgodovina* (1938); L. Čarni, »O razmerju med sociologijo in zgodovino« (1969; 2012); W. Mommsen, »Sociološka zgodovina in historična sociologija (Max Weber)« (1990).

reproducirajo. Išče skrite strukture, ki nekatera človeška prizadevanja ovirajo, druga pa omogočajo, ne glede na to, ali to cenimo ali ne. Takšna vednost je vredna raziskovanja. [...] Raziskovanje mehanizmov družbene reprodukcije in transformacije je tesno povezano s še eno zadevo. To je raziskovanje osnovnih družbenih pogojev in posledic poskusov vpeljevanja ali oviranja takšnih vrednot, kot so svoboda, enakopravnost in pravičnost (Smith, 2011: 9–10).

Če zelo poenostavimo, lahko rečemo, da je historična sociologija raziskovanje preteklosti z namenom, da bi ugotovili, kako delujejo in se spreminjajo družbe. Nekateri sociologi so »nehistorični«: empirično zanemarjajo preteklost, konceptualno pa ne upoštevajo niti časovne razsežnosti družbenega življenja niti historične specifičnosti družbenih struktur. Podobno so nekateri zgodovinarji »nesociološki«: empirično zanemarjajo razlike med procesi in strukturami v posameznih družbah, konceptualno pa se ne ukvarjajo niti s splošnimi lastnostmi procesov in struktur niti z njihovim odnosom do dejanj in dogodkov. V nasprotju z njimi se s historično sociologijo ukvarjajo zgodovinarji in sociologi, ki raziskujejo medsebojno prežemanje preteklosti in sedanjosti, dogodkov in procesov, delovanja in strukturiranja. Ti raziskovalci skušajo združiti pojmovno pojasnjevanje, primerjalno posploševanje in empirično raziskovanje (Smith, 2011: 12–13).

Potemtakem Smith znanstveno zanimanje historične sociologije opredeljuje kot odkrivanje in raziskovanje mehanizmov, ki jim je pripisati spremembe v posameznih družbah oziroma njihovi reprodukciji. Med njene prvenstvene naloge sodi iskanje skritih struktur (historičnost socialnih struktur je temeljna preokupacija historične sociologije), ki uresničevanje človeških prizadevanj bodisi onemogočajo bodisi podpirajo. Tem namenom služi tako zatekanje v preteklost kot povezovanje preteklosti s sedanjostjo, še posebej, ko gre za vprašanja, kako delujejo posamezne družbe in po kakšni poti prihaja do njihovih sprememb. Historična sociologija je tesno povezana z zgodovinsko primerjalno analizo družbenih procesov in pojavov, pri čemer zaobjema dve dimenziji, prostor in čas. Raziskovalno delo na tem področju obsega proučevanje zakonitosti v izbranih družbah, ki razkriva razlike in podobnosti v razvoju družb ter ugotavlja prisotnost različnih (ali enakih) vplivov in vzročnih zvez, kot se pojavljajo v sodobni družbi.

Morda nekoliko preseneča ugotovitev, da se je kot nova sociološka disciplina (sodobna) historična sociologija kot študijski in raziskovalni predmet dodobra utrdila in uveljavila na uglednih mednarodnih univerzah šele v 90. letih preteklega stoletja, na Slovenskem – na ljubljanski almi mater (natančneje na Oddelku za sociologijo Filozofske

fakultete) – pa s prehodom na bolonjski študijski program l. 2010.⁴⁰ Rekli smo »šele«: ne gre namreč prezreti, da sta na razvoj in vsebino sociologije ob njenem nastanku odločilno vplivala tako filozofija kot zgodovinopisje.⁴¹ V tem kontekstu štejemo utemeljitelje moderne sociologije tudi za utemeljitelje historične sociologije. Povedano z besedami C. W. Millsa: »Vsaka sociologija, ki je vredna svojega imena, je lahko le 'historična sociologija'« (1959: 146). Zato je razumljivo, da je bil potreben čas, da se je nova disciplina (kot posebna sociologija) lahko profilirala in osamosvojila tako v odnosu do zgodovine kot tudi do obče sociologije. Odločilen korak je bil storjen po letu 1960, ko se z obdobjem drugega dolgega vala (po Smithu) začne vzpon historične sociologije s čisto novimi temami: »Odkril sem več tem, ki v zadnjih desetletjih prevladujejo v historični sociologiji, [...] kot so fevdalizem, razvoj mest, vzpon in propad agro-birokratskih držav, formiranje družbenih razredov, narodotvornost in nacionalizem, državljanstvo, revolucija in vojna« (Smith, 2011: 5).

III.

D. Smith je upravičeno zapisal, da se »historični sociologi lahko opirajo na dolgo tradicijo« (Smith, 2011: 267). Zato je vzpone in padce, ki jih je doživljala historična sociologija v svojem razvoju, razvrstil v dva dolga vala.

Prvi val se je začel sredi 18. stoletja, zlasti v Veliki Britaniji in Franciji. Tako kot drugega je tudi prvi val gnala potreba po razumevanju takratnih političnih dogodkov. Ti so namreč pomenili ogromen intelektualni izziv. [...] Dolgi prvi val – od Montesquieuja in Huma, Tocquevilla in Marxa do Durkheima in Webra – se je navsezadnje zlomil ob zidu totalitarizma, tako levega kot tudi desnega, v poznih dvajsetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Režimi, ki so »poznali« prihodnost in ki so si izmislili preteklost, so zavračali historično sociologijo. [...] A historična sociologija je preživela. Vprašanja, s katerimi se je spopadala, niso izginila. Še naprej so tvorila

40 Naj na tem mestu opozorimo, da predmetno področje historične sociologije za sociološki oddelek na FF UL ni nikakršna tabula rasa; prav nasprotno, oddelek je vseskozi imel in ima tako raziskovalno kot študijsko tradicijo in afiniteto za zgodovinsko-sociološke tematike, tako na ravni teorije kot analize ključnih socialno-političnih procesov 19. in 20. stoletja. Naj spomnimo le na dela prof. M. Britovška, še posebej na njegove knjige *Razkroj fevdalne agrarne strukture na Kranjskem* (1964), *Carizem, revolucija, stalinizem* (1980) in *Stalinov termidor* (1984), ter na študije prof. L. Čarnija, še posebej na njegovo delo *Teorija formacij družbe* (1979) in razprave o »azijskem produkcijskem načinu«; *Izbrani spisi* slednjega so izšli leta 2012 pod naslovom *Historična sociologija – Izvori sociološke misli na Slovenskem*. S tega področja so tudi objavljena dela A. Lešnika (1994; 2000) in K. Vidmar Horvat (2009; 2012).

41 Potrebo po novi »znanosti o družbi« so njeni ustanovitelji utemeljevali z dejstvom, da filozofija (zgodovine) in družboslovne vede, v prvi vrsti zgodovinopisje, resda ponujajo parcialne poglede na družbeni red in njegov razvoj, hkrati pa ne dajejo splošnega, globalnega vpogleda v zakone funkcioniranja in razvoja človeške družbe kot celote; in prav ta vpogled naj bi bil naloga novoustanovljene sociologije.

osrednje moralne dileme zahodnega liberalizma. [...] V petdesetih letih je ta problematika znova stopila v ospredje. [...] Takrat je bil drugi dolgi val historične sociologije že na poti (Smith, 2011: 10–11).

Dolgi drugi val Smith deli na tri faze, pri čemer zapiše, da vsako fazo zaznamujeta specifičen preplet ugodnih političnih okoliščin in značilno razpoloženje med historičnimi sociologi.

Prvo fazo, pred sredo šestdesetih let 20. stoletja, je oblikoval boj s totalitarizmom. [...] Osrednji figuri prve faze sta bila Talcott Parsons in T. H. Marshall, moje razpravljanje pa bo zajelo tudi N. J. Smelserja, S. N. Eisenstadta, S. M. Lipseta in Reinharda Bendixa (Smith, 2011: 15).

V zgodnjih šestdesetih letih sta v anglofonskem svetu postala širše znana Marc Bloch in Norbert Elias. Njune ideje so prispevale k razvoju druge faze, vendar je njen ton najmočnejše zaznamovala takratna politika, zlasti protestna in aktivistična gibanja za pravice študentov in temnopoltih ter konec vojne v Vietnamu. [...] Historična sociologija je vnovič odkrila gospostvo, neenakopravnost in odporniška gibanja. Osrednja lika druge faze sta bila Barrington Moore in E. P. Thompson, a tudi tu bom razpravljal tudi o delu drugih, zlasti Charlesa Tillyja in Thede Skocpol. [...] Tok uporništv se je nadaljeval skozi sedemdeseta in osemdeseta leta, dodatno pa ga je okrepilo še žensko gibanje (ibid.: 16).

Tretja faza se prekriva z drugo. Začela se je sredi sedemdesetih let kot posledica fragmentacije dotlej stabilnega, dvopolnega sveta med hladno vojno. Leta 1974 so bila objavljena prelomna dela Perryja Andersona in Immanuela Wallersteina. [...] Anderson je s sveže perspektive raziskal ločnico med Vzhodom in Zahodom v Evropi. Wallerstein je ponudil novo interpretacijo odnosov med prvim, drugim in tretjim svetom. Braudel je znova pritegnil pozornost k starim trgovskim mrežam, ki povezujejo Evropo, obe Ameriki in Azijo. Mann se je ukvarjal s področjem od Mezopotamije do Atlantika. Skocpolova – kot Tillyjevo se tudi njeno delo prekriva z drugo in tretjo fazo – je v enovit interpretacijski okvir vključila tri revolucije (op.: francosko, rusko, kitajsko), ki jih sicer jasno ločujejo zgodovina, geografija in ideologija. [...] Medtem se je povečevalo zanimanje za metodologijo [...] in oblikovanje vélike teorije (npr. Randall Collins, W. G. Runciman, Anthony Giddens, Ernest Gellner) (ibid.: 17–20).

Smithovo argumentirano delitev »drugega dolgega vala« (povojne historične sociologije) na tri faze lahko v celoti sprejmemo za referenčno. Z zadržkom pa bi lahko sprejeli njegov ponujeni nepretrgani »prvi dolgi val«, ki se časovno razteza od sredine

18. do petdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Večina teoretikov, ki so se ukvarjali s historično sociologijo kot intelektualnim poljem – P. Abrams (1982), R. Aron (1971), L. Goldmann (1958), G. Gurvitch (1966), J. Kocka (1994), P. Veyne (1993) idr. – namreč meni, da je zgodovina historične sociologije predvsem zgodovina metodološkega spora sociologije (nomotetična orientacija) z zgodovino/zgodovinopisjem (idiografska orientacija) oziroma: je zgodovina samega razumevanja ter interpretacije zgodovinskega in družbenega dogajanja. Smith (1991: 3) povzema:

Toda »pomembne ločnice prečkajo meje posameznih ved [in] [...] so tehtne: temeljijo na predlaganih argumentih, ki so nujno, čeprav ne vedno sistematično, teoretični« (Calhoun, 1987: 625). Pravzaprav »med družboslovnimi vedami in zgodovino preprosto ni nobenih logičnih ali celo metodoloških razlik, ki bi bile primerno opredeljene« (Giddens, 1979: 230). Zgodovina in sociologija tvorita »enovito intelektualno pustolovščino« (Braudel, 1980: 69). Ti vedi bi lahko združili v »en sam, enoten analitski program« (Abrams, 1982: xviii).

Spremljanje komunikacije sociologije in zgodovine v času in prostoru pokaže, da je sprejemljivejša delitev Smithovega »prvega dolgega vala« na dve obdobji: doba izziva (1820–1880): sociologija kot teoretska zgodovina; 2. doba krize (1880–1960): od sociologije proti zgodovini do sociologije brez zgodovine (gl. npr. Antičić, 1995). Izhodiščna časovna točka pri tej delitvi se navezuje na formiranje sociologije kot samostojne znanstvene vede.⁴² Smith je v tem pogledu širši, saj postavlja začetek prvega dolgega vala v sredino 18. stoletja; lahko mu pritrdimo. Ne gre namreč spregledati, da lahko o nastanku sociologije govorimo zgolj formalno, to je s stališča klasifikacije znanosti, pred tem pa le o »predzgodovini« sociološke misli, saj se je ta (do osamosvojitve v samostojno vedo v prvi polovici 19. stoletja) razvijala v okviru filozofije ter v posameznih družbenih vedah, zlasti v politični ekonomiji, državoslovju in pravoslovju. Potrebo po novi družbeni znanosti (sociologiji) so utemeljevali z argumentom, da filozofija (zgodovine) ter zgodovinopisje in druge posebne družboslovne vede sicer ponujajo parcialne poglede na družbeni red in njegov razvoj, manjka pa splošni, globalni vpogled v zakone delovanja in razvoja družbe kot celote. Potemtakem se nam ponuja ustrežnejša, dopolnjena notranja delitev »prvega dolgega vala« historične sociologije (ki sovпада z zgodovino sociološke misli), in sicer na tri faze: 1. »predzgodovina«

42 Auguste Comte, Saint-Simonov tajnik, je leta 1838 – v 4. zvezku svojega dela *Tečaj pozitivne filozofije (Cours de philosophie positive, Paris)* – prvi poimenoval »znanost o družbi« za *sociologijo* (»socialna fizika«), medtem ko za utemeljitelja sodobne sociologije velja Claude-Henri Saint-Simon.

(historično-) sociološke misli (gl. Lešnik, 2010: 181–207); 2. afirmiranje sociologije kot znanstvene zgodovine v zgodnji dobi sociološke misli;⁴³ 3. kriza v komunikaciji sociologije in zgodovine v dobi klasične sociološke misli (1880–1960).

Upoštevač dejstvo, da je Smithov prevod hkrati tudi prvo sistematično delo o historični sociologiji kot sociološki disciplini na Slovenskem, sem (podpisani pod ta tekst) smiselno dopolnil Smithov »drugi dolgi val« – v *Spretni besedi* (»Skica za zgodovino historične sociologije«) – še s problemskim orisom »prvega dolgega vala«, konkretno druge in tretje faze (Lešnik, 2011: 369–414).

IV.

Osrednji raziskovalni predmet Smithovega dela je – kot že povedano – vprašanje vzpona historične sociologije kot vede, ki dobi ponovni zagon po 2. svetovni vojni: »V štiridesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja je bila historična sociologija na robu propada. Fašizem in stalinizem sta bila do njene kritične perspektive zelo sovražna« (Smith, 2011: 9).

Trdim, da so povojna oživitve te vede in zaporedne faze njenega razvoja povezane s spremembami v širšem političnem in ideološkem kontekstu. Moje besedilo predstavlja tri zaporedne faze; vsako od njih zaznamuje specifično stališče glede demokracije, kapitalizma, moči in vrednot na področju historične sociologije (Smith, 2011: 5–6).

V nadaljevanju s pomočjo sistematične obravnave vodilnih imen sociologije in družboslovja v omenjenih treh fazah Smith prepričljivo pokaže na konvergenca razvoja discipline in družbenozgodovinskih okoliščin, ki uokvirijo intelektualni interes.

V pričujočem delu smo precej podrobno obravnavali osemnajst historičnih sociologov – oziroma, natančneje, trinajst sociologov (Parsons, Smelser,

43 Epohalne družbene spremembe ob koncu 18. in v začetku 19. stoletja (zlom *ancien régime*, rojstvo konstitucionalizma, procesi industrializacije, deagrariacije, migracije, urbanizacije, modernizacije, razredne stratifikacije idr.), ki so jih povzročila in pospešila družbena gibanja in revolucije (ameriška protikolonialna, francoska meščanska, angleška industrijska), niso postale samo osrednji predmet takratnega diskurza političnih elit in akademske javnosti, pač pa so (so) ustvarile objektivne pogoje za osamosvojitve »znanosti o družbi« v samostojno znanstveno vedo, sociologijo. Zgodovinarji sociologije v splošnem soglašajo, da je treba pripisati utemeljitev (znanstvene) sociologije trem mislecom 19. stoletja: Saint-Simonu, Augustu Comtu in Karlu Marxu. Ti trije so prvi povezali raziskovanje družbenih pojavov s sodobnim znanstvenim mišljenjem, obenem pa so postavili prve teorije o razvoju moderne družbe, ki temeljijo na zgodovinskem preučevanju pretekle in sodobne družbe. Skupno jim je bilo, da so se vsi trije zanimali za družbene spremembe, in da so si prizadevali za praktično uporabo svojih (družbenih) spoznanj; ravno zato so se tudi povezali s socializmom: prvi je znani predstavnik utopičnega socializma, drugi si je prislužil naziv socialistični 'odpadnik' (konservativni reformator), tretji pa velja za utemeljitelja znanstvenega socializma.

Eisenstadt, Bendix, Skocpol, Lipset, Moore, Wallerstein, Marshall, Runciman, Giddens, Mann in Elias), štiri zgodovinarje (Thompson, Anderson, Bloch in Braudel) in enega sociologa, ki se je prelevil v zgodovinarja (Tilly). Ta izbor je seveda neizbežno pristranski, toda ljudje in teme, ki smo si jih ogledali, zavzemajo osrednje mesto, kajti tvorijo strateško pomemben del historične sociologije kot intelektualnega polja, ki ga je mogoče raziskovati še naprej, da bi poglobili naše razumevanje tega polja (Smith, 2011: 267–269).

Posebnost Smithovega metodološkega pristopa k obravnavanju drugega dolgega vala – katerega soustvarjalec je (bil) s svojimi deli tudi sam (»V pričujočem delu sem skušal razviti historično sociologijo same historične sociologije.«) (ibid.: 5) je, da na razvoj povojne historične sociologije ne gleda več z vidika »drugih« ved (tj. z oči zgodovine, sociologije, filozofije), kar velja za prvi dolgi val, temveč izhaja iz nje same, kar pomeni, da jo problemsko opazuje ter gradi z analizo in primerjavo zgoraj navedenih avtorjev, natančneje njihovih temeljnih del, ki so sooblikovala raziskovalna polja (sodobne) historične sociologije, vključno z metodologijo in teorijo.

Smithov prispevek se torej ne odlikuje le po svoji preglednosti v definiranju razvoja historične sociologije, pač pa tudi po kritičnem analitičnem izrisu metodologije historično-sociološkega raziskovanja, saj združuje sociološko in zgodovinsko epistemologijo: v poenoten konceptualno-teoretski aparat združi raziskovanje statičnih struktur in spremenljivih dinamik gibanja, razvoja in spremembe. V tem pogledu prinaša pomembno podlago za družboslovno-humanistično sistematizirano raziskovanje fenomenov, procesov, gibanj in struktur, ki jih je zaradi različne narave zgodovinskega artikuliranja pogosto težko speljati na enotno metodološko osnovo. S Smithovim delom historična sociologija zagotovo pridobiva analitsko eksaktnost vede in konceptualno-miselno urejenost paradigme.

Zato se v Smithovem specifičnem pristopu zrcali tudi družbena vloga sociologa pri javnem artikuliranju pomenov spremembe in razvoja, družbene dinamike, konfliktov in družbenega eksperimenta, še posebno, ko razpravo umesti v sočasne tokove razvoja teorij nacionalizma, razrednega boja, kapitalizma, demokracije in državljanstva.

Ta mešanica intelektualnega dinamizma in splošne pozornosti ponuja historični sociologiji izjemno priložnost, da se uveljavi v državljanski kulturi. S svojim delom imajo historični sociologi možnost svojim sodržavljanom ponuditi znanje in sposobnosti, ki bi slednjim utegnili pomagati pri ocenjevanju različnih stališč o tem, kaj je »mogoče« ali »nemogoče«. Skratka, historična sociologija lahko pozitivno vpliva na demokratično državljanstvo (Smith, 2011: 9).

Hkrati velja opozoriti, da je Smithov prispevek že sestavni del sodobne družboslovno-humanistične intelektualne in akademske obravnave družbe, zgodovine in razvoja, pa tudi, da spadajo njegove študije, vključno z delom *Vzpon historične sociologije*, v kategorijo temeljnih del. Ker Smith s svojim natančnim in kritično izostrenim pregledom vzpona historično-sociološke misli od zgodnje modernosti do poznega 20. stoletja bralcu omogoči reflektiran vpogled v razvoj vede ter njen raziskovalni aparat, je nepogrešljiv študijski vir za visokošolske programe družboslovja in humanistike.

Smithova historična sociologija je zagotovo – tudi zaradi svoje intelektualne širine in inovativnosti družboslovno-humanistične argumentacije – zanimiva ne samo za znanstveno in strokovno, temveč tudi za širšo javnost, torej za tisto bralstvo, ki poskuša družbene procese sedanjosti misliti v transhistoričnih in primerjalnih perspektivah. Njegovo ljubljansko predavanje k tej aktualnosti dodaja zgolj novo poglavje.

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Marko Kržan

Kaj nam lahko historična sociologija pove o
krizi EU?

Pogovor s profesorjem Dennisom Smithom

M. K.: Vaše glavno raziskovalno področje v zadnjih letih je bilo »ponižanje«. Pred nekaj tedni je Ciper postal nova žrtev »ponižanja« zaradi posledic krize evropskih integracij. Poleg tega lahko v medijih vsak dan beremo, da se bo morala tudi Slovenija pridružiti tej skupini evropskih držav, zato se mi zdi prav, da se posvetiva vprašanju, kako je EU, ki naj bi kot politična skupnost ravno onemogočila takšno »ponižanje« ter uveljavila enakopravnost med državami članicami in družbenimi skupinami v njih, zdaj postala območje degradacije [downward displacement], kar je vaša definicija ponižanja.

Predlagam, da pogovor razdeliva na tri dele. Najprej bi se rad posvetil vaši knjigi z naslovom *Vzpon historične sociologije* (Smith, 2011), ki je pred kratkim izšla v slovenskem prevodu. Nato bi bilo prav, da z zgodovinskimi primeri, ki ste jih raziskovali, pojasniva sociološki pomen pojma ponižanje. Šele potem bova lahko govorila o sedanjih razmerah ter primerjala nedavne dogodke v EU, Veliki Britaniji in Sloveniji.

Prvi del: Historična sociologija 1990–2010

M. K.: V knjigi o vzponu historične sociologije ste razpravljali o vodilnih historičnih sociologih prvih osemdesetih let 20. stoletja. V spremni besedi k slovenskemu prevodu je profesor Avgust Lešnik pregledno opisal predzgodovino te discipline, tj. mislece in teorije, ki so nastale v 18. in 19. stoletju. Ali lahko naredite podoben pregled njene najnovejše zgodovine? Kdo so bili ali so še vedno najvidnejši predstavniki, s čim se ukvarjajo v svojih raziskavah in katere so njihove najzanimivejše oziroma najbolj kontroverzne ugotovitve?

D.S.: Hvala za ta zanimiva vprašanja. Morda bi za začetek povedal nekaj malega o družbenopolitičnem premeščanju [displacement]. V približno zadnjega pol stoletja je ta pojem zasenčila predstava o družbeni tekočnosti [fluidity], ki je prav tako ena od poglobitvinih metafor našega razumevanja sveta. V mislih imam Hayeka, Friedmana (Miltona in Thomasa), Castellsa, Baumana in Urryja, ki so se v svojih delih ukvarjali predvsem z družbeno vlogo trga: ta naj bi bil vseprisotno topilo, olje in mazilo, ki motivira, mobilizira in naelektri, ustvarja omrežja, proži tipalke in je menda substanca vsakdanjega izkustva.

Resda so obstajale tudi močne nasprotno tendence, recimo ženski študiji, študiji »rase«, etnij in religije, migracijski študiji in študiji subalterna: vse proučujejo skupine, ki so bile v sociološkem smislu premeščene [displaced]. Toda njihovi zagovorniki so se praviloma skrivali v svojih nišah, v katerih so sicer izvrstno opravili svoje delo, toda nagovarjali so bolj ali manj sami sebe. Družbenopolitično premeščanje so obravnavali tudi drugi pisci, pogosto je šlo za briljantne posamične učenjake (torej ne za vodje ali nadaljevalce kake »šole«), na primer Elias, Schumpeter, Hirschman, Barrington Moore ter nam bližji Amy Chua in Naomi Klein. Toda ena od glavnih posledic pešanja zahodne hegemonije (če lahko uporabim to neustrezno stenografsko frazo) – še posebej po

11. septembru in kreditnemu krču leta 2008 – je, da postajajo dinamike premeščanja intelektualno še relevantnejše in zanimivejše za širši krog ljudi ter še pomembnejše za razprave znotraj naše znanstvene discipline.

V resnici sta tako tekočnost kot premeščanje marsikje prisotna pojava, ki se na zapletene načine prepletata med seboj. Skupaj ju lahko najdemo na primer v delu Roberta Parka, v njegovih analizah medmestnih in mednarodnih migracij ter vzorcev poselitve. Enako velja za *Komunistični manifest*. Marx in Engels po eni strani razglašata: »Vsa čvrsta zarjavela razmerja s spremstvom častitljivih predstav in nazorov vred se razvežejo, vsa novo stvorjena zastarevajo, preden morejo zakosteneti. Vse trdno in stalno se razblinja[]« (Marx in Engels, 2009: 98). To je tekoči svet ali svet, ki se »utekočinja«. Po drugi strani pa slikata svet premeščanja: »Cehovske mojstre je spodrinil industrijski srednji stan; [...] na mesto industrijskega srednjega stanu so stopili industrijski milijonarji, šefi celih industrijskih armad, moderni buržujji. [...] Kjer je buržoazija prišla na oblast, je razdejala vsa fevdalna, patriarhalna, idilična razmerja. Pestre fevdalne vezi, ki so vezale človeka na njegovega naravnega predstojnika, je neusmiljeno raztrgala[]« (Marx in Engels, 2009: 96–97). In tako naprej.

Oba, Park in Marx, imata dober pregled nad silami, ki delujejo v družbi in skozi zgodovino, kar lahko navežem na vaše vprašanje o nedavni zgodovini historične sociologije, torej o obdobju od konca 80. let. V svojem odgovoru bom v okvir historične sociologije vključil tudi sociološko usmerjene zgodovinarje in zgodovinsko usmerjene sociologe (kar sem storil tudi v *Vzponu historične sociologije*, objavljenem leta 1991). Sam mislim, da so najpomembnejša tista dela, ki odstopajo od stare samoumevne predstave Zahoda o njegovi superiornosti, ki se zdaj tako nezadržno podira, ter vpeljejo svež pogled na Zahod in njegov svetovni zgodovinski kontekst. Po mojem mnenju izstopajo tri knjige. Ena je delo Cliva Pointinga *World History: A New Perspective* (2001). Pointing obravnava vprašanje človeštva od »njegovih začetkov« in upošteva najnovejše razpoložljive podatke o naši ekološki, biološki, demografski in družbenopolitični »karieri« vse do današnjega dne. Gre za knjigo, ki je »vstopna točka za nove bralce« in ki z uporabo empiričnih podatkov oriše model človeškega življenja kot nečesa, kar je vključeno v ogromen in zapleten tok, s tem pa sodobne ideologe (ki se navezujejo na zadnjega 0,0001 odstotka življenja človeštva) postavi v miniaturni kontekst, kakršnega si zaslužijo. Knjiga Jareda Diamonda *Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years* (1998) poveže zoološke, epidemiološke, geografske in družbenopolitične vidike človeškega razvoja na način, ki predstavlja še večji izziv. Diamond in Pointing sta prispevala k temu, da je bilo intelektualno vzdušje bolj dojemljivo za nadvse inovativno *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914* (Bayly, 2004), ki raziskuje naraščajočo medsebojno povezanost velikih evropskih, ameriških in azijskih družb v njenih praktičnih učinkih na institucije, identitete in prakse telesa.

Baylyjeva knjiga se umešča na presečišče s še enim močnim tokom, ki ga je začel Giovanni Arrighi z izjemno vplivnima deloma *Dolgo dvajseto stoletje* (2009) in *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (2007). Obe deli se ukvarjata s konkurenčnimi logikami zgodovinskega kapitalizma, podobno kot knjiga Kennetha Pomeranza *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (2000). Ta »ekonomski« tok bi lahko postavil ob bok delu Dominica Lievena *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the Present* (2003), ki opazuje drug, a enako pomemben niz logik, bolj političnih in ozemeljskih. Tukaj smo nedvomno na območju premeščanja (tekmovanja za položaj in koristi), v to analitično areno pa spadajo tudi dela Roberta D. Kaplana, recimo nedavno izdana *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate* (2012). Gre za nekakšno nadaljevanje dela *The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (Kaplan 2010), obe pa obravnavata tako preteklost kot prihodnost in ju skušata povezati. Gre za specifično »ameriško« perspektivo, ki je pomembna sestavina sodobne historičnosociološke »mešanice«.

Seveda je izšlo mnogo več knjig, toda to so tista dela, ki so po mojem mnenju del prihodnjega vala historične sociologije.

Drugi del: »Ponižanje« kot sociološki koncept

M. K: Vaše delo se zadnje čase vrti okrog koncepta ponižanja. Poudariti je treba, da ste mu dali natančen sociološki pomen, ki je lahko podlaga za bolj običajno psihološko rabo, ne pa obratno. Kot sociolog, ki proučuje družbene strukture in procese, postavljate v ospredje premeščanje različnih vrst družbenih skupin z njihovega sedanjega ali preteklega položaja v teh strukturah in procesih. Ena vrsta premeščanja je degradacija, tj. izguba nekdanjega družbenega položaja. Ta proces spremljajo določeni odzivi prizadete skupine, ki jih poimenujete s širokim izrazom »ponižanje«. Skupina, ki si ne more povrniti nekdanjega položaja, se mora nekako sprijazniti s spremembo. Toda preden se posvetiva ponižanju dandanes, bi rad bralce popeljal na kratek sprehod po vašem raziskovalnem itinerarju.

Prva razprava, ki mi pride na misel, je *Conflict and Compromise: Class Formation in English Society 1830–1914* (Smith, 1982). Ali bi jo lahko opisali kot zgodovino razrednega boja v ideoloških aparatih države (Althusser), ki je bil odziv na premestitev [displacement] določene frakcije razreda zemljiških lastnikov – anglikanske duhovščine – z njihovega nekdanjega ekonomskega položaja? Ali lahko na kratko predstavite osnovno razredno dinamiko v ozadju razvoja angleškega šolskega sistema v 19. in 20. stoletju? (Mislim, da bi bila za slovenske bralce zanimiva primerjava s slovenskimi razmerami. Slovenci so primer nemškega modela nastanka nacije, pri katerem je nacionalna država nastala šele po nastanku kulturne nacije. Slovenski primer je še

radikalnejši od nemškega, zato ker lokalne slovenske elite niso bile podrejene le na gospodarskem področju, ampak tudi na političnem, kar se je spremenilo šele potem, ko se je socialistična Jugoslavija radikalno decentralizirala v zgodnjih 70. letih. Ideološki aparati države, katerih središče je bilo šolstvo, so bili v teh razmerah glavno prizorišče razrednega boja.)

D. S.: Althusserjev opis šolstva kot ideološkega aparata države je lahko sicer točen v nekaterih omejenih pomenih – specifičnih šolah, specifičnih družbah, specifičnih obdobjih –, toda splošnejša formulacija bi morala (1) reducirati formulo na »ideološke aparate« (ki niso nujno državni), (2) upoštevati, da je šolstvo v številnih družbah in časih kraj nenehnega boja za koristi, in (3) natančneje določiti, na kaj natanko meri izraz »ideologija«, ki je precej ohlapen.

A kakor koli že, moja teza je bila, da je bilo šolstvo v Angliji sredine 18. stoletja področje tekmovanja med hierarhijama z ruralno in z urbano osnovo, pri čemer je bila religija le ena razsežnost boja, ki je sicer segal tudi na področje politike, svobodnih poklicev in gospodarstva. Proučeval sem razredna nasprotja na teh področjih in ugotovil, da na njihovo dinamiko ni vplivala le artikulacija med mestom in podeželjem, ampak tudi razlike in spremembe v relativnem pomenu soseske, mesta, grofije, pokrajine in nacionalne ravni.

To je zelo abstrakten povzetek, toda do tega sklepa sem prišel tako, da sem raziskal kariere stotin posameznikov v času in prostoru na območju Birminghama in Sheffielda, mojih dveh mest. Šlo je za neke vrste historično antropologijo. Sčasoma je mesto premagalo podeželje na ravni pokrajin, toda po drugi strani je plemstvo (povezano z londonskim cityjem) premagalo industrialce na nacionalni ravni. Obstoj britanskega imperija je pripomogel k vzpostavitvi oblasti aristokratsko-finančnih elit, katerih otroci so se šolali na zasebnih šolah,¹ zato da so potem upravljali kolonije, namesto da bi se odločali za »manjvredne« poklice, povezane s trgovino in obrtjo. Zadnji stavek opisuje rezultat, ki je v britanski kulturi tako močno zakoreninjen, da ostaja spregledano, kako resnično nenavaden in disfunkcionalen je.

M. K.: Vaša druga študija ima naslov *Barrington Moore: Violence, Morality and Political Change* (Smith, 1983). Moore pri nas skoraj ni poznan, toda problemi modernizacije in usode glavnih razredov ruralne družbe – kmetstva in zemljiških lastnikov – so stalnica v zgodovini evropskih držav. V naši širši regiji se je sprememba agrarne družbe v industrijsko dejansko zgodila v 20. stoletju, v precejšnji meri po 2.

1 Čepprav bi lahko po imenu sklepali, da gre za javne šole, so *public schools* v resnici zasebne srednje šole, praviloma z internati (op. M. K.).

svetovni vojni. Jugoslavija je verjetno ena od tistih držav, v katerih se je ta sprememba – ki jo lahko definiramo kot proces, v katerem se delež agrarnega prebivalstva zmanjša s 70 na manj kot 50 odstotkov – zgodila izjemno hitro. V Jugoslaviji je proces trajal manj kot 15 let, medtem ko se je v Italiji vlekel 40 let, v Franciji 80 let itn.

Mislím, da lahko upravičeno rečemo, da je večina evropskih sociologov prenehala razmišljati o kmetijstvu zaradi urbanizacije in zmanjševanja deleža kmetijstva v BDP. Toda to je etnocentričen pogled: dejansko je spreminjanje azijskih (in v manjši meri tudi afriških ter južnoameriških) družb v urbane (post)industrijske družbe eden od glavnih vidikov tega, kar imenujemo globalizacija. Ena od Moorovih temeljnih tez je bila, da odziv kmetstva in razreda zemljiških lastnikov na degradacijo, ki sta jo večinoma doživela, določa, kakšen bo rezultat modernizacije. Veliko ste se ukvarjali z globalizacijo: ali bi lahko Moorove tipologije in vzročne nize uporabili za razlaganje tega, kar se danes dogaja na Kitajskem, v Indiji?

D. S.: Glavni deli Barringtona Moora *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (1966) in *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (1978) obravnavata glavne udeležence 2. svetovne vojne – ZDA, Rusijo, Anglijo, Francijo, Kitajsko in Japonsko (ter Indijo) –, čeprav Moore tega ni odkrito priznal. Te države so, če se grobo izrazim, oblikovale svet po letu 1945, Moore pa je hotel vedeti, »kako delujejo od znotraj«, kako so se zgodovinsko razvijale in kako naj to dinamiko razumemo, po možnosti na podlagi enega samega niza vzročnih dejavnikov. Temu problemu je posvetil dve ali tri desetletja, orodje za njegovo proučevanje pa so bili skrbna primerjalna analiza, domiselni kontrafaktični postopki in potrpežljivo, kumulativno empirično raziskovanje. Danes se o Mooru nikjer ne govori prav dosti, toda po drugi strani na svojih potovanjih stalno srečujem druge člane razpršene, a zveste četiце njegovih privržencev.

Moore je bil eden od tistih znanstvenikov, ki so postavljali standarde disciplinirane, akademske in domiselne historične sociologije. Če naj bolj konkretno odgovorim na vaše vprašanje, bi rekel, da je Moorova metodologija, ki sem jo pravkar opisal, še vedno zelo relevantna, čeprav bi bilo treba njegove specifične vzročne verige revidirati v kontekstu sveta, ki je medsebojno povezan na bolj globalen način. Pri tem gre za to, da Moore ni bil najbolj pronicljiv pri obravnavah razmerij med družbami (ni znal, recimo, prepoznati posledic kolonialnih razmerij za britansko družbo, čeprav je lahko gotovo videl, kako so vplivala na Indijo). Po drugi strani pa bi nam Moorove analize gotovo razkrile zatiralsko vlogo, ki so jo imeli v Indiji zemljiški lastniki, tako v preteklosti kot tudi danes, pa tudi uporništvó kitajskih kmetijskih vasi pod udarom razlaščevalske države, ki poskuša zadovoljiti nenasitno lakoto rastočih mest. Razmere na Kitajskem so še posebej zanimive. Pred nekaj leti sem bil z majhno skupino zahodnih obiskovalcev v Čengduju (v provinci Sečuan). Šli smo na ogled »novega podeželja«. Šlo je za območje, spremenjeno v

slikovito kulturno krajino s kulturnim tematskim parkom, v okviru katerega sta delovali umetnostna galerija in kavarna. Nikjer nobenih kmetov.

Če dobro pomislim, je bil ta izlet na podeželje malce podoben ogledu bojišč prve svetovne vojne, ki jih zdaj preraščajo lepe trate in spremljajo trgovine s spominki. To pravim zato, ker imam vtis, da je velikanska bitka potekala tudi med kitajskim kmetstvom, v imenu katerega je bila izvedena revolucija, in partijo. Režim je od kmetov zahteval, da ostanejo na podeželju, toda ti so vseeno odhajali v mesto (pa tudi mesto se je širilo proti njim in pri tem požiralo njihove vasi). Na koncu je bil režim prisiljen v nepremišljeno industrializacijo in urbanizacijo, ki sta imeli takojšnje in nepredvidene posledice. V vsej tej zmedi sta partija in kmetstvo (in njegovi urbanizirani otroci) podobna matadorju in biku. Ni še jasno, kdo bo imel zadnjo besedo. No, in ko smo že pri bikoborbi, ob nekem prejšnjem obisku Džinana sem presenečen ugotovil, da so španske bikoborbe priljubljena oddaja na lokalnih televizijskih postajah.

M. K.: Do zdaj sva govorila o proučevanju makroprocesov, ki zajemajo družbene razrede, države in celo celine. Vendar ste se ukvarjali tudi z raziskavami na mikroravni, pri čemer ste se posvečali predvsem tako imenovanemu prestrukturiranju britanskega kapitalističnega gospodarstva v 80. letih. Kakšne posledice so imele neoliberalne politike za britanski industrijski sektor in za delavski razred? Vemo, da se je organizirano delavstvo odzvalo z okrepitvijo sindikalnega aktivizma, vendar je kmalu podleglo ukrepom pokojne Margaret Thatcher. Kako je britanska postindustrijska družba integrirala delavski razred? (To je zelo relevantno vprašanje, ki omogoča primerjavo s Slovenijo in drugimi nekdanjimi socialističnimi državami. Njihova gospodarstva so temeljila na močnem industrijskem sektorju, ki ga je zelo prizadela tako imenovana »tranzicijska depresija«. V zadnjih dvajsetih letih je potekala množična deindustrializacija. Le nekaterim nekdanjim socialističnim državam je uspelo ohraniti močno in konkurenčno industrijo – ena od njih je tudi Slovenija –, toda tudi tu se je zaradi liberalizacije trgovine in krize evrskega območja zaposlenost v industrijskem sektorju močno zmanjšala, zaradi česar se seveda zastavlja vprašanje, ali bo presežna delovna sila obsojena na dolgoročno strukturno brezposelnost in odseljevanje ali bo našla zaposlitev v drugih sektorjih.)

D. S.: Pri tej velikanski spremembi, katere socialno zgodovino (in historično sociologijo) bo treba v veliki meri še napisati, gre za dezintegracijo lokalnih industrijskih sosesk z njihovimi trgi dela, ki so bili povezani s sorodstvenimi in sosedskimi omrežji. V Britaniji so se te soseske ohranile do 70. let, sam pa imam nekaj osebnih izkušenj z delom v eni od nottinghamskih tovarn sredi 60. let. Tovarniške in sosedske kulture tistih časov so praktično izginile, z njimi pa tudi ves aparat lokalnega družbenega nadzora – ideološki aparat soseske, če se

lahko tako izrazim. Reintegracija »sirot« te tovarniške/sosedske kulture je od konca 70. let potekala s pomočjo kulture, ki je v ospredje postavljala zasebni družinski prostor (znotraj katerega se varuje in izraža gospodinjstvo), potrošnja z namenom zadovoljevanja ambicij, ki jih je v veliki meri oblikovalo oglaševanje, in (za nekatere) individualistično konkurenco za družbeno mobilnost po organizacijskih hierarhijah, ki je obljudljala izboljšanje statusa in dohodka. Ta način integriranja je bil vse bolj odvisen od lahko dostopnih kreditov, tako zasebnih kot javnih. Naloga oblasti je bila zagotoviti, da bo državljanom in potrošnikom nenehno dostopen življenjski slog, ki sem ga pravkar opisal. Ko je delovanje tega sistema postalo bolj nezanesljivo (torej po letu 2008), je začela oblast izkoriščati delitve med »družinami, ki trdo delajo«, in ljudmi, ki prejemajo socialno pomoč, ter med domačini in »priseljenci«. Glavna grožnja nadaljnji uspešni integraciji in koheziji je v takih družbah verjetno stalno visoka raven brezposelnosti mladih, kar se danes dogaja, recimo, v Španiji. Ko gre za takšne družbe, si je težko zamisliti izhod, ki ne bi vključeval nemirov in represije.

Tretji del: Ponižanje in kriza EU

M. K.: Primerjali ste odzive na krizo javnega dolga in ponižanje v dveh državah, ki sta morali zaprositi za mednarodno pomoč, na Irskem in v Grčiji. Vse ponižane države so periferne države. zato bi jih bilo treba po mojem mnenju obravnavati s pomočjo koncepta perifernega kapitalizma. Že v 60. letih je Samir Amin ugotavljal, da bi bilo treba gospodarstva držav tretjega sveta obravnavati drugače kot gospodarstva razvitih držav. Skoval je izraz periferne kapitalistične formacije, ki jih je postavil nasproti kapitalističnemu produkcijskemu načinu v centru. Opazil je, da so centralne kapitalistične formacije razmeroma koherentne celote, ki jih obvladuje kapitalistični produkcijski način, ki zagotavlja trajno reprodukcijo gospodarstva in razredne formacije. V perifernih kapitalističnih formacijah pa je kapitalistični produkcijski način nerazvit, ni dominanten produkcijski način, zato si »deli oblast« s predkapitalističnimi produkcijskimi načini. Sam po sebi ni sposoben zagotoviti enotnosti in reprodukcije formacije, tako da se mora zanašati na centralne kapitalistične formacije, še posebej ko gre za kapitalske investicije, finančni sektor itn. To se odraža v razredni strukturi: namesto kapitalistov, menedžerjev in delavcev bomo našli predkapitalistične razrede, kot so kmetstvo, psevdofeudalno plemstvo, birokracija, kompradorska buržoazija itn.

Moja teza bi zato bila, da to velja tudi za periferne članice EU, le da v manj dramatični obliki. Ko so se te države v nekem trenutku vključile v EU, so bile v strukturnem smislu nerazvite, ker je bil njihov kapitalistični sektor šibkejši tako v razmerju do centralnih kapitalističnih formacij kot do »nekapitalističnih« sektorjev. Vse te države so imele velik delež kmečkega prebivalstva; za marsikatero je bila značilna kmetijska struktura, v kateri so prevladovala majhna posestva, glavni razred pa so bili mali kmetje, in ne na primer

kapitalistični farmarji oziroma zakupniki. Po drugi strani so imele še posebej nekdaneje socialistične države velike državne sektorje ne le na področju storitev, kot sta šolstvo in zdravstvo, ampak tudi v energetiki, komunali in gradbeništvu. Mislim, da je to strukturna podlaga razvpitih pojavov, kot so paternalizem, klientelizem in korupcija. Kratka obdobja rasti, ki so jo poganjali financiralizacija in nepremičninski posli, so zakrivala te strukturne razlike znotraj EU, toda potem so se znova razkrile v še hujši obliki. Zaradi procesov, ki jih zakrivajo, so se te razlike še poglobile, zato periferija ne dohiteva več centralnih držav, niti v smislu rasti BDP.

Ali se strinjate s tezo, da je mogoče ponižanje na periferiji evrskega območja pojasniti kot skupno posledico (1) streznitve po gospodarskem polomu in (2) dejstva, da so bile te države dejansko degradirane [displaced downward] in bodo verjetno še bolj?

D. S.: Okvirno se strinjam z večino vašega opisa družb, ki jih imenujete »periferija« EU, pri čemer ta »periferija« najbrž vključuje velike dele Španije, Italije, Grčije in Portugalske, pa tudi dele Irske. Po mojem mnenju dihotomija centra in periferije, ki jo uporabljate, ne pomeni absolutne dihotomije, ampak postopno prehajanje od enega pola k drugemu. Za Francijo so značilne tako »centralne« kot »periferne« tendence. Tendence v smeri paternalizma, klientelizma in korupcije so prisotne v vseh državah EU, le da imajo nekatere od njih (na primer Nemčija) dovolj močan gospodarski »pogon«, ki lahko »zdrži« njihovo breme. Strinjam se z vašo ugotovitvijo, da je zaradi nenadne prekinitve dotoka ogromne količine kreditov, ki jih je zagotavljalo bančništvo v senci (ki je bilo glavni dejavnik sedanje »krize«), prišlo do streznitve, razočaranja in premeščanja (ali strahu pred njim), vendar bi k temu dodal: ne le na periferiji (kakor koli jo že definiramo), ampak tudi v centru. Posojilodajalci se bojijo, da bodo izgubili denar, posojilojemalci pa, da ne bodo mogli odplačati ali reprogramirati svojih posojil.

Občutek degradacije, ki je prisoten v vsej EU, še posebej pa v evrskem območju, je po mojem mnenju deloma posledica povečanja moči, odgovornosti in oblasti centra v Bruslju. Evrsko območje dobiva nekatere značilnosti protodržave, kar s seboj prinaša krepitev birokratskih hierarhij in zmanjševanje avtonomije na ravni »vladanih«, v to kategorijo pa spadajo tudi vlade nacionalnih držav. Istočasno se v razmerju med vladami (katerih legitimnost izhaja iz tega, da so izraz »volje ljudstva«) in velikimi podjetji, vključno s finančnimi in medijskimi (ki se odzivajo na »diktat trga«), ravnotežje sil preveša v prid drugim. Sposobnost vlad, da bi nevtralizirale učinek polarizacije, ki ga ima kapitalistični trg, je načeta. To je še en vzrok degradacije, tako znotraj družb kot med družbami znotraj EU.

Po drugi strani pa nekateri na podlagi primerjav svojega položaja s položajem svojih neposrednih sosedov – revnejših in morda manj stabilnih – sklepajo, da je članstvo v EU dragocena pridobitev. Ena od koristi odločenosti gospodarskih elit, da bodo tako rekoč za vsako ceno obvarovale integriteto evra in evrskega območja, so (ironično)

prizadevanja (ne vselej uspešna) za ohranjanje minimalne ravni politične stabilnosti. Grčija in Ciper seveda nista najboljša zgleda take politike. Za majhne posestnike in tiste, ki bi to radi postali, je družbenopolitična stabilnost dragocena pridobitev, čeprav lahko pripelje do družbenopolitične ureditve z razmerji, ki nikakor ne prinašajo družbene pravičnosti. Prava nevarnost (ali, za optimiste, ki radi tvegajo, prava priložnost) je, da bo naraščanje brezposelnosti morda na koncu ustvarilo državljansko bazo, ki bo dovolj velika, da bo lahko zahtevala spremembo političnoekonomskega sistema. Kot je znano iz Severne Afrike, izida takšnih razmer ni lahko napovedati, kaj lahko se zgodi, da se s tem ne poveča socialna pravičnost.

M. K.: Če skleneva: zdi se mi, da bo zaradi načina reševanja te krize prišlo do še večje diferenciacije ne le v Evropi, ampak tudi znotraj samih držav. Kot sociologa – in v nasprotju z običajno prakso politologov in politikov – veva, da subjekti, ki se srečujejo v zgodovinskih procesih, niso države, ampak družbeni razredi in njihove frakcije v različnih državah. Ti subjekti poskušajo, bolj ali manj zavestno in z več ali manj uspeha, uravnavati mednarodne odnose v svojo korist. Dober zgled so odnosi med Kitajsko in ZDA: kitajska birokracija in velika ameriška podjetja, še posebej finančni sektor, imajo koristi od poceni izvoza kitajskega blaga in poceni (glede na obrestne mere) uvoza denarja (kredita) v Ameriko. Toda to zagotovo ne koristi delovnim ljudem v ZDA ali na Kitajskem. Odnosi med severom in jugom Evrope torej niso odnosi med Grki in Nemci, ampak med severnimi in južnimi vladajočimi razredi, ki si skušajo zagotoviti oblast. Trenutno je, recimo, četrtnina španskega aktivnega prebivalstva brez kakršne koli zaposlitve, toda »elite oblasti« imajo vajeti trdno v svojih rokah. Paradoks je, da take razmere koristijo prav »starim elitam«, tistim, ki so povezane z nekapitalističnimi družbenimi strukturami, ki v teh okoliščinah pridobivajo pomen. Naj vam dam primer: prodaja industrijskih zmogljivosti in bank zahodnim investitorjem – kar so, recimo, storili v baltskih državah, na Slovaškem itn., v Sloveniji pa ravnokar nameravajo – ne povzroči zatona rentnikov, klientelizma in korupcije. Nasprotno, ti pojavi še bolj cvetijo, zato ker se njihova strukturna baza – periferni položaj teh držav – pogloblja. Edini izhod, ki ga vidim, je, da ljudstva v teh perifernih državah poskušajo doseči drugačno modernizacijo. Ne modernizacijo, ki bi temeljila na krepitvi njihovih kapitalističnih lastnosti, kajti to je samouničujoč proces – vedno bodo obstajale centralne formacije, ki bodo »bolj kapitalistične« na področju financ, politične moči in tehnologije, prav tako pa bodo vedno obstajale periferne formacije, ki bodo imele več surovin in poceni delovne sile. Alternativa je v modernizaciji, ki bi preseгла kapitalizem tako v smislu odnosa med centrom in periferijo na eni strani kot odnosa med delom in kapitalom na drugi.

Kaj vi mislite o teh strukturnih procesih in kaj je po vašem mnenju rešitev pred ponizanjem?

D. S.: Mislim, da je, dokler se EU upira procesom dezintegracije in odcepitve – pri čemer menim, da bi se ti procesi lahko sprožili v Grčiji in Veliki Britaniji (in celo v Nemčiji) –, skratka, dokler se EU temu izogiba, najverjetnejši rezultat trenutne krize delna »korporativizacija« EU. S tem mislim na kristalizacijo režima, v katerem vladajo velika podjetja in v katerem se širi privatizacija, medtem ko se socialne pravice državljanov zmanjšujejo. Morda ni prezgodaj, da se začnejo nasprotniki teh trendov učiti od intelektualcev in aktivistov naprednega krila ameriške demokratske stranke, da bodo znali preživeti, se reorganizirati, upreti in boriti za izboljšanje v takih razmerah. V mislih imam pisce, kot je Jacob Hacker (glej Hacker 2006), in organizacije, kot je Scholars' Strategy Network (<http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org>).

Tri desetletja sredi 20. stoletja, pred in med drugo svetovno vojno ter po njej, so bili strokovnjaki s področja družboslovja tisti, ki so skupaj s svojimi zavezniki v vladi in političnih gibanjih postavili temelje socialne revolucije. Formulirali so strategije, oblikovali institucije in izvedli raziskave, ki so zagotovile več priložnosti in pravičnosti običajnim državljanom v družbah, ki so jih obvladovali interesi zemljiških lastnikov, industrijskih delodajalcev in veletrgovcev. Zdaj, ko so te strategije in institucije v zatonu oziroma postajajo manj učinkovite, je odgovornost na sedanji in prihodnjih generacijah strokovnjakov s področja družboslovja. Ti morajo podati jasno analizo strukturnih sprememb, ki potekajo, in ugotoviti, katere obstoječe ali nove vzvode potrebujemo, če hočemo znova uvesti standarde in kriterije, ki so v povojnih desetletjih zagotavljali pravičnost in socialne pravice. Nedvomno bodo potrebni nov način razmišljanja, nove strategije in nove institucije, katerih oblik v tem trenutku še ni mogoče predvideti.

Bolj splošno lahko rečemo, da bodo na politiko EU v prihodnjem desetletju skoraj zagotovo vplivale izkušnje ponižanja, ki ga je po letu 2008 doživelo praktično vse prebivalstvo znotraj njenih meja. Nalogo odpravljanja strukturnih razmer, ki so povzročile sedanje ponižanje, bo oteževal pomemben dejavnik: vseprisotni politični učinki močnih čustev, kot so jeza, strah in žalost. Ta čustva, ki jih je okrepilo vsiljevanje varčevalnih ukrepov, vplivajo na to, ali bodo različne skupine svoj položaj poskušale obvarovati z defenzivnim ali ofenzivnim ukrepanjem (Grki so bili na primer bolj jezni kot prestrašeni, Irci bolj prestrašeni kot jezni). Stvari se dodatno zapletajo, ker je prebivalstvo novih članic EU ob vstopu pogosto razumelo kot nekakšno oazo, ki je obetala konec predhodnih oblik ponižanja pod diktaturami ali različnimi vrstami izrazito avtoritarnih režimov. Če se bo občutek razočaranja zaostрил, bodo novi prebivalci z volilno pravico, ki bodo začeli s cinizmom gledati na Bruselj, ranljivi za etnonacionalistične programe, ki jih širijo demagoški politiki. Nekaj takega smo že videli. Med obema vojnoma je bila podobna tarča cinizma Ženeva, sedež Društva narodov. Ženevi ni uspelo izpolniti obljube, da bo Evropi prinesla boljše življenje; Bruselj je začel boljše, zdaj pa odpoveduje. Spet živimo v nevarnem času za Evropo.

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Polona Fijavž

(E)vropska (u)topija?

Pogovor s profesorjem Dennisom Smithom na TV
Slovenija

Profesor dr. Dennis Smith je ob množičnih protestih proti varčevalnim ukrepom, krčenjem socialnih pravic, ponižanjih držav s suspendirano demokracijo, ki jim ustroj države kroji zloglasna Trojka finančnih institucij, o prihodnosti Evropske unije in nekaterimi vzporednicami iz preteklosti govoril tudi za aktualno-politično oddajo Globus na nacionalni/slovenski televiziji maja 2013 z voditeljico oddaje Polono Fijavž.

P. F.: Lepo pozdravljeni v naši oddaji, profesor Smith.

D. S.: Hvala, lepo je biti tukaj.

P. F.: V Evropi imamo različne delitve – staro in novo Evropo – ta delitev že nekoliko slabi – članice in nečlanice Schengena, članice in nečlanice evrskega območja; imamo pa tudi države upnice in t. i. države prestopnice ... Kot kaže trenutno v Evropi šteje le gospodarski položaj države. Je to vzdržno?

D. S.: Ni. Ni mogoče še naprej misliti, da je Evropska unija nekakšna povečevana bančna institucija. Evropa je bila vedno projekt, ki je nastal za zaščito evropskega načina življenja, ki ceni svoje državljane in gleda nanje kot na ljudi, ki imajo pravico do varnosti in do priložnosti. Menim, da se moramo spomniti, čemu smo skupaj v tej Evropi: zato, da bi ustvarili svet za oboje, za močne in šibke, za mlade in stare. Zdaj pa nam grozi, da bomo na to pozabili. Grozi pa nam tudi to, da bomo pozabili, da nekatere šibke države potrebujejo morda – poleg golega diktata in varčevalnih ukrepov – še kaj.

P. F.: Tudi vi govorite o ponižanju in nekatere države se čutijo v zdajšnji Evropi ponižane.

D. S.: Da, in to je nadvse ironično, kajti začetna spodbuda za ustanovitev Evropske gospodarske skupnosti v daljnih 50. letih 20. stoletja je bila prav želja, da bi vodstva Francije, Nemčije in Italije nehala poniževati druga drugo z vojno. In ko se je skupnost po razpadu Sovjetske zveze razširila, je bila obljuba o družbi brez poniževanja dana vsem našim državljanom.

P. F.: Zdaj ni več tako, se zdi ...

D. S.: Ni več. Zdi se, da je bistveni del evropskega projekta trenutno utonil v pozabo. Mislim, da zaradi strahu in gneva, ki sta ponovno oživila v teh razmerah. To pa sta čustvi, ki sta v Evropi povzročili že toliko spopadov v stoletju, preden smo dobili Evropsko unijo.

P. F.: Koga pa to poniževanje v Evropi trenutno najbolj zadeva?

D. S.: Ko pravite zadeva, ali mislite na to, kdo je odgovoren za to?

P. F.: Ne, zanima me, kdo je najbolj prizadet zaradi tega.

D. S.: Ironično mislim, da to čutimo vsi. Evropa je skupnost, čeprav je to težko reči, ponižanih ljudi. Vsi smo se znašli na napačnem koncu tega konfliktnega položaja. Nemčija je zelo občutljiva na kritiko zaradi svoje preteklosti, prav tako Britanci in vsi drugi narodi. Menim, da je ponižanost skupno čustvo in prav zato sem presenečen in razočaran, da pri ravnanju s temi odnosi nismo bolj občutljivi.

P. F.: Česa pa nam manjka? Nam manjka solidarnosti? Z vami bi namreč rada govorila še o nečem, in to o tem, kako se odzivamo na to ponižanje. Grki se na primer upirajo na ulicah, Irci pa to sprejemajo z nekakšno dostojanstvenostjo. V čem se razlikujejo?

D. S.: Oboji, pa nikakor ne bi hotel uporabiti stereotipov,.... najbolje, da povem takole: ljudje v obeh teh državah želijo obdržati svoje urade, svojo zmožnost, da si sami oblikujejo svoje življenje. Irci imajo tisočletne izkušnje s tem, kako je biti pod nekom, pod neko drugo silo, pod nadoblastjo Londona. Znajo razlikovati med sabo kot morebiti zatiranimi in drugimi, ki se jim predstavljajo. Presenetljivo je, da se je irska vlada v svojem trenutnem položaju uspela z vodjem skupine finančnih ministrov dogovoriti za sedemletno podaljšanje odplačevanja posojila. Ohranili so mirno kri, čakali so, ker so tega vajeni, in uspelo jim je.

P. F.: Na drugi strani pa imamo Grke.

D. S.: Da, Grke, ki so na ulici, ker govorimo o skupini ljudi iz javnega sektorja, ki so 25 let uživali na položaju, ki so jim ga zagotovili po 40 letih življenja »v divjini«. PASOK je namreč podpiral predvsem leve grške politike, ki so zdaj nadvse ogorčeni zaradi tako strogega ravnanja z njimi.

P. F.: Če je torej različno dojemanje ponižanja odvisno od zgodovine, če sem vas prav razumela, kako pa bi se potem odzvala Slovenija, če bi se ji zgodilo kaj takega?

D. S.: To je vprašanje, ki bi ga morali še preučiti. Na eni strani je to država, ki je bila kar nekajkrat zelo blizu tiranskim gospodarjem v minulih stoletjih, kljub temu pa lahko na to gledamo še drugače. Slovenija bi se morala zavedati, da je že preživela take čase, da enkrat ne bo več v središču pozornosti in da varčevalni ukrepi, ki so vsiljeni različnim državam, ne bodo nujno vzdržali. Prišli smo do točke v evropski politiki, ko ljudje, kot je predsednik Barroso, pravijo: Morda pa smo s temi varčevalnimi ukrepi res nekoliko pretiravali. Dejal bi, da se bodo srednjeročne politične možnosti za Slovenijo in druge države v tem položaju v prihodnjih mesecih najverjetneje nekoliko izboljšale.

P. F.: Toda trenutno imamo države, ki se čutijo nekako ponižane, na drugi strani pa so države, ki se imajo za nekaj več. V svojem predavanju v Ljubljani ste primerjali to z nekim zgodovinskim trenutkom. Na podlagi česa? Nam lahko poveste malo več o tem?

D. S.: Pri vsem tem gre za zelo škripajočo poveličevanje samega sebe, ki ga je zelo težko obvladati, ko se tako ali drugače znajdeš v njem, in pred ogromnim nezadovoljstvom na drugi strani. To me je spomnilo nekako na obdobje po državljanski vojni v Ameriki, ko so si abolicionisti tako močno prizadevali odpraviti suženjstvo, da so pri tem popolnoma pozabili na slabe učinke tega na družbo. Zdi se mi, da smo trenutno v podobnem položaju. To velja namreč tako za moralnost ali nemoralnost suženjstva kot za moralnost ali nemoralnost uravnoteževanja proračuna.

P. F.: Povejte mi, prosim, kaj o nemški vlogi pri vsem tem. Nemčija se ima za zelo pravično, usmerila se je v neoliberalno politiko, podpira jo, v nasprotju s Francijo in Italijo. Kako se bo to razvijalo naprej?

D. S.: Najprej, Nemčije ne bi označil ravno s temi besedami. Govoril sem z mnogimi ljudmi v Nemčiji in ugotovil, da mnogi tako kot v drugih državah veliko razmišljajo o tem, da jih vse to zelo skrbi. Že od samega začetka prihajajo iz Nemčije dvoji glasovi: na eni strani tisti, ki pravijo,

trpeli smo, ponovno smo se združili z Vzhodno Nemčijo, zato vemo, kaj je treba storiti, zato se morajo drugi učiti od nas. Na drugi strani pa slišimo: naša zgodovinska dolžnost je, da pomagamo Evropi skozi to obdobje; konec koncev so pomagali tudi nam po letu 1945. Mislim, da še vedno lahko slišimo oboje, čeprav sem nekoliko žalosten, da teh drugih ne slišijo dovolj.

P. F.: Je tako zaradi moči Angele Merkel? Od česa je to odvisno?

D. S.: Mislim, da je deloma to posledica tega, da Merklova ni preverila javnega mnenja. Javnost je zelo zaskrbljena. Ljudje, ki jih je strah v teh razmerah, niso samo tisti, ki so postali dolžniki, ampak tudi tisti, ki denar posojajo. Pred kratkim sem v nemški reviji videl naslov, ki pravi: »Ali jo bodo Grki popihali z vsem našim denarjem?« Res pametno. Hočem reči, da je Evropa celina, ki je med najbogatejšimi v svetu. Z BDP-jem se lahko zelo dostojno merimo z gospodarskim sporazumom med Ameriko, Mehiko in Kanado (NAFTA). Če ne moremo rešiti težave, kot je Grčija, z vsemi svojimi viri, se lahko vprašamo, kam se je izgubil duh sodelovanja in sklepanja kompromisov v Evropi. Tako je pisalo v nemškem tisku že decembra 2009, preden so Nemci sploh slišali, da bodo morali prispevati nekaj denarja. Tako ravnanje ni razumno.

P. F.: G. Smith, se vam zdi vloga Nemčije dvolična? Slišali smo, da je ga. Merklova dejala, da se nihče ne bo dotikal nemških bančnih računov, nekaj mesecev kasneje pa so na Cipru storili prav to.

D. S.: Da. Mislim, da so komentarji v finančnem tisku in drugod to predstavili kot točko, na kateri se dotakneš električne ograde. Takrat se namreč tudi zaveš, da je treba stopiti korak nazaj. Vse skupaj je bilo predstavljeno zelo zanimivo, posebej tisto, kar smo slišali v Veliki Britaniji. Pravzaprav je bil to predlog s Cipra. Nekaj zmede je torej pri tem, od kod je prišel predlog, zagotovo pa bi bilo slabo, če bi posojilodajalce, ki jim jamčimo ... oprostite, če bi ljudem, ki imajo bančna posojila, garantirali za določeno vsoto, če bi bili njihovi skladi ogroženi. To bi povzročilo še več zaskrbljenosti, ki pa jo skušamo v Evropi odpraviti. Znebiti se moramo zaskrbljenosti in zamere.

P. F.: Toda ali je oziroma ali bo zaradi te poteze Ciper zdaj najbolj ponižana država v Evropi?

D. S.: Vsekakor. Tako je po definiciji, tako to opisujemo, čeprav je to precej neumno. Tudi tesni odnosi med Ciprom in Grčijo in navzočnost Turkov in Grkov na otoku obstajajo že nekaj časa. To naj nas ne moti. To naj pomaga rešiti trenutne razmere, ne pa jih še oteževati.

P. F.: Trenutne razmere ... Bi dejali, da je Nemčija izšla iz njih kot zmagovalka?

D. S.: Mislim, da nihče ni zmagovalec. Trenutno se namreč dogaja, da so se vsa zavezništva, vse povezave, ki so tako zavzeto nastajale v preteklih nekaj desetletjih, začeli trgati, začeli so razpadati Nemčija in Francija, državljani in parlamenti, oprostite, njihove vlade, odnosi med državami, med ljudmi v evrskem območju in zunaj njega. Govori se o izstopnih referendumih, veliko se govori o fragmentaciji ... To pa vznemirja in je lahko nevarno.

P. F.: Kaj pa bi lahko naredili za to, da bi bila Evropa spet bolj povezana, da ne bi postajala tako razdrobljena?

D. S.: Mislim, da bi se morali vsi zavedati, da gre še vedno za začetne, temeljne trenutke v nastajanju Evropske unije. Smo tako rekoč šele v prvem letu, na ničelni točki. To je trenutek, v katerem vsi trpimo, bogati in revni. Skupaj moramo analizirati, kar se nam dogaja: politiki, akademiki in mladi morajo začeti skupaj govoriti o tem odprto, med sabo in prek meja. Otresimo se trenutnih čustev in se vprašajmo, zakaj se nam to dogaja. Potem pa skušajmo bolj zavestno sodelovati.

P. F.: Na tej točki pa smo spet pri solidarnosti. Ali je solidarnost tista, ki je potrebna med državami v Evropski uniji?

D. S.: Pred solidarnostjo potrebujete razumevanje in dialog. Vidimo, da se razhajajo države, ki so si bile prej zelo blizu. Prvi grški kralj je bil Nemec; država, iz katere je Grčija uvažala največ blaga, je Nemčija. Vse skupaj spominja na razpadajoč zakon. To pa so ene izmed najbolj grenkih izkušenj. Naučiti se moramo ponovno oživiti medsebojne odnose. Iz tega pa bo potem izšla solidarnost, in upajmo, tudi politika, s katero bomo lahko skupaj zgradili Evropsko unijo, ki se jo bo splačalo ohraniti.

P. F.: Toda če ni razumevanja med državami, kdo je kriv za to? Imamo institucije v Bruslju, v Strasbourgu, ki naj bi skrbele za razumevanje med državami članicami. Kaj potem manjka?

D. S.: Mislim, da vse to ni odvisno od tega, kar dela Bruselj, ali česar ne dela. Bruselj tega ne more narediti za nas. To bomo morali narediti sami. Tudi s takimi oddajami. Mediji imajo pri tem lahko zelo pomembno vlogo, pri organiziranju čezmejnega komuniciranja. Mediji imajo ogromno možnosti, da pomagajo politikom in drugim ljudem doseči ta cilj.

P. F.: Kakšna pa bo prihodnost Evropske unije? Smo lahko optimisti? V svojem predavanju tukaj v Ljubljani ste dogajanje pogosto primerjali z drugimi, ne preveč optimističnimi dogodki iz ameriške preteklosti.

D. S.: Ta se me je res dotaknila. Če pogledate v leto 1857, boste naleteli na prvo svetovno gospodarsko krizo, ki je zelo podobna temu, kar preživljamo zdaj. Ameriko je kriza prizadela v času, ko je skušala povezati dve različni politični ekonomiji: suženjsko in nesuženjsko. Sami smo v popolnoma enakem položaju. Soočeni smo namreč z zelo močno staroliberalno tendenco, imamo pa tudi ureditve, ki temeljijo bolj na političnem klientelizmu. Italija, Francija stopa v to smer, Romunija, zagotovo Grčija, pa tudi Madžarska. Ta dva sistema morata najti način, da se bosta zblížala. Politični klientelisti se morajo zavedati, da so odgovorni za vse ljudi, ne le za svoje privrženke, ordoliberalci pa morajo razumeti, da morajo biti njihovi dobički primerno obdavčeni in za revne in šibke prav tako kot za močne in prodorne.

P. F.: Pravite, da bo, če propade evrsko območje, propadla tudi Evropska unija, vendar se to najverjetneje ne bo zgodilo. Kako lahko to trdite?

D. S.: To je malo verjetno zato, ker obstajajo močni interesi, ki prinašajo veliko dobička – to sem povedal nekoliko neprevidno, ampak tako pač je. Imamo ogromen trg, na katerem so stroški transakcij razmeroma nizki. Poslovne organizacije lahko tu ustvarjajo denar. Žal pa se evropsko gospodarstvo, v katero se pomikamo, začenja

krčiti, namesto da bi se širilo, je nedejavno, ni dinamično. Začenjamo biti podobni Otomanskemu cesarstvu v poznem 19. stoletju: imamo pravico do izkoriščanja, bogate vire, nismo pa sposobni rasti. Če ne bomo pazili, nas bodo drugi pojedli.

P. F.: Kaj pomeni tu »pazili«?

D. S.: Če ne bomo postali močni, dinamični, civilizirani in demokratični in če se ne bomo zavedali svojega cilja – če se ne bomo zavedali, da nam gre za več kot zgolj za gospodarstvo, za več kot za zasebni dobiček, da nam gre pravzaprav za ustvarjanje skupnosti, ki bo zavezana k temu, da bo življenje, ki ga bo vredno živeti, zagotovila vsem svojim članicam.

P. F.: Prav. G. Smith, hvala, ker ste prišli v naš studio.

D. S.: Tudi vam najlepša hvala.

Borut Krajnc

Smith na Filozofski fakulteti – fotografije
Smith at the Faculty of Arts – photography


























Ksenija Vidmar Horvat

A European Intellectual on the periphery: after Dennis Smith's visit to Ljubljana

There is a growing number of European intellectuals who, lately, have been concerned with the future of the European project. The sociologists who, until recently, studied the European Union mainly within broader contexts of globalization and/or processes of modernization, for example Ulrich Beck or Zygmunt Bauman, have been fast returning to the “homeland” of the analysis which is inward again: refocused back to Europe, to its very inner origin of historical turbulence and intellectual uncertainty. The sociologists who, on the other hand, had been occupied with the constitution of the supranational and transnational European democratic society already before the crisis, such as Jürgen Habermas, today have been refocusing their critique to the engineers of the European integration, including political elites, bureaucrats and intellectuals, and have called for the instant revitalization of the idea of the European public (if not demos!) that should be launched from the immediate centre of the EU. There are only few, if any, who, in order to contribute to the mission of saving the EU, anticipated to be activated from the centre, are willing to travel to the periphery: to observe how the core of the European idea is being dismantled on the fringe, but also how, considering the articulation of the key values of unification: justice, solidarity, social state, even active citizenship (sic!), people on the margins of the European Union have become the most resistant to let them go.

Dennis Smith did not come to the borderlands of the EU, and to semi-peripheral Slovenia, by accident. To the contrary, the talks of his potential visit to Ljubljana first started in time when prof. Avgust Lešnik was finishing the project of translation of his book *The Rise of Historical Sociology* by Studia humanitatis. At that time, due to financial constraints, the journey could not be realized. However, earlier in the spring of 2013, he contacted us again and announced that he was doing field research in Greece, Cyprus, Croatia and, if possible, Slovenia. This time, he could cover the travel costs himself.

Where did this wish to visit the countries amidst the peak of their facing of the financial crisis? What could *professor emeritus*, coming from a prestigious British university, learn by observing the moment of sobriety which hit the people when watching the riders of apocalyptic Trojka blowing away the last remaining signs of European solidarity – what new and different could he collect which, a historical sociologist, familiar with colonial histories of Europe, British empire and the history of the U.S., did not know from before?

The answer to the above questions arrives the moment one has the opportunity to exchange only a few words with Dennis Smith. The outstanding intellectual clarity, wit, humour and healthy self-distance do not thrive in the saloon armchairs of studying history in the making; nor in the field observations of the other who has found themselves on the threshold of a collapse of an ideal-civilizational project, called the EU.

He is only among a few, or perhaps the only one, of the intellectuals who travel to these places, who radiates the energy which makes you feel that you talk to a familiar figure, to a “native” of your local home – a European from a shared country of democratic future.

At the moment of visits like this one, and this should not sound too far-stretching, it becomes clear, that the future of the EU is being decided upon on the margins; and that the only recipe for the European intellectual who wants to take part in this process of decision making is to face the European truth which is “lived” on the peripheries.

The truth is that humiliation, as we in these postsocialist Eastern parts of the EU have been trained to believe, does not stem from our cultural incompatibility. Humiliation is spreading across the EU, in its core and on the borders, in the economic centres and social abysses – attached to the only true motor of the current progressive demise: which is the global dictate of the capital.

Dennis Smith

Making Sense of the EU Crisis*

* This is a revised version of the *LLL Jean Monnet* lecture given at the University of Ljubljana on Tuesday 23rd April 2013.

Introduction

I have discovered that Slovenia is a special place. Perhaps because it welcomes wandering scholars (or at least this one) when they take a well-meaning interest in its affairs. Perhaps because it has a unique location at the crossroads of major European trade routes. Perhaps because it is in a place where Slavic, Germanic, Hungarian and Romance languages all meet together. Perhaps, also, because over the centuries Slovenes have been recruited into many larger political units, from the Roman Empire to the European Union. People with this kind of history have to develop subtlety, watchfulness and determination if they wish to survive. Such qualities pay intellectual dividends. No wonder Ljubjana is home to a university that is not only one of the largest in Europe but also one of the world's best.

That is why I am so delighted to have been invited by Professor Avgust Lešnik and Professor Ksenija Vidmar Horvat to give this lecture on the current crisis in the European Union, which is surely far from over. It is an opportune time to discuss such a matter, and not just from Slovenia's point of view, although people in this country have certainly been through a rather disorienting "European journey" in the past few years.

Slovenia

In 2004 Slovenia's entry to the EU offered its citizens the prospect of a safe harbour in a storm-ridden region. Going into the Eurozone in 2007 also seemed a smart move, enabling Ljubjana to join the inner circle. But one year later the collapse of Lehman Brothers turned that safe harbour into a whirlpool. Slovenia found itself joining the queue of candidates for a bailout, a risky prospect if we consider the Greek example. In fact, Slovenia's case is quite different from Greece. It is a dramatic and complex story that mixes Euro-troubles with mass street protests against corruption in Ljubjana and Maribor. This is one of twenty-seven or (after July 2013)¹ twenty-eight complicated stories that could be told about the member states of the EU-27 (now EU-28). But if you turn to Europe's media screens or newsstands don't expect to find there a panoramic view that does justice to the complexities of the European scene.

Stereotypes

On the contrary. Some of the core narratives about the current European crisis endlessly repeated in the mass media are thinly disguised versions of lurid morality tales plucked from the nursery. Remember Hansel and Gretel? It is a story of a wicked witch with a gingerbread house who deceives and betrays two hapless infants. For "witch" read bankers and financiers. Their supposedly infantile prey are Europe's employers, workers,

1 Croatia joined the EU on 1st July 2013.

consumers and small investors. In the original story, Hansel and Gretel pushed the witch into her own oven and made their escape. In reality, the bankers and financiers have largely survived, with a few bruises, mostly temporary.

A competing account features a litter of foolish “pigs” such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain.² Their badly built dwellings were destroyed by ravenous wolves in the global market. These predators “huffed and puffed and blew the pigs” houses down, just as in the original story of the *Three Little Pigs*. The pigs’ stern “Northern” elders have reacted with horror. These elders are like the “old lady who lived in a shoe” as recorded in an English nursery rhyme, a personage who surely must be a prototype for the popular view of Angela Merkel. The old lady’s over-stretched shoe was full of unruly children. How did she cope with them? She “gave them some broth without any bread”, then “whipped them all soundly, and put them to bed”. Here is austerity summed up in a rhyming couplet.³

Struggles

So, if the tabloid media cannot help us much in our quest for understanding, let us look elsewhere. For example, to Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck who have both put their minds to these issues. Beck’s basic message is that Europe has become German: “we boldly assert that what’s good for the German economy is right for the European economy as a whole, and beyond!” (Beck, 2013: 57). But what’s “good for us” turns out to be bad for us, says Beck: “these austerity programmes have only intensified the economic crisis in Europe, leading to the opposite of what was intended” (58). Where Beck sees the plague of German “euro-nationalism”, Habermas sees another malady: “executive federalism”. The leaders of member states in the “self-authorizing European Council” make deals among themselves and then “organize majorities in their respective national parliaments under threat of sanctions” (Habermas, 2012: viii).

What can be done? Habermas is cautiously optimistic. He thinks political authority in Europe is gradually becoming less brutal and hierarchical. This process, he says, is being pushed forward by the norms being built into European law at the supranational level. These norms look forward to a Europe in which there is expanded democratic association, collective decision-making, and EU-wide civic solidarity. So Habermas places great hopes on the *learning* being done by Europe’s political elites, as their constitutional lawyers educate them to be more cosmopolitan-minded.

2 P(for Portugal), I(for Ireland and/or Italy), G(for Greece) S(for Spain). The acronym could easily be misunderstood as disparaging.

3 This nursery rhyme goes: “There was an old woman who lived in a shoe./She had so many children, she didn’t know what to do./She gave them some broth without any bread;/And whipped them all soundly and put them to bed”.

Beck also takes a positive stance. He focuses on crucial *unlearning* being done by Europe's national electorates as voters lose their faith in rigidly market-driven policies. As he puts it, "the euro crisis has definitively stripped neo-liberal Europe of its legitimacy". The resulting political space might be filled by reform-minded political leaders and organized groups of citizens, all ready to "act transnationally" (Beck, 2013: 85). They would, hopefully, work towards a new social contract between newly enlightened European governments. This would promote transnational democracy, providing protection and support to all within a framework of European solidarity.

For Habermas the agents of desirable change are enlightened professionals drawing on the resources of philosophy and constitution law. For Beck, enlightened citizens armed with sociological insight play a similar role. However, as both would fully recognize, we also need to factor in two other crucial agents of change: governments, who are able to deploy the massive military, judicial and tax-gathering power of the state, and big business (including the media) with its enormous financial, technological and persuasive capacities.

In fact, I shall argue that two sets of relationships are key to understanding the development of the European Union. One is the triad that links together the state, big business and ordinary citizens ("the people"). Within Europe a battle is under way between government and business for the upper hand within the commanding heights of the capitalist political economy. This is being played out on several fields of combat including taxation, privatization, lobbying and corruption. The key question is: which kind of citizenship will have priority in the programmes of governments, will it be what might be called "market citizenship" which gives priority to the interests of big business, or will it be "social citizenship" that puts high on the spending agenda the needs of the so-called "99 percent", in need of work, accommodation, healthcare, and so on?

The other key relationship is between the European Union and the United States. A long-term transatlantic struggle is under way between the EU and the US for priority in prestige, authority and clout within the West and globally. This struggle may be followed in debates within the WTO, disputes over the Iraq and Afghan wars, contests for influence in North Africa and the Middle East, and occasional exposures of covert operations such as "gladio" (notably in Italy)⁴ and the European surveillance programmes of the National Security Agency based at Fort Meade, Maryland.⁵

4 See, for example, Ginsborg, 2001: 171–3.

5 See, for example, "Attacks from America: NSA spied on European Union Offices", *Spiegel Online International*, 29 June 2013, at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nsa-spied-on-european-union-offices-a-908590.html> (consulted September 30th 2013).

The US-EU relationship is especially interesting because, in my view, the present crisis is just as important for the future of the European Union as the American Civil War was for the development of the United States. The point is that if these historical cases are placed side by side, we can see, in each case, a framework of governance struggling to contain two forms of political economy that are pushing in radically different directions. In both cases, to put it crudely, there is a clash between property rights and human rights. In both cases, also, there is hypocrisy and corruption on both sides of the argument, as well as some fanaticism.

I am going to present my argument in three parts. In the first part, I narrate the “European story” as two sequences: one of fifty years (1939–89), culminating in a seizing up of the machinery, and a slowing down of the engine by the late 1980s; the other sequence (since 1989) shorter in length, so far, and culminating in a series of jolts that have loosened up the machinery, making its constituent parts, which had been locked closely together, more visible as if in an exploded diagram.

In the second part of my argument, I will briefly analyze the “exploded diagram” of the EU in crisis, identifying the axes of cooperation, the frontiers of struggle and the chasms of alienation that have emerged or become pronounced within Europe in the period since 2008. I will show that the principal group actors differ in their orientations in two respects: towards following rules and towards the roles of government and the market. As part of the argument, I will briefly contrast the pattern of tensions within the EU during the years after 2008 with a parallel but significantly different pattern of tensions that existed in the United States in the crisis years that followed the banking collapse of 1857, leading towards civil war and reconstruction.

In the final part of the argument, I will consider possible futures for the EU beyond the current crisis.

I

Europe 1939–89: catharsis, genesis, sclerosis

In October 2012 the European Union (as it officially became in 1991) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for having “over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”.⁶ There was a lot of adverse comment at the time, perhaps because the member states had been quarrelling for several months over how to deal with the Eurozone crisis. But when it first sparked into

6 For further details see http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html (consulted August 30th 2013).

life in the 1950s, the EU's great appeal for leaders and voters alike was that it provided a refuge from war and political oppression.

This powerful integrative force – the huddling together of grateful survivors – should be incorporated in our historical understanding of the processes that led towards the current crisis. In fact, beginning in 1939, we have passed through six phases: *catharsis*, *genesis* and *sclerosis* up until the end of the Cold War in 1989; and since 1989 *hubris*, *nemesis* and, most recently, *crisis*.

Catharsis. In retrospect, the two European (and world) wars of the twentieth century answered two questions. The first was whether the empires dominating nineteenth-century world politics could survive in an age that was increasingly commercialized, urbanized and industrialized. The answer was negative and many of those political structures – including the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires – were destroyed by 1918.⁷ The British and French empires, linked by their *entente cordiale*, limped on.⁸ They were the most “modern” of the old empires and they continued to exploit the resources of Africa, Asia and the Middle East while they still could.

The Second World War gave a partial answer to a second question, as follows: which interests and which ideologies would fill the global gap left behind when the Anglo-French imperial regime finally collapsed: German nazism, Russo-Chinese communism or American capitalist democracy?

As is well known, between 1939 and 1945 there was a fight to the death between these three interests and ideologies killing at least 60 million people, perhaps half of those being in Europe. The war and its aftermath was a deeply cathartic experience for Europeans.⁹ Following the 1940s there was much less willingness to die and kill in the name of utopian promises made by politicians. The warrior spirit had been purged. People were ready to build peace rather than engage in violent struggle.

Genesis. Countries on both sides of the “iron curtain” were under external discipline after 1945, not just the “Eastern bloc”. Washington planted its tanks and nuclear warheads on West European land and turned Europe's bloody warrior chiefs into servile courtiers. France and Germany were forced to put an end to their long revenge cycle, stretching back to the early nineteenth century. The whole business was reminiscent of Norbert Elias's description of the “civilizing process”.¹⁰ As Elias

7 The Spanish empire had already been badly damaged in the 1898 Spanish-American war. The Chinese imperial dynasty had lost power in 1912.

8 The Belgians and Dutch also retained lucrative colonial possessions.

9 See, for example Lowe, 2012.

10 See Elias, 1994.

saw it, state formation in early modern Europe began with the establishment of strong centralizing royal courts where warlords were forced to throw away their swords and bow down before the throne.¹¹

Likewise, following the Allies' victory, Europe's generals had to make do with NATO exercises under American command, a modern version of medieval jousting tournaments. Marshall Aid was a powerful diplomatic weapon, enabling American leaders to insist that France and Germany especially but also Italy and the other aid recipients should enter into economic cooperation with each other.

The Coal and Steel Community (1951) led to the European Community (1957), which led in turn to the European Single Market Act (1986). The European "courtiers" from Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries soon regained a great deal of control over their lives. The European "community" became a West European club giving its members a field of action that excluded ruthless economic protectionism or cut-throat military competition between themselves. This club became a post-humiliation sanctuary for Western Europe's political leaders and their business friends. They entered into regular dialogue and put behind them the old habit of deciding matters according to whoever had the strength to knock his opponent to the floor and kick him off the field of combat.

The bureaucrats, businesspeople and politicians of Western Europe gradually became more willing to trust each other, do deals, and cooperate in Brussels. During these years the club's membership doubled. Three "northern" countries, UK, Ireland, Denmark, joined the original six in 1973. So did three ex-dictatorships: Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986).

There is an important "back story" here. That is the long-running rivalry between the United States and European governments. This stretched back to before 1776, date of the official rejection of Europe by the "new world". Despite the massive wound inflicted by the American Civil War during the 1860s by 1918, American strength was sufficient to help win the First World War and then dictate the main terms of the peace in Europe. The highpoint of American pride and European submission arrived in 1945, a US-led military victory subsequently reinforced by French and British humiliations in Dien Bien Phu, Algeria and Suez between 1954 and 1962.

The tables were turned when the United States was unable to enforce its will in Vietnam, and had to accept defeat, to the delight of many European intellectuals and their students. This American reverse was a sign of "imperial overstretch". There were other signs during the 1970s: devaluation of the US dollar, a thaw in the Cold War, and US defense cuts in Europe.

11 See Elias, 1983; also Smith, 2001.

Sclerosis. To summarize with a nod towards Hegel, the cathartic experience of ghastly all-out war in the 1940s established the EU's initial "thesis": that is to say, it created a general yearning for peace, stability and prosperity. The "antithesis" arrived soon afterwards: the post-war genesis of a friendly club where old adversaries settled down to cozy deal making. During the 1970s, the "synthesis" reared its head in the form of "Eurosclerosis", a term invented in 1985 by Herbert Giersch, the leading German economist.

Sclerosis, or hardening of institutional tissue, was the "other side" of conflict avoidance, that European desire for peace at all costs. To put it another way, European politicians, businesspeople, professional groups and trade unions preferred to buy their way out of trouble rather than change their ways. As a result they lost their flexibility and capacity to adapt. This did not seem serious during the long economic boom that followed the war. But that boom was over by the early 1970s. It then became clear that peace and stability were no longer delivering the steady upward curve in living standards for the many that had been enjoyed in previous decades.

Giersch pointed out in 1985 that European nations were facing many rising costs: from raw materials, energy, welfare-state expenditures, and the demands of vested interests. Meanwhile, unemployment was increasing, and growth rates were falling: from over four percent a year in the 1960s to less than two percent in the early 1980s.¹² How could these problems be overcome? By releasing human inventiveness in the new "information society"; and by lowering taxes, public expenditure, wages, rents and trading barriers.

The European Commission was very sympathetic to this analysis, which was widely accepted in intellectual circles. The Single European Act of 1986 was a big move towards opening up trade within the EU.¹³ But this opening was not followed up systematically at the time. Brussels was knocked off course by two massive events, whose effects are still being felt.

One of these was the creation of a vast reservoir of private and public borrowing capacity, fuelling and funding the ambitions of politicians and consumers. A key moment was the "big bang" (1986), which opened up the City of London to American finance houses, making available a large amount of credit across Europe and beyond. The explosive energy of deregulated finance put abundant credit in the hands of governments and private consumers: a real bonanza.

This rich flow of credit allowed governments to keep taxation lower than otherwise and let citizens supplement their wages with what Gillian Tett (Tett, 2009) has called

12 Giersch, 1985:1. See <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48070> (consulted September 10th 2013).

13 The explicit objective of this act was to increase the degree of harmonisation and competitiveness within the EU.

“fool’s gold”, the loan facilities made available in the world of shadow banking. The bottom line was this: there was *no* bottom line. Additional credit could always be leveraged into existence, or so it seemed. This reduced the pressure on European governments, businesses and vested interests to address seriously their own inefficiencies and rigidities.

The second massive event was the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, which meant the end of the Cold War and, amazingly, the re-unification of Germany, a happening few people born in 1945 had expected to see in their lifetime.

Europe since 1989: hubris, nemesis, crisis

This brings us to the second sequence in our account of the European Union’s career. Much of Europe’s political dynamism after 1989 came from the urgent need to cope with the question of German reunification, which threatened to bring back to life old political alignments and divisions. France and Britain were both opposed to this change in the status of their old enemy. Would they withdraw from the EU and draw much closer together in a new *entente cordiale*? If that happened, would a Germany confronting rejection eventually seek a powerful new partner in the East, as in the days of the Rapallo treaty (1922) between Berlin and Moscow?¹⁴ Would Europe be divided once more, facing a new threat of conflict and disruption, even war?

Avoiding these potential outcomes meant drawing the new Germany deep inside the European project, making it thoroughly committed to the project’s success. It also meant making that project more substantial, harnessing more resources and promising greater rewards to all. To swallow a big and ambitious Germany, the EU had to be still bigger and yet more ambitious.

Confronting these challenges set in motion yet another quasi-dialectical sequence, one in which hopes and ambitions raised in the initial phase of *hubris* were contradicted by disappointments in the phase of *nemesis*, producing a clash of expectations and experience that led to resentment, anxiety and disappointment in the culminating phase of *crisis*.

Hubris. Before 1989, the EU was poised between the state-heavy regimes of the USSR and Eastern Europe and the market-heavy regime of the United States. This balance of influence on its borders was complemented by the balance of power within the EU. Business and government remained in perpetual, though covert, struggle, neither having the upper hand, each trying to gain benefits from the other without giving too much away in return. The European Commission in Brussels was used to being pushed from

14 On the Rapallo Treaty, see Salzman, 2012.

both sides. A large number of business lobbyists were near at hand, constantly making policy suggestions. But the salaries of the Brussels bureaucracy were drawn from funds provided by national governments that had to justify that spending to their own voters.

After 1989 business lobbyists and consultants from the West swarmed across central, eastern and south-eastern Europe, promoting packages for providing healthcare, education, management services and other functions to help fill the large vacuum left by the wholesale collapse of state socialist administrations. The early 1990s also saw a steady rise in the popularity of the ideology of “globalization”, usually meaning a business-led drive for capitalist efficiency, high profits and maximum transparency within a transnational marketplace.¹⁵ In other words, the balance between government and business shifted strongly towards the latter in the EU’s hinterland.

The Maastricht Treaty (1993) tried to maintain the pre-1989 state of approximate balance between state and market but it raised the bar on both sides of this equation. On the one hand, the creation of monetary union (the Euro) demanded unprecedented strictness in national budgetary discipline, including limitations on public spending; this would hopefully please the markets. On the other hand, the Maastricht social chapter drew upon a strong ideal of social citizenship, envisaging all citizens having equal access to decent housing, educational opportunities, affordable health care, and a reliable safety net to minimize the suffering caused by unemployment, infirmity and other forms of vulnerability. Meanwhile, the Copenhagen criteria (1993) for new member states required them to implement democracy, enforce the rule of law, protect minorities, and maintain robust market economies.¹⁶ These measures would hopefully please the voters, not least in would-be member states.

The EU set itself a very ambitious target: to be a disciplined and dynamic business-friendly economy; to be a post-humiliation polity for citizens, not just for governments; to build appropriate structures and systems to achieve these objectives; and to do all this while expanding its membership, bringing in as many as possible of the countries “released” by the crumbling of the “socialist bloc”. For a while, it seemed to be working. Between 1995 and 2007 the EU took in fifteen new members. Meanwhile, the aches and pains of Eurosclerosis were being eased by the reduction of internal trade barriers and the flow of profitable business stimulated by easy credit.

15 See, for example, Smith, 2006.

16 The criteria for eligibility to join the EU were laid down at the meeting of the European Council at Copenhagen in June 1993. For more details see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (consulted March 30th 2013). The social charter covered areas such as gender equality, health and safety, the rights of migrants, the treatment of vulnerable groups and rights of association and collective bargaining. As is well known, special provision had to be made for the UK government which had strong reservations about accepting these obligations.

If the word “hubris” comes to mind with reference to the EU in the 1990s, it surely applies even more to the United States during the same period, the decade of the first Gulf war, the Dayton Accord, the “Washington Consensus”, and the increasingly routine use of the phrase “American Empire”.¹⁷ America’s equivalent of Rudyard Kipling, the man who explained British imperialism to the masses, was Thomas Friedman, the author of *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Friedman, 2000). This best seller, full of zoological analogies, was globalization’s version of *The Jungle Book* (Kipling, 2013). Basically, he implied, America was destined to be the Lion King. Other nations had to find their place in the global jungle’s pecking order as best they could.¹⁸

Nemesis. Arrogant ambition met its retribution. That at least was the message conveyed by Osama bin Laden when he took credit for 9/11. He declared that America, leader of the West, was being punished in revenge for the humiliation being endured by Islam in the Middle East.¹⁹ The subsequent history is too well known to need detailed description. We can skip over the failure of Washington to win United Nations backing for its war against Iraq, opposed by both France and Germany. The most important fact about the few years after 2001 is that in spite of its hi-tech weaponry the American government failed to show it could get its own way, politically, in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan. This created an impression of US weakness and lack of direction.

That perception of American weakness overflowed into the financial sector. The summer of 2008 was spent negotiating with the Iraqis about the date of US troop withdrawal and later that year the US government agreed to talks with the Taliban who were still busily engaged in violent acts across Afghanistan.²⁰ Lehmann Brothers collapsed on September 15th 2008, a few weeks before a US presidential election that was likely to propel into the White House an untried, unknown newcomer called Barack Obama who, unlike the previous eight presidents, had not previously served as either vice-president or state governor. It is not unreasonable to suggest that miserable aftermath of these American-led wars plus Obama’s lack of a track record were major background factors that contributed to the loss of financial confidence in September 2008, triggering the precipitate collapse of the vast international mountain of debt – and the Eurozone crisis.

17 See, for example, Bacevich, 2002.

18 On Friedman see Smith, 2006: 88–90, 154–7.

19 For his words see Smith, 2006: 21–2.

20 See, for example, <http://www.mapreport.com/years/2008/countries/afghanistan.html> and <http://www.cato.org/download/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policy-makers/2009/9/hb111-49.pdf> (consulted September 15th 2013). The talks were announced in October 2008 after consultations with Afghan and Pakistani officials. See *France 24*, 28 October 2008 at <http://www.france24.com/en/20081028-kabul-islamabad-agree-talks-with-taliban-afghanistan> (consulted September 15th 2013).

Crisis. One element of the EU has *not* been in a critical condition during the few years after 2008: the role of the Euro as a reliable international currency. That has not been weakened. This reflects the confidence (so far) of major currency holders that the top priority of the European Central Bank and the European Council is to prevent the Eurozone from breaking up.

The crisis is to be found elsewhere: in the member states, institutions and social groups forced to bear the collateral damage incurred in the (so far) successful operation to save the Euro and the Eurozone. Not least, it is to be found on the households of the millions of Europeans who have been thrown into unemployment, forced into less secure employment, and required to accept the prospect of smaller pensions, lower standards of healthcare and reduced social rights.

It all began when banks on both sides of the Atlantic suddenly stopped lending to each other, taking massive amounts of liquidity out of the system almost overnight. In response, many creditors called in their existing loans to institutions and individuals. Many mortgages were foreclosed. This banking “strike” set up a chain reaction. National governments stepped in where they could to recapitalize the banks, increasing their own national debts. In turn, the governments’ own creditors demanded cuts in public spending so these national debts could be reduced as soon as possible. So the banking strike produced a momentum towards government cut backs in the public sector. This process was dramatized by the protesters’ street theatre and the *troika’s* inquisitorial discourse accompanying bailouts, or threat of bailouts, in Greece, Spain and Italy.

The banking crisis humiliated the EU leadership, forcing it to request assistance from the IMF in 2010. The EU’s embarrassment became very public in 2012 when some of the world leaders at the G20 meeting in Mexico took evident delight in dismissing the request for help from their old European colonial masters. Some of the harshness of the bailout terms in Greece and Cyprus is surely due to the European Commission “passing downwards” the sting it received from global colleagues. Significantly, the Cypriot request for a bailout, only granted on ferociously punishing conditions, was made just a week after the Mexico meeting.²¹ However, also relevant is that the evident anger and dismay caused by extreme austerity measures in Greece helped the EU to win support from anxious voters throughout Europe for its fiscal treaty imposing mandatory budgetary discipline from above upon national governments in the Eurozone.²²

So far the crisis has bestowed three legacies. One is a rapid and radical centralization of surveillance and control by the European Commission and the European Central Bank

21 The G20 met on 18th–19th June 2012. The Cypriot bailout request was made on 25th June 2012.

22 For details, see www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/3/304649/stOotscg26_12.pdf (consulted September 30th 2013).

over the budgetary affairs of member states within the Eurozone. This is no small matter but it has been on the cards for some time and the crisis has had the “useful” effect of making it more politically acceptable than before. So now we have a powerful European Central Bank, the European Semester, the “six pack”, the “two pack”, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, the Fiscal Stability Treaty (all introduced 2010–12), as well as the European Stability Mechanism (October 2012), Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), and Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs).

The second legacy is the creation of a large amount of unemployment, especially among young people. They have experienced being overwhelmed, diminished, rejected and neglected; in other words, being victims of humiliation. The sense of degradation is intensified by memories of the EU’s promise to provide a post-humiliation polity for its citizens. Humiliation is a very dynamic process: it demands action to overcome a condition that is, by definition, unacceptable. We should expect the dynamics of humiliation to figure largely in European politics over the next few years.²³

To understand humiliation dynamics, which may be destructive and subversive, politicians would do well to put down their Hayek and pick up their Hašek. The “good soldier” Švejk, the Czech anti-hero of Jaroslav Hašek’s novel, was a reluctant private in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I. He used his intelligence to disrupt, and laugh at, the pretensions of a sclerotic society, one which treated him with contempt and which he, in return, thoroughly disliked. The age of Hašek is returning as more reluctant recruits are forced into the regiments of the precariate and the unemployed. The “Švejkian” techniques of institutional and ideological sabotage – sit-ins, tent cities, ad busting, culture jamming and so on – are being deployed by Occupy Wall Street, 5MS, 15M and others.

There is also a third legacy. The crisis has reshaped the European political map, bringing to the surface subterranean tensions within and between Europe’s political and business elites. How does the new political map look?

II

High priests, puritans, cavaliers and buccaneers

Europe. The original European marriage between France and West Germany – symbolised by the famous de Gaulle/Adenauer kiss in 1963 – was based on mutual respect and tolerance between the state-focused *dirigisme* of Paris and the greater willingness of

23 See Smith, forthcoming.

Germany, especially under Ludwig Erhard, to let business, and finance have their head, albeit in a socially responsible way.²⁴

Half a century later, in the wake of the crisis, a sharp distinction has appeared within a greatly enlarged EU between two types of political economy, both of which are heavily represented. On one side of the dichotomy are elites and states (such as Germany and the UK) in which the voice of “the market” is held to be the main arbiter of politico-economic behaviour. On the other side there are elites and states (such as Italy and Greece) in which political leaders and government officials emphasise that their main duty is to serve “the people” and protect the interests of citizens rather than meet the demands of financiers. Crudely, we may identify these two types according to whether they give priority to big business (“the market”) or big government (“the people”).

The German and French approaches both exude pride and decency, although each is sometimes embarrassed by evidence of corruption. Each is also part of a wider spectrum. The high standards of French *dirigisme* have traditionally pervaded the bureaucratic culture of the European Commission, driving its standards, rules and procedures. However, in some parts of the EU the authority and influence of the state, acting in the name of the people, has sometimes been abused for clientelist purposes, allowing political leaders to build up extensive patronage systems and divert tax revenues towards schemes that benefit their friend at the expense of other groups.

Similarly, the atmosphere of strict probity and close adherence to proper procedures associated with the *Bundesbank* is in marked contrast to the culture of opportunism that has developed in other institutions in Europe, including some parts of the City of London. In the latter case, the emphasis of the workplace culture has not infrequently been upon the risk-taking capacity of the entrepreneur rather than the sanctity of the rules supposedly governing behaviour in the marketplace.

So, on each side of our dichotomy between elites oriented to big business (operating in “the market”) and those oriented to big government (serving “the people”), a further distinction may be made: between stern rule-enforcers and adventurous rule-benders. On the one hand, there are political leaders and business elites who take pride in the strict manner with which they stick to clear principles and formal rules. On the other hand, there are politicians and business folk who take a more flamboyant and adventurous approach, with greater tolerance towards rule-bending while generally, of course, trying to stay inside the law. Deliberate deception on a large scale is not unknown, either in the realm of big business (witness the LIBOR scandal) or the realm of

24 Ludwig Erhard was West German Chancellor 1963–6, having been Vice Chancellor 1957–63, and Minister for Economics 1949 to 1963.

big government (witness the alleged doctoring of Greece’s budgetary record before that country’s entry into the Euro).

In fact, we can discern four types of elite. First there are the *high priests*. For example, a rigorous rule-enforcing governmental approach can be found in Brussels, where the European Commission’s bureaucracy is very keen to maintain a high reputation for competence and probity.²⁵ Then there are the political *cavaliers*, virtuosos of crowd-pleasing adventurism. In this field we may look to Italy, Romania and Hungary, all widely regarded as prominent examples of political clientelism.

Figure 1: Struggles and collaborative relationships in the EU (post 2008)

HIGH PRIESTS (European Commission)	→ cooperation ←	PURITANS (Ordo-liberals)
↓ rivalry ↑	↘ ↙ hostility and alienation ↗ ↖	↓ rivalry ↑
CAVALIERS (Political clientelism)	→ cooperation ←	BUCCANEERS (Neo-liberals)

On the other side of the dichotomy, we also have two tendencies. One of these consists of the rigorously punctilious *puritans*, prominently represented by the ordo-liberals in Frankfurt and Berlin. Finally, profit-seeking big business and finance has its *buccaneers* whose main preoccupation is the practical success of the entrepreneurial trader rather than

25 A recent blog noted “that the entrance exams for EU officials are tougher than those for most national civil servants. The language skills required also deserve a premium wage. And the level of complexity in crafting policies palatable to all 27 member states is quite unique”. However, high pay and a reputation for arrogance make the bureaucracy vulnerable to criticism. Dean Carroll, “The EU ‘gravity train’ in Brussels – fact or fiction?”, <http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/editor-blog/211/the-eu-gravity-train-in-brussels-fact-or-fiction> (consulted March 30th 2013).

obsessive observance of correct market protocol. The most prominent European base of this approach is London. Examples of this tendency have allegedly sometimes appeared in the extensive media empire under the ultimate control of Rupert Murdoch.²⁶

Four political struggles are currently under way within the EU (see figure one). One is between the puritans (notably the ordo-liberals in Germany) and the cavaliers (especially the Greeks). However, equally outspoken has been a confrontation between the buccaneers in the City of London, and the European Commission's high priests led by Mr Barroso. Both struggles have an ideological dimension; world-views are at stake. They are both somewhat visceral: many German "puritans" have a strong and fixed opinion that all Greeks (even all "Southerners") are lazy and untrustworthy, while London's buccaneers are apt to be enraged by the determination of Brussels to stifle enterprise, as they see it. In both cases, the other side is regarded, or so it often seems, as being incorrigibly wicked.

Two other struggles are also under way. Many Frankfurt traders would really like to win business from the UK and make the City of London play by their rules. Finally, a little-noticed battle is under way between Brussels and cavalier leaders such as the prime ministers of Hungary and Romania who are both keen to remodel their countries' constitutions in favour of their own parties and patronage networks.

Taken together these cross cutting conflicts have a paradoxical effect: they produce a kind of stability, even if it inhibits the development of anything approaching "ever-closer union". Furthermore, these conflicts are complemented by two key partnerships across the government/market frontier. One of these is one between the bureaucratic high priests of Brussels and the market-oriented puritans in Berlin, lined up behind Mrs Merkel, both sharing the task of disciplining the Eurozone. The other type of partnership, equally pragmatic, facilitates mutually convenient arrangements between cavaliers and buccaneers. These allow oligarchs to thrive and privatization to flourish across central Europe.²⁷

So where does that leave us? The aggregate result is a European Union in which the complex to-and-fro of visceral conflict and pragmatic cooperation between elites produces a noisy and frustrating stasis. The EU is currently stuck in a rut. This makes a nasty all-out confrontation across some kind of metaphorical common "firing line" within the EU highly unlikely. It also raises a barrier against fragmentation of the EU and/or Eurozone, without ruling that out completely.

26 Following accusations that newspapers controlled by the Murdoch interest had been improperly hacking into mobile phones, Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, were summoned to appear before a British parliamentary committee in July 2011.

27 See Eric Best, "Five families that rule Czech Republic", 23 May 2012, *Aktualne.cz*, <http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=746021> (consulted 30th March 2013); Donald Blinken, "Privatization helps", 31 July 2011, *Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-blinken/privatization-helps-the-h_b_914383.html (consulted March 30th 2013).

Most serious of all, despite recent institutional innovations in the EU that increase centralized surveillance and discipline, the continuing low level of trust between member states inhibits serious movement towards internal reforms that would sharply increase economic growth, reduce high unemployment, improve wage levels and restore lost ground in the realm of social rights.²⁸

The most effective way forward would be to overcome the structural incongruities between the EU's two political economies, one focused on the rights of property in the market place, the other promising to protect human rights within a democratic polity, and both currently ridden with hypocrisy and corruption. At the moment the high priests and the puritans have the upper hand but the cavaliers and buccaneers remain too strong to be disciplined effectively.

How do we make forward movement? It may help in thinking about this if we first step back very briefly and compare our situation as Europeans after 2008 with that of Americans after 1857.

America. Observers have been struck by similarities between the bank panics of 2008 and 1857.²⁹ In both cases, these panics were both instigated by the banks themselves, trying to protect their capital in the wake of a speculative boom fed by easy credit. The bank strikes were followed by widespread bankruptcies and public disorder both in the United States (1857) and Europe (2008). In 1857 Karl Marx, working as a journalist, even thought that the crisis in that year marked the beginning of the catastrophic world recession he was hoping for and he quickly set about writing what became his *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1973).

As in Europe a century and a half later, the sudden decline in liquidity led to a sharpening of socio-political divisions.³⁰ Again, as in Europe later, this occurred in the wake of a substantial expansion in the size and complexity of the Union. Each accession produced a spasm of uncertainty, as implications for the existing balance of power were considered. The United States, originally thirteen in number,³¹ added twenty-one new

28 See, for example, Martin Wolf "Why the euro crisis is not yet over", *Financial Times*, 20th February 2013, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/74acaf5c-79f2-11e2-9dad-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=crm/email/2013220/nbe/Analysis/product#axzz2LQW3Hiub> (consulted February 15th 2013).

29 For example, Riddiough, 2012 (<http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:bisbpc:64-03>; consulted 30th September 2013); Panitch and Gindin, 2011; see also Marini, 2005 at <http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/3366/2/marini-1857.pdf> (consulted 30th September 2013).

30 James L Huston (Huston, 1987) has argued that political reactions to the 1857 crisis in the United States, especially in the "keystone state" of Pennsylvania, helped the Republicans win the 1860 presidential election, leading to Southern secession and the civil war. However, the details of that particular argument are less important at this point than the balance of political and economic forces that prevailed immediately before the civil war.

31 The original thirteen were Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.

states in the seventy years after 1791, increasing the number of “voices” in the council chamber by a factor of 2.6.³² The European Union, originally six participants, also gained twenty-one new members in the fifty-seven years after 1960, a bigger proportionate increase (4.5) in a shorter period (see figure two).

Figure 2: USA and EU

	I: Foundation	II: Expansion
USA	The Original Thirteen 1776-91	1791-03: +4
		1812-21: +7
		1821-37: +2
		1845-61: +8
		1791-1861: +21
EU	The Original Six 1951-60	1960-86: +6
		1995: +3
		2004: +10
		2007: +2
		1960-2007: +21

Figure three is a tentative attempt to see how the categories of high priests, puritans, cavaliers and buccaneers might apply to elites in antebellum America, and how those elites related to each other. Broadly speaking, the southern planters and their political leaders asserted that individual states were sovereign powers – their “big government” – and that American law protected their rights to own slaves as private property. They staked their honour on maintaining these principles, and some of their representatives, the so-called “fire-eaters”,³³ were prepared to take violent and cavalier action to defend them.³⁴

32 The twenty-one new states were Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, Florida, Texas, Iowa, Wisconsin, California, Minnesota, Oregon, and Kansas.

33 The “fire eaters”, mainly lawyers, some with military backgrounds, were radical secessionists. See, for example, Walther, 1992.

34 One “fire-eater”, Laurence M Keitt, started a brawl in the House of Congress in 1858, involving about fifty representatives which broke out when he physically attacked Galusha A Grow, a radical republican (See <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=O45/llcgO45.db&recNum=666> ; consulted 30th September 2013). The Southerners’ confidence in claiming to know best as “high priests” of constitutional interpretation, so to speak, may have been strengthened by the fact that seven out of America’s first ten presidents came from the South, though the run of southerners was broken after the tenth, Zachary Taylor (1848–50), died in office.

By contrast, capitalist entrepreneurs in trade, industry and large-scale engineering were the dominant driving force of Northern life by the 1850s. Big business was king. Abraham Lincoln, a Republican railway lawyer from Chicago, was their candidate. David Donald, a Lincoln biographer, captured the buccaneering spirit of Lincoln’s backers in his “translation” of their programme in 1860. They expected Lincoln, if elected to “enact a high protective tariff that mothered monopoly, to pass a homestead law that invited speculators to loot the public domain, and to subsidize a transcontinental railroad that afforded infinite opportunities for jobbery” (Donald, 1961: 106).

Within the Republican Party, the “buccaneers” were in coalition with the “puritans” who in this case were the Northern abolitionists dedicated to eliminating slavery as a way of enforcing not only human rights but God’s divine law.³⁵ The pattern of cooperation and conflict between these four elites is summarized (and, of course, over-simplified) in figure three.

Figure 3: Struggles and collaborative relationships in antebellum US

HIGH PRIESTS (Southern planter elite)	← →	PURITANS (Northern abolitionists)
↓ cooperation ↑	hostility and alienation	↓ cooperation ↑
CAVALIERS (“fire-eaters”)	← →	BUCCANEERS (Northern big business)

The disposition of forces shown in figure three (antebellum US) did not make outright conflict inevitable but surely made it much more likely than the complex pattern presented in figure one (EU post 2008). As we know, slavery was abolished, opening up Afro-Americans to new forms of oppression: discrimination in the North, Jim Crow laws

35 John Brown, who attempted to start a slave insurrection in 1859, was an extreme abolitionist as well as a devout Protestant. See, for example, Reynolds, 2006.

and lynching in the South. Despite the brief experiment of Reconstruction, the sequence of experiences handed out by the North to the South was to be, in turn, overwhelmed, diminished, rejected and neglected, all adding up to sustained humiliation: ironically, a similar sequence to that currently being experienced by Europe's unemployed millions in Spain, Greece and elsewhere.

However, there is major difference between the post-bellum American South and the post-2008 European South. In America, freed slaves and poor whites alike confronted a powerful, solid and determined Northern establishment. This establishment was united in its commitment to expansion of business enterprise at all costs and equipped with the air of sanctity bestowed by victory in a puritan crusade against wicked cavaliers and heretical high priests. By contrast, the victims of the recent EU crisis face a European establishment that is divided and locked in internal conflict. In these circumstances, what might the future hold?

III

Conclusion

Three possibilities loom up before us. I will take them in order of attractiveness, leaving till last the most agreeable option, which is also, of course, the most difficult to achieve. The first possible future is both unpleasant and moderately likely. It is that the Eurozone and, more generally, the EU, will become an arena of resentment and revenge, a climate that could lead, at worst, to a process of secession and fragmentation. Bear in mind that at the age of at least sixty-two (taking 1951 as the start date), the EU is already much older than the German Empire (1870–1918) which was forty-eight years old when it died and nearly as old as the USSR (1917–1991) when it breathed its last in its early seventies. Is the EU living on borrowed time?

Consider the possibility that SYRIZA may enter government after the next Greek parliamentary election. A very sizeable minority within the ranks of SYRIZA's activists is prepared to consider leaving the Eurozone. Meanwhile, in the UK, between a third and a half of MPs in the Conservative party, currently the largest in the House of Commons, would support Britain leaving the EU. Would such defections start a trend of dissatisfied voters in other countries demanding exit? This is not entirely impossible if popular hostility to immigrants became so great that throughout Europe voters demanded a return to strong national border controls.

In practice, the most pervasive form of alienation is found in the relationship between politicians and ordinary citizens. Many voters choose to give their support to entertaining anti-politicians such as Beppe Grillo and Nigel Farage, leader of UKIP. This

widespread political apathy keeps most citizens outside parliamentary politics for most of the time. This may play a role in keeping secession off the official agenda in most member states.

Turning to the second possibility, a more likely future, and only slightly less worrying, is that in the wake of austerity business lobbyists in national capitals and in Brussels will press hard to ease the way for corporate capital to invest heavily in services traditionally provided by government in the public sector: for example, healthcare, education, child-minding, care of the elderly, and postal services. At the same time they are likely to lobby for a lowering of standards (“less bureaucracy”), which will mean lower costs and higher profits but worse services and a dilution of social rights.

Western and Southern Europe after 2008 may well become like Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after 1989: a vast region in which insecurity and the threat of impoverishment increase as politicians cease to take responsibility for the welfare of their citizens, a place where businesses can gather up customers for their privatized services. If this happens, the balance of influence between government and business will have shifted so far towards the latter that the EU’s “unique selling proposition”, the approximate equality it maintain between the state and the market, will have ceased to exist. It is still not clear whether the terms of the proposed free-trade agreement between the EU and the United States will accelerate the shift of influence away from government towards big business, but that is, perhaps, not an unlikely outcome.

The third possibility, the most attractive but also the most challenging, is that citizens may be brought to recognize that big business is acquiring increasing influence and control over their lives while their own influence through the workings of national parliamentary democracy is being gradually reduced. Non-voters or anti-voters should be reminded that in parliamentary democracies governments still ultimately act “in the name of the people”. It is voters who produce political legitimacy when they express their will, in elections and sometimes on the streets. As the creators of that legitimacy, for the present at least the people continue to have a very powerful “producer interest”, one that abides even when industries collapse and trade unions decay.

Meanwhile, the constitutional lawyers invoked by Habermas should be encouraged to frame legislation that requires buccaneers to yield up a greater proportion of their immense profits to the state, while also ensuring that cavaliers accept responsibility to look after the interests of all citizens, not simply their followers. This is a serious challenge but it would be a very worthwhile implementation of the “civilizing” effect that Habermas argues is an important aspect of constitution making. It would be a positive move in the direction of reducing the structural contradictions between big government and big business that are a major cause of sclerosis within the European economy.

If citizens and law makers were mobilized in this way, the socio-political climate would hopefully become much more propitious than at present for the cosmopolitan social contract between European governments envisaged by Ulrich Beck. We could then look forward with greater optimism to the development of a vibrant transnational democracy, providing protection and support to all citizens within a framework of European solidarity.

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Avgust Lešnik

Historical sociology in the eyes of Dennis
Smith

*All sociology worthy of the name
is “historical sociology”.*
C. Wright Mills (1959: 146).

It was within the framework of the European project Jean Monnet European Module, which is being carried out at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana (2012–2015), that eminent British sociologist professor Dennis Smith gave a talk on 23 April 2013. Through his lecture “How to explain the crisis of the EU”, a most relevant issue that hinders the current European project was approached from a position of historical sociology. In this context let me recall that professor D. Smith is the author of the reference work *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (1991), which was in 2011 published also in Slovenian translation (*Vzpon historične sociologije*) by Studia humanitatis. Therefore, this essay on the guest lecture is primarily focused on the scientific contribution of professor D. Smith in the field of historical sociology.

Professor Dennis Smith (1945) is considered one of the most renowned names of historical sociology and one of its founders. After studying modern history at the University of Cambridge and later sociology at the London School of Economics, he lectured at Aston Business School and at the departments of social sciences at the University of Leicester and Loughborough University. Up until recently he was editor of the respected journal *Current Sociology* (2002–2010) and Vice-President of the European Sociological Association. Today, after retirement, he holds a title of Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the Loughborough University and is still highly active and continues to be involved in many international projects and field research in historical sociology, social theory, globalization and modernization. He has collaborated with many universities, academies and institutes around the world.¹

I.

As he published his book *The Rise of Historical Sociology* in 1991 (Slovene translation followed in 2011), D. Smith explained that it is “part of a larger project”. After publishing a historical comparison of the processes of formation of social classes in two English cities (Birmingham and Sheffield) entitled *Conflict and Compromise* (1982), he decided

¹ Harvard University; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; Institute of Social-Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; University of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa); Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research (Sweden); Rhodes University (South Africa); University of Silesia (Poland); Gothenburg University (Sweden); University of Zaragoza (Spain); American University of Beirut University; Institute of Sociology at Graz University (Austria), Higher School of Economics, Moscow; etc. In addition, he has carried out field research in Turkey, Cyprus, Mexico, Singapore, India, South Korea, and other parts of Europe. More at: <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/socialsciences/staff/dennis-smith.html>.

to upgrade his research with a similar transatlantic comparison, which would focus on Birmingham and Chicago.

I soon discovered that this meant coming to terms with the fact that approaches to (for example) the city, the state, capitalism, democracy, human nature and power differed greatly between the two societies. As a result I have spent some time trying to make sense for myself of intellectual tendencies within the western liberal tradition, especially the American and British variants.

This has resulted in studies of Barrington Moore (Smith, 1983) and the Chicago school of sociology (Smith, 1988) and, of particular relevance here, a book entitled *Capitalist Democracy on Trial: The Transatlantic Debate from Tocqueville to the Present* (Smith, 1990). Like the present work, it tries to identify the unfolding logic and lines of convergence and divergence within a debate central to the western liberal tradition and to locate this debate within its historical and political contexts (Smith, 1991: ix-x).

After the publication of *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (1991), D. Smith wrote the following books: *Zygmunt Bauman: Prophet of Postmodernity* (1999); *Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory* (2001); *Globalization: The Hidden Agenda* (2006), and a number of attention-grabbing studies published in sociological journals (*Current Sociology*, *Sociological Review*, etc.). His work is without doubt an indispensable reference for all scientists and researchers of the historical development of social structures and the historicity of social phenomena.

II.

The question – what is historical sociology? – indeed seems elementary at the first sight, but given that the Slovenian environment doesn't comprise many texts that deal with historical sociology as a scientific discipline,² it is certainly in place. D. Smith responds to this question: [Historical sociology] is presented as a discipline which tries to make sense of the past (and present) by investigating how societies work and change (Smith, 1991: ix).

At its best, historical sociology is rational, critical and imaginative. It looks for the mechanisms through which societies change or reproduce themselves.

2 Bright exceptions being the discussions: F. Zwitter, *Sociologija in zgodovina (Sociology and History)* (1938); L. Čarni, "O razmerju med sociologijo in zgodovino" (*On the Relation between Sociology and History*) (1969; 2012); W. Mommsen, "Sociološka zgodovina in historična sociologija (Max Weber)" (*Sociological History and Historical Sociology (Max Weber)*) (1990).

It seeks the hidden structures which frustrate some human aspirations while making others realizable, whether we appreciate it or not. This knowledge is well worth searching for. [...] The search for mechanism of social reproduction and transformation is closely related to a second concern. This is to explore the social preconditions and consequences of attempts to implement or impede such values as freedom, equality and justice (Smith, 1991: 1).

To oversimplify, historical sociology is the study of the past to find out how societies work and change. Some sociologists are “non-historical”: empirically, they neglect the past; conceptually, they consider neither the time dimension of social life, nor the historicity of social structure. Similarly, some historians are “non-sociological”: empirically, they neglect the way processes and structures vary between societies; conceptually, they consider neither the general properties of processes and structures, nor their relationships to acts and events. By contrast, historical sociology is carried out by historians and sociologists who investigate the mutual interpretation of past and present, events and processes, acting and structuration. They try to marry conceptual clarification, comparative generalization and empirical exploration (Smith, 1991: 3).

Smith thus defines the scientific interest of historical sociology as exploration and investigation of the mechanisms that could be subject to change in certain societies or their reproduction. One of its primary tasks is finding hidden structures (historicity of social structures is a fundamental preoccupation of historical sociology) that either block or support the realisation of human endeavour. This could be done either by resorting to the past or by linking the past with the present, especially when it comes to the questions of how certain societies function and what paths lead to their change. Historical sociology is closely related to historical comparative analysis of social processes and phenomena, wherein comprising two dimensions, space and time. Research work in this field includes the study of rules in certain societies, which reveal the differences and similarities in the societies’ development and notes the presence of different (or similar) effects and causal connections, as they appear in contemporary society.

Perhaps it is somewhat surprising to note that (modern) historical sociology as a new sociological discipline was thoroughly recognized and asserted at the prestigious international universities as a study and research subject “only” in the 1990s; in Slovenia however – at the Ljubljana Alma Mater (specifically at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts) – only in 2010 with the transition to the Bologna study

programme.³ We said “only”: namely, it is not to ignore the fact that the development and the content of sociology at its origins were decisively influenced by both philosophy and historiography.⁴ In this context, the founders of modern sociology are also regarded as the founders of historical sociology. In the words of C. W. Mills: “All sociology worthy of the name is ‘historical sociology’” (1959: 146). Therefore it is understandable that it took time for the new discipline (as a special sociology) to become profiled and independent in relation to history as well as to general sociology. A decisive step was made after 1960, when along the period of the second long wave (according to Smith), the rise of historical sociology with completely new topics began: “I have traced a number of themes running through historical sociology over the past few decades [...] like feudalism, the growth of cities, the rise and decline of agrobureaucratic states, class formation, nation-building and nationalism, citizenship, revolution and war” (Smith, 1991: ix).

III.

D. Smith has rightly stated that “historical sociologists can draw on a long tradition” (Smith 1991: 156). Therefore he classified the ups and downs faced by historical sociology in the course of its development into two long waves.

The first wave began in the mid-eighteenth century, in Britain and France especially. Like the second, it was driven by the need to make sense of contemporary political events. These presented a formidable intellectual challenge. [...] This first long wave – from Montesquieu and Hume, Tocqueville and Marx to Durkheim and Weber – finally crashed against the wall of totalitarianism, right and left, in the late 1920s. Regimes which “knew” the future and invented the past

- 3 At this point we should note that the field of historical sociology is not a tabula rasa for the sociological department at the Faculty of Arts; on the contrary, the department has always had both research and study tradition and affinity for historical sociological topics, both at the level of theory and analysis of key socio-political processes of 19th and 20th centuries. Let us recall only the works of prof. M. Britovšek, particularly his books *Razkroj fevdalne agrarne strukture na Kranjskem (Dissolution of Feudal Agrarian Structure in Carniola)* (1964), *Carizem, revolucija, stalinizem (Tsarism, Revolution, Stalinism)* (1980) and *Stalinov termidor (Stalin's Thermidor)* (1984), as well as studies of prof. L. Čarni, especially his work *Teorija formacij družbe (Theory of Formations of a Society)* (1979) and the studies on “Asiatic mode of production”; *Izbrani spisi (The Selected Essays)* of L. Čarni were published in 2012, holding a title *Obča in historična sociologija – Izvori sociološke misli na Slovenskem (General and Historical Sociology – The Origins of Sociological Thought in Slovenia)*. Also some published works by A. Lešnik (1994; 2000) and K. Vidmar Horvat (2009; 2012) represent this field.
- 4 The founders substantiated the need for a new “science of society” with the fact that philosophy (of history) and social sciences, primarily historiography, although they do offer partial views of the social order and its development, they do not provide a general, global insight into the laws of functioning and development of human society as a whole; and it is this insight that should be the task of the newly established sociology.

rejected historical sociology. [...] Historical sociology survived. The questions it had wrestled with did not go away. They were the central moral dilemmas of western liberalism. [...] During the 1950s, these issues became prominent once more. [...] By that time the second long wave was under way (Smith, 1991: 2).

Smith divides the long second wave into three phases; and notes that each phase was characterized by a specific combination of favourable political circumstances, and the distinctive atmosphere among historical sociologists.

The first phase, before the mid-1960s, was shaped by the battle with totalitarianism. [...] Key figures in this first phase were Talcott Parsons and T. H. Marshall, although the argument will also bring in Neil J. Smelser, S. N. Eisenstadt, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Reinhard Bendix (Smith, 1991: 4).

Marc Bloch and Norbert Elias became more widely known in the English-speaking world during the early 1960s. Their ideas contributed to the second phase, although its tone was mainly set by contemporary politics: especially, protest movements for student rights, Black power, and an end to the Vietnam war. [...] Historical sociology rediscovered domination, inequality and resistance movements. Key figures in this second phase were Barrington Moore and E. P. Thompson, although, once again, others will also be discussed, especially Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol. [...] The current of protest flowed on into the 1970s and 1980s, energized by the women's movement (ibid: 4–5).

The third phase overlaps the second. It began in the mid-1970s, under the impact of the fragmentation of the stable bi-polar world of the Cold War. In 1974 key works were published by Perry Anderson and Immanuel Wallerstein. [...] Anderson explored the East/West division in Europe from a fresh angle. Wallerstein produced a novel interpretation of relations between the First, Second and Third Worlds. Braudel brought back into focus the old trading networks linking Europe, the Americas and Asia. Mann worked on a canvas stretching from Mesopotamia to the Atlantic. Skocpol – whose work, like Tilly's, overlap the two phases – brought three revolutions (NB: French, Russian and Chinese), clearly separated by history, geography and ideology, into one interpretative framework. [...] Meanwhile, interest in methodology increased. [...] The same pattern was found in attempts to build grand theory (e.g. Randall Collins, W. G. Runciman, Anthony Giddens, Ernest Gellner) (ibid: 5–6).

Smith's substantiated division of the "second long wave" (post-war historical sociology) into three phases can be fully accepted as a reference. However, some

restraints should be considered with his proposed continual “first long wave”, stretching from the mid 18th century to the 1950s. Namely, most theorists who have dealt with historical sociology as an intellectual field – P. Abrams (1982), R. Aron (1971), L. Goldmann (1958), G. Gurvitch (1966), J. Kocka (1994), P. Veyne (1993) and others – consider that the history of historical sociology is mainly a record of the methodological dispute of sociology (nomothetic orientation) with history/historiography (idiographic orientation), or a record of the mere understanding and interpretation of historical and social developments. Smith (1991: 3) cites:

However: “The important lines of differences all across disciplines [and] [...] are substantive: they lie in the arguments put forward, which are inescapably, if not always systematically, theoretical” (Calhoun, 1987: 625). In fact, “there simply are no logical or even methodological distinctions between the social sciences and history – appropriately conceived” (Giddens, 1979: 230). History and sociology are “one single intellectual adventure” (Braudel, 1980: 69). The two disciplines may be integrated “as a single unified programme of analysis” (Abrams, 1982: xviii).

Following the communication flow between sociology and history in time and space shows that it would be more appropriate to divide Smith’s “first long wave” into two periods: 1. the challenge period (1820–1880): sociology as a theoretical history; 2. the crisis period (1880–1960): from sociology to history and towards sociology without history (see e.g., Antonić, 1995). The starting time point in this division is related to the formation of sociology as an independent scientific discipline.⁵ Smith is in this respect more “general”, since he places the beginning of the first long wave in the middle of the 18th century; we can agree with him. Namely, it should not be overlooked that we can talk about the emergence of sociology merely in formal terms, that is, from the standpoint of science classification; and before that only about the “prehistory” of sociological thought, because it developed (until its independence to an autonomous science in the first half of the 19th century) in the context of philosophy and some social sciences, particularly in political economy, political science and law. The need for a new social science (sociology) was based on the argument that philosophy (of history), historiography and other special social sciences offered partial views of the social order and its development, while a general, global insight into the laws of functioning

5 Auguste Comte, Saint-Simon’s secretary, in 1838 – in the 4th workbook of his essay *The Course of Positive Philosophy* (*Cours de Philosophie Positive*, Paris) – was the first to name the “science of society” as *sociology* (“social physics”), while Claude-Henri Saint-Simon is considered as the founder of modern sociology.

and development of a society as a whole was missing. Therefore, a more appropriate, supplemented internal division of the “first long wave” of historical sociology (which coincides with the history of sociological thought) is coming to the fore, namely a division into three phases: 1. “prehistory” of (historical) sociological thought (see Lešnik, 2010: 181–207); 2. affirmation of sociology as a scientific history at an early stage of sociological thought;⁶ 3. crisis in communication of sociology and history in the era of classical sociological thought (1880–1960).

Considering the fact that Smith’s translation is also the first systematic work on historical sociology as a sociological discipline in Slovenia, I (the undersigned under this text) sensibly complemented Smith’s “second long wave” – in the *Foreword* (“A Sketch for the History of Historical Sociology”) – with the problematic outline of the “first long wave”, specifically the second and third phase (Lešnik, 2011: 369–414).

IV.

The main research subject of Smith’s work is – as already mentioned – the issue of the rise of historical sociology as a discipline, which gets new momentum after World War II: “In 1940 historical sociology was on the verge of extinction. Fascism and Stalinism were deeply hostile to its critical perspective” (Smith, 1991: 1).

I argue that the post-war resurgence of this discipline, and successive phases of its growth, are related to changes in the broader political and ideological context. The text presents three successive phases, each characterized by a distinctive approach to democracy, capitalism, power and values within historical sociology (Smith, 1991: ix).

Through a systematic study of leading names in sociology and social sciences in the above-mentioned three phases Smith convincingly points to the convergence

6 Epochal social changes at the end of the 18th and early 19th century (the collapse of the ancien régime, the birth of constitutionalism, the processes of industrialization, deagrarisation, migration, urbanization, modernization, class stratification, etc.), caused and accelerated by social movements and revolutions (American anti-colonial, French bourgeois, English industrial), became not only the main focus of the then discourse of political elites and academic public, but also (co)created the objective conditions for the independence of “sciences of society” into an autonomous science, sociology. Historians of sociology in general agree that the establishment of (scientific) sociology should be attributed to three thinkers of the 19th century: Saint-Simon, August Comte and Karl Marx. These three were the first to link the research of social phenomena with modern scientific thinking, while also forming the first theories on the development of modern society, based on the historical study of past and contemporary societies. All three shared a common interest in social change, and they all made efforts to make practical use of their (social) knowledge; that was also the precise reason why they got engaged with socialism: the first is a known representative of the utopian socialism, the second earned the title of socialist “heretic” (conservative reformer), and the third is considered as the founder of scientific socialism.

of development of the discipline and socio-historical circumstances that frame the intellectual interest.

Eighteen historical sociologists have been considered at some length in this work – more precisely, thirteen sociologists (Parsons, Smelser, Eisenstadt, Bendix, Skocpol, Lipset, Moore, Wallerstein, Marshall, Runciman, Giddens, Mann and Elias), four historians (Thompson, Anderson, Bloch and Braudel) and one sociologist-cum-historian (Tilly). Although the selection has inevitable biases, the people and issues dealt with are central representing a strategically important part of historical sociology as an intellectual field, one which can be further explored as a way of increasing our understanding of this field (Smith, 1991: 156).

The specialty of Smith's methodological approach to dealing with the second long wave – which he co-created with his works (“In this book I develop a historical sociology of historical sociology itself” (ibid: ix)), is that he doesn't view the development of post-war historical sociology from the standpoint of “other” sciences (i.e., through the eyes of history, sociology, philosophy), which is the case with the first long wave, but he starts from historical sociology itself, which means that he observes it problematically and builds it through the analysis and comparison of the above-mentioned authors, specifically their fundamental works that have co-shaped the research field of (modern) historical sociology, including the methodology and theory.

Smith's contribution is therefore distinguished not only for its transparency in defining the development of historical sociology, but also for the critical analytical outline of the methodology of historical sociological research, since he combines sociological and historical epistemology: he combines the research of static structures and of the changing dynamics of movement, progress and change into one unified conceptual-theoretical apparatus. In this respect he contributes an important basis for the systematized research in social sciences and humanities, of phenomena, processes, trends and structures, which are, due to the different nature of their historical articulation, often difficult to present on a uniform methodological basis. With Smith's work, historical sociology certainly gains analytical rigor of a science and a conceptual-orderliness of a paradigm.

Therefore Smith's specific approach reflects the social role of a sociologist in the public articulation of meanings of change and development, of social dynamics, of conflicts and social experiment, especially when placing the debate into simultaneous streams of development of theories of nationalism, class struggle, capitalism, democracy and citizenship.

This mix of intellectual dynamism and popular attention gives historical sociology a great opportunity to make its mark on civic culture. Through their work, historical sociologists have the chance to give their fellow citizens knowledge and skills which may help them to assess competing views about what is “possible” or “impossible”. In brief, historical sociology can be a positive force for democratic citizenship (Smith, 1991: 1).

At the same time it should be noted that Smith’s contribution is already an integral part of the modern intellectual and academic discussion on society, history and progress in social sciences and humanities; and that his studies, including the work *The Rise of Historical Sociology*, are part of the category of fundamental works. Since Smith, with his precise and keen critical review of the rise of historical sociological thought from early modernity to the late 20th century, enables readers to understand and reflect upon the development of the science and its research apparatus, his works are a valuable study source for higher education programmes in social sciences and humanities.

Smith’s historical sociology is for sure – also thanks to its intellectual breadth and innovation in argumentation in social sciences and humanities – interesting not only to the scientific and professional public, but also to the general public, thus to the readers who try to think the social processes of the present in transhistorical and comparative perspectives. His lecture in Ljubljana only adds a new chapter to this topicality.

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Marko Kržan

What can historical sociology tell us about
the crisis of the EU?

A conversation with Prof. Dennis Smith

M. K.: The main topic of your research in the last years has been “humiliation”. Only weeks ago, Cyprus became the next nation to be “humiliated” as a consequence of the crisis of European integration. Moreover, there has been wide speculation in international media that Slovenia is about to follow. So it seems appropriate that our conversation focuses on how the EU, which was supposedly a “post-humiliation” political community that would ensure equality among the member states and social groups within them, is now becoming a place of downward displacement, as you define humiliation.

So this conversation might be split into three parts: first, it will focus on your book *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (1991) which was recently published in Slovene (Smith, 2011). Secondly, it will try to clarify the notion of humiliation as a sociological concept using the historical examples you have studied. Only then will we be able to comment on the current situation and to compare recent developments in the EU, UK and Slovenia.

Part I: Historical sociology 1990–2010

M. K.: Your book on the rise of historical sociology is a study of the leading historical sociologists of the first eight decades of the 20th century. In his afterword to the Slovene translation, Professor August Lešnik has written a short outline of the prehistory of the discipline, i.e. of the authors and theories that were developed in the 18th and 19th centuries. Could you make a similar outline of its most recent history? Who were, or are, the most prominent figures, what are their main objects of research and what are their most interesting/controversial findings?

D. S.: Thank you for your very interesting questions. May I start by saying a few words about the theme of socio-political displacement? For the past half-century or so, that theme has been rather kept in the shadows by the idea of social fluidity, which is another core metaphor in our thinking about the world. I’m referring to Hayek, Friedman (Milton and Thomas), Castells, Bauman, and Urry whose work focuses heavily on the role of the market in society: as an ever-present solvent, ointment and lubricant; motivating, mobilizing and mesmerizing; making networks, extending tentacles, supposedly generating the stuff of daily experience.

It is true there have been strong counter-tendencies, for example in women’s studies, studies of ‘race’, ethnicity and religion, migration studies and subaltern studies: all of which are examining displaced groups. However, their advocates have tended to stay in their own niches, doing excellent work but mainly talking to themselves. Also there have been other writers, often brilliantly original individual scholars (not the leaders or scions of “schools”) who have been examining socio-political displacement: for example, Elias, Schumpeter, Hirschman, Barrington Moore and, more recently, Amy Chua and Naomi Klein. But one major result of the faltering

of Western hegemony (if I can use that inadequate shorthand phrase) – especially after 9/11 and after the credit crunch in 2008 – is that the dynamics of displacement are becoming even more intellectually relevant, more interesting to more people, and more central to our shared debates across the disciplines.

In fact, fluidity and displacement are both widely present and they interact with each other in complex ways. For example, they co-habit in the work of Robert Park, in his analyses of intra-urban and international migration and settlement patterns. Likewise in *The Communist Manifesto*. On the one hand, we find Marx and Engels proclaiming that “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air ...”; this is a fluid or “liquifying” world. On the other hand, they depict a world of displacements: “The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry; the place of the industrial middle class by industrial millionaires, the leaders of the whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois ... The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, ... has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors” and so on (Marx and Engels, 1969: 51–2, 60).

Park and Marx both have powerful visions of forces at work within society and through history, which brings me to your question about the recent history of historical sociology, since the 1980s. I am going to take that question to include sociologically-minded historians as well as historically-minded sociologists (as I did in *The Rise of Historical Sociology* which was published in 1991). In my view the most significant works are those that step back from the West’s old taken-for-granted sense of its global superiority, now being so rudely shattered, and take a fresh look at the West in its global-historical context. Three books stand out for me. One is Clive Ponting’s *World History: A New Perspective* (2001). Ponting takes humankind since “the beginning” as his theme, incorporating the latest information available on our ecological, biological, demographic and socio-political career to the present. It is a “new readers begin here” type of book, using empirical information to portray a model of human life as embedded in a vast and complex flow which puts contemporary ideologies (relating to the latest 0.00001 per cent of human life) in their proper miniscule place. Jared Diamond’s *Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 years* (1998) links the zoological, epidemiological, geographical and socio-political aspects of human development in an even more challenging way. Diamond and Ponting helped create an intellectual climate more receptive to the highly innovative *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914* (Bayly, 2004) which traces the increasing interconnectedness of major societies in Europe, America and Asia, impacting equally upon institutions, identities and bodily practices.

Bayly's book intersects with another powerful flow driven by Giovanni Arrighi whose highly influential *The Long Twentieth Century* (1994) was followed by Adam Smith in *Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (2007). Both of these works are concerned with competing logics of historical capitalism, as is Kenneth Pomeranz's *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (2000). I would put this "economic" stream alongside Dominic Lieven's *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the Present* (2003) which looks at another equally important set of logics, more political and territorial. We are clearly in the sphere of displacement here (contests for place and advantage), and this arena of analysis also includes the work of Robert D. Kaplan, for example his recent *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate* (2012). This is a successor to his *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (2010), both as much about the past as the future and relating the two. This is a distinctively "American" perspective and an important part of the modern historical-sociological "mix".

Much more has been published, of course, but those are works that seem to me to be part of historical sociology's wave of the future.

Part II: "Humiliation" as a sociological concept

M. K.: Your recent work revolves around the concept of humiliation. It is important to note that you give it a precise sociological meaning, which can support more common psychological uses, and not vice versa. As a sociologist studying social structures and processes, you emphasize displacements of social groups of various types from their current or past position in those structures and processes. One type of displacement is downwards displacement, i.e. the loss of the former social position. This position is accompanied by certain reactions of the group considered, which you broadly term "humiliation". A group that is unable to restore its former position must cope with it somehow. Before turning to humiliation in our time, I would like to take our readers to a short walk through your itinerary as a researcher.

The first study that comes to mind is *Conflict and Compromise, Class Formation in English Society 1830–1914*. Could we describe this book as a story of a class struggle in the ideological state apparatuses (Althusser) which was a reaction to the displacement of a certain fraction of the landed classes – Anglican clergy – from their previous economic position? Could you make a short outline of the basic class dynamics behind the development of English education system in the 19th and 20th century? (I think it would be interesting to compare it with certain Slovenian experiences. Slovenians are a case of the German type of nation building where nation state was established after cultural nation. Slovenian case is even more radical than German, because local Slovenian elites were

dominated not only in the political, but also in economic sphere, a situation that lasted until radical decentralisation of socialist Yugoslavia in the early 1970s. Ideological state apparatuses, with education in their centre, became the main focus of class struggle.)

D. S.: Althusser's characterisation of education as the ideological state apparatus may well be accurate in certain limited situations – specific schools or systems, specific societies, specific periods – but a more general formulation would have to (a) reduce the formula to “ideological apparatus” (i.e., not necessarily state-driven), (b) recognise that education is, in many societies at many times, a site of perpetual struggle for advantage, (c) be quite precise about what the term “ideological” implied, since it is quite an elastic term. Anyway, having said that, my argument is that education was a site of competition between rural and urban-based hierarchies in mid-nineteenth century England, with religion being one dimension of a struggle that also stretched across politics, the professions and industry. I trace class conflict across these domains and argue that its dynamics were shaped not only by the articulation between city and countryside, but also by differences and changes in the relative salience of neighbourhood, city, county, region and the national level.

That is a very abstract summary but the way to that conclusion was by tracing the careers of hundreds of individuals through time and space within Birmingham and Sheffield, my two cities. This was a kind of historical anthropology. Over time, the city won out over the countryside at the regional level but the aristocracy (linked to the City of London) won out over the manufacturers at the national level. The existence of the British empire helped to boost the authority of the aristocratic-financial elites whose children were trained at public schools to administer the colonies rather than go into “degraded” occupations related to trade and industry. That last sentence describes an outcome that is so entrenched in British culture that its truly amazing and dysfunctional character still escapes proper attention.

M.K.: The second study would be *Barrington Moore: Violence, Morality and Political Change (1983)*. Moore is not a well known author in our parts, but the problems of modernization and the fate of the main classes of the rural society – peasants and landlords – are universal in the history of European countries. In our broader region, the transformation of agrarian society into an industrial one has taken place in the 20th century, much of it after the WWII. In fact, Yugoslavia might have been one of the countries where this process – defined as a process, in which the share of agrarian population is reduced from more than 70% to less than 50% – has been extraordinarily rapid. In Yugoslavia, it took less than 15 years, whereas it took 40 years in Italy, 80 years in France etc.

I think it is safe to say that most European sociologists have stopped thinking about agriculture, because of urbanization and shrinking of the share of agriculture in GDP's.

But this is an ethnocentric view: in fact, the transformation of Asian (and, to a lesser extent, African and South American) societies into urban (post) industrial societies forms a major part of what we call globalization. One of Moore's basic theses was that the reaction of peasantry and landed classes to mostly downward displacement determines the outcome of modernization. You have studied globalization extensively: could Moore's typologies and causal chains be used to explain what is happening in China, India?

D. S.: Barrington Moore's main books, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (1966), and *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (1978) were about the main participants in World War II – USA, Russia, Germany, England, France, China, Japan (plus India) – although Moore did not directly acknowledge this. Those countries have, to put it crudely, shaped the world after 1945, and Moore wanted to know their “inner workings”, how they had developed historically, and how those dynamics were to be understood, if possible as part of a single set of explanatory factors. He spent two or three decades on that problem, using careful comparative analysis, imaginative counterfactual procedures and steady, cumulative empirical inquiry as his tools. He is not much discussed anywhere, these days, but I keep encountering other members of a dispersed but loyal cohort of Moore enthusiasts as I travel around.

Moore was one of the scholars that set the standard for disciplined, scholarly and imaginative historical sociology in the post-war world, in my view. But to be more specific in answering your question, Moore's methodology, which I have just summarized, remains very relevant even if his specific causal chains have to be revised in a more globally-interconnected world; the point here being that Moore was not at his most insightful when dealing with inter-societal relations (for example, he was not really well tuned in to the implications of colonial relationships for British society although he could evidently see how it impacted on India). That being said, Moore's analysis would certainly alert us to the oppressive part played by local landowners in India, today as in the past, as well as the rebelliousness of Chinese peasant villages faced with an expropriating state trying to satisfy the land hunger of expanding cities. The Chinese situation is especially interesting. A couple of years ago I was in Chengdu (in Sichuan province) with a small party of Western visitors. We were taken on a visit to see “the new countryside” It was an area converted into picturesque parkland including a cultural theme park with an art gallery and coffee shop. No peasants around.

On reflection, this trip into the countryside was a little like a tour of World War I battle sites, now neatly covered with lawns and gift shops. I say that because my impression is that a battle royal has been underway between the Chinese peasantry, in whose name the revolution was undertaken, and the Party. The regime instructed the peasantry to stay in the countryside but they insisted on going to the city (and the

city came towards them, swallowing their villages). In the end, the regime has been forced into headlong industrialization and urbanization, bringing a rash of unintended consequences. In the middle of this confusion are the Party and the Peasantry (and their urbanized children), like a matador and a bull. It is not yet clear whose will is going to prevail. Incidentally, on an earlier visit, to Jinan, I was intrigued to notice that Spanish bullfights were a popular feature on local television stations.

M.K.: We have been talking about studies of macro processes, encompassing social classes, countries and even continents. But you have also done research at the micro level focusing on what was called capitalist restructuring in Britain during the 1980s. What were the effects of neoliberal politics, globalization and financialization on British manufacturing sector and the working class? We know that organized labour responded with the rise of trade union militancy, but it soon succumbed to the measures of the late Margaret Thatcher. How did British postindustrial society integrate the working class? (This is a very relevant point of comparison with Slovenia and other post-socialist countries. Their economies were built around a strong manufacturing sector, which was severely hit during so called “transition depression”. In the last twenty years, they have witnessed massive deindustrialization. Only some post-socialist countries managed to retain a strong and competitive industrial sector, Slovenia is one of them, but even here global liberalization of trade and the euro crisis enormously reduced employment in manufacturing sector, begging the obvious question whether surplus labour will be forced to long-term structural unemployment and emigration or become employed by other sectors.)

D. S.: A massive change whose social history (and historical sociology) as yet remains under-researched is the disintegration of local manufacturing neighbourhoods with their labour markets closely interconnected with networks of kin and neighbours. In Britain these neighbourhoods persisted into the 1970s and I had some personal experience of working in a Nottingham factory in the mid 1960s. The factory and neighbourhood cultures of those days have practically disappeared, and with them a whole apparatus of local social control – the “ideological neighbourhood apparatus” – if I might take the liberty of using such a phrase. Reintegration of the “orphans” of that factory/neighbourhood culture after the 1970s was managed through a culture that valued possession of a private family space (in which to protect and give expression to a household), consumption in fulfilment of aspirations largely shaped by advertising, and (for some) individualistic competition for upward mobility within organizational hierarchies offering increased status and income. This mode of integration depended to an increasing extent on the ready availability of credit, both private and public. The task of government was to ensure that citizens and consumers had continuing access

to the lifestyle just described. As this system has become less reliable in its operation (e.g., since 2008), governments have tried to exploit divisions between “hardworking families” and people on welfare benefits, and between locals and “immigrants”. The biggest single threat to continuing successful integration and cohesion within such societies is probably a continuing high level of youth unemployment, a situation now being reached in some countries, e.g., Spain. It is difficult to see a road ahead in such societies that does not include both riot and repression.

Part III: Humiliation and the crisis of the EU

M. K.: You have compared the responses to the sovereign debt crisis and humiliation in the countries that had to ask for international assistance, Ireland and Greece. All of the humiliated countries are peripheral countries. So I think one should approach them by using the concept of peripheral capitalism. Already in the 1960s, Samir Amin argued that the Third world economies should be studied differently than the developed ones. He coined the term peripheral capitalist formation opposing it to the capitalist mode of production in the centre. He saw that central capitalist formations are rather coherent units dominated by the capitalist mode of production, which enables sustained reproduction of the economy and class formation. In peripheral formations, capitalist mode of production is underdeveloped; it is not a dominant mode of production so it shares its “power” with precapitalist modes. It is not able to secure the unity and reproduction of the formation by itself, it has to rely on central capitalist formations, especially their capital investments, financial sector etc. This is reflected in the class structure: instead of capitalists, managers and workers we find precapitalist classes such as peasantry, quasi feudal gentry, bureaucracy, comprador bourgeoisie etc.

Now, my thesis would be that this is the case with peripheral EU member states as well, albeit in a less dramatic fashion. When each of those countries joined the EU at some point, it was underdeveloped in the structural sense, meaning that its capitalist sector was weaker in relation both to central capitalist formations and “non-capitalist” sectors. All of them had large agrarian populations; many of them had a typical structure of the agriculture with smallholdings, with peasants rather than capitalist farmers/tenants as the leading social class. Post-socialist states in particular had large state sectors when it comes to services, such as education, health care, but also utilities and construction. Those, I think, are the structural bases of notorious phenomena such as paternalism, clientelism, corruption. Short periods of growth fuelled by financialization and real estate business have hidden those structural differences in the EU, but they have re-emerged stronger than before. The processes hiding them actually made them worse and that is why periphery is no longer catching up with the core countries, not even in GDP growth terms.

Would you agree that humiliation in euro periphery could be explained as a combined result of (i) disillusionment that followed the economic bust and of (ii) the fact that those countries have actually been displaced downwards and might become even more so?

D. S.: I broadly agree with much of your description of what you call “peripheral” EU societies and this “periphery” would probably include large parts of Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal, as well as parts of Ireland. In my view, the implied core/periphery distinction is not so much an absolute dichotomy but a gradual shift from one to the other. France has both “core” and “peripheral” tendencies. There are tendencies towards paternalism, clientelism and corruption in all EU member states but some of them (e.g., Germany) have economic “engines” that are powerful enough to “carry” this weight. I agree with you that the sudden drying up of the large reservoir of credit produced by shadow banking (the heart of the recent “crisis”) has produced disillusionment, disappointment and displacement (or fear of displacement) – but I would add: not only in the periphery (however defined) but also in the core. Lenders are afraid of losing their money; borrowers fear not being able to repay, or renew, their loans.

The sense of downward displacement throughout the EU, and especially the Eurozone is, it seems to me, partly a consequence of the increased power, responsibility and authority of the centre in Brussels. The Eurozone is acquiring some of the characteristics of a proto-state, which involves the strengthening of bureaucratic hierarchies and a reduction of autonomy at the level of the “governed”, and this last category includes national governments. At the same time, in the relationship between government (legitimized by being an expression of “the people’s will”) and big business, including finance and the media (responding to the “dictates of the market”), the balance of power has been shifting towards the latter. The capacity of government to counteract the polarizing effect of the capitalist market is being undermined. This is another source of downward displacement, both within societies and between societies within the EU.

At the same time, some of those who contrast their situation with at least some of the EU’s immediate neighbours – poorer and potentially less stable – may well regard membership of the EU as a valuable asset. One of the (ironic) benefits of business elites’ determination to protect the integrity of the Euro and the Eurozone at almost all costs is that efforts (not successful at all times) are being taken to maintain a minimum level of political stability. Greece and Cyprus are not the best exemplars of this policy, of course. For small property owners, and those who intend to belong to this category, socio-political stability may be regarded as an asset, although it is liable to produce socio-political orders whose arrangements fall a long way short of delivering social justice. The real danger (or, for risk-taking optimists, the real opportunity) is that rising unemployment may eventually produce a large constituency of citizens sufficiently desperate to demand a change in the politico-economic system. As we know from North

Africa, the outcome of such a situation is not easy to predict and may not involve an increase of social justice.

M. K.: To conclude: I feel that the way this crisis has been handled will lead to even more differentiation not only within Europe, but also within the countries themselves. As sociologists – and contrary to the common practice of political scientists and politicians – we know that the subjects interacting in historical processes are not countries, but social classes in particular countries and their fractions. As far as they can, and as conscious as they are, those subjects try to manage international relations to their advantage. Relations between China and the US are a clear example: the Chinese bureaucracy and US big business, especially financial sector, are benefiting from cheap Chinese export of commodities and cheap (if we consider low interest rates) American import of money (credit). But this is surely not benefiting the working people in the US or China. Now, this exchange between North and South in Europe is not about Germans and Greeks, but about north and south ruling classes securing their power. For instance, about one quarter of active population in Spain is now without any kind of employment, but the “power elites” aren’t losing their grip. And the paradox is that it is precisely the “old elites”, the ones linked to non-capitalist social structures that are gaining. To give you an example of Eastern Europe: selling industrial capacities and banks to Western investors – which was done, for instance, in the Baltic states, Slovakia etc., Slovenian “elites” are contemplating it as we speak – does not bring about the decline of rentiers, clientelism, corruption. On the contrary, they blossom even more, because their structural basis – peripheral position of those countries – deepens. The only way out that I can see is that the people of those peripheral countries strive for another kind of modernization. Not the one strengthening their capitalist features, because this is a self-defeating process – there will always be central formations “more capitalist” when it comes to finance, power and technology, and there will always be peripheral formations more abundant of raw materials and cheap labour force – but the one of overcoming capitalism both as a relation between centre and periphery on the one hand and capital and labour on the other.

What are your thoughts on these structural processes? And what do you think is the way out of humiliation?

D. S.: I think that as long as the EU resists pressures towards disintegration and secession – noting that Greece and the UK (or even Germany) seem to be possible places where such processes might be triggered – to repeat, as long as that is avoided, the most likely outcome of the current crisis is a partial “corporatization” of the EU. I mean by that the crystallization of a regime in which big business rules, privatization expands, and the social rights of citizens are undermined. It may not be too early for opponents of these

trends to start learning from intellectuals and campaigners on the progressive wing of the Democratic party in the US, in order to discover how to survive, regroup, resist and struggle for reform in these conditions. I am thinking of writers such as Jacob Hacker (see Hacker, 2006) and organizations such as the Scholars' Strategy Network (<http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org>).

In the middle third of the twentieth century, before, during and after World War II, it was social science professionals and their allies in government and in political movements who laid the groundwork for a social revolution. They formulated strategies, designed institutions and carried out research that would help to deliver more opportunities and greater fairness to ordinary citizens in societies that had been dominated by the interests of landlords, industrial employers and commercial traders. As those strategies and institutions fall into decay or become less effective, it is a responsibility of the current and next generation of social science professionals to provide a clear analysis of the structural changes now occurring and identify the levers that either exist or need to be created if we wish to implement once again the standards and criteria that provided social justice and social rights in the post-war decades. That will clearly involve new thinking, new strategies and new institutions and it is impossible at this moment to prejudge what those will be.

More generally, the politics of the EU over the next decade are almost certainly going to be influenced by the humiliating experiences that have been endured by practically all populations within its boundaries since 2008. The task of eradicating the structural conditions that have created the current humiliation will be complicated by an important factor: the widespread political effects of powerful emotions such as anger, fear and sorrow. These emotions, aggravated by the imposition of austerity, are shaping the way different groups take defensive or aggressive measures to try and protect themselves (e.g., the Greeks were more angry than afraid; the Irish more afraid than angry). An added complication is the fact that many populations came into the EU regarding it as a kind of oasis that offered an escape from their previous experience of humiliation under dictatorships or highly authoritarian regimes of various kinds. If disillusionment sets in, newly enfranchised populations that have become cynical about Brussels may be vulnerable to ethno-nationalist programmes proclaimed by demagogic politicians. We have been here before. Between the two wars, the comparable object of cynicism was Geneva, headquarters of the League of Nations. Geneva had been unable to keep its promise of bringing Europeans a better life; Brussels made a better start but now it is faltering. We are, once again, at a dangerous moment in Europe's history.

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Polona Fijavž

(E)uropean (u)topia?

**A conversation with Professor Dennis Smith
on TV Slovenia**

In May 2013 Professor Dennis Smith spoke with Polona Fijavž for Globus, a current affairs programme on Slovenian national TV, about the mass protests against austerity, cuts in welfare, the humiliation of certain countries where democracy is suspended and the infamous Troika of institutions, the levers of power, the future of the European Union, and certain parallels with the past.

P. F.: A warm welcome in our studio, Professor Smith.

D. S.: Thank you. It is nice to be here.

P. F.: We have different divisions inside Europe – we have old and new Europe, which is fading away a little bit, we have Schengen and non-Schengen members, we have Eurozone members and non-Eurozone members and now we have lenders and so called delinquents. All that matters now, it seems, is the economic situation in the European Union. Is this sustainable?

D. S.: It is not sustainable to continue to think of the European Union as if it was some glorified banking company. Europe has always been a project that is designed to protect our European way of life with its special version of citizenship which treats human beings as having a right to be given care as well as opportunity. I think it's important to recall why we are in this Europe of business – it's to make a world that's fit for both the powerful and weak, the young and the old, and we are in danger of forgetting that.

P. F.: But we are in danger of also forgetting that some weak countries maybe need something else than the mere dictate and austerity measures. You are talking about humiliation. Today, some countries are experiencing humiliation in the European Union.

D. S.: Yes, and that is powerfully ironic because the initial motivation for establishing the European Economic Community way back in the 1950's was that the leaderships of France, Germany and Italy should stop humiliating each other through war. And when the community became larger, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this promise of making a post-humiliation society was extended to all of our citizens.

P. F.: Not any more, it seems.

D. S.: Not any more. It seems that that essential heart of the European enterprise is being forgotten at the moment because I think of fear and anger which have been resurrected in this situation, and those were just the emotions which led to so much conflict in Europe during the century before we got our European Union.

P. F.: Who does this humiliation reflect upon the most in the European Union at the moment?

D. S.: When you say reflect upon do you mean who is to be blamed for it the most?

P. F.: No, I mean who experiences it the most?

D. S.: Ironically, I think we are all experiencing it. Europe is a community of – this is a harsh way of putting it – humiliated people. We have all been at the wrong end of conflict situations. Germany is very vulnerable to criticism of its past, so are the British, so is every nation. So I think humiliation is a shared emotion. And for that reason I am surprised and disappointed that we're not more sensitive in the way in which we handle these relationships.

P. F.: What do we lack? Do we lack solidarity? Because there is another thing I wanted to talk to you about. It's about the way we are taking this humiliation. We see Greeks on the streets rioting and on the other hand, Irish people who kind of take this with a dignity. Where are the differences?

D. S.: Well both of these peoples, and I don't want to stereotype at all, both of this ... I will put this another way: people in both of these countries wish to preserve their agency, their capacity to shape their own lives. The Irish have had a millennium of experience of coping with situations of being under the thumb, under the boot, of another power, the power based in London. They have a capacity to make a division between themselves as the potentially oppressed and the other to whom they present themselves. It is striking that the Irish government has arranged an extension of their loan period for seven years. They kept it cool, they waited, they are used to doing that..., and they've been successful!

P. F.: And on the other hand, we have Greeks....

D. S.: ... Yes who are on the streets because we are talking about a group of people in the public sector who for 25 years have enjoyed a position which have been restored to them after 40 years in the "wilderness". I mean, the PASOK supporters are generally on the left side of Greek politics, who are now totally indignant to the harsh way in which they are being treated.

P. F.: So if humiliation or accepting humiliation in different ways is down to history, if I understood you correctly, how would Slovenia react if that happened here?

D. S.: That is very much a question to be found out. Because on the one hand it is a country that has been quite close to oppressive masters several times over the past centuries. I don't think there is another hand to this issue because, I think, Slovenia should remember that they have survived before and that the spotlight will move away, that to some extent, the austerity measures that are being imposed upon various

countries are not necessarily well thought through. And we are at a point in Europe politics where president Barroso is saying maybe we are taking this austerity just a little too far. So I would say the medium term political prospects for Slovenia and other countries in this situation are liable to improve slightly over the coming months.

P. F.: But at the current moment we have some countries that in one way feel humiliation and than there are countries that feel self-righteousness. In your lecture in Ljubljana you compared this to some past historical event. On what basis, can you tell us more?

D. S.: What we get here is a tone of very strident self-righteousness which is very difficult to cope with when you are on the other end of it; and immense resentment on the other side. And this reminded me somewhat of the post-civil war situation in America when the abolitionists were so keen to abolish slavery that they took absolutely no account of the knock on collateral effects on societies involved; and I think we are somewhat in a similar situation now. This is irrespective of the morality or slavery or the morality or otherwise of having a balanced budget.

P. F.: What do you think of Germany's role in all this? They are self-righteous, now they have turned into this more neoliberal kind of politics; they are in favour of that as opposed to maybe France and Italy. How can that evolve further?

D. S.: First of all I wouldn't characterize Germany quite like that. Having spoken to many people from Germany, and many of them are, like in any country, highly reasonable, highly thoughtful. At the beginning of this business one heard two voices coming from Germany. On the one hand, [the voice] of "We have suffered, we have reincorporated Eastern Germans, we know how to do it, other people must learn. On the other hand, [the voice of] "We have a historic responsibility to help Europe through this period, we were helped after all after 1945". I think those two voices are still there. I am a bit saddened by the fact that the second voice is not being heard more.

P. F.: Is this due to Angela Merkel's power? What does it come down to?

D. S.: I think it's partially down to the fact that she has to carry a public opinion which is itself very anxious. People who are afraid in this situation are not just the people who are becoming the debtors, it's also the creditors. There was a headline in a recent German magazine which said: "Will the Greeks run away with all our money?". This is a continent which is one of the richest in the world in terms of GDP (!), we show very respectably against NAFTA – the America-Mexico-Canada combination... If we cannot solve the problem like Greece with all our resources, one wanders where the spirit of cooperation, and give and take, has gone to in Europe. That, after all, was what German

press was saying in December 2009 – before they actually heard they were going to have to pay some money. It's irrational, these attitudes.

P. F.: Do you see Germany's role as double faced? We heard that Mrs. Merkel said that nobody was going to touch German bank accounts and few months later in Cyprus, that was exactly what they were doing.

D. S.: Yes and I think the commentaries in the financial press and elsewhere have demonstrated that there is a point where you touch the electric fence. That is when you know it's time to move backwards! That was presented in a very interesting way. Certainly what we heard about in Britain was that this was a suggestion that came from Cyprus itself, so there is some confusion about where that suggestion came from. But certainly it would be a bad idea if the notion that guaranteed creditors, sorry, guaranteed people who had loans, who had money in the bank guaranteed up to a certain amount if their firms came in danger – this would spread still more the anxiety that we are trying to remove from the European situation. We have to take the anxiety and resentment out of this situation.

P. F.: But this move itself, would it make Cyprus the most humiliated country in Europe, would you say?

D. S.: Absolutely. Clearly by definition it is how we are describing it and this is a rather stupid thing to do, given the close relationship between Cyprus and Greece, the presence of both Turks and Greeks on that island, that's a situation that has been quiet for some time, let us not disturb it! Let us work towards solutions, not aggravations in this current situation.

P. F.: Current situation – would you say Germany is a winner out of it?

D. S.: I don't think anyone is a winner out of this because what is happening at the moment, all those alliances and relationships that have been sawn together so acidulously after the past few decades, over the past few decades, are beginning to frail and fall apart – Germany and France, citizens and their governments, relationships between states, relationships between people inside the Eurozone and outside, this talk about in and out referendum, there is a lot of fragmentation talk in the air and that is unsettling and could be dangerous.

P. F.: What could be done in order for Europe to become more united again, not to be as fragmented as it is leaning towards?

D. S.: I think we ought to realize that this is really a foundation moment in the creation of the European Union. We are almost at year one, ground zero. This is a moment where we are all suffering whether we are rich or poor. We need to collectively

analyse what's happening to us: politicians, academics, young people ought together to begin to talk about this openly amongst themselves and across borders. Step back from immediate emotions and ask why this is happening to us. And then attempt to work together in a more conscious way....

P. F.: ... this is the point where we come back to solidarity. Is solidarity what is needed among countries in the EU?

D. S.: Before you have solidarity you have to have understanding and dialogue. We are seeing a movement away from countries that have been quite close to each other. First king of Greece was a German; the biggest country from whom Greece imports goods and services is Germany. This are like marriages that are breaking apart and those are some of the bitterest experiences. We must learn to relive our relationships with each other, from this, solidarity will emerge and also, hopefully, a kind of politics that we can build together upon a European Union that is worth saving.

P. F.: But if there is not enough understanding among the countries, whose fault is it? We have institutions in Brussels, in Strasbourg that are supposed to handle an understanding among nation countries. What are they lacking?

D. S.: I don't think it's all the matter of what Brussels is doing or isn't doing. This is not something that Brussels can do for us, it is something we have to do for ourselves in programmes like this. The media can play a terribly important role in organizing a cross-border communication. I think the media has a tremendous opportunity to help politicians and ordinary people towards this goal.

P. F.: What is the European Union's future going to be like? Is it optimistic because back at your lecture you were drawing comparisons to some other not so optimistic events in the American past?

D. S.: It struck me that if you go back to 1857, to the first world economic crisis, it has many similarities to what we are going through now. And it hit America at the time when it was trying to find how to bring together two kinds of political economies: slave and non-slave. We are in precisely that situation, because we have a very strong auto-liberal tendency but we also have some arrangements which are much more based on political clientelism: in Italy, France is in that direction, Romania, Greece certainly, and also Hungary. Now these two systems have to find a way of moving together. Political clientelists must learn they have a responsibility towards whole people, not just their followers, ordoliberalists have to know that profits are to be taxed properly and used to help the poor and the weak – as much as the strong and striving.

P. F.: You are saying if the Eurozone falls apart, European Union falls apart, but you don't think that's very likely to happen. On what grounds?

D. S.: I don't think it's very likely to happen because there are strong interests which profit too much. I put that in unguarded way but this is the situation. We have a large market in which transaction costs are relatively low. Business organizations can make money here. But what is unfortunate is the kind of European economy we are moving towards – it is beginning to look as if it was contracting, not growing, it is inert, not dynamic. We are beginning to look like the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century: right for exploitation, rich in resources, unable to grow itself. If we are not careful, we will be beaten up.

P. F.: What does it mean “be careful”?

D. S.: If we do not make ourselves strong, dynamic, civilized, democratic and with a sense of purpose again. If we do not remember that we are about something more than economics, more than individual profit. We are about creating communities which are committed to making life worth living for all their members.

P. F.: Mr. Smith, thank you for coming to our studio.

D. S.: Thank you, I enjoyed it.

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