## CHAPTER NINE: ACCEPTANCE

### Freedom and slavery

As we have seen, the reverse side of escape is domination and/or destruction. Escapees 'on the run' do not want to be trapped and turned into victims once more. In order to remain free and in control of their lives they will impose domination on others if they have to and where they can. They will inflict destruction where they find it necessary or convenient. This is how those who escape from humiliation turn themselves into agents of humiliation.

But let us now look at the dominated ones, those who have been conquered or hemmed in and cannot escape. Take the case of Africans forced into slavery and shipped to America, or Native Americans forced to share their hunting grounds with intruders from across the sea. What strategies are available to people in such situations?

Their first response is a disabling shock at being overpowered and humiliated. This is neither acceptance nor rejection but acquiescence. However, what happens next? All action is risky. What if acceptance is unrewarded? What if rejection is unsuccessful?

Alexis de Tocqueville found both acceptance and rejection in America during the 1830s. For example, 'The negro makes a thousand fruitless efforts to insinuate himself into a society that repulses him; he adapts himself to his oppressors' tastes, adopting their opinions and hoping by imitation to join their community. From birth he has been told that his race is naturally inferior to the white man and almost believing that , he holds himself in contempt' (Tocqueville 1968, 394).

The African slaves were not saved by this attitude of acceptance. On the contrary, they were subjected to intense oppression.[i] This is not surprising. They were brought to America for precisely that purpose. The conforming, surrendering consciousness noticed by Tocqueville was not the only form of adaptation to humiliation. The Native Americans resisted. Many of them allied with the British in the War of 1812. In response, the white settlers treated Native Americans with a mixture of seduction and repression. Treaties were signed, then broken. Reservations were set aside, then taken back again.

Tocqueville is utterly scathing. He notes that the Spaniards, for all their 'unparalleled atrocities,' did not succeed in 'exterminating the Indian race' or 'prevent them from sharing their rights.' However, 'the Americans of the United States have attained both these results with wonderful ease, quietly, legally, and philanthropically, without spilling blood, and without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect to the laws of humanity' (Tocqueville 1968, 421). Tocqueville was, of course, writing before the massacres at Sand Creek (1864) and Wounded Knee (1890).[ii]

**Acquiescence and acceptance**

Tocqueville was describing an extreme version of a challenge that faces most of us: how to get or keep whatever you think you have a right to, and avoid becoming a victim. Humiliation poses that challenge because it forces those who suffer it to undergo an *unacceptable* displacement or exclusion from the position in society they think is rightfully their own. It is the unacceptability of this

displacement, along with its enforced character, that makes it humiliating and not merely inconvenient or annoying.

In many cases, those placed in humiliating circumstances cannot immediately escape them. They find themselves driven, for a while at least, into acquiescence, behaving in ways that conform to their oppressors' degrading view of their identity and interests. They endure the virtual chains in which they are unwillingly locked. They adopt subservient body language, and cease to make an outward show of discontent.

But acquiescence is certainly not full acceptance of humiliation. On the contrary, acquiescence is nothing more than partial, conditional and reluctant acceptance. In fact, many people live much of their personal lives moving around in the zone of anxiety that lie between forced acquiescence in humiliation (at work, in the home, in the education system, in the neighbourhood) and the more decisive options of rejection, escape, or, in some circumstances, full acceptance.[iii]

In practice, we are usually driven most strongly by the negative desire to avoid being trapped, cornered and caged, in other words, to avoid being forced into complete acceptance of humiliation. Under what conditions will people go into that cage without expressing utter outrage? There are two. They will accept a situation that they would have previously considered unacceptable if:

- the particular humiliation threatened is redefined as something else, which is not humiliating; or

- their own interests and identity are redefined as being so insignificant that their subjection to humiliation is of little account.

These considerations apply on a world scale as well as in our personal lives. People and governments in many national states live under conditions of forced acquiescence in humiliation. Meanwhile, they are looking around for opportunities to resist, escape or transform these humiliating circumstances.

Powerful and persuasive interests try to push these states and their peoples into more complete acceptance of their humiliation. For example, over the past few decades neo-liberals and neo-imperialists have been trying to persuade governments all over the world that the 'Washington Consensus' with respect to economic and social policy is not humiliating, as some would describe it, but liberating. In cases where their persuasion is successful, this meets the *first condition* just listed.

Meanwhile, religious fundamentalists have been trying to persuade people that if they adhere to 'true religion' human existence on earth is insignificant compared to the paradise to come. This means, according to the understanding of some, that they may happily sacrifice their lives or risk prolonged imprisonment in the course of carrying out terrorism. In cases where their persuasion is successful, this meets *both the conditions* just listed.

In other words, there are strong pressures trying to push people from mere acquiescence in humiliation to a more complete acceptance of it. If they succumb, this leaves them more vulnerable to the dangers of *victimisation.*

By victimisation I mean a condition in which one person or group is at the mercy of another that chooses, for its own purposes and satisfaction, to put them in situations that cause them pain and suffering, however much they deny this fact to themselves and others.

However, whenever individuals and groups are required in the course of everyday life to acquiesce in situations they find personally humiliating, they routinely 'switch on' certain internal disciplinary practices that protect their own identities and interests as far as possible. People normally take as much care as they can to avoid being pushed or pulled into situations where they can be victimised.

**Hidden injuries**

Most people in humiliating situations find themselves wavering between acceptance and rejection. The road to rejection is never easy, even amongst people who feel intense disappointment and anger with the way their loyalty has been rewarded.

Jonathan Cobb and Richard Sennett traced some of the tactics and strategies of acquiescence, and some of their psychological manifestations, in *The Hidden Injuries of Class,* a study carried out in Boston, Massachussetts during the late 1960s and early 1970s.[iv] Cobb and Sennett mainly looked at male workers from Polish, Greek and

other ethnic backgrounds. They had all made the transition from blue-collar to white-collar work.

These men had gone up in the world but still felt disappointed and dissatisfied. They were, to borrow Mike Davis's phrase, 'prisoners of the American dream,' seduced by its promise or, at least, not aware of any feasible alternative.[v] They conformed as far as they could to its expectations, working hard in a disciplined way to improve themselves.

They were caught 'in between,' in two respects:

- on the one hand, they were in between the fraternal values of the ethnic extended family and the individualistic independence they craved; and
- on the other hand, they were caught between the desire to conform with and surrender themselves to the system, and the need to defend themselves against the system.

Conformity left these working men unsatisfied, stranded in an alien informal culture whose secret springs did not flow through their own veins.[vi] When they tried to solve the problem by withholding personal involvement at work,[vii] this made them feel ashamed. To compensate, they took refuge in the micropolitics of victimhood,[viii] making their wives and children feel guilty because they, the breadwinners, were sacrificing their time and energy in frustrating and exhausting jobs for the benefit of their close relatives.[ix]

The *Hidden Injuries of Class* ends with a call for a classless society, one that does not humiliate its members, making them feel inadequate at work while selling them consumer goods to salve their psychic wounds.[x]

At about the same time Cobb and Sennett were planning their Boston-based study, the works of Frantz Fanon, author of *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon 1967) and *Black Skin, White Masks* (Fanon) were beginning to appear in English translation. Fanon, who died six years before these translations appeared, had also been fascinated by the anguish of acquiescence in a humiliating system and the question of how to put things right.[xi]

In his books, Fanon, born in Martinique and educated in Paris, drew on his experiences both as a soldier fighting for the Free French during World War II and a clinical psychiatrist in Algeria during the 1950s.[xii] He found that black Africans were, like Boston's ethnic white-collar workers, caught 'in between.' Their dilemmas were similar, but not the same:

- on the one hand, Africans were caught between accepting the myth of 'negritude,' which would confine them to a de-politicised cultural ghetto, and engaging more fully with the political challenge posed by the dominant colonial power; and
- on the other hand, they were caught between the indignity of having a 'colonised personality' (hyper-sensitive and self-doubting), and the chance to regain their respect by reconstructing their personalities and attacking colonial oppression directly with violence.[xiii]

Fanon's basic analysis is very similar to that of Cobb and Sennett. Acquiescence in a humiliating socio-political order produces pain. Ultimately, the only way to overcome the humiliation is to transform the socio-political order, liberating those who are oppressed by it.

Cobb and Sennett's proposed solution is that American citizens should, hopefully, accept their analysis and take a deliberate decision to make their society classless, even at the cost of some inefficiency.[xiv] In effect, they want something like an 'emancipation proclamation' for all workers, backed up with institutional change.

Fanon would have none of that. In his view, it was profoundly undignified and demoralising for slaves to be set free by white people in the nineteenth century. In fact, they did not gain either free institutions or liberated personalities as a result of this emancipation from above. To regain their self-respect, the oppressed must liberate themselves, not have freedom handed to them on a plate. They must take what is theirs by force.

Fanon's prescription is truly 'American.' He takes his stand alongside Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett. Like them, he believes in regenerative violence.[xv] As surely as any American frontier heroes, Fanon believes that 'violence is a cleansing force.' Violence 'frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction: it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect' (Fanon 1967a, 94).

The similarity is not surprising since, as Fanon puts it, 'The violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the native balance each other and respond to each other' (Fanon 1967a, 88). Edward Said quotes this passage in his *Culture and Imperialism* (Said 1993).[xvi] In this book Said provides substance to Fanon's general charge that European culture demeaned its colonial subjects. Said claims that his study of Western literature reveals a victimising attitude at work within it.[xvii] In Said's view, by the time of Fanon's birth (in 1925) any fictional person coming from the colonial world was depicted as 'either a victim or a highly constrained character, permanently threatened with severe punishment, despite his or her many virtues, services or achievements.'

Such people did not really count. They were 'excluded ontologically for having few of the merits of the conquering, surveying, and civilizing outsider.' They were marginal to the European field of vision. In their own eyes, Europeans were making heroic efforts to keep their noble imperial ventures going in spite of having to deal with such inferior people. As they saw it, the least and the most colonial people could do to help was give their obedience. The best way to get this was by imposing strong discipline. In other words, 'For the victim, imperialism offers these alternatives: serve or be destroyed' (Said 1993, 204).

According to Joseph Stiglitz, one-time chief economist of the World Bank,[xviii] this approach had not changed by the end of the twentieth century. As he puts it, 'All too often, the [International Monetary] Fund's approach to developing countries has had the feel of a colonial ruler.' Stiglitz cited a photograph taken in 1998. The head of the IMF, 'a short, neatly dressed former French Treasury bureaucrat, who once claimed to

be a Socialist, is standing with a stern face and crossed arms over the seated and humiliated president of Indonesia.'

Stiglitiz comments: 'The stance of IMF, like the stance of its leader, was clear: it was the font of wisdom, the purveyor of an orthodoxy too subtle to be grasped by those in the developing world' (41).[xix] Like Cobb and Sennett's white-collar workers, and like Fanon's Africans, the Indonesian president was drawn into the game but not allowed to 'join the club' in whose interest it was being played. The Fund's decisions 'were made on the basis of what seemed a curious blend of ideology and bad economics, dogma that sometimes seemed to be thinly veiling special interests' (Stiglitz 2002, xiii).

**Ways of acquiescing**

There are four approaches to acquiescing in humiliation (see table 1). A particular person, group or society may adopt more than one of these ways at the same time, and may switch between them.

One set of responses involves *reversal* of the experience or condition. It says: 'while trying to humiliate us, you have partly succeeded but we can make the very scars left by our partial and incomplete humiliation into useful weapons with which to defend and advance ourselves.'

Another set of responses involves *separation* of the self from the experience or condition. It says: 'you think you are humiliating us but even though the part of us you see performs the rituals of abasement for you, in fact that is a screen

behind which we are either indifferent to you or engaged in actions that are unfavourable to you.'[xx]

Another approach is *conformity*, in other words, bringing perceptions of the self and one's group or society into line with the circumstances in which they find themselves following the humiliation. It says: 'your actions were humiliating us but in fact you have showed us who we really are and/or what our situation really is, and we accept it.'

Table One
Forms of Acquiescence by Victims of Humiliation

<table>
<tr><th></th><th>Strategies</th><th>Tactics</th><th>Tendencies</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="8">FORMS OF ACQUIE-SCENCE</td><td rowspan="2">REVERSAL</td><td>Defiant acceptance</td><td rowspan="3">→ REJECTION</td></tr>
<tr><td>Politics of victimhood</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">SEPARATION</td><td>Sabotage</td></tr>
<tr><td>Inner withdrawal</td><td rowspan="2">→ ESCAPE</td></tr>
<tr><td>Denial</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">CONFORMITY</td><td>Self-abasement</td><td rowspan="3">→ ACCEPTANCE</td></tr>
<tr><td>Elevation of master</td></tr>
<tr><td>Stoicism</td></tr>
<tr><td>SURRENDER</td><td>Self-abandonment</td></tr>
</table>

Finally, there is *surrender* to fate, giving up the effort of coping through reversal, separation or conformity. It says 'you have tried to humiliate us and you have succeeded but we will not impose upon ourselves the additional burden of confronting or evading you. Mould us as you will'[xxi]

Let us go into these four strategies in a little more detail.

**Reversal, separation, conformity and surrender**

*Reversal*: One variant of reversal is the defiant acceptance of stereotyping labels that were originally intended to victimise, to make people feel small and keep them cowering. A classic recent example is the institutionalisation of 'Queer Studies.'[xxii]

A second variant of reversal is the politics of victimhood. This involves persuading others they are undeservedly lucky non-victims, who should feel guilty, ashamed, afraid or sorrowful (or a mixture of these) about your own situation. It means using these feelings in others to get them to act in ways that serve you or inhibit them from acting in ways that oppose you. There are at least five versions of the politics of victimhood:

1.*The demand for compensation*: 'You or others have hurt me in a very unfair way. You must all try your utmost to put this right.'
2.*The demand for indulgence*: 'We have been badly damaged. We are hurting. We are angry. Do not be surprised if we hit out, or if we hurt others, including you. You have no right to censure us, especially since you are responsible for the fact that we are damaged. You must accept us the way we are.'
3.*The demand for privileged credence*: 'We, the victims, know who our attackers are. You must believe us when we name them and they must be punished in a way that satisfies us.'
4.*The demand for revenge*: 'We have been wronged and we have the right, and feel a strong and justified urge, to purge our anger by hurting someone else very badly, especially someone who can be plausibly blamed for our suffering.'

5.*The demand for respect through strength*: 'We were victimised because we were weak and now we are making ourselves so strong that no one dare touch us. You must keep your distance or only come near on our terms. This is the kind of respect we demand.'

The politics of victimhood are useful as a way of both sustaining individual or group morale and appealing to more powerful third parties.

*Separation*. In this case the core tactic is to represent oneself to the humiliating party through words, actions, posture and demeanour that seem to satisfy their wishes and expectations. At the same time, one makes a separation between the compliant and subservient 'self' that is represented in full congeniality to the master standing over you and another 'self' that has its own intentions.

This other self may, for example, conspire to sabotage the oppressor's plans at every opportunity. This is done, hilariously, by the 'good soldier' Svejk in Hasek's novel and, dramatically, by the soldiers who built, then destroyed, the bridge over the River Kwai.[xxiii] While these responses move towards rejection of humiliation, other variants – inner withdrawal ('I am not here') and denial ('this is not happening to me') provide means of psychological escape.

The tactics of reversal and separation try to avoid the oppressor's framing power. They undermine its ability to encage others in categories of its choosing. They subvert its capacity to say 'who you are' and 'where you fit in.' They are attempts to destroy the cage or slip through its bars.

*Conformity and Surrender*. By contrast, the remaining tactics acquiesce in the oppressor's victory and say: 'ok, you've got us where you want us but let us also take the following into account.' The victim then tries to make a bargain with the oppressor ('Look, we believe in what you are doing so, in return, please accept us in our reduced circumstances and treat us decently') or gives reasoned instructions to the self ('Stop fighting this because then the pain will be not so bad'), or both. The fact of being cornered, encaged and vulnerable to abuse is accepted but an attempt is made to make this condition less unbearable.

Conformity and surrender are often combined. There are two basic moves. One is to identify as strongly as possible with the oppressor, which means no longer seeing this agent as an oppressor but rather as a lord who performs great and honourable deeds. The other move is self-belittlement, relegating and diminishing the self so that it is less demanding (due to self-abandonment), more accepting (due to stoicism) or more servile (due to self-abasement) but in any case a smaller obstacle to the lord's intentions, and a less significant loss if degraded or destroyed.

Here we have the fundamental rationales of European (and Japanese) feudalism and Christianity. The defeated warrior who kneels in humiliation before the victor who spares his life has every incentive to glorify his chief. In his new role of vassal his own prestige is a reflection of his master's. The key to a stable adaptation is wholehearted acceptance of a new role, a new self, and new rules. The intention, not always realised, is that the destructive feelings of humiliation,

of being displaced, should be left behind with the old role, the old self, and the old rules.

So it is with Adam, who aspires for god-like powers in Eden, and then pays for his arrogance with expulsion from Paradise. His successors accept their belittlement, adapt willingly to their new place in the hierarchy of creation, and learn to obey the new rules delivered on tablets of stone. Christ takes upon himself the pain of their humiliation. By accepting the verdict contained in God's humiliation of Adam, human beings discover who they are and where they fit in. Their humiliation is turned into shame: shame for Adam's past sins, shame for failing too often to follow the rules they have been given.

These civilisational and cosmic dramas are also replayed daily in a minor key world-wide. This has been going on for centuries: in local settlements buying off Viking raiders by paying Danegeld and accepting Danelaw;[xxiv] on slave plantations in the Old South in the United States where 'Uncle Tom' and 'Sambo' played the game, consciously or not, to make life less agonising;[xxv] in the European colonial empires as local bosses came to terms with their 'civilised' administrators; in NATO headquarters in Europe after World War II as each new Washington-briefed American military consul arrived to take command; in Africa, Asia and Latin America when the people from the IMF or World Bank descend upon national governments; when new top managers install themselves in companies that have been taken over; and in kitchens, dining rooms and bedrooms throughout the world.

To summarise, the 'conformity' and 'surrender'[xxvi] strategies mean the subordinate must

- work on the self to make it compatible with the ruler's view of the way things are or should be;
- accept that the conditions of their existence are almost completely controlled by the ruler;
- adapt to the ruler's actions and his or her prescriptions and perceptions about the interests and appropriate behaviour of subordinates
- abandon defence mechanisms built into the 'reversal' and 'separation' strategies of acquiescence;
- try hard to believe the 'official' line and hope it produces some benefits for subordinates, especially those promised from above;
- discover that after a honeymoon period during which subordinates may feel lifted up and liberated, the dominant mood is likely to become a sense of loss and diminishment; and
- accept an increased vulnerability to victimisation and victimisation cycles, as the Biblical fall-guy, Job, for one, discovered.

**Victimisation cycles**

Victimisation cycles are repeating sequences of actions and reactions that may be stimulated by the acceptance response to humiliation. They become possible when people or groups are drawn into a relationship of high dependency upon, and vulnerability to, a dominant agent. This may be a result of conquest (the 'Robin Hood/Sheriff of Nottingham' model) or a more subtle process of

infiltration combined with attractive oratory and advertising (the 'Pied Piper' model).

Once the conquered or seduced ones are in thrall,[xxvii] there is a 'strong invitation' from above (an 'offer one cannot refuse') to abide by rules and values imposed from the top. Those below become highly vulnerable to being manipulated by sharp tugs on the lead strings of desire, shame and fear: desire for promised rewards; shame at the thought of disobedience; and fear of punishment.

Once subordinates are committed, and have no alternative, it is very tempting for those at the top to abuse those who have put themselves in dependence upon them.

When subordinates complain, it is both satisfying and effective for those who rule to give them yet more abuse to stun them into silence. Tell them they are not good enough. Tell them they have not come up to the standards of the system. Still better, ignore them, sometimes the most effective abuse of all.

Victimisation cycles have the following elements (see table 2):

(i) a relationship of high dependence of the weak upon the strong is established or confirmed, either through conquest or seduction;

(ii) the dominant party makes the rules of the relationship and manipulates it by playing on motives of desire, shame and fear on the part of subordinates;

(iii) the dominant party abuses and/or estranges the subordinates and rapidly lowers the level of trust in the relationship;

(iv) outrage and/or despair on the part of the subordinate is met by a renewal of seduction and/or a renewal of repression, and/or silent contempt.

Table Two
The Victimisation Cycle

| | |
|---|---|
| (i)<br>conquest or seduction creates relationship of high dependency/ vulnerability for the weaker party<br>↓ | (iv)<br>outrage/despair by subordinate is met ← by renewal of seduction and/or repression and/or silent contempt |
| (ii)<br>dominant party manipulates shame, → fear and desire to ensure obedience to its rules. | ↑<br>(iii)<br>dominant party abuses and/or estranges subordinates and rapidly lowers trust level |

When this cycle has been played out a few times, acceptance may be replaced by mere acquiescence, or it may turn into rejection.

**Japan and Israel**

Speaking of victimisation, it is worth noticing that the World Society of Victimology is based in Japan.[xxviii] It is a global organisation whose president and vice-

presidents are, at the time of writing, drawn from the United States, Israel, Africa, Mexico and the United Kingdom. However, it is interesting that pioneering work on victimology was done by an Israeli[xxix] and that the society has found its institutional home in Japan.

Interesting because Israel and Japan both have a dual relationship to victimisation: they have been accused of victimising others (in the first case Palestinians, in the second case, Koreans, Chinese, Allied prisoners of war during World War II, and 'comfort women'); and they also identify themselves as victims (in the first case, of anti-Semitism and the Nazi concentration camps; in the second case, of nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and continued abuse due to the presence of US military personnel in Okinawa).[xxx]

Israel and Japan have shared the experience of being treated as 'pariah states' by their immediate neighbours, both have been under supervision or protection from the United States, and both have had troubled relations with their patron, often appearing to others like difficult 'children.'[xxxi]

The nature and situation of Israel has been high on the agenda of global politics in the second half of the twentieth century. It seems possible that Japan may find itself in a similar position during the first half of the twenty-first century. Japan has recently been playing a role for troubled neighbouring regimes worried about discontent amongst their own urban populations that is similar to the one Israel has played for neighbouring Arab regimes.[xxxii]

It is convenient for regimes being criticised by their own populations to re-direct that discontent against a foreign country, amplifying existing prejudices and turning them into expressions of hatred. Faced with this situation, both Israel and Japan have an aversion to 'explaining themselves' and assume that 'being misunderstood' is the default position, so to speak. Neither of them seems to care about this as long as people leave them alone. Unfortunately, their history, their geographical positions and the current state of geo-political tensions combine to make this very unlikely.

In both countries, the status of victim and the status of perpetrator are balanced against each other when dealing with critics. Israel's stance says 'Remember our previous victimhood when you accuse us of being perpetrators of humiliation today.' By contrast, Japan's stance, as presented by at least some of its politicians, is 'Let us forget our previous history as perpetrators of humiliation but please notice how we are victimized today.'

Israel offers the world defiant acceptance ('We are who we are') and the politics of victimhood ('Don't expect us to be nice'). These responses have been relatively consistent since the late 1940s. By contrast, over the same half-century, Japanese responses have changed radically.

**From surrender to reversal**

*Surrender.* In 1945 total psychological surrender was commonplace in Japan. The emperor had let his people down. The imperialist system he headed lost

much of its legitimacy amongst the people.[xxxiii] According to Masao Maruyama, there was 'a feeling of stagnation, of prostration so complete that foreigners were astonished' (Maruyama 1963, 4).

*Conformity.* The Japanese turned away from nationalism and politics in revulsion. They turned towards 'the household and corporate family' (Thorsten 2004, 3).[xxxiv] Their new desire to conform to the American way stimulated feelings of shame at their backwardness but also gave a clear direction for personal effort. Hard work, and overwork, repressed 'the unbearable.' Many Japanese males refocused their loyalty at a lower level, devoting themselves to the business corporations for which they worked, expecting jobs for life.[xxxv]

However, during the early 1990s, with the Asian economic crisis, the corporation failed them just as the Emperor had failed their parents and grandparents. Jobs for life and the many paternalistic fringe benefits that went with them began to disappear.

*Separation*. The question now is: where will the Japanese propensity for loyalty be focused? One possible answer is reinvestment in a nationalistic state, although that prospect remains deeply controversial within Japan. One indication of trends at the top (although not necessarily amongst the population at large) is that in 1989, after over four decades of disuse, the National Diet ordered Japanese schools to display the national flag and sing the national anthem. In 1999 the flag and the anthem were officially reinstated

as state symbols. In other words, Japan began to mark out a strong identity clearly separate from the United States.

*Reversal*. In 1989 Shintaro Ishiharo, later Governor of Tokyo, published *The Japan That Can Say No* (Ishiharo 1991). In this book, the author presents himself as a proud Japanese who has overcome the inhibitions caused by the national habit of self-effacement. His title is a sardonic comment on the stereotypical Japanese normally encountered by Americans, 'Japanese who smile and agree with them' (142). Here is a strong move towards the 'reversal' strategy for coping with unwilling acquiesence in humiliation; in other words, the strategy that takes a prevailing image (in this case, the Japan that says yes) and turns it around against the oppressor.[xxxvi]

It is Ishihara's evident intention to attack the Japanese sense of shame but strengthen their sense of having been subjected to unjust humiliation. [xxxvii] For example, Ishihara accuses the Americans of racism against the Japanese.[xxxviii] In this way, and others, he contributes to the politics of victimhood.. He recalls, for example, how as a teenager in 1946 he had refused to stand aside as three American GIs walked down the street: 'The new rulers had the street to themselves and that swaggering trio seemed to glory in the deference. I did not like their attitude so I walked straight ahead, pretending not to see them. Just as I was about to pass, one GI hit me in the face with his water ice' (79-80). There are many other anecdotes in the book about how Ishihara habitually stood up to the Americans and demanded equality with them.[xxxix]

It is impossible to know to what extent Japanese feelings of being victimised will be stirred up and intensified by a mixture of external pressures and internal political opportunists. Nor whether they will overcome the continuing suspicion of Japan's political elites among the general population. However, over the past half century there has been a shift in the ways that the Japanese have acquiesced in the social and political condition brought about by their humiliation at the hands of overwhelming American power, a change in the character of their responses to what many have seen as the racial arrogance directed against them. This shift has been:

- from an initial pattern of *surrender* blending into *conformity*,
- to *conformity* blending into *separation*, and now
- to *separation* blending into *reversal*.

Will this eventually turn into rejection?

**A new Jungle Book**

Japan's restlessness under American tutelage is part of a bigger picture. Washington has responsibility for the one remaining global nation-state-empire remaining after the end of the Cold War. Like the European empires that preceded it, this empire is built on a contradiction between two sets of principles and practice:

- on the one hand, the exercise of imperial control, expressing the capacity to humiliate others that is so valued by the honour code, imposing an absolute difference between the overlord, ultimately responsible only to

God (and his 'chosen people'), and those 'below' who have been conquered and belittled; and

- on the other hand, the exercise and protection of citizenship rights embodying the human rights code, expressing the principles of universality and equality in relations between individuals, groups and nations.

The logic of the market, explored in an earlier chapter, carries and conceals this contradiction. As we saw, it contains elements from both the honour code and the human rights code. It glorifies the struggle in the market place, stays silent about the unequal conditions in which that struggle occurs, ignores the role played by military force in sustaining that inequality, and downplays the significance of social rights.

Now Thomas Friedman's The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Friedman 2000), which we briefly touched on earlier, can be placed in its proper context. It is as an aid to accepting humiliation, a set of reasons for being cheerful even though the sky may look dark. Friedman's text is intended to provide reassuring cognitive therapy although one American reviewer admitted to his compatriots, 'I would be embarrassed to lend this book to friends overseas. Friedman gets very rah-rah as an American apologist, and he poses no serious objections to the worldview that regards globalization as an international extension of Manifest Destiny.'[xl]

Thomas Friedman presents a view of the world that 'dilutes' victimisation. In his view, it is an unavoidable by-product of the way the global free market simply *has* to work if it is to be efficient and therefore good for us all. Friedman's book is

conservative, demotic and quietly aggressive. Friedman has some similarities to Rudyard Kipling who made the most attractive case he could for the British Empire at its height, speaking in language that would delight and comfort not just lords but also the ordinary British worker. Friedman tries to pull off a similar trick for Americans.

In fact, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* is similar in some ways to *The Jungle Book* (Kipling 1994a), which Kipling wrote in the 1890s. Friedman's work is full of animals such as long-horn cattle, short-horn cattle, lions, gazelles and turtles, each signifying different players in the global jungle.[xli]

Friedman's basic argument is that openness and transparency are being forced on businesses and government by the democratization of technology, information and finance. Globalization is managed by an 'electronic herd' of investors and business executives that gallops into or out of national economies depending on whether or not those economies are good to graze upon. If those economies adopt the new rules of low tax, low inflation, and friendliness to powerful foreign business interests, then the herd will be happy to trample its way in. If they don't, then the herd will find juicier pastures.

The herd imposes a 'golden straitjacket' (Friedman 2000, 101) on companies and countries. It always fits tightly.[xlii] Friedman gives advice about getting into shape for the fitting. He says: get the right system of financial regulation, enforce accountancy standards,[xliii] and start to think of your nation as something between a computer, hopefully with the right soft- and hard-ware, and a

publicly-traded company that tries to earn a good credit rating. If you cannot get into the straitjacket, this shows you have not got the will or skill to survive. If you cannot get these things, you deserve to go under.[xliv]

Let us follow Friedman into the middle of his jungle. In a typical passage, he describes meeting the mayor of a small town in the Brazilian rain forest. As the two men walked through the forest together, the mayor 'patted every tree. He knew each tree in the rain forest by its Brazilian name.' Friedman 'took an immediate liking to this Brazilian lumberjack. There was something very solid about him.' As they sat down to picnic together in the forest, the mayor 'explained to me that intellectually he understood that logging was not sustainable anymore' but he knew 'his little town was not ready for life without logging.'

After a while, Friedman got ready to leave: 'I thanked him and started to pack up my IBM ThinkPad laptop, when he said to me, "Now I want to ask you something." "Please," I answered, "ask anything you like." The mayor then looked me in the eye and said, "Do we have any future?" The question hit me like a fist in the stomach. It almost brought tears to my eyes, looking across the table at this proud, sturdy man, a mayor no less, asking me if his villagers had any future….I cobbled together an answer, trying to explain in simple terms that he and his people did have a future, but they needed to start making a transition from an agro-economy to a more knowledge-based economy…' (Friedman 2000, 330).

In Friedman's terms, this is a meeting between an unusually friendly lion (himself) and a frightened, slow moving turtle (the mayor) who wishes he could turn himself either into a lion cub or a fast-running gazelle.[xlv]

Friedman is telling a similar story to Robert Kagan.[xlvi] The story is: the world is a jungle, the lion is king and everyone, even the lion-king, has to accept the law of the jungle inscribed in the nature of things. The point of this story is, precisely, to normalise victimisation, to make it seem an unavoidable, everyday event, something built into the natural order. This is a Just-So story. Its moral is: 'Sorry, but that is just the way we are and just the way you are. Bad luck, friends, that is just the way it is.'[xlvii]

**The logic of the global market**

Friedman sees business globalization as a largely uncontrolled process driven by herd-like instincts that has beneficial effects. But other commentators are more sensitive to the damage done by this process, and some of them see the partly hidden hand of corporate interests behind it.

For example, Zygmunt Bauman believes the world is in chaotic flux. Most of us have been turned into travelling strangers. Some of us are tourists with sizable wallets and 'well-respected' passports. More of us are vagabonds scavenging for the means of survival, trying to put together the means of a decent life against the odds.

Not everyone is allowed to be a vagabond. Some groups are judged to be too dangerous or unsightly to be let loose. The rich take every measure they can to tie the

poor down, trapping them in slums, stopping them from crossing borders. Whenever possible, they put them in prison where they can do no harm except to themselves.[xlviii]

Society's taste for incarcerating the poor, especially young men, is also noticed by Edward Luttwak.[xlix] As an American conservative (old-style, not neo-) he comes from a very different part of the political spectrum from Bauman. However Luttwak shares Bauman's vision in three respects:

- capitalism is out of control;
- it is creating a sharp division between the top and the bottom of society;
- and the rich are responding to the growing multitude of discontented poor people by throwing them into jail to an increasing extent.[l]

In his study of 'turbo-capitalism' (Luttwak, 1999) argues that deregulation of capitalism is a bad thing. It has made some people extremely rich and about fifty million Americans better off, mainly because of easy credit, but that still leaves more than sixty million rank-and-file American employees with hourly earnings less than they were in the early 1970s in real terms, taking inflation into account.[li]

Figure Two
Business Globalization: Good or Bad? Controlled or Uncontrolled?

| | Mainly beneficial for human interests | Mainly damaging for human interests |
|---|---|---|
| Process largely | Alan Shipman | Samir Amin<br>Noreena Hertz |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| controlled | | Naomi Klein<br>Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann<br>Michael Hardt and Antoni Negri |
| Process largely uncontrolled | Thomas Friedman<br>Charles Leadbetter | Edward Luttwak<br>Zygmunt Bauman |

Luttwak warns that any government in Africa, Latin America or Eurasia allowing forceful political pressure for deregulation to overwhelm them is in danger of being sold a false prospectus. The reason is that if they tear down all their institutional defences against open competition they will be acquiring an 'American' form of capitalism but without two essential balancing features of American life that make it relatively orderly and decent for those who stick with the system.

One of these features is the American legal system, which gives people with grievances, even poor people, the chance to get restitution in court to a much greater extent than in most countries.[lii] The other is the Calvinist ethic. This makes being rich a sign of virtue, which reduces social envy. It also forbids people to enjoy their wealth, which reduces corruption and encourages the rich to plough their money back into the community through charitable trusts.[liii]

Table Three
Luttwak on Turbo-Capitalism vs Regulated Capitalism[liv]

| TURBO-CAPITALISM | REGULATED CAPITALISM |
|---|---|
| Society serves the economy | The economy serves society |
| All capital is allocated according to the rate of economic return obtained | Capital is also allocated to economically unprofitable activities because of felt |

| | |
|---|---|
| | moral obligations, professional commitments, and social ideals |
| Widening income differentials<br><br>Moderate economic growth<br><br>Disintegrates society into small elite of winners, a mass of losers' rebellious law-breakers<br><br>Erodes social fellowship and family ties<br><br>Social breakdown leads to harsh laws and widespread imprisonment of offenders | Overburdens employers<br><br>Suppresses entrepreneurship<br><br>Retards technological progress<br><br>Growth slower than with turbo-capitalism<br><br>Steady impoverishment of nation<br><br>Reduced opportunities for young people |
| Making all institutions profit-maximisers perverts their essential content although it improves their economic performance | Resisting the profit motive may eventually lead to impoverishment and annihilation of the institutions concerned |

Unlike Friedman, who sees the existing global political economy as a way of liberating human beings, and Bauman who sees it as an engine of systematic victimisation, Luttwak sees a 'great dilemma' (see table 3). His own preference is, fairly clearly, for regulated capitalism. However, he acknowledges that most Western governments have 'no better plan than to allow turbo-capitalism to advance without limit, while hoping that faster growth will remedy all its shortcomings' (237).

Some critics of the free market ideology claim it weakens the democratic state which, in turn, reduces the citizens' institutional defences against victimisation. This undermines their human rights. This makes social disorder more likely, according to Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann. However, 'It is not the really destitute who are rebelling; rather it is the fear of losing position, a fear now sweeping the middle layers of society, which is politically explosive to an incalculable degree. Not poverty

but the fear of poverty is the danger to democracy' (Martin and Schumann 1997, 11). The global race for high efficiency and low wages is a recipe for disorder, fear, xenophobia and irrationality.

To put it another way, the great danger is fear of humiliation and victimisation. If the democratic state disappears, if more power is assumed by multinational companies responsible only to their shareholders, who will care about the citizens' interests? In Noreena Hertz's words, 'We, the people are displaced – and in the one-ideology world of the twenty-first century, if things start going wrong, where can the global citizen go to be granted asylum?' (Hertz 2001, 88).

Naomi Klein has traced her own pathway through the landscape shaped by the 'silent takeover' of the public sphere and public spaces by corporate interests. In *No Logo* (Klein 2000), she tells a story about how citizenship has yielded ground to consumerism although she also reports that a fight-back is underway, a 'fight for the global commons' (439).

The fight for the global commons and the challenge posed by global capitalism are two of the central themes in *Empire* (Hardt and Negri 2000) and *Multitude* (Hardt and Negri 2005). Linking these two themes together is is the growth of capitalism's global 'network power' (Hardt and Negri 2000, 160). Through this network, 'biopolitical' control is exercised over the multitude. Ordinary people, as workers, consumers and members of families, are not dominated from above through military force in the old-fashioned way. Instead, they are 'ruled along internal lines, in production, in exchanges, in culture' (344).

This global network is an ‘empire’ although one that ‘has no Rome’ (317). This empire has learnt to penetrate the ‘immaterial, cooperative, communicative, and affective composition of labor power’ (277). In other words, business managers have learned how people are thinking and behaving these days and have turned it to their own advantage. Nevertheless, say the authors, the really creative force in society is ordinary people, the multitude. [lv]

Samir Amin also believes globalisation is a struggle between democratic and capitalist forces. He sees the IMF and World Bank as being mainly preoccupied with short-term profitability for international business. They are pushing ahead with a programme of weakening states wherever possible so the market can reign (Amin 1997). This has pushed ‘the ruling classes of the periphery’ into nationalist and ethnic politics. The likely outcome, unless the democratic state can be revived or created, is ‘total submission to the logic of capital’ (xi).

In fact, says John Gray, unregulated markets are an unusual phenomenon, historically, and only strong states can bring them into being and maintain them. Such states are unlikely to be very democratic in spirit or practice because ‘democracy and the free market are competitors rather than partners’ (Gray 1998, 213).[lvi] In fact, globalisation is not a matter of free markets conquering the world. Instead, it is a product of new information technology abolishing distance to a greater extent than ever before. The result has been to ‘throw all types of capitalism – not least the free-market varieties – into flux’ (216).

The result has been a high degree of insecurity that is undermining the institutions and values of the existing socio-cultural order. This insecurity is prolonged by the fact that the United States cannot get its own way globally but can veto projects of global institutional change that do not suit its own interests. Frustration will increase as the struggle for control in Central Asia gathers pace. Gray concludes that in this situation, warfare and anarchy are a likely prospect.

These commentators are all looking at the same world as Friedman but they see it very differently. Friedman sees a shared human condition resulting in a universal jungle law that is, he argues, hugely beneficial in material terms to those who go along with it, one that can be civilised around the edges as long as we all accept its basic logic. Many others see loss: especially, the loss of human rights, dignity, and security. Luttwak sees the existence of some balancing gains but it is not clear that he thinks they are adequate compensation.

Friedman's work is important because it is a high-selling attempt at persuasion. It tries to make us accept that victimization, and the humiliation that brings it about, are natural events like thunderstorms or 'kills' in the jungle. This is a rhetorical strategy that leads us back towards the honour code, inviting us to accept it as our mantra. It is an attempt to neutralise the impulse to reject victimization on the grounds that it diminishes our human rights.

**Summary**

In this chapter we have: considered the dilemmas facing those forced to acquiesce in humiliation; identified the strategies of reversal, separation, conformity and surrender;

analysed victimization cycles; considered the cases of Israel and Japan; deconstructed the work of Thomas Friedman as an attempt to 'naturalise' victimization and make it acceptable within the framework of the honour code; and compared voices raised for and against the view that business globalization driven by the logic of the market is mainly beneficial for human interests.

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[i] On slavery, see Elkin 1968, Davis 1986, Patterson 1982, Myrdal 1996, Bales 2004, Blackburn 1988, Genovese 1976, Turley 2000, Miles 1987.

[ii] The destruction of the Native Americans involved, first, the intermediate solution of transporting the inconvenient and unwanted population to reservations beyond the territory occupied by the white 'master race' and, then, as the advance of the expanding empire's frontier brought those dumping grounds back 'inside,' the 'final solution' of exterminating the 'nuisance.' See Arendt 1963; Levi 1987; Levi 1988. On the massacre of the Lakota tribe at Wounded Knee in 1890, see http://www.dickshovel.com/WKmasscre.html (May 25th 2005). On the treatment of African-Americans, see, for example, Dailey 2000; Klarman 2004;

[iii] See, for example, the films of Woody Allen.

[iv] See Sennett and Cobb 1972.

[v] Davis 1986

[vi] In Bourdieu's terms, they lacked the right 'cultural capital.' In Foucault's terms, they were oppressed by the dominant discourse.

[vii] What I call the tactic of separation (see later in this chapter).

[viii] Discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

[ix] On these points, see Cobb and Sennett 1972, 22, 29-31, 37, 75-9, 94-8, 102-13, 117-8, 124-40, 150-7, 171-83, 192-8, 210-19, 256-62. Sennett has returned to, and further developed, some of these themes in Sennett 1999 and Sennett 2004. See also Susan Falud's *Stiffed* (Faulidi 1999) for another analysis of feelings of inadequacy amongst American males, and Stud Terkel's *Hard Times* (Terkel 1970), especially the section entitled Honor and Humiliation' (481-503). See also, for background, Terkel 1972; Terkel 1973; Terkel 1982; Terkel 1986.

[x] Cobb and Sennett 1972, 256-62. Compare Edward Luttwak's views on 'shopping as therapy. Luttwak 1999, 204-14.

[xi] As far as I know, Cobb and Sennett were not especially influenced by Fanon's work in writing the 1972 book. There is no reference to Fanon in it.

[xii] On Fanon's life, see Macey 2000.

[xiii] Fanon 1967a; Fanon 1967b. See also McCulloch1983; Perinbam 1982; Gordon, Sharpley-Whiting and White1996

[xiv] See Cobb and Sennett 1972, 261-2.

[xv] For a relevant discussion, see Jinadu1986, 65-96.

[xvi] Fanon's quotation is to be found at Said 1993, 327.

[xvii] See also Moore-Gilbert 1997.

[xviii] Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001.

[xix] In practice, 'Both the IMF and the United States Treasury, which calls the tune at the IMF, have gone out of their way to appease the market-fundamentalist tendencies of [the US] Congress.' That is the view of someone who should know: Georg Soros (Soros 2000, 280). One consequence of such political bias is that the IMF normally asks weak countries in need of IMF-brokered loans to reduce budget deficits and raise interest rates. This systematically imposes the burden of adjustment upon the borrowing countries with obvious inequities in the distribution of human costs. As Soros points out, the burden of adjustment could be shared more equally between borrowers and lenders if trouble were taken to undertake the necessary institutional reforms.

[xx] On the costs and benefits of fragmenting the self in this and others ways, see Cobb and Sennett 1972, 194-8; Sennett 1998, 60-63.

[xxi] All of these strategies except the last build up personal and group disciplines, and a capacity for skilled management that would be invaluable if deployed in efforts to transform the humiliating relationship.

[xxii] For example, 'Queer Studies is an emerging interdisciplinary field whose goal is to analyze antinormative sexual identities, performances, discourses and representations in order ultimately to destabilize the notion of normative sexuality and gender. Queer studies comes out of a critique of identity politics. It rejects essentialized conceptualization[s] of sexuality, gender, and sexual identity as innate or fixed. It represents a deconstruction of hegemonic conceptions of sexual and gender

categories within straight, gay and lesbian communities. In queer studies, the interpretation, enactment, and destabilizing of sexual identities is linked to that of gender categories. The queer studies concentration's home in women's studies makes explicit these links between theories of gender and sexuality'. See website at Smith College (Massachussetts): http://www.smith.edu/wst/queerstudies.html

[xxiii] See Haek 1972; Boulle 1954.

[xxiv] As Rudyard Kipling puts it, 'Once you have paid the Dane-geld, you never get rid of the Dane.' In his poem entitled *Dane-geld*, Kipling concludes that 'the end of that game is oppression and shame and the nation that plays it is lost.' The poem was included in C R L Fletcher's *A History of England* (1911). See http://www.theotherpages.org/poems/kipli05.html (25th May 2005).

[xxv] See Elkins 1968.

[xxvi] Hobbes's view of the matter is that 'It is not… the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten and taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself (without promise of life), to spare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think fit' (Hobbes 1996, 141).

[xxvii] The word 'thrall' means, literally 'slave' or one who is in bondage.

[xxviii] The objects of the WVS objects are 'to promote research on victims and victim assistance; advocacy of their interests throughout the world; to encourage interdisciplinary and comparative research in victimology; to advance the cooperation of international, regional, and local agencies, groups, and individuals concerned with the problems of victims.' See http://www.worldsocietyofvictimology.org.

[xxix] Benjamin Mendelsohn. See Wemmers 1998 at http://www.world-society-victimology.de/wsv/index.aspx?page=19&nr=6

[xxx] According to Chalmers Johnson, 'The condition (in Okinawa) – expropriation of the island's most valuable land for bases, extraterritorial status for American troops who committed crimes against local civilians, bars and brothels crowding around the main gates of bases, endless accidents, noise, sexual violence, drunk-driving crashes, drug use and environmental pollution – are replicated anywhere there are American garrisons' (Johnson 2004, 8). See also Johnson 2000, 34-64.

[xxxi] General MacArthur, who led the invasion force that occupied Japan in 1945, is reputed to have expressed the view that 'the mentality of the Japanese is that of a twelve year old.' (Kawasaki 1969, 9). In October 1945, President Truman was told by an envoy that, in MacArthur's view, '"Oriental peoples suffer from an inferiority complex which leads them to 'childish brutality' when they conquer in war and slavish dependence when they lose."'( Dower 1999, 223)

[xxxii] For example, China's annual 'Day of National Humiliation' institutionalises anti-Japanese feeling.

[xxxiii] See, for example Dower 1999, 302-8; Wetzler 1998; Lamoot 1944; Maruyama 1963.

[xxxiv] Citations to Thorsten 2004 refer to the internet version at https://goliath.ecnext.com/free-scripts/document_view_v3.pl?item_id=0199-18419&f (consulted 12 April 2005) which is differently paginated from the print version.

[xxxv] For examples of the American influence on Japanese industrial techniques, see Deming 1986; Juran 2004; Landsberg 1999.

[xxxvi] In his introduction the English translation of the book, Ezra Vogel acknowledged that what I have called the 'separation' strategy for coping with forced acquiescence in humiliation was also well established: 'Until recently, Japanese could assume that what they said to each other and wrote to their press would not get picked up by Americans…Among themselves,…they could talk of American irrationality, pomposity, ignorance, and inferiority, assuming that it would not be noticed.' (Vogel 1991, 8).

[xxxvii] Ishiharo severely criticised a book by Ichiro Kawasaki, a Japanese diplomat, called *Japan Unmasked*, that had expressed shame about many aspects of Japanese society and culture. See Kawasaki 1969. Ishihara 1991, 31.

[xxxviii] Ishihara 1991, 27-8, 80, 143-5.

[xxxix] See, for example, Ishihara 1991, 27-9, 43, 47, 59, 60-61, 7680, 142-4, 146. See also Mohamad and Ishihara 1995.

[xl] Scott Whitney at Salon Books, April 19th 1999. See www.salon.com/books.review/1999/04/19/friedman (consulted 16 April 2005)

[xli] 'Short-horn cattle' are short-term traders in stocks, bonds and currencies. 'Long-horn cattle' are the multi-nationals involved in foreign direct investment. (Friedman 2000, 114-15).

[xlii] 'To fit into the golden straitjacket a country must either adopt or be seen as moving toward, the following golden rules: making the private sector the primary engine of its economic growth,

maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its currency convertible, opening its industries, stock and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and investment, deregulating its domestic economy to promote as much competition as possible, eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible, opening its banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership and competition and allowing its citizens to choose from an array of competing pension options and foreign-run pension and mutual funds. When you stitch all of these pieces together you have the golden straightjacket' (Friedman 2000, 105)

[xliii] Friedman's book was written before the Enron scandal and the subsequent criminal investigation .

[xliv] See, especially, Friedman 2000, 7-16, 46-67, 104-111, 112-17, 151-5, 169-74, 187-90, 205-6, 212-13, 250, 271-281-3, 301-5, 342-3, 355—8, 367-78, 437-40, 444-5, 451-7, 463-8.

[xlv] For more on lions and gazelles, see Friedman 2000, 331. See also Friedman 2003.

[xlvi] In *Power and Paradise* (Kagan 2003). See previous chapter.

[xlvii] The Just-So stories were written to amuse children. They include, for example, 'How the whale got his throat,' 'How the camel got his hump,' 'How the rhinocerous got his skin' and 'How the leopard got his spots,' Kipling 1994b

[xlviii] See Bauman, Globalization. The human consequences (Bauman 1998), for example 64-5, 92-7, 106-18.

[xlix] Edward Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He describes himself as 'the son of an innovative capitalist manufacturer and an entrepeneur on my own account (who) believe(s) deeply both in the virtues of capitalism and in the need to impose some measure of control over its workings' (Luttwak 1999, ix).

[l] Luttwak 1999, 2.

[li] Luttwak 1999, 3, 218

[lii] According to *The Economist*, December 16th, 2000, 'America has 281 lawyers for every 100,000 people, compared to Britain with 94, 33 in France and a mere 7 in Japan'

[liii] Luttwak 1999, 12-25. A third factor, mentioned by Luttwak, is the propensity for jailing discontented losers.,

[liv] Based upon Luttwak 1999, 236-7. Luttwak's statement of the dilemma assumes that turbo-capitalism is the dominant tendency globally.

[lv] The challenge now, say Hardt and Negri, is to turn this into political power in the globalised world. One of the points of conflict where a global political consciousness might develop is immigration: '*The general right to control its own movement is the multitude's ultimate demand for global citizenship'* (400; italics in original). Also, the multitude's constant creativity, and the empire's dependence on it, should be recognised by '*a social wage and a guaranteed income for all'* (403; italics in original). The 'mobilization of the common' (Hardt and Negri 2005, 211) will become more widespread as people engaged in struggle in different global locations learn to understand and exploit 'the new network model of the multitude' (217). For other demands, hopes and expectations, see Hardt and Negri 2000, 403-13 and Negri and Hardt 2005. For elaborations and critiques, see Balakrishman 2003; Negri 2003; Passavant and Dean 2004; Virno 2004.

[lvi] The difficulties of bringing capitalism and democracy together are explored in *Capitalist Democracy on Trial* (Smith 1990).