2 Out of the Ashes

War and peace

War and its aftermath have shaped the preoccupations and careers of historical sociologists. Marc Bloch's personal experience as an army officer in World War I must have helped him, years later, to recreate imaginatively the Europe of one thousand years before when, confronted with alien invasions, the assembled bishops of the province of Rheims lamented:

> you see before you the wrath of the Lord breaking forth . . . there is naught but towns emptied of their folk, monasteries razed to the ground or given to the flames, fields desolated . . . Everywhere the strong oppresseth the weak and men are like fish of the sea that blindly devour each other. (Bloch, 1961, p. 3).[1]

That quotation is from the first volume of *Feudal Society* (Bloch, 1961) which appeared in 1939. The second volume was published in 1940, with German troops advancing into France and Bloch in uniform once more as an army captain. Four years later, he was shot by the Germans in his home town of Lyons where he had been active in the French resistance.

Bloch's career is an extreme example of war's impact. There are other examples. In the year France fell, T. H. Marshall was writing a discussion paper for the Foreign Office on how a defeated Germany would be dealt with. Marshall had spent four years as a civilian prisoner of war on a race course in Germany during World War I. This experience was mirrored by Norbert Elias's internment in Liverpool and on the Isle of Man during World War II. Elias's incarceration, though painful to bear, was relatively brief. Fernand Braudel's much longer confinement in Germany between 1940 and 1945 helped shape his approach to the analysis of historical time.[2] According to Edward Shils, World War II 'enhanced the confidence of the sociologists' (Shils, 1980, p. 119). In the United States, many of them joined the Information and Education Branch of the Office of the Adjutant General. Other historians and sociologists, including recent immigrants from Europe, joined the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.[3]

World War I destroyed imperial regimes in Russia, Turkey, Austria–Hungary, and Germany. It helped create conditions for successful revolution in Russia, attempted revolution in Germany and, for a short while, fear of revolution in Britain. Established authorities collapsed in the midst of widespread death and destruction. These events intensified debate on two unresolved issues within Western liberalism. One was the relationship between justice and order within modern societies. More specifically, between, on the one hand, unmet claims for the legal, political and social rights of citizenship and, on the other hand, the need for a stable political framework guaranteeing life, property and peaceful economic exchange. The other unresolved issue was the relationship between the rational and the non-rational in thought, experience and behaviour.[4]

Max Weber met both issues head on. As is well known, he was interested in the nature of rationality and the part played by intuitive understanding and interpretation. He also analysed in depth the conflict between democracy and bureaucracy, especially after the fall of Bismarck. Democratic government needed a powerful bureaucratic organization to assert its will against aristocratic institutions. However, bureaucracy itself had to be held in check by inspired and intelligent political leaders within a strong parliamentary system: 'a merely *passive democratization* would be a wholly pure form of *uncontrolled bureaucratic domination*' (Weber, 1978, p. 1453; emphasis in original).[5]

If the nation were to be strong, justice and order had to be reconciled by active bourgeois reformers such as Weber himself. Unfortunately, between the two world wars in Europe the rise of mass movements promising 'justice' was followed by social breakdown, political oppression, or both. This situation was transformed by Allied victory in World War II. The 'American way' was advertised as the 'best' form of democracy. It was supposedly free from the tensions troubling Weber and his contemporaries. Consensus was based upon emotional commitment and rational assent to a just social order offering equality of opportunity. Patriotic commitment and calculated self-interest were in harmony. Rational and non-rational aspects of human nature were both positively engaged within a moral and stable polity.

In this atmosphere Talcott Parsons developed his structural-functionalist approach. It exercised a major influence on historical sociology before the mid-1960s. The rest of this chapter looks at two aspects of this phenomenon. Its first theme is the impact on American intellectuals of the two world wars and European politics during the interwar years. Second, the contribution of structural-functionalism to historical sociology is studied in the work of Talcott Parsons, Neil J. Smelser, S. N. Eisenstadt and Seymour Martin Lipset. The argument then turns to T. H. Marshall and Reinhard Bendix. Parsons, Marshall and Bendix were alike in two respects. First, they were broadly satisfied that capitalist democratic ideology as it stood in the aftermath of the Second World War accurately described the dominant tendencies within American and British society. Second, they believed values made a systematic contribution to regulating societies. However, Marshall and Bendix took more interest than Parsons in the evidence ideologies provided about social tensions and conflict.

The end of ideology?

When Daniel Bell proclaimed the 'end of ideology' (Bell, 1962), he was reflecting a mood widespread on both sides of the Atlantic. By the 1950s, it seemed, fascism had been defeated and communism outfaced. Social planners had learned a sense of proportion (cf. Hayek, 1976). There was a broad consensus in favour of political pluralism, the mixed economy, the welfare state, and power-sharing between central government and more decentralized authorities.

Not all contemporaries responded in the same way to the defeats and victories of the 1930s and 1940s. One pattern is exemplified by Seymour Martin Lipset. During his youth in the late 1930s, while at the preparatory school for the City College of New York, Lipset belonged to the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), the youth section of the Socialist Party, and to the American Student Union, an organization dominated by communists. Later in his undergraduate career, he was national chairman of the YPSL. However, by 1961 he was attacking C. Wright Mills for the latter's Marxist bias.[6]

A quite different example of the intertwining of personal experience and intellectual development is provided by Reinhard Bendix. He was born in Weimar Germany, grew up under Hitler's regime, and for a short time joined the Socialist Labour Youth. He came to Chicago in 1938 as 'a twenty-two year-old German-Jewish refugee' (Bendix, 1984, p. 1).[7] He had a 'European' concern with moral and political dilemmas

which, according to official American ideology, had been solved. Lipset and Bendix have collaborated on several projects;[8] but the message of their individual work is that, while Lipset thinks 'the American way' is 'the best possible,' Bendix merely regards it as 'one of the best available'.

The American way: Parsons and Smelser

Talcott Parsons's intellectual and moral development reflected his Calvinistic, Midwestern background and his experiences in Europe between the wars. Parsons had visited Germany on an exchange fellowship during the 1920s:

> The state of Western society which might be designated as either capitalism or free enterprise – and on the political side as democracy – was clearly in some kind of state of crisis. The Russian Revolution and the emergence of the first socialist state as controlled by the Communist party had been crucial to my thinking since undergraduate days. The Fascist movements affected friendships in Germany. Less than two years after the publication of [*The Structure of Social Action*] . . . the Second World War was to begin, and, finally, came the Great Depression with its ramifications throughout the world. (1970, p. 831)

During World War II, Parsons worried about the effects of Nazi propaganda upon immigrants poorly integrated into American society. This helps account for his later insistence on the importance of integrating values within social systems.

Parsons told Americans how their society worked – or at least how it should work.[9] In principle at least, Parsons's main concerns – with socialization and social control, the maintenance of integration within social systems, and the part played by consensus with respect to values – could have been pursued through comparative and historical analysis. This approach was implied by, for example, his early piece entitled 'Some sociological aspects of the fascist movements' (Parsons, 1942) which concluded that 'one of the most important reasons for the different degrees of success of the fascist movement in different countries has lain in the different degrees in which national traditions and with them pride and honour, have been integrated with the symbols of the rationalized patterns of Western culture.' (p. 145)

In *The Social System* (1951), Parsons provided insights into specific historical situations and processes: for example, the rise to power of technologists and professional managers in the United States. This had

'a great deal to do with the fact that the "business elite" of the great era of capitalist expansion during the period following the Civil War failed to become consolidated as anything closely approaching a "ruling class" in America' (p. 509). Parsons also analysed the rise of national socialism in Germany, and the implications for Russian communism of its success in capturing the state. All these examples were relevant to his concern with the development of responsible leadership in American society.

There is little doubt that Parsons 'was greatly intrigued by empirical variety and extremely well-informed about historical and comparative issues on many fronts' (Robertson and Turner, 1990, p. 550). However, comparative and historical explorations came second in Parsons's work to the challenge of clarifying the responsibilities of the intelligentsia in modern society. In his view, it was the job of professional men and women, especially sociologists, to help maintain a rational, moral and integrated social order (see, for example, Buxton, 1985).

Interpreting social dynamism

In Parsons's view, it was necessary to distinguish between three aspects of social dynamism: dynamism which maintained particular social systems (e.g. through socialization and social control); dynamism which carried forward 'particular sub-processes of change *within* such systems' (e.g. within the institution of the family); and dynamism which contributed to 'the over-all processes of change *of* the systems as systems' (e.g. the rise of a 'charismatic revolutionary movement' such as National Socialism in Germany) (1951, pp. 486, 520–1).

It was possible to go 'beyond description' and produce explanations with respect to change *within* social systems – under certain conditions. For example, 'explanatory generalization' was possible if you understood the relevant 'structural imperatives' within such systems. The 'paradigm of motivational process' was also a useful explanatory device. By this, Parsons meant his assumption that 'value-orientations' became internalized in 'role-expectations' and 'the personalities of individual actors' (pp. 484–5).

In 1951 Parsons believed that '*a general theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge*' (p. 586; emphasis in original). Instead of a theory, Parsons offered: first, a set of interrelated concepts for describing some aspects of change; second, the Weberian assumption that 'the process of rationalization' was 'a general directional factor in the change of social systems' (p. 499); and, third, the observation that change was often accompanied by 'strains' (p. 513) due to the resistance of vested interests and the disruption of established expectations.

During the late 1950s Parsons began to incorporate societal change more fully into his thinking, mainly through his association with Neil Smelser, to be discussed shortly. In fact, by the mid-1960s Parsons had developed a neo-evolutionist analysis. According to this view, societal change took the form of increasing differentiation leading to problems of integration handled by 'adaptive upgrading' of differentiated systems, improving their capacity to survive (Parsons, 1966, p. 22).[10] Ironically, in some respects, these ideas took Parsons towards Herbert Spencer, whose work he had criticized three decades before in *The Structure of Social Action*.[11]

By taking historical change seriously, in the mid-1960s Parsons was following the example of academic colleagues who had been trying to apply structural-functional approaches in that sphere for a decade or so. Parsons's best-known student, Robert K. Merton, falls into a special category. He carried out important historical work in the middle and late-1930s, leading to his *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England* (1970), originally published in 1938. Unlike Parsons, Merton concentrated on developing middle-range theories which could be operationalized in empirical research. Merton's approach interested English sociologists such as W. G. Runciman who were, by contrast, rather dismissive of Parsons. Merton managed to combine a rich vein of irony and human feeling in his work which is largely absent from Parsons. However, despite his early work Merton was not, in the main, a historical sociologist.[12]

Another American sociologist working on historical themes was George Homans, whose *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century* was published in 1942. This fascinating work could almost have been produced by an early member of the *Annales* school, opening as it did with over a hundred pages on medieval field systems and agricultural methods, followed by long sections on family structures, the social organization of the manor, and the annual pattern of work and ritual. However, this was very much an individual effort from a scholar whose interests also encompassed social theory, poetry and the study of small groups. Like Parsons, Homans was a Harvard sociologist. However, Homans found Parsons 'guilty of both fuzzy thought and sloppy writing' (Tilly, 1990a, p. 263).[13]

Unlike Merton and Homans, the three sociologists now to be discussed all developed approaches to historical analysis which drew upon Parsonian structural functionalism to a significant degree in their work of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The most thoroughly committed was

Neil J. Smelser, who insisted on the close relationship between the validity of his historical analysis and the validity of the theory itself. S. N. Eisenstadt and Seymour Martin Lipset were less heavily committed, but drew upon the structural-functional approach to a significant extent.

Handling and channelling social change

When Talcott Parsons came to deliver the Marshall lectures at Cambridge University in the autumn of 1953, he met Neil Smelser who was a Rhodes Scholar studying Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford. Smelser, previously a sociology student at Harvard, collaborated closely with Talcott Parsons from the early 1950s. The problems of 'growth and institutional change' were tackled in their *Economy and Society* (Parsons and Smelser, 1956).

In their view, institutional change affected the 'boundary-maintaining' conditions of a social system: for example, it disrupted the processes of integration carried out through the family. Change typically meant a period of instability followed, eventually, by a restoration of equilibrium. This was an advance beyond Parsons's position of the early 1950s. Smelser and he were now discussing changes of the system itself, rather than changes within the system. The key was structural differentiation, meaning an increase in the number of sub-systems and a shift to a higher degree of complexity in the relationships between them. Structural differentiation passed through a cycle containing a number of 'logical steps' (p. 270).

This cycle, to be discussed shortly, was the basis of Smelser's argument in *Social Change and the Industrial Revolution* (1959). In this book, Smelser's overt purpose was to demonstrate the utility in historical analysis of the structural-functional approach. As his subtitle made clear, it was 'an application of theory'. The book's subject was the Lancashire cotton industry between 1770 and 1840. This was not an innocent choice of theme. Since Marx and Engels, the mechanization of English textile production has been the *locus classicus* of debates on the early development of industrial capitalism, including its implications for the rise of the bourgeoisie and the working class. Smelser focussed on two closely-related spheres: the cotton industry, and 'the family economy of its working classes' (p. 4). He did not discuss the family economy of the factory owners. This curious omission had the consequence, intended or not, that he was able to ignore the broader issue of the interplay between kinship and property relations. 'Class' disappeared into the interstices between 'industry' and 'family'.

Smelser argued that structural differentiation typically happened as a consequence of two conditions: dissatisfaction with 'the goal-achievements' of a social system, perhaps caused by an inhibiting 'external pressure'; and the 'prospect of facilities . . . to correct this imbalance' (p. 15). Subsequently, social control mechanisms ensured that disturbances were handled and channelled in such a way that resources were mobilized, producing innovations which would then be routinized. These processes were broken down into seven steps: (i) feelings of dissatisfaction and frustrated opportunity; (ii) symptoms of disturbance, including unreasonable hostility and unrealistic aspirations; (iii) covert handling of these tensions, along with attempts to restore commitment to existing values; (iv) official tolerance of experimentation, but without acceptance of responsibility for implementation or consequences; (v) positive attempts to specify the new ideas and encourage entrepreneurial commitment to them; (vi) the implementation of new ideas with the innovators being either rewarded with success or punished by failure; and (vii) the consolidation of gains from innovation through the institutionalization of new ways of doing things.

Having established his 'empty theoretical boxes' (p. 7), Smelser filled them up three times. First, he produced empirical evidence for cycles of structural differentiation in spinning and, more briefly, weaving. For example, he argued that the spread of Methodism in the manufacturing districts strengthened values legitimizing manufacturers' complaints about bottlenecks in the existing industrial structure (steps i and ii). The law courts handled and channelled disturbances (step iii); the Patent Office showed tolerance of new ideas (step iv); and so on (pp. 69–85). Steps v to vii were illustrated through innovations such as the spinning jenny, the water-frame, carding machinery, mule spinning, the self-acting mule, steam power, and the factory system (pp. 85–128).

The other two box-filling exercises involved the family economy. Smelser examined, in turn, changes in the family division of labour and its consumption functions. He traced the emergence of new specialized roles by examining labour market patterns, protest activity (e.g. machine breaking), factory reform agitation, the cooperative and trade-union movements, and institutions such as the poor laws, friendly societies, and savings banks. Confronted with the need 'to offer industrial labour on new terms [e.g. to become a factory hand instead of a domestic worker] *and at the same time* maintain its functions of socialization and tension-management . . . the family rose to this challenge by a process formally identical with that of the industrial change itself – the process of structural differentiation' (p. 180; emphasis in original).

Smelser's achievement was to order a great deal of historical material,

more or less plausibly, in terms of his seven-step model of structural differentiation. As he put it: 'the nature of our "explanation" was to relate a multitude of complex social phenomena to a single set of analytical propositions without varying the logic of the propositions themselves' (p. 384). However, this achievement was more limited than Smelser implied.

Smelser argued that a number of competing theoretical explanations – referring variously to economic motivations, resistance to capitalist exploitation, responses to misery and the working of the free market – were all less discriminating than his own. Each relied too heavily upon a single causal factor, and ignored or glossed over cases which contradicted that approach. Smelser made these points in a chapter only eighteen pages long in a text of over four hundred pages. Apart from a brief passage in the introduction (p. 5), this is the only place where competing theories were mentioned. A serious attempt to consider such theories would surely have involved, first, a more detailed comparison of their assumptions and logic, and second, consideration of the alternative explanations offered by these theories at several points in the various empirical applications by Smelser of his seven-step sequence.

Although Smelser's overt project was to use his analysis of historical data to validate structural-functionalist theory, in practice the reverse occurred: the prestige of the theory was used as a means of validating his historical analysis. The key lies in chapters two and three (pp. 7–49). These contain the general theory of action, the seven-step sequence, eight diagrams, two technical appendices and a lot of algebraic notation. In effect, these chapters issue a challenge: who will quarrel with a theory worked out in such detail and with such sophistication?

Smelser's work can be compared, very briefly, with a book which had appeared five years earlier: J.A. Banks's *Prosperity and Parenthood* (1954). Banks was concerned with the relationship between the fall in middle-class fertility in England from the 1870s and changes in middle-class standards of living. Although the period is slightly later than Smelser's, Banks's book directs attention to a highly relevant theme which was, as has been noticed, neglected by Smelser; the strategies and social constraints associated with family life among the educated and property-holding part of the population.

Like Smelser, Banks was interested in the part played by economic and normative factors in bringing about changes in the family. However, the latter's approach was very different. Instead of invoking the transcendent logic of structural differentiation, he explored the situational logic implicit in middle-class responses to increasing social competition. Briefly, Banks found evidence supporting the hypothesis that deliberate limitation of family size in the English middle-class was a response to a perceived threat to their social superiority. For example, in the late nineteenth century the wealth of their immediate inferiors, the lower middle-class, increased disproportionately. So did the costs of bringing up children and preparing them for middle-class careers.

With a little ingenuity, it would not be difficult to 'translate' Banks's analysis into Smelserian terms, describing how middle-class dissatisfaction and frustration associated with 'unrealistic' aspirations (the wish to maintain both relative social superiority *and* large families) produced 'tensions' which were 'handled and channelled' by the institutionalization of new ways of doing things (the adoption of birth control techniques). However, carrying out such a translation does not represent an advance in knowledge.

Confronted with a historical phenomenon (the decline in fertility from the 1870s) and a large list of possible causes ranging from the growing prestige of science to the emancipation of women, Banks isolated a strategic aspect of the phenomenon – the decline of *middle-class* fertility – and focused upon one possible cause: changes in the middle-class standard of living considered with reference both to established aspirations and actual consumption. Empirical investigation was then carried out to identify how the middle class expected to live – what kind of housing? how many servants? what forms of personal transport? and so on – and the changing level of expenditure required. The strategy adopted by Banks of carefully investigating the interrelationship between specific variables allowed a chain or web of causal connections to be built up gradually. From the perspective adopted by Banks, a fact has significance if its causal connection with another fact can be demonstrated through careful empirical work, not because it can be located within a 'theoretical box'.

Old empires, new nations: Eisenstadt and Lipset

At the end of *Social Change and the Industrial Revolution*, Neil Smelser called for further studies of structural differentiation: for example 'the segregation of political parties from the system of aristocratic family cliques . . . [and] the segregation of the military and civil service from the earlier system of political and class patronage' (1959, p. 408). In 1963 two works appeared dealing with these issues, especially the development of specialized political institutions and movements resisting 'traditional' ways of doing things. They were S. N. Eisenstadt's *The Political Systems of Empires* (1963), and Seymour Martin Lipset's *The*

First New Nation (1963). The latter book was an application to a specific case, the United States, of a theoretical approach developed a few years earlier in *Political Man* (1981; originally published in 1960).

Eisenstadt and Lipset both operated within a structural-functionalist framework at the time these books were written. They dealt, respectively, with pre-industrial societies (Eisenstadt) and societies which have undergone or are undergoing industrialization (Lipset). The works were written in very different styles. Lipset made no secret of his admiration for American democracy and his contempt for extremism of the left and right. He conveyed a strong sense of political commitment to the American way. Eisenstadt had a much drier and more abstract style. His book was completely free from evaluations (or, indeed, any evidence of feeling).

A laboratory report

The Political Systems of Empires resembled a laboratory report on a crucial scientific experiment. The subjects of the experiment were the political systems within the historical bureaucratic empires: e.g. Egypt, China, Rome, Byzantium, and the major European states between feudalism and the end of absolutism. Eisenstadt set out to identify, firstly, the conditions for the development of specialized political systems within such societies, and, secondly, the conditions which allowed such systems to be perpetuated.

As a type, historical bureaucratic empires stood between 'traditional' and 'modern' political regimes. As in traditional societies, the masses were politically passive. However, the 'historical' regimes had certain modern characteristics: a relatively unified and centralized polity, bureaucratic administration and, not least, institutionalized political conflict between elites for the support of social groups.

Almost a third of the book consisted of bibliographical citations indicating the sources of the 'data', and a large collection of tables containing Eisenstadt's manipulation of variables. Some of these tables compared five pre-bureaucratic societies (e.g. the Mongol and Carolingian empires) with twenty-seven historical bureaucratic societies. Others compared particular societies within the latter category. One, for example, displayed relationships between 'autonomy of ruler's goals, differentiation of institutional spheres, and extent of development of centralized polity' (p. 449). Within the tables, specific societies were given scores for different variables, or located in various categories.

Eisenstadt's book is frustrating. The empirical evidence on which he

Figure 2.1 Eisenstadt on historical bureaucratic empires

based his generalizations is largely kept under wraps. It is also tendentious, because the criteria according to which his data were manipulated in the tables remain covert. There is the suspicion of inspired guesswork here and there. However, the book remains very interesting because of Eisenstadt's clever analysis of structural conflicts within historical bureaucratic empires (see Figure 2.1). Eisenstadt argued that political systems became institutionalized within historical bureaucratic empires when two conditions were fulfilled: first, when rulers began to pursue their own objectives rather than simply accepting the traditional values and goals of the society; and, second, when social differentiation through urbanization, the spread of the market, new religious movements and so on, brought into being 'free-floating resources' (p. 27) which were not trapped by traditional institutions and attitudes. This 'created a reservoir of generalized power' which could be used by the

ruler, the governmental bureaucracy and new social groups such as merchants and other town-dwelling groups.

The ruler and the bureaucracy had to regulate interchanges between the political system and other groups and activities within the society. This task involved them in conflict. For example, the ruler's 'autonomous' goals differed from those of powerful traditional groups, with whom he or she had to compromise. A cross-cutting factor was that the ruler typically shared many traditional values. Relations with new social groups were also complex. Not surprisingly, they resisted the ruler's attempts to restrict their independence and rake off a sizeable share of the new surplus they created. At the same time, bureaucrats were torn between their responsibility to maintain an orderly flow of resources within the society, and their inclination to line their own pockets and build themselves up as an independent power.

These conflicts created constant pressure for change. Eisenstadt distinguished between three kinds of change: total, marginal and 'accommodable'. Total changes occurred when, following uprisings or usurpations, 'dislocated groups' could not be accommodated in the existing political system without a fundamental alteration of its framework. Marginal changes were much less serious, involving negative attacks on aspects of the existing order. Finally, 'accommodable' change introduced innovations which did not affect '*basic* norms, symbols, and levels of activity of the central political institutions' (pp. 313–4; emphasis in original).

One possible outcome of total change was a more differentiated political system; in other words, the modern state. In such a polity, state and society interpenetrated in a more complex way. Distinctions between the aspirations of the rulers and those of the ruled became blurred. Within modern polities, the 'latent despotic and totalitarian power' of the state might become fully realized. On the other hand, there might be 'fuller freer participation of different groups in the political process' (p. 371).

As will be recalled, Smelser argued that structural differentiation occurred in a repeated pattern: an initial disruption of the harmony of means, ends and values, and subsequent restoration of this harmony. S. N. Eisenstadt discerned a similar pattern, but with two differences of emphasis. First, Eisenstadt stressed the potential for disruption to recur, rather than the tendency for harmony to be re-established. Second, while Smelser assumed that 'handling and channelling' of discontent and maladjustment occurred within each specialized institutional order – e.g. the family, the economy – Eisenstadt saw that conflicts between groups cut across different institutional orders. Specifically, the differ-

entiation of goals and institutions within historical bureaucratic empires led to conflicts among traditional groups (especially landowners), the beneficiaries of 'free-floating resources' (e.g. bureaucrats, merchants), and those with investments in both camps (e.g. rulers). They were not contained within sub-systems, but were society-wide.

To recap: in Eisenstadt's view, historical bureaucratic empires were 'in-between'. The appearance of a differentiated political system disrupted a more harmonious traditional order. The re-establishment of a more integrated order would occur with the establishment of the modern state, in the form either of dictatorship or democracy. The rhythm of change – harmony/disruption/harmony – was the same as in Smelser's model but the scale was different. Smelser worked with specialized institutions and decades, Eisenstadt with whole societies and centuries.

Eisenstadt concluded his book by suggesting that historical bureaucratic empires contained the seeds of modern dictatorship and modern democracy. This provides a natural bridge to Lipset, who was very interested in the distinction between these two political forms.

The sociologist as patriot

The first part of *Political Man* (first published in 1960) was concerned with 'the conditions of the democratic order'. In exploring these conditions, Lipset applied a methodology similar in some respects to that used by Eisenstadt. For example, he classified a number of modern societies according to whether they were 'stable democracies' or 'unstable democracies and dictatorships'. By tabulating various indices of wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization, he was able to show that in all cases the 'stable democracies' had the higher score (1981, pp. 31–8).

A second similarity is that Lipset and Eisenstadt were both interested in the conditions under which conflicts arising from competing goals and values could be accommodated within the political system. Lipset's view was that a certain amount of institutionalized conflict was helpful in maintaining a democratic consensus. He had drawn this conclusion from his earlier study of the internal politics of the International Typographical Union (Lipset, Trow and Coleman, 1956).

Third, Eisenstadt and Lipset, like many other American social scientists in the early 1960s, were both interested in the development of ex-colonial states in Africa and Asia. Eisenstadt pointed out that the interaction of 'traditional' and 'differentiated' elements within the poli-

tical systems of historical bureaucratic empires generated problems which 'may be akin, to some degree, to those of various "new states" now undergoing processes of modernization' (1963, p. 4).[14]

In *The First New Nation*, Lipset was more direct:

> The United States may properly claim the title of the first new nation. It was the first major colony successfully to break away from colonial rule through revolution... So perhaps the first new nation can contribute more than money to the latter-day ones; perhaps its development can give us some clues as to how revolutionary equalitarian and populist values may eventually become incorporated into a stable nonauthoritarian polity. (1963, p. 15).

This book was written against the background of American fears that post-colonial societies might become communist. One of the difficulties confronting attempts to establish stable democracies was, in his view, the 'world-wide totalitarian conspiracy seeking to upset political and economic development from within, and holding up an alternative model of seemingly successful economic growth through the use of authoritarian methods' (p. 91).

Lipset sought to undermine 'the appeal of a vulgar Marxism which would have democracy wait solely upon economic development' (p. 313). His own analysis gave a larger place to elite strategies, political institutions and, above all, values and national character. In his view, 'Basic alterations of social character or values are rarely produced by changes in the means of production, distribution and exchange.' Instead, as societies became more complex their institutions adjusted to new conditions 'within the the framework of a dominant value system' (p. 103).

New nations required a strong national authority and a stable national identity. The social and constitutional arrangements of the United States had acquired legitimacy by 'being *effective*' (p. 59; emphasis in original); in other words, by 'taking off' economically and giving symbolic rewards to American citizens. These rewards included a sense of nationhood deriving, in particular, from the American Revolution and the Puritan religious heritage. Since the population was homogeneous and law-abiding, political stability was not threatened by tension between the equalitarian values of the Revolution and the Puritan stress on achievement. This tension has persisted in American life. Although Lipset did not make the point, this tension has a strong family resemblance to the contradiction between the social rights of citizenship and the

inequalities of the market, as explored by T. H. Marshall in his essay on 'citizenship and social class' (1963d).

However, Lipset's main point was that through its particular history, the United States had 'produced a particular set of "structured predispositions", which is one way of defining values, for handling strains generated by social change' (p. 207). The predispositions were favourable to stable democracy, aided by institutional factors such as a two-party system. This type of party system also prevailed in Britain, another stable democracy. A bi-polar system promoted generalized leadership and support, rather than the fragmentation occurring after World War II in France with its multi-party arrangements.

Newly developing nations might not possess a stable two-party system. They might not enjoy the relatively equitable land ownership and vigorous spirit of enterprise that made achievement values so strong in the early American Republic. However, they might still derive benefits from having stable traditional regimes promoting diffuse and ascriptive values. What mattered was how a traditional upper class reponded to the rise of new groups with industrialization, and how traditional values such as elitism, diffuseness, ascription and particularism became embedded in the modernizing society. Lipset developed this argument through a comparison between the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Sweden.

Lipset took a modified Schumpeterian view of democracy. In other words, complex societies were best served by a political elite competing for the votes of a mainly passive electorate. The struggle could only be 'meaningful' (p. 208) if individuals were motivated to pursue their interests actively within a political system with well-defined rules. The United States, Britain and Sweden were stable democracies in this sense. Germany and France did not qualify for that label. The cases will be briefly described in turn (see Figure 2.2).

The United States emphasized the mutually-supportive values of achievement, equalitarianism, universalism and specificity (with the major exceptions of ethnic and racial issues and, more generally, the South – here dealt with in a single short paragraph and a footnote). It was favoured with non-revolutionary lower-class groups, and upper classes able to accept improvements for the lower strata '*without feeling morally offended*' (p. 214; emphasis in original).

In Britain, the economy and polity were a mix of achievement and universalism on the one hand, and elitism and diffuseness on the other. By contrast, the social class system retained a great deal of ascription, elitism, particularism and diffuseness. Instead of the open competition

	Economy	Polity	Upper strata	Lower strata
Stable cases				
United States	Ach, U Sp	Eq, U Sp	open	moderate
Britain	Ach, U; Asc, El, Part, Diff	Ach, U; Asc, El, Part, Diff	incorporating	moderate
Sweden	El, Part, Diff; becoming Eq, Ach, U	Asc, El, Part, Diff; becoming Eq	insulative; becoming incorporating	moderate
Unstable cases				
France	Ach, U; Asc, El, Diff Sp	Eq, U Sp	insulative	immoderate
Germany	Ach, U; Asc, El, Diff	Asc, El, Diff	insulative	immoderate; becoming moderate

Key Ach = achieved
　　 Asc = ascriptive
　　 Diff = diffuse
　　 El　 = elitist
　　 Eq　 = equalitarian
　　 Part = particularistic
　　 Sp　 = specificity
　　 U　　 = universalist

Figure 2.2 Lipset on conditions for stable democracy

of '*contest mobility*' found in American education, British schoolchildren were selected from above through a system of '*sponsored mobility*' (p. 222; emphasis in original). However, the British upper strata were flexible and open, willing to receive successful people from business and elsewhere. The deference accorded to members of this open and 'incorporating' (p. 239) upper class reinforced political stability.

France, like the United States, emphasized achievement, equalitarianism, universalism and specificity in its value system. Unfortunately,

the French Revolution had left fundamental ambiguities and social cleavages. White-collar culture was divided between the deferential Catholicism of the private sector and the assertive egalitarianism of the public sector. Workers shared the latter spirit, but were confronted by an unyielding bourgeoisie which retained substantial quasi-aristocratic pretensions.

French workers achieved full participation in politics, but were denied this in industry. The German working-class experience was the reverse. Its members enjoyed substantial rights and protection in the industrial sphere, but had only limited political access. The main source of opposition was a traditional middle-class which feared for its privileges and was prepared to support Nazism. As in France, the German upper strata were not 'incorporating', but 'insulative' (p. 239), a response leading in both cases to political polarization. Although this spirit had weakened in the political sphere since World War II, German management remained authoritarian.

Sweden demonstrated how Germany might have developed into a stable democracy:

> In many ways, pre-World War I Swedish social structure resembled that of Germany. The Swedish privileged classes strongly resisted universal suffrage, and adult suffrage was adopted only in 1909 for the lower house and in 1921 for the upper one. Swedish social life contained many of the new authoritarian patterns that characterized Germany's and Sweden instinctively looked to Germany for intellectual and cultural leadership. But Sweden was both small and geographically isolated from European wars; it escaped the tensions resulting from the overthrow of a monarchy after military defeat. Its radical Socialist party became moderate and its extreme conservatives and upper class came to accept the right of the workers to participate in, and ultimately to dominate, the polity. (pp. 235–6)

In other words, a society with a culture and social structure almost diametrically opposed to the American pattern could still develop in a very favourable direction.

Three ways to persuade

On the face of it, Lipset was more tentative than either Smelser or Eisenstadt. Smelser insisted on the ubiquity of his seven-stage sequence of structural differentiation. Eisenstadt presented his conclusions about historical bureaucratic empires with all the confidence of a biologist

drawing on a well-stocked sample cupboard full of labelled specimens. By contrast, Lipset contented himself with an apparently modest objective: 'merely to demonstrate that values are one important source of variation among social systems' (1963, p. 4). He provided much more evidence than Eisenstadt about particular cases, especially the United States, and his conclusions were less dogmatically expressed than Smelser's. Lipset

> tried to think in terms of a dynamic (that is, moving or unstable) equilibrium model, which posits that a complex society is under constant pressure to adjust its institutions to its central value system, in order to alleviate strains created by changes in social relations; and which asserts that the failure to do so results in political disturbance. (pp. 7–8)

The model was explicitly offered as a guide to thinking, rather than a product of empirical enquiry.

Lipset claimed not to have 'proved' anything, but to have 'attempted . . . to use a certain conceptual framework to point out possible relationships' (pp. 343–4) between values and the internal differentiation of social systems. He concluded by stressing the importance of 'looking at the same problem from different theoretical perspectives' so that we may 'increase knowledge about social processes' (p. 347).

However, Lipset's text carried a concealed weapon. The tentatively presented hypothesis about the central importance of values such as equality and achievement in American society was four-square with a vital tenet of American ideology. This is that America remains strong as long as its citizens continue to believe in the principles of the Declaration of Independence. This background assumption gave Lipset's hypothesis considerable latent power. There was a strong 'structured predisposition' on the part of his American readers to accept it as the truth without serious question. Belief in its central proposition was a major aspect of national identity, of being American. Furthermore, Lipset's support for the American way was evident. Indeed, he was offering American experience as an exemplar to Third World nations, in the context of intense international competition for their support.

The three structural-functionalist approaches to historical analysis drew on different sources of legitimacy. Smelser evoked the reader's respect for complex theory. Eisenstadt exploited the reader's deference to the model of the natural sciences. Finally, Lipset tapped the power of political ideology. All three approaches marginalized the liberal dilemmas associated with the limitations of rationality and the conflict between political order and social justice. Eisenstadt swept aside these

issues by presenting his analysis as a scientific study of systems whose pressures and counter-pressures could, in principle at least, be objectively measured. Smelser and Lipset both acknowledged that social protest was typically fed by moral outrage as well as collective fear and anger. However, both assumed that within advanced industrial societies a mutual adjustment tended to occur between, on the one hand, integrating values, and, on the other, the needs and demands arising within differentiated institutions and groups. In other words, social systems usually solved the problems that were set for them. Increasingly, it was assumed, these problems were limited to technical matters requiring pragmatic adjustments.

At this point in the argument it is necessary to cross the Atlantic.

Ideology and social conflict: Marshall and Bendix

> I was born on 19 December 1893 in London, the fourth child, and second son, of a successful architect. Two younger sisters raised the total to six – enough to constitute a very self-contained social unit. Our home was, I suppose, typical of the higher professional classes of the period – intellectually and artistically cultured and financially well endowed. Although we lived, officially, in London, we spent our holidays in the country, either in our house in Hindhead or, in the summer, at the seaside or in the Lake District, and it was in the country that we felt we really belonged . . . I knew nothing of working-class life, and the great industrial north was a nightmare land of smoke and grime through which one had to travel to get from London to the Lake District. My feelings on this point were unaffected by the fact that I was enjoying a share – only a modest one by that time – of the fortune my great-grandfather had made in industry a hundred years before. (Marshall, 1973, p. 88)

T. H. Marshall's solid upper middle class origins, capped by a public school education and a Cambridge fellowship, helped sociology become respectable in Britain after the last war. They gave Marshall, 'one of the deans of British sociology' (Lipset, 1963, p. 9), a secure position within the professional and social establishment.

There are similarities between the post-war national contexts which nurtured Marshall, on one side of the Atlantic, and Parsons on the other. The British, like the Americans, felt insulated from the troubles of the Continent. They generally shared the American assumption that the existing social order was good rather than bad. Intellectuals in both countries were more aware of society's capacity to solve human problems, than its capacity to create misery. A pervasive liberal ethos had

become part of English identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[15] As in the United States, universal laws of historical development had gone out of fashion by the 1940s. However, the evolutionist legacy of L.T. Hobhouse continued to shape the British intellectual agenda.[16] Moral issues were not marginalized. In his inaugural lecture at the London School of Economics, Marshall insisted that:

> Sociology can find a better patron saint than Autolycus, that 'snapper-up of unconsidered trifles', and some of us may still prefer to spend time over such gross and obvious things as law, justice, authority and citizenship, instead of joining the merry hunt after the laws that determine whether men lean their right or left side against the bar when drinking, and what social conditions determine the rate at which they empty their glasses. (Marshall, 1963b, pp. 14–15)

Citizenship and social class

After World War II, Marshall held university appointments in history, social work and sociology. All three perspectives were combined in his long essay on 'Citizenship and social class' (Marshall, 1963d; originally published in 1950). As with Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action*, the economist Alfred Marshall provided the point of departure. T. H. Marshall seized upon Alfred Marshall's speculation that, despite persisting inequalities, at some future date every human being might live like a gentleman or 'achieve the standard of civilized life' (Marshall, 1963d, p. 72). This would imply full membership of the community, being as much a citizen and having the same rights and duties as everyone else, rich or poor.

Societies in which the idea of citizenship was developing

> . . . create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed. (p. 87).

In England this equalizing process had coincided with the growth of capitalism, a system producing inequality: 'in the twentieth century, citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war' (p. 87).

Marshall's analysis concentrated upon, firstly, the inner logic of the evolution of citizenship and, secondly, its implications for social inequality, social justice and economic dynamism.

In the medieval period, all rights depended on a person's status in the local community. As these local communities gradually disintegrated, distinctions emerged between civil, political and social rights, each administered by specialized national institutions such as the royal law courts, parliament, and the poor law (managed locally within a national framework). The three kinds of rights evolved in different ways and at different speeds. Civil rights advanced strongly during the eighteenth century, political rights during the nineteenth, social rights during the twentieth.

The courts successfully upheld the rule of law against royal or parliamentary attempts to weaken the principle of individual liberty embodied within it. In fact, this latter principle was extended. Restrictive practices enforced by Tudor legislation like the Statute of Artificers were eroded, freeing people to work in any trade if they were technically qualified. The extension of civil liberties meant giving more substance to a universal right, one already enjoyed by all. By contrast, the extension of political citizenship meant giving the right to vote, whose substance was already fully developed, to a greater proportion of the population. Political rights were 'defective . . . not in content, but in distribution' (p. 80). The property and income qualifications attached to the franchise after 1832 made political rights dependent upon successful use of civil rights in the economic arena. In principle at least, the franchise could be obtained by any one. This economic hurdle was gradually lowered until political rights were given to all, irrespective of their economic means, as a direct attribute of citizenship (see figure 2.3).

Political and civil rights developed in counterpoint. The first began as a collective attribute and became an individual attribute; the other moved in the opposite direction. In the earliest days, Members of Parliament represented whole communities. By 1918 they represented individual voters. The civil dimension of citizenship developed originally in defence of individual liberty. By the late nineteenth century, however, it was providing protection for collective bargaining by trade unions. The unions were using this power to demand a decent standard of living. Furthermore, this demand was put forward as a legitimate expectation, due to citizens irrespective of market conditions. Originally, civil rights had enabled economically-successful individuals to acquire political rights. Now they were enabling economically-powerful industrial groups to bargain for social rights.

Dynamics

I   Differentiation leads to displacement of local medieval community by specialized rights and regulating bodies including:

- royal courts (civil rights),
- parliament (political rights),
- poor law administration (social rights).

II   Political rights become independent of civil rights.

III   (i)   *Civil rights* become the basis for collective bargaining.
　　　(ii)   *Political rights* foster public opinion and national consciousness.
　　　(iii)   Use of civil and political rights increases pressure for *social rights*.

Dilemmas

Social rights —— Justice *vs* efficiency —— Market inequalities

Passive *vs* active citizenship　　　Consensus *vs* competition

Obligations of national citizenship

Figure 2.3 Marshall on citizenship

In fact, bargaining for rights was a contradiction in terms. The problem was the absence of signals within the competitive market indicating what degree of inequality or poverty was morally acceptable. Indeed, under the Victorian poor law, if you sought shelter from the cold blast of the market by going 'on the parish', you forfeited your civil or political rights. During the nineteenth century, social rights guaranteeing minimum living standards had been whittled away, along with occupational restrictive practices. However, the situation changed during the latter part of the century with the development of public opinion and national consciousness, encouraged by the spread of political rights. This stimulated a new determination to make national citizenship mean equality of social worth. In practical terms, this meant a right to welfare, a health service, education, an old-age pension, and so on.

Unfortunately, this added a new set of dilemmas. First, social rights were being expanded to limit inequalities deriving from social class and the market economy. But what limits were there on the drive towards equality of status implicit in citizenship? Second, how were social duties, deriving from national needs, to be reconciled with individual rights satisfying the dictates of social justice? And, finally, how would the equalizing effect of citizenship impinge upon the working of the market economy? To summarize the central problem: the rights and obligations created by contracts in the market place were simultaneously dependent upon and challenged by the rights and obligations bestowed through citizenship.

Governments attempted to meet conflicting expectations by a pragmatic mix of strategies in spheres such as legal aid, health and housing. Education was the key area, because of its strategic significance for both individual opportunity and the success of the national economy. Educational channels fed directly into different points within the job market. As pupils passed through their schools, they were placed into a few broad categories. The hierarchical categorization of students which resulted located them in a system of social stratification which would affect them throughout their lives. In this way, citizenship had invaded the realm of social class. People accepted these new inequalities because of 'the compression, at both ends, of the scale of income distribution [and] . . . the great extension of the area of common culture and common experience' (p. 121) in modern society. However, they complained loudly if they did not get the jobs their education entitled them to. This caused Marshall some nagging doubts, expressed at the end of his argument.

Educational selection should, ideally, be both socially just and economically efficient. Competitive selection was bound to create inequality. However, the egalitarian spirit of democratic citizenship with full civil, political and social rights would only tolerate 'undynamic' inequalities: in other words, inequalities which did not create deep dissatisfaction or make people want to bring about change. This was unfortunate, because such inequalities were 'economically functionless' (p. 125). They were much less useful to society than inequalities generated within the market.

In Marshall's view, inequality could be

> . . . justified only if it *is* dynamic, and if it *does* provide an incentive to change and betterment. It may prove, therefore, that the inequalities permitted, and even moulded by citizenship will not function in an

economic sense as forces influencing the free distribution of manpower. Or that social stratification persists, but social ambition ceases to be a normal phenomenon, and becomes a deviant behaviour pattern – to use some of the jargon of sociology. (p. 121; emphasis in original)

These conflicts and ambiguities were endemic. In his later work, Marshall suggested that modern Western societies were 'hyphenated' (1981b, p. 110). They embodied an uneasy compromise between democratic, welfare and capitalist principles. Marshall had very little sympathy with Daniel Bell's argument that the democratic-welfare-capitalist society had led to consensus over basic values, an end of ideology. In 1972 he commented: 'Even the most cursory glance at the history of western Europe during the last ten or fifteen years shows that it did not' (p. 120). Disagreements about how to handle social inequality were a 'deeply-rooted threat . . . The trouble is that no way has been found of equating a man's value in the market (capitalist value), his value as a citizen (democratic value) and his value for himself (welfare value)' (p. 119).

Marshall focused upon persisting structural conflicts, avoiding grand theory and irrelevant detail. Models of 'social systems' were valid if it were accepted that alongside 'pro-system' phenomena there were also 'anti-system' and 'non-system' phenomena (1963c, p. 27–8). Max Weber and Emile Durkheim were useful but he would not 'swallow either of them whole' (1973, p. 95). Concepts and explanations should be 'stepping stones in the middle distance', an idea similar to Robert K. Merton's 'theories of the middle range' (1963b, p. 13; 1973, p. 98).

With these intellectual tools he was able not only to carry out historical analyses, such as his study of social policy in Britain since the Victorian era (Marshall, 1965), but also to range across other national cases, including India, the Soviet Union and the United States (Marshall, 1981a). On the question of Black protest, for example, he argued in 1969 that while political and social rights could not be used effectively against an unjust regime, civil rights were in general much more difficult to neutralize or ignore. They were 'a hydra-headed monster' (1981d, p. 142) built into the personality and encouraging group formation. The Blacks faced a serious difficulty, however. They were not 'heirs to the full complement of the civic culture' (p. 148). Their collective status in American society imposed a heavy load, which civil rights could not easily overcome. Means had to be found to lift this burden and give Blacks the will and courage to defend their interests. In fact, Marshall was quite sympathetic to the Black Power movement insofar as its aim was to 'replace the anomic weakness of the Negroes by a new internal power generated by self-realization' (p. 150).

This last comment goes to the heart of Marshall's approach. Whether he was serving in the post-war Control Commission in Germany, standing as a Labour candidate, working for UNESCO, or writing and lecturing on sociological themes, T. H. Marshall remained at heart a liberal Englishman. What really mattered to him was the moral vigour of the individual and the community. Human energy had to be stimulated, and legitimate aspirations satisfied. This did not

. . . necessarily imply actual equality of treatment for all persons, any more than it implies equality of powers. It does, I think, imply that whatever inequality of actual treatment, of income, rank, office, consideration, there [is] . . . in a good social system, it would rest, not on the interest of the favoured individual as such, but on the common good.

Other questions were raised, for example:

How far is it possible to organize industry in the interests of the common welfare without either overriding the freedom of individual choice or drying up the springs of initiative and energy? How far is it possible to abolish poverty, or to institute economic equality without arresting industrial progress? . . . What is the real meaning of 'equality' in economics? . . . What is the province of justice in economics?

These are Marshall's sentiments and Marshall's preoccupations, but they are not his words. In fact, the extracts come from *Liberalism*, by L. T. Hobhouse (1911, pp. 131, 173–4).

Order and justice

Both T. H. Marshall and Reinhard Bendix put conflicts within and between principles of social regulation at the centre of their work. They specialized in tracing contradictions in the justifying creeds developed by vested interests in competition with each other. Marshall focused upon institutions such as the political, welfare and educational orders, Bendix upon social groups such as industrial entrepreneurs and managers. Reinhard Bendix made use of Marshall's work in his own *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (1964), also citing Marc Bloch and Norbert Elias in the same volume (pp. 234, 261). As the most 'European' of the American writers considered so far, Bendix accepted that sociology was not 'useful' in the short run. It could not provide 'secular answers to the ultimate questions of human existence, such as the meaning of life or of history' (1984, p. 127). He was very aware of the dynamic, historical

character of the cultural tradition which supplied his intellectual tools. This approach put him at odds with his contemporaries.

For example, in *Political Man* Lipset declared, notoriously, that 'the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved' (1981, p. 442).[17] He broadly accepted Daniel Bell's argument that the age of grand political ideologies was over. Like Marshall, Reinhard Bendix had a different view. The 'age of ideology' (1970b), begun in the seventeenth century, would continue as long as there were disputes over goals, and doubts about the rationality of human beings.

Bendix has been preoccupied with 'the circumstantial, institutional, and . . . irrational foundations of knowledge' (1974, p. xviii). Producing reliable sociological knowledge was a difficult task within a culture plagued by ideological mystifications, misleading theories and unwise reliance on the model of the natural sciences. Such knowledge had to be pursued with dogged faith in 'embattled reason', and in full awareness of its implications for moral issues (1970a).

In the year that *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* came out, Bendix was busy undermining its basic approach. For example, he pointed out that a concept like 'successful adaptation' could be seriously misleading, especially if it failed to balance the short-run and long-run consequences of conflict. A 'dysfunctional' strike might bring increased efficiency and stability in the long run. It was tempting 'to advance judgements with an air of assurance: e.g. strikes jeopardise the consensus required for social integration.' However, 'From a scholarly standpoint such judgements are ideological shortcuts of doubtful value' (1966, pp. 134–5; originally published in 1959). Social structure was 'not . . . a natural system with defined limits and invariant laws governing an equilibrating process, but rather . . . a system of historical dimensions which we examine in terms of the piecemeal solutions men have found for the characteristic problems of that structure' (1963, p. 537).

Like his adopted mentor, Max Weber, Bendix saw national cultures as complex mosaics of beliefs and tendencies produced by past conflicts and the domination of successive elites.[18] Integration and consensus were always incomplete. The intellectual matrix within which modern sociologists formed their theories and concepts was a kaleidoscope of ideologies thrown up in the course of historical development – a fact which escaped many modern students of society. For example, 'given the decreasing interest in the history of ideas among sociologists, a number of them may no longer be aware of the evolutionary theory implicit in their use of "pattern variables" ' (1963, p. 533). However, a sensitive and self-aware historical sociologist could exploit these com-

plexities. Ideologies and associated social structures provided clues to the way specific problems were coped with in the past. Changes in the ideologies of closely-related groups (e.g. industrialists and their employees) could give important evidence of shifts in power relationships and socio-political strategies.

Comparing different societies increased the visibility of distinctive national patterns. In contrast to the reifying tendencies of structural-functionalism, 'Comparative sociological studies are likely to impart a salutary degree of nominalism to the terms we use' (p. 538). The openness of historical change and the coexistence of conflicting tendencies could be captured by using 'paired concepts' (1966, p. 127) as 'benchmarks that can facilitate detailed analysis' (p. 129): for example, bureaucracy and social class could be paired as rival tendencies of action, in Bendix's view. This approach and other aspects of his methodology may be illustrated by looking at two of his works: *Work and Authority in Industry* (1974; originally published in 1956), and *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (1964).

Unlike many of his fellow sociologists, Bendix did not marginalize the dilemmas of Western liberalism. They were central to his work. As has been seen, he paid great attention to the problem of human rationality. He also examined the ways in which developing societies, including the western democracies and their totalitarian rivals, had confronted the dilemma of reconciling order and justice.

In *Work and Authority in Industry*, the emphasis was upon the problem of order generated by industrialization. In *Nation-Building and Citizenship* the area of interest widened. It included the forms of authority implemented within political communities and in the employment relationship. It also encompassed the origins, character and consequences of lower-class demands for fuller rights within the nation-state.

Work and Authority in Industry was mainly concerned with two things: the impact of the factory system upon the employment relationship; and the implications of industrialization for the wider set of relations between workers, industrialists, the state, and the landed class. Industrialization posed the problem of how the new labour force would be disciplined within and outside the factory. It also raised the issue of how industrialists and the working class would fit in to the existing society. Bendix argued that in societies faced with these problems, employers tended to unite together in thought and action, either on the basis of the shard interests of social class, or on the basis of authoritative directives within bureaucracies. Bendix analysed these tendencies and the ideologies developed to justify them in four contexts: eighteenth-

and nineteenth-century England; eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia; the United States during the twentieth century; and East Germany after World War II. In all four settings the analysis focused upon the emergence of entrepreneurs and, later, managers as distinct groups with ideologies justifying their demands upon society.

In the English case, early industrial entrepreneurs faced hostility from both the aristocracy and the working population. Industrialists fought for social recognition by competing with the former for the support of the latter. Entrepreneurial ideologies emphasized the power and excitement of new technology. However, the interests and attitudes of factory masters were in conflict with the traditionalism of their workforces. Parents were willing to send their children to work in the factories, but adults fought a rearguard action against the discipline imposed by new forms of production. At the same time, the new entrepreneurs refused to accept the traditional obligation to care for the interests of their employees. Instead, they applied Malthusian principles and punished the poor for their poverty.

Industrialization brought degradation and social isolation to working people. Aroused by the denial of their 'rightful' place in society, they turned to Methodism and Chartist radicalism. Both 'enlisted the active participation of the common people and thereby satisfied their inarticulate quest for social recognition' (Bendix 1974, p. 46). On the other side, the entrepreneurs' harsh rejection of social responsibility was modified in a number of ways. Evangelical preaching insisted on the moral worth of every individual. Employers led popular political campaigns, for example against the corn laws. The task of improving the condition of the people came on to the political agenda. In sum, the class relationship between employers and employees was brought inside a single moral community encompassing both.

The three other cases will be discussed more briefly. Industrialization in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia was initially promoted by central government and subsequently controlled by the aristocracy on their rural estates. As mercantile and industrial groups struggled for greater independence they received encouragement from central government. In the event, entrepreneurs failed to develop a cohesive sense of group identity. In Bendix's terms, they were coordinated in terms of bureaucracy, rather than social class. During the late nineteenth century, government regulation of industry increased, legitimized by the ideology of Tsarist paternalism.

However, urbanization and the freeing of the serfs caused considerable social disruption. The lower orders were detached from their traditional place within an authoritarian rural order. Paternalistic reg-

ulation was quite unable to meet the challenge of satisfying the demands of the workers. Unlike England, the workforce could not be satisfactorily reintegrated into the moral and political community. The eventual consequence was revolution and the overthrow of the Tsarist regime.

In the twentieth century, the managerial task has become more complex in both East and West. In the case of the United States, Bendix saw a long-run shift. Late nineteenth-century managerial ideology had stressed the need to reward individual effort and character. This justified executive authority over an obedient workforce in which, paradoxically, initiative was discouraged. Later, this ideology was succeeded by others emphasizing technical competence and intelligent cooperation between management and workers. Psychological manipulation of the shopfloor was attempted and more attention given to the social relationships in which workers were embedded.

In post-war East Germany, the Communist Party and the state tried to regulate all key economic and political relationships. Party bureaucrats and state officials formed a dual hierarchy, each monitoring the other. Industrial production was surrounded by an all-pervasive atmosphere of insecurity. Within both hierarchies there was the constant threat of being overruled, purged or forced to engage in self-criticism. Continuing pressure upon industrial managers to fulfil impossible demands created repeated crises. These drew in party officials hunting for evidence of slackness or sabotage. Failures of executive planning at the highest level were often disguised by blaming middle-level management for supposedly failing to keep in touch with the masses (see figure 4).

Like Smelser, Bendix argued that in the English case complex social struggles passed through phases of disruption and reintegration. Throughout, there was a great deal of institutional continuity. However, compared to Smelser, Bendix had a greater feel for the opposing forces at work, a livelier sense that in other circumstances things might have turned out differently. This grasp of alternative possibilities is displayed through his comparison with the eastern cases, where the strains of industrialization were not successfully 'handled or channelled' (Smelser, 1959, p. 39). On the contrary, they undermined the Tsarist regime and prepared the way for violent revolution. Surprisingly, Smelser made no reference to Bendix's book in his *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*.

In *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, Bendix presented an argument which encompassed not only the 'historical bureaucratic empires' analysed by Eisenstadt, but also Lipset's concern with the development of 'new nations'. Bendix incorporated a moral dimension absent from

Eisenstadt's former work. He rooted this dimension in his detailed analyses of the dilemmas and choices confronting key social groups in the course of nation-building. As for Lipset, Bendix criticized his *The First New Nation* for assuming that 'the achievement of political independence in the middle of the eighteenth century is comparable with a similar achievement in the middle of the twentieth century', an assumption apparently made on the grounds that 'all achievements of independence by former colonies are comparable – irrespective of time and place'. Bendix commented: 'I do not consider the utility of that assumption very great' (1970e, p. 224).

Lipset and Bendix agreed that two criteria of a national political community were that the state must possess legitimate authority, and the inhabitants must share a national cultural identity. As far as Lipset was concerned, stable democracy required an appropriate set of 'structured predispositions' – e.g. orientation towards achievement and equality – and political institutions inhibiting excessive fragmentation or monopolization of power. His comparative-historical analyses in *The First New Nation* ran the relevant data through a kind of sieve, designed to distinguish between favourable and unfavourable conditions and outcomes. By contrast, Bendix paid much more attention than Lipset to the shape and dynamics of historical processes, especially the development of the central relationship between state and citizen in the course of nation-building. This process, he argued, was just as significant as industrialization. In *Nation-Building and Citizenship* he examined both processes, focusing upon Western Europe, Russia, Japan and India (see figure 2.4).

His analyses of western Europe, partly influenced by T. H. Marshall's work, identified four phases of development, beginning with the medieval age. In this first phase, most people were locked into dependency relations and had no direct political involvement – although they sometimes engaged in unlawful violent protest in defence of established customs. Political rights and obligations were not individual, but collective. They derived from membership within corporate bodies (e.g. manorial estates, guilds, municipalities), each with its distinctive law. These separate jurisdictions, overlapping and conflicting, enjoyed considerable autonomy in relationship to each other. Feudal tendencies of this kind were in conflict with royal patrimonialism. The king, who claimed a general responsibility for all subjects, exploited conflicts between corporations, built up the administrative capacity of the royal household, and tried to extend the effective power of kingship beyond the immediate royal domain.

During the second phase, patrimonialism triumphed and developed

Industrialization

West	East
Class competition/conflict mediated by the market	Centralized bureaucratic regulation
18th/19th century Britain: Crisis of paternalism, leading to civic reincorporation.	*19th/early 20th century Russia*: Crisis of paternalism, leading to revolution.
19th/20th century United States Shift from individualistic Social Darwinism to effective psychological and social manipulation of workforce by managers as a social group.	*20th century East Germany* Conflicting demands upon atomized middle management by centralized dual hierarchy of state and party officials.

Nation-building

I	II	III	IV
Royal patrimonialism *vs.* localized feudal jurisdictions.	Absolutism; estates; masses excluded from participation in political life.	Royal patrimonialism replaced by public bureaucracy; eradication of estates; masses demand entry to political sphere.	Increase in power and scope of state apparatus; civic incorporation of masses; class inequalities limit effective power of the people.

Figure 2.4 Bendix on modernization

into absolutist monarchy, backed by an apparatus of royal justice and taxation. The feudal corporations were transformed into estates. These assemblies represented groups with particular rights within a rigid status hierarchy. They retained control over many legal and administrative functions. Most of the population remained outside the political community, protected only by the obligation of a master to care for his subordinates within the sphere of private authority.

In the third phase, public and private authority relations were transformed. In the wake of the French Revolution the estates were swept away, increasing the power and functions of the state. Commercialization eroded the traditional obligations of employers in the private sphere, although not their power. Meanwhile, new ideas of liberty and equality stimulated a rejection of dependency from below. Outraged and alienated, the people demanded entry in their own right to the political community, the sphere of public authority. This was the point of maximum danger in nation-building.

However, in the fourth phase the crisis was overcome as a result of three factors: the increased willingness of industrialists to assume political leadership on behalf of the people; the civic reincorporation of the masses through the extension of citizenship rights to the urban workforce; and an increase in the strength and scope of the state apparatus. There were major limitations on the power of citizens. In Western Europe and elsewhere, the relationship between state and citizen was embedded in differentiated and unequal social orders. Formal political and legal equality was quite consistent with economic inequality. Also, traditional interests retained significant influence within some nation-states.

By contrast, in Russia a plebiscitarian franchise legitimized a dominant state which suppressed independent pressure groups. In Japan and Germany, industrialization and nation-building were shaped by the continuing political influence of aristocracies. In India, the power of local interests organized through the caste system meant that the state had considerable difficulty in establishing its authority within an integrated polity. Bendix used distinctions developed in his analysis of Western Europe – such as state/society, authority/association, public authority/private authority – to explore these cases at length. The case studies in *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, with the exception of India, were explored in even more historical detail in *Kings or People* (1978).

Bendix's approach evoked a sense of direction and coherence by focusing on major structural dilemmas common to all cases and exploring the principles exhibited in attempts to cope with these dilemmas. In the works mentioned, Bendix did not develop an overall explanation of historical change. Nor, however, did he assert the supposed certainties of grand theory, science or ideology. His agnosticism carried an authority of its own. The influence of structural-functionalism in historical sociology was undermined by Bendix's reasoned attacks on its central postulates. Along with Marshall, he exploded the assumption that normative consensus was either normal or necessary. This helped prepare the way for the second phase.

3   Taking Flight

Injustice and domination

Historical sociology was transformed during the 1960s. By mid-decade its agenda was dominated by power, privilege, and social justice. These issues were tackled, for example, by W. G. Runciman and Gerhard E. Lenski.[1] In the second phase, historical sociologists remembered that social 'actors' were human beings of flesh and blood. This lesson was made easier by the brilliant examples of Marc Bloch and Norbert Elias. Although their key texts were produced in 1939 and 1940, their ideas did not begin to attract much attention in the English-speaking world until the 1960s.

Human interdependence: Bloch and Elias

Bloch and Elias belonged to the continental European tradition of historical sociology forced underground or overseas during the 1930s and 1940s. Both had served in the front line. In fact, somewhere in northern France during World War I Marc Bloch and Norbert Elias, both in military uniform, may conceivably have come within a few dozen miles of each other. Elias joined the German army in 1915 at the age of eighteen and, after a brief spell in Poland, served on the Western front in the Signals Corps. He was a reluctant soldier: 'I have never been a patriot – I was strongly anti' (quoted in Mennell, 1989, p. 6). By contrast, Bloch was eager to serve his country. He was following the example of his great-grandfather, who had fought against the Prussians in 1793 (Fink, 1989, p. 17). There is a strong connection between Bloch the patriot and Bloch the historian.